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INTRODUCTION
Even  though  the  international  impact  on  the  domestic  political  regimes  only  recently 
attracted the scholars’ attention, the international influence over the nation-states is generally 
far from being a new phenomenon. Through the centuries, the international and/or regional 
super powers exercised a strong influence on the domestic struggles for power and even on 
the changes in the political regimes. In the long history of the states, and particularly in the 
history of the small and weaker states, we account for numerous cases of foreign influence 
over the domestic politics, be it through diplomatic and/or military interventions, or through 
the  systemic  impact  of  the  international  political  economy  and,  more  generally,  the 
international environment. 
However,  while  the  non-democratic  regimes,  over  the  long  history  of  mankind,  were 
relatively  easily  imposed  and  maintained  through the  foreign  military  action,  the  external 
promotion  of  democracy,  due  to  the  particularities  of  the  democratic  political  regime, 
represents a far more difficult task. On the one hand, democracy promotion, like any external 
involvement  in  domestic  politics,  is  limited  by  the  international  environment  and  by  the 
complicated, often antagonistic relationships between the super-powers of the international 
system. In a multi-polar international system, any effort of a specific state to influence other 
states’  domestic  politics  might  be  perceived as  an effort  to  change the  balance  of  power 
between  the  international  actors  so  that  the  international  legitimacy  of  the  external 
involvement in domestic politics represents a serious problem, which limited the possibilities 
of  the  external  promotion of  democracy  for  a  long time.  Further  on,  being  democracy a 
political  regime based on consensus and participation rather than on violence,  its  external 
promotion  by  definition  needs  a  certain  level  of  domestic  acceptance  and  cooperation 
between external and domestic actors, requiring the development of new strategies based on 
non-violence and a series of domestic factors that would favour the transition. 
The  end of  the  cold  war  thus  created  a  particularly  fertile  ground for  the  democracy 
promotion in many aspects. The victory that liberalism gained over communism solved the 
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problem of the international legitimacy of the external intervention. Democracy became the 
only legitimate political regime, and the promotion of democracy became both acceptable and, 
due to the “democratic peace paradigm”, a desirable course of the foreign policy to follow. 
Very soon, it turned into the hallmark of many developed countries’ foreign (and security) 
policy. On the other hand, the victory of the liberal paradigm also strongly resonated among 
the  citizens  of  the  non-democratic  states  who,  aspiring  to  the  economic  and  political 
prosperity of the “West”, started, more or less successfully, to call for the liberalization and 
democratization  at  home.  Such  overall  acceptance  of  liberalism  as  the  only  legitimate 
paradigm created a particularly fertile ground for the democracy promotion. The last wave of 
democratization that spread through the Eastern Europe represented an unprecedented case 
of international promotion of democracy by peaceful means, and saw the emergence of EU as 
one of the world’s most important and most successful democracy-promotion actors. 
Such situation clearly reflected on the interests of those scholars who, after the tumultuous 
changes that took place over the last two decades of the XX century, became more and more 
attracted  to  understanding  the  mechanisms  of  the  external  influence  on  the  domestic 
transitions. The call to “reverse the second image”, made by Gourevitch already in 1978, was 
therefore supposed to wait for the fall of the Berlin wall before the scholars started to “cross 
the bridge between the internationalists and comparativists” and develop the analytical tools 
for studying what Pridham labeled the “forgotten dimension of democratization”. How can 
the international environment and international actors influence the domestic change of the 
political regime? Can democracy be promoted, and if yes, how? When trying to influence the 
domestic  politics  and  to  bring  to  democratization,  do  the  international  actors  exercise  a 
positive  influence,  or,  as  underlined  by  Snyder  (2000),  can  the  democracy  promotion 
sometimes bring more harm than good? Finally, how can we overpass the internationalists-
comparativists  division  and  create  theories  on  the  external-internal  linkage  of 
democratization?  These  are  some  of  the  questions  concerning  the  link  between  the 
international and domestic politics to which, since the beginning of the Nineties, both the 
scholars and the policy makers were more and more interested in finding an answer.
This study is nested in the developing stream of studies concentrated on the influence of 
the international  actors on the democratization process. Its goal is  to identify the relevant 
factors on both the international and domestic level and to analyze how these factors combine 
to bring to the adoption (or lack thereof) of the promoted democratic norms. In particular, we 
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will  concentrate  on  the  EU democracy  promotion  in  the  two  Balkan  states,  Serbia  and 
Macedonia, examining the course of democratization in the two countries and the role played 
by  the  EU.  The  main  question  of  our  empirical  work  will  therefore  be:  how  did  the 
democratization in the two countries develop? What is the level of democratization achieved? 
Did the EU influence the domestic changes and, if yes, how did it contribute to the registered 
outcomes?
In order to give an answer to our questions, in the first chapter of the theoretical part we 
will examine the existing literature in the field, and describe one of the most recent and most 
developed  analytical  frameworks  that  unpack  the  black  box  of  the  interactions  between 
international  and domestic  factors:  Morlino  and Magen’s  analytical  framework EUCLIDA 
(European Union Cycles and Layers of International Democratic Anchoring). In the second 
chapter we will  further develop the EUCLIDA framework,  including,  on the supply  side, 
three  groups  of  factors  concerning  the  international  level:  the  interests,  capacities  and 
approach of the international actor engaged in the democracy promotion. We will explain how 
these three groups of factors combine with the original EUCLIDA framework and explore 
the impact that  the feedback of  the anchoring produces on our independent  variables,  to 
conclude the chapter with the hypothesis  deriving from our analytical  model.  In the third 
chapter we will face some fundamental questions concerning the research: we will explain the 
choice of the cases, the choice of the dimensions of the democratic rule of law that we will 
study, the choice to concentrate on the EU as the most successful and active democracy-
promoting international actor. We will also explain the choice to use the comparative method 
and the combination of the inductive and theory-testing process tracing techniques, describe 
the data sources that will be used and organize the structure of the empirical chapters.
In the second part we will proceed with the empirical analysis, following the process of 
democratization in the two countries along the thirteen dimensions of the democratic rule of 
law, analysing  the EU promotion of  the norms and assessing the  factors  that  brought to 
particular  outcomes.  We dedicated the first  thirteen chapters  of  the  empirical  part  to  the 
dimensions of the democratic rule of law we identified as relevant. As the revised EUCLIDA 
analytical framework includes, among other factors, the impact of the developments in the 
process of the boundary removal, in the last three chapters we will explore those issues that, in 
a  preliminary  analysis,  were  identified  as  the  most  relevant  questions  in  the  relationship 
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between the EU and the state subject to the anchoring process. Finally,  in the conclusive 
chapter,  we  will  summarize  our  findings,  reflecting  on  the  outcome  and  on  the  impact 
exercised by each of the factors we included in our analytical framework, we will describe the 
process of anchoring and de-anchoring of the Serbian and Macedonian democracy in the final 
paragraphs, to conclude our work with reflections on the most important lessons that can be 
drawn from the study.
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A Theoretical Framework
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1. INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION AND 
EUCLIDA 
1.1. INTRODUCTION: CAUSES OF DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE COUNTRY’S BORDERS
As Kant1 stressed, some causes of democratization lie beyond the country’s borders. This 
study aims to investigate the external factors of democratization, concentrating on what, as we 
will see, appears to be an emerging form of international democracy promotion: international 
anchoring. 
The  theoretical  framework  we  propose  is  built  on  the  analytical  model  EUCLIDA, 
developed  by  Morlino  and  Magen  in  order  to  analyze  the  process  of  EU  democracy 
promotion through integration2. The theoretical goal of this study is to further develop the 
framework that gives the basis for studying the concept of the international  anchoring of 
democracy as a particular form of international (and not only EU-) influence on the process 
of the domestic regime change. Before describing the basic EUCLIDA model and developing 
the analytical framework for a more general study of the international anchoring, let us first 
summarize the existing findings and approaches, starting from the debate on the importance 
of the international dimension of democratization
Even  though Gourevitch  underlined,  already  in  1978,  the  need  to  revise  the  “second 
image” and envisaged the deep impact the “international  system, international economy as 
well  as  ideas  and  ideologies”  have  on  the  domestic  political  regimes,  up  to  1990  the 
democratization was perceived as mainly an internal process with international factors playing 
only a marginal role. Thus, in their study “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule”, O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986) asserted that: 
“One of the firmest conclusions that emerged… was that transitions from authoritarian rule 
and immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in terms of national 
forces and calculations. External actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role…” (p. 
5). 
1 Kant, 1963.
2 Morlino and Magen 2004, 2008.
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Seen the period of these studies (before the end of the cold war), as well as the regions 
included  (Latin  America  and  Southern  Europe),  such  conclusion  was  no  surprise.  While 
subscribing such conclusion, Whitehead, however, underlined its limitations:
“The cases chosen for this study (…) shared a variety of defining characteristics. Not only 
were  they  post-war  peacetime  attempts  at  transition,  they  all  concerned  transition  from  an 
authoritarian regime of the right; and they nearly all concerned countries whose political traditions 
included a substantial amount of liberalism and constitutionalism. The generalizations proposed in 
this  chapter may only apply within these restrictions.  For example,  in all  the peacetime cases 
considered  here  internal  forces  were  of  primary  importance  in  determining  the  course  and 
outcome of the transition attempt,  and the international actors only played a secondary role” 
(Whitehead 1986, p. 4). 
Already  in  that  moment,  Whitehead  went  a  step  further,  by  recognizing  a  certain 
importance  to  the  international  actors  even  in  those  cases  described  by  O’Donnell  and 
Schmitter (1986). He underlines the important role of the EC, and describes the mechanism 
by which the EC supported the democratization in the southern Europe: 
“One perhaps decisively favorable aspect of the incentives for democratization offered by the 
European Community was the guarantees and reassurances it could provide to those conservative 
and upper-class groups in Southern European society that were most likely to feel threatened by 
popular government” (Whitehead, 1986, p. 23). 
Only five years later, Pridham will  call  for the inclusion of “the forgotten dimension”3, 
while in the same year, in the panel Whitehead chaired at the International Political Science 
Association  conference  in  Buenos  Aires,  two  draft  papers  on  the  mechanisms  of  the 
international  influence  on  democratization  will  be  presented.  Two  co-authors  of  the 
Transitions from the Authoritarian Rule will  present the first works in which they directly 
challenge the conclusions from 1986: Whitehead’s own “Three international dimensions of 
Democratization”  and  Schmitter’s  “The  influence  of  the  international  context  upon  the 
Choice  of  National  Institutions  and  Policies  in  Neo-Democracies”  (both  published  in 
“International  dimensions of  democratizations”,  Oxford,  1996).  The failure of “transitions 
literature” to account for the  international  dimension was blamed not  only  on the spatial 
limitations of the generalizations, but also on the methodological inclinations characterized by 
“the  focus  on  coalition-building  and  on  strategic  interactions  between  relatively  well-
established political forces” (Whitehead, 1996, p. 16). 
In order to make justice to the work of O’Donnell and Schmitter, we should also underline 
the importance that the historical moment had in obstructing the proper understanding of the 
international factor’s role. The studies prior to 1990 considered that international dimensions 
3 See Pridham, 1991.
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might matter only in war times. This way, while Whitehead underlined that O’Donnell and 
Schimtter’s finding is limited to the transitions that took place in peacetime and in a relatively 
stable  international  system,  in  the  same  volume  Stepan  identified  the  “paths  towards  re-
democratization”, three among which played the important role of external factors: internal 
instauration  after  external  re-conquest,  internal  reformulation,  externally  monitored 
installation4.  For Stepan, the international  dimension was salient only in those cases where 
warfare and conquest played an integral part in the democratization process and accounted 
only for a few cases:
“For the last  three decades,  and for the conceivable future,  the overwhelming majority of 
cases of re-democratization have been and will be the ones in which socio-political forces rather 
than military forces play the key role” (Stepan, 1986, p. 65). 
The international dimension of democratization was under-theorized more than unknown, 
due to the lack of empirical cases in which the international influence over the “peacetime 
undergoing democratizations” was so determinate to attract the attention of scholars.  The 
“discovery” of the international  dimension in literature was destined to wait for the most 
recent wave of  democratization of  the eastern European countries,  whose internal  system 
appears  as  a  perfect  reflection of  the international  environment  and its  changes since the 
Second World War up to today. 
As it usually happens, the discovery of the international factor and its importance was the 
product of the changes that made such factor more visible in the reality. With the growing of 
democracy promotion as an acceptable foreign policy strategy, the international influence on 
the domestic regime became more visible. Three are the factors (all strictly linked with the end 
of the cold war) that made the influence on the domestic regimes a widespread foreign policy 
strategy. 
1. The change in the international system produced by the end of the cold war removed 
the  obstacles  that  had been undermining  the  attempts  to include  democracy  as  an 
international norm for years 5. The democracy promotion is not a “new finding”: the 
USA made efforts of democracy promotion during the era of the cold war, while the 
EU made  its  first  effort  in  democracy  promotion  in  the  cases  of  Franco’s  Spain, 
Salazar’s Portugal and the colonels’ Greece6. However, we shall underline that, at the 
time, the concept of democracy had different meanings as we passed from one side of 
4 See Stepan, 1986.
5 See Rich 2001, Christiansen, Petito e Torna, 2000.
6 See Whitehead, 1986.
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the iron curtain to the other. While both west and east claimed to support the rule of 
people,  the  democracy of  the  other  was perceived as  falsity,  and the democracy (or 
communism) promotion represented a clear act of aggression in an attempt to change 
the balance of  power.  The rivalry  between the  east  and west  made the democracy 
promotion a diplomatically sensitive issue, an obstacle that is far less significant since 
the end of the cold war; 
2. The spread of the liberalist idea, together with the growing threat of terrorism, made 
democracy promotion one of the foreign- and security policy goals for many existing 
democracies7.  The  idea  of  the  democratic  peace  surely  was  not  a  new idea  in  the 
diplomatic circles,  as it  guided the foreign policy of USA for a long time, and was 
recently included among the means of the EU security policy8. However, it would be 
wrong to consider  democratic  peace  the  only  reason guiding  the  policy  makers  to 
conceive  democracy  promotion  as  a  mean  of  security  policy.  The  democracy 
promotion is, by definition, the involvement in the internal affairs of the country, and 
as such it  allows the “promoter” to influence the domestic distribution of powers in 
order to protect his own economic and security interest. As Whitehead (1996) explains 
in his study on democratization through imposition, in some cases the external actor 
might consider it a less costly strategy to invest in democratization than to establish 
control  on the conquered territory.  We can imagine  that  the  new elite  that  gained 
power due to external support might be favourable to the external partners. While the 
thesis about the “democratic peace” is not confirmed, we can imagine how the thesis 
claiming that “in case of successful democracy promotion, the elite that gained power 
due  to  the  influence  of  the  external  actors  would  not  declare  war  to  its  external 
sponsors” might be credible. Moreover, the end of the cold war saw the triumph of the 
liberal paradigm over communism, not only in terms of the “democratic peace” thesis. 
The  western  liberal  democracies  with  their  capitalist  economies  became  the  only 
7 See Magen, 2004; Morlino and Magen, 2004; Morlino and Magen 2008; Mattina, 2004.
8 However, Snyder, 2000, shows that such assumption is not fully true and that while there might be a link 
between peace and democracy, the states undergoing the democratization process are more prone to make war. 
“While  the  world  would  undoubtedly  be  more  peaceful  if  all  states  became  mature  democracies,  Clinton’s 
conventional  wisdom failed to  anticipate  the  dangers  from getting  from here  to  there.  (…) The successful 
unfolding of a global,  liberal democratic revolution might eventually  undergird a more peaceful era in world 
politics, but in the meanwhile, the transition to democratic politics is creating fertile conditions for nationalism 
and ethnic conflict. (…) Thus, the process of democratization can be one of its own worst enemies, and its 
promise of peace is clouded with the danger of war” (Snyder, 2000, pp. 15, 20, 21).
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paradise on earth and the  only  model  of  society  that  can ensure the  wealth of  its 
citizens9, which brings us to our third point: 
3. The fall of the Communism made democracy and market economy become the most 
used resources for the legitimization of the regimes, which meant that, in order to win 
and/or maintain the power, the former communist regimes were expected to liberalize 
and to introduce multi-party  elections  and capitalism.  This  on the  one hand made 
democracy promotion a far less costly project: being a form of external involvement in 
the domestic affairs, it is much more favourable if such intervention is perceived as 
“legitimate”. On the other, this brought to a series of transitions that in some cases 
resulted in  the establishment  of  democracy,  in  many others  in  spreading  of  hybrid 
regimes on the fuzzy borderline between authoritarianism and democracy10. The very 
nature of the hybrid regimes represents a fertile ground for the process of democracy 
promotion. 
These three factors made democracy promotion both a possible and profitable strategy to 
follow,  with  a  number  of  international  institutions  and  national  governments  engaged  in 
financing the increasing democratic transitions.11 This change was gradually reflected in the 
literature on democratic transition and consolidation that, by the mid-'90s, started to pay more 
attention to the international dimension of democratization. 
Even  though  the  study  of  democratization  became  more  internationalized  in  the  last 
decade, the literature on the subject is only starting to develop12. It has not yet developed core 
theories or examined cross-national empirical data, exploring the association of international 
factors with democratic transitions or democratic consolidation13. The main cause of this poor 
understanding  of  the  phenomenon  lies  in  the  separate  research  agendas  and  lack  of 
communication between comparativists and internationalists14. Such lack of inter-disciplinary 
communication represents a large shortcoming in literature, seen that Whitehead underlined 
the necessity to face the issue already in 1996. As he stressed, 
9 “Democracy has become everyone’s slogan today. Who does not claim that democracy is a good thing, and 
which politician does not assert that the government of which he is a part practices it and/or the party that he 
represents wishes to maintain and extend it? It is hard to remember that not so very long ago, in the period from 
the French Revolution up to 1848 at least, democracy was a word used only by dangerous radicals. ” (Wallerstein, 
2001).
10 See Diamond 2002.
11 For a discussion on the influence of the fall of USSR on the EU foreign policy and democracy promotion, 
see Mattina, 2004, pp. 13 – 15.
12 See Pevehouse 2002, p. 516; Morlino and Magen, 2008.
13 Pevehouse, 2002, p. 516; Magen 2004, Morlino and Magen, 2008.
14 Morlino and Magen, 2008.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 22
“… Whether the appropriate perspective for studying a given issue is contagion, control, or 
consent,  it  may  be  artificial  to  dichotomize  the  analysis  into  domestic  and  international 
elements… In the contemporary world there is no such thing as democratization in one country, 
and perhaps there never was. ” (Whitehead, 1996, p. 24). 
What we need is to open the black box of the state and try to understand the linkages 
between  international  agents  and  domestic  actors15.  In  order  to  fully  understand  the 
importance of unpacking the black box of the state, we should turn to the third reason to focus 
on external actors when studying the process of democratization: the nature of the hybrid 
regimes, the prevalent type of regime since the last decade of the 20th century. More than half 
the existing regimes belong to  a gray zone between closed authoritarian regimes and liberal 
democracies. The variety of these regimes is enormous, the proliferation of different terms 
due to the difficulties of capturing their fluid reality being the main illustration of such variety. 
The features of  these regimes differ,  and with them also the  grade of  democratization (or 
better,  the distance and the possibility  of  becoming a consolidated democracy).  The most 
interesting case is represented by the electoral democracies that, even though they do not fully 
protect civil liberties, are characterized by relatively fair electoral procedures and ambiguous 
regimes  floating between electoral  democracies  and competitive  authoritarian regimes16.  In 
these cases, beside the possibility of exercising external political or economic pressure in order 
to promote democracy, the existence of the political pluralism gives the external actors the 
possibility to play something similar to Putnam’s two level game17. It can try to change the cost 
and benefits  calculation of  the actors  and their  respective  powers,  or it  can contribute to 
unmask the undemocratic aspects of the incumbent elite. The case of Maciar’s Slovakia serves 
as an example for how the international actor's intervention can be crucial for bringing the 
regime sliding to authoritarianism back onto the democratic path18. 
The  presence  of  the  international  actors  can  influence  the  result  of  the  electoral 
competition or contribute to maintain the “democratic forces” in power. This influence may 
be necessary in order to maintain the fragile democratic regimes by keeping the ancient regime 
forces away, but,  at the same time, it  might also undermine the goal  of the party system 
competitiveness  and  seriously  damage  the  horizontal  accountability19.  As  Whitehead 
underlined  when speaking  about  democratization  by “imposition”,  if  the  democracy  is  to 
15 On a discussion about the relation between the domestic and international level variables in explaining the 
process of democratization, see Mattina, 2004.
16 For a definition of electoral democracy and ambiguous regime, see Diamond, 2002, pp 25 – 26.
17 See Putnam 1988. 
18 On the EU influence on Slovakian democratization, see Vachudova, 2001.
19 Morlino 2006.
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become fully  consolidated, the external protection and support  to the domestic protagonists 
of transition shall be brought to end, and the opposition shall be accepted (Whitehead 1996). 
This argument, developed in relation to the democratization through imposition, can also  be 
applied to all those cases where the international actor produces serious effects on the political 
competitiveness. The goal and effects of these actions can differ, and surely, their intensity is 
not comparable with the cases where force is used, but they shall be taken in consideration 
due to the impact they might have on the quality of the established democracy. 
Last, but not least, we shall remember that beside being a “moral obligation” for some 
international actors, when we go beyond rhetorics, the democracy promotion is a powerful 
instrument  of  the  foreign  and  security  policy20.  Even  the  EU,  which  in  its  first  treaties 
underlined the devotion to the “conservation of the democratic regimes”, includes democracy 
promotion as a mean of its security policy. Being not only a goal, but often conceived as an 
instrument  of  foreign  and  security  policy,  it  is  important  to  understand  the  order  of 
preferences  of  the  international  actors  engaged  in  the  process  of  democracy  promotion. 
Whenever  promoting  the  democratic  norms  is  in  line  with,  or  at  least  neutral  for,  the 
international actor’s other interests, it will be the strategy to follow. Nevertheless, the entire 
process might be undermined and the influence of the external actor might even go towards 
the undermining of the democratic practices in those cases when his national interests are 
threatened by the implementation of some particular democratic norm. 
Besides,  in  those  cases  where  democracy  promotion  is  guided  by  values  other  than 
democracy itself, the IA’s interests in the target country produce an establishment of the bi-
directional relationship of power. In those cases when the target state elite is aware of the 
security,  economic,  political  concerns  that  lie  behind  the  international  actor’s  democracy 
promotion actions, it might try to use this knowledge in order to put the international actor 
under pressure and contribute to the change of the IA’s preferences. The existence of such 
interests  might  not  only  make  the  external  actor  undertake  measures  that  obstruct 
democratization, but it might also be used by the authoritarian elite to obstruct the democracy 
promotion process. 
20 For enlargement and democracy promotion as a particular EU foreign policy, see Mattina, 2004.
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1.2. MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE ON DEMOCRATIZATION
Like we already stressed in the first paragraph of this chapter, until the mid-'90s the studies 
on the democratic transition and consolidation gave little importance to factors other than the 
domestic ones. Only with Geoffrey Pridham the scholars started to explore the influence of 
the international actors and structure on what used to be conceived as a mainly domestically 
driven change. In the recent years, literature identified different mechanisms through which 
international  factors  may  influence  the  democratization.  These,  to  list  only  some,  would 
include:  diffusion,  contagion,  zeitgeist,  gravity,  complex  interdependence,  convergence, 
emulation, socialization, learning, conditionality21. Many of these concepts were developed by 
the scholars of the  europeanization, where the EU’s capacities to promote democracy were 
examined. Some of the studied mechanisms were then “EU-size modeled”, while the other are 
more generalized and concern the democracy promotion mechanisms independently on who 
the involved actors are. Moreover, seen the tendency to study the democracy promotion, and 
seen  the  contemporary  prevalence  of  the  liberal  democratic  values  as  the  basis  for  the 
legitimization of political  regimes and promotion strategies,  it  appears  that we forgot that 
democracy is not unique, but of many kinds, and, even more important, that it is not the only 
possible political regime. If we are to cast some light on the issue, first we should pay attention 
to the fact that the EU democracy promotion is actually the promotion of a specific political 
regime by a specific actor. If we go back to the period of the cold war, we can easily observe 
how there is a possibility that an idea other than liberalist, and a political regime other than 
liberal  democracies,  can equally  be promoted by the international  actors.  In this  light,  we 
believe it necessary to keep, as much as possible, the objects of our study separated from the 
concepts we develop for the analysis. Obviously, at the lowest level of abstraction we might 
be forced to define some concepts so bound into their goal that they appear to apply to only 
one existing actor (as it was the case with Whitehead’s concept of democracy by contagion). 
However, until this becomes necessary, we should keep in mind that the mechanisms that are 
described  as  “methods  of  democracy  promotion”  often  are  the  “instruments  for  the 
promotion of a political regime”, and, if we go up the scale of abstraction, are based on the 
methods of exercising influence/power. This said, we will try here to represent some main 
21 Gruegel 1999; Huntington 1991; Kubicek 2003; Linz and Stepan 1996; Pridham 1991, sited in Baracani 
2006.
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models  considered  in  literature,  underlining  however  that  an accurate classification  of  the 
terminology would require a much deeper analysis than this work is aiming to. 
First  of  all,  we  shall  distinguish  between  “spread  of  democracy”  and  “promotion  of 
democracy”, a distinction based on the role of the external actors (active or passive). Some of 
the models developed in literature assumed that “democracy is contagious”, that it can diffuse 
(by itself), that the specific timing or “democratic neighborhood” might serve as an example 
and influence the internal events. Whitehead’s (1996) and later Schmitter’s (1996) concept of 
contagion, Linz and Stepan’s (1996) concepts of “zeitgeist” and “diffusion effects”, all imply 
passive international actors without intention or interest for democracy promotion. 
In the “diffusion studies”, different models were developed, some of them even including 
the situation of the active democracy promotion as a kind of “diffusion”. For example, some 
authors  identify  coercion,  competition22,  rational  learning,  cognitive  heuristics,  external 
pressure and quest for legitimacy23 as different “manners” in which democracy can spread. In 
some  other  studies,  diffusion  is  defined  in  a  manner  to  embrace  both  persuasion  and 
contagion,  both  imitation  of  the  neighbor  state  and  the  pressures  of  the  International 
Organization24. Finally, in the work of Starr where the diffusion was defined as strictly geo-
political,  time  and  space  variable,  the  model  remains  insensitive  to  the  cases  where  the 
outcome was a product of strong regional actors making pressures on the countries situated in 
their zones of interest, therefore being “responsible” for what appears to be the “diffusion 
effect”.25 
Some  authors,  however,  underlined  that  the  important  and  distinctive  feature  of  the 
democratic “contagion” can be identified in the “source of the incentive for contagion”: the 
democratization is not influenced by external pressures, but it refers to the situation when the 
domestic elite  seeks the rule adoption. It is mainly a domestically driven process, where the 
“example”  to  imitate  is  only  a  “source  of  solution”  for  a  problem.  Schimmelfennig  and 
Sedelmeier (2005) use similar criteria (labeled by the authors as the “main actor in the rule 
adoption  process”)  to  distinguish between the  alternative  mechanisms of  europeanization, 
underlining  that  the  “most  useful  distinction  (between  different  mechanisms  of 
europeanization, author's note) is the extent to which the rule adoption is EU- or domestically 
driven. In simple terms, we consider rule adoption as EU driven in those cases in which a 
22 Simmons, Dobbin, Garrett 2006, 2007.
23 Weyland, 2005.
24 Brinks and Copendge, 2006.
25 Starr, 1991.
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state would not have adopted these rules had it not been for a particular action from the EU” 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, pp. 8-9).  Weyland (2005) expressed it by underlining 
the “need” for rule adoption. In the case of the externally promoted norms (by pressures or, 
in the cases of the “quest for legitimacy”, by the normative pressures) there is  no  internal  
necessity for the rule adoption which takes place only due to the external incentives. In the 
case of the contagion (here Weyland distinguishes two mechanisms on the bases of the type of 
the actor’s  rationality:  rational  learning  and cognitive  heuristics),  the impulse  to adopt the 
norm comes from  inside and is primarily driven by the search for solution26.  In Kingdon’s 
terms (1984),  the  distinction  lies  in  “which stream contributes  to opening the window of 
opportunity”: in the case of contagion  it is the stream of problems to  search for solutions, 
while in the case of external pressure, or quest for legitimacy, it is the solution which searches 
for problems. 
As  represented  in  literature,  there  appears  to  be  a  partial  overlapping  between  those 
concepts known as “socialization mechanisms” and the concepts linked with contagion, both 
being the cases where no explicit external pressures can be traced. We can distinguish between 
the two by arguing that, in the process of contagion, the external actor is not exercising power 
and the domestic actors are not influenced by external pressures. 
This apparently easily understandable criterion of distinction becomes much fuzzier if we 
consider what Vachudova (2001) labeled as “passive EU leverage”, and it  deserves further 
consideration. Vachudova’s concept of “passive EU leverage” refers to the non-action of the 
EU in the period immediately after the fall of communism. Even though EU was not engaged 
in actions of democracy promotion, the existence of the community and the East European 
desire to gain membership status brought to the introduction of the democratic norms. It was 
only the attraction for the EU membership, and not the incentives and impulses coming from 
the EU to influence the internal  politics.  In this  case,  obviously,  the international  actor is 
passive. However, it appears difficult to compare this concept with the concepts conceiving 
the international environment as a “stream of Kingdon’s policy solutions”, as it is clear that it 
was not the existence of the EU, but the prospect for membership, even though EU was an 
inactive component, to bring to democratization. The same problem appears in Levitsky and 
Way's (2005) more general term “western leverage”, or at least in some existing interpretations 
of the term. The authors include the diffusion as one of the forms of “external democratizing 
26 Later on, we will underline that what Wayland considered “research for solution” should be formulated 
differently. 
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pressures”,  but  when  considering  the  ways  of  exercising  leverage,  they  list  “political 
conditionality and punitive sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military intervention”, all forms 
implying active international actors. 
 The difficulty appears very similar to the debate existing in the political science over the 
intentionality of causation and power. Should the concept of power include those cases where 
A unintentionally causes the behaviour of B? The scholars are divided between those, claiming 
that the notion of power shall include only  intentional  causation (thesis supported by Weber, 
1922 and Russell, 1938), and those, like Dahl (1969) or Oppeinheim (1961), who claim that 
power can be exercised even by the passive actor. Dahl (1967) adopts the distinction between 
the cases where, even if passive, the actor A is  a cause of B’s behaviour (as B anticipates A’s  
reaction and acts in form of  anticipated reactions),  and those cases where A  is  not  a cause of B’s 
behaviour. Vachudova’s passive EU leverage appears to be a textbook example of Dahl’s case 
of anticipated reactions. 
In line with this argumentation we can draw a line between two types of influence the 
international factor can have on the establishment of a specific political regime: spreading of the  
regime, or promotion of the regime. We have spreading of the regime when a particular regime (in 
our case democracy) is spread without influence from the external actors27. We speak about the 
promotion of the regime in all those cases when the domestic actors’ choices are influenced by the 
external actors. 28
27 While the term “diffusion” was rejected as too-vaguely defined in literature, we have considered whether or 
not to use Whitehead’s concept of contagion in order to label this category, seen that: 1) the term already exists 
in literature, 2) it captures what we are trying to say: the lack of any action by the international actors. Two are 
the  reasons  why  we opted  for  assigning  a  new label  to  the  category,  risking  to  be  accused  of  conceptual 
untidiness deriving from assigning two labels to the same thing. The first reason concerns the origins of the term. 
It comes from Whitehead’s 1996 typology developed in order to classify not the different mechanisms of the 
international  influence  on the  process,  but  the  theoretical  approaches to  the  issue.  Originally,  it  was thought to 
represent  not  the  subject  of  the  study,  but  the  approach  to the  subject.  However,  already  few pages  later 
Schmitter used the term to refer to the mechanisms of international influence, not only re-defining the term, but 
also narrowing it from its initial meaning. Thus, the bases for a different interpretation of the term were already 
settled. Moreover, the criterion on which the typology was based concerned the factors included in the analysis, 
and in these terms, the particularity of the term is that while it envisages the passive international actors, it also 
appears to cut the internal actors away. This way, we still wonder if the “democratic example” mechanism should 
be included as a case of contagion, as it envisages an important role for the internal actors. Finally, the two other 
Whitehead’s patterns, “control” and “consent”, while well-fitting in the author's typology, if considered by the 
criteria we chose to use here, belong to a level of abstraction lower than the concept of “contagion”, as the two 
actually represent different subtypes of leverage. 
28 The same difficulty we had with the label for this category, this time the dilemma concerning Levitsky and 
Way’s term leverage. At first sight, it appears that the term, combined with the specification to the diffusion we 
previously made, could be used as a label for the second category. However, we opted for another term, “regime 
promotion”, considered more suitable due to the following reasons:  1) the term leverage, even though, with 
some precision,  potentially  identical  to the term regime promotion,  it  might be ambiguous seen that it  was 
defined as distinct from the other term, linkage. As it results from Levitsky’s and Way’s work, the linkage might 
“reshape the domestic balance of power”. The two concepts, leverage and linkage, even though, as we will see, 
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1.2.1. SPREADING OF DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC EXAMPLE MECHANISM
The literature on the spread of regime started to develop with the American fear of a 
“domino effect of the communist block”, and was based on the assumption that if one single 
first democracy falls and becomes a victim to the “communism”, the “disease” will spread as 
in a domino effect to all other western democracies. The models of contagion and diffusion 
developed  during  the  cold  war  mainly  concerned  the  contagion  of  the  conflicts,  war  or 
secession requests29.  After the third wave of democratizations,  these models  were used to 
examine the “contagiousness” of the democracy. At the same time, as with the end of the cold 
war, the liberalism diffused as the world-prevalent paradigm30, and a series of studies on the 
diffusion of the specific policies and norms were developed. 
The spread of democracy is a process mainly guided by internal  factors. Even though the 
country follows the democratic example of its neighbors (or the example of some important 
international actor), the decision to imitate is based on the internal factors and necessities. 
Even though we do not consider it one of the mechanisms or strategies of the international 
promotion  of  democracy,  there  are  two  analytical/methodological  reasons  inducing  us  to 
include this model in our analysis. The first reason lies in the important insight deriving from 
this model that deserves to be tested. In order for an international  actor to influence the 
domestic  change,  domestic  decision  makers  need  to  view  its  attributes  (wealth,  security, 
values) as attractive and worthy of emulation. This means that the rule transfer can be possible 
only when there is a low level of misfit between the characteristic of the example and the goal 
the  domestic  actors  are  pursuing31.  Another  important  lesson  to  be  learnt from  this 
explanatory model is  that if  we are to understand the strategies and capacities of the EU 
democratic rule promotion, before driving enthusiastic conclusions, we should check if the 
case being studied could be explained in a satisfactory manner by the democratic example 
model. We will therefore include the example model as one of our alternative explanations: 
before asserting the prevalent role of an external actor in democratization, we should first 
assess the possibility that what we had was not a case of contagion with norm. 
capture an important aspect of the process, still slightly differ from the concept of “regime promotion”. 
29 See Brown 2002, Saidman 1995.
30 Goldstein and Keohane, 1993.
31 While for the socialization process we speak about the misfit between values, and in the conditionality 
mechanisms we refer to the misfit between the status quo and the norm promoted, in the case of the example 
and spread of norm the misfit refers to the desired outcome and the norm promoted. In the case of spread of the 
norm, the status quo is usually delegitimized, so the actors’ preferences and their balance should be used in order 
to assess the misfit with the external norm.
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How  does  the  contagion,  or  democratic  example  mechanism,  function?  According  to 
Morlino and Magen (2008), the model considers the external actor as a passive agent whose 
characteristics represent the pole of attraction for the decision makers in research for policy. 
As  Weyland (2005)  describes,  two are  the  possible  “models”  of  the  contagion,  based  on 
different assumptions on the actor’s rationality.  The rational  learning model consist in the 
following steps: first of all,  the domestic policy makers must be unsatisfied with the status 
quo. This might happen due to the failure of the previously adopted solutions, due to the 
public opinion pressures or it might be a consequence of the new elite coming to power. In 
other words, the need for the new norm is open. Secondly, as there are no available solutions 
(or, as the available solutions for some material or political reasons appear to be impossible), the 
domestic  leaders  look  outside  their  domestic  system for  a  solution  to economic,  social  or 
regulatory  problems.  The  leaders  identify  such  solution  in  the  normative  package  of  a 
particular external actor, evaluate the rule and, if it is transferrable, they adopt and implement 
the rule. 
The second pattern, which according to Weyland is the most capable of explaining the “S” 
curve  shape  of  the  norm  promotion  registered  in  the  studies  of  the  pension  reform,  is 
cognitive  heuristics.  According  to this  model,  the  domestic  actors  are  interest-guided,  but 
instead of  precise  research for the  best-fitting  and adaptable  policy  solution,  they use the 
“cognitive shortcuts” to cope with an unlimited number of information. The spreading of the 
new norms and the innovative solutions, as well as the “S” shape of the diffusion pattern, is 
explained as a consequence of the “cognitive process” that leads to imitation32.
The states are usually more interested in their neighbouring countries’ domestic policies 
and events than to events from the “other side of the globe”. When a country in the region 
adopts an innovative policy or undertakes some innovative reform, this attracts the attention 
of the neighbouring ruling elite. It can happen that, in some countries, some “problem” shows 
up (media  and politicians  comparing  the  domestic  and neighbour’s  innovative  policy,  the 
advocacy coalition might mobilize, a new definition of an old problem might take place, or the 
ruling elite and influential groups, eager to adopt a similar design, might “create” a problem). 
The domestic elite looks for the first assessments of the innovative policies, and in case they 
appear to have a positive effect, they are strongly encouraged to adopt it. The adaptation is 
not necessarily taking place, which can also explain why the adoption of the external rules 
brings in some cases to “disastrous” effects. 
32 See Weyland, 2005.
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How shall we account for the democratic example mechanisms and distinguish them from 
the  other  mechanisms?  We  already  underlined  the  necessity  for  the  external  actor  to  be 
indifferent to the solutions adopted in the specific area of policy. Secondly, the norm adopted 
shall not be included among the issues the external actor isn’t recommending or requesting. The 
adopted rule shall be similar/identical to the rule already implemented by another state/states 
and it shall be considered (most or at least “most among the solutions fitting the domestic 
conditions”)  efficient  and  positively  assessed.  The  imitated  state  shall  be  considered 
particularly well-performing in a specific area of policy and this success shall be proved by the 
result  of  this  norm.  On the  one  hand,  the  domestic  actors  shall  be  unsatisfied  with  the 
domestic  situation,  while,  on the other,  at  least  the ruling  elite  shall  be  favourable  to the 
adopted rule. We can add here the criteria deriving from the model of cognitive heuristics (yet, 
not  the  case  when  we  speak  about  rational  learning):  the  “imported”  policy  should  be 
innovative,  or  “striking”  in  some  other  sense,  or  some  dramatic  events  shall  attract  the 
decision maker’s attention. The cognitive heuristic model is, among other things, based on the 
“availability  heuristics”,  referring  to  “people’s  tendency  to  award  excessive  importance  to 
information that is especially immediate and striking, grabs their attention, and is therefore 
uniquely “available” (Weyland, 2005, p. 284).  The last Weyland’s criteria,  “existence of the 
domestic  problems”,  is  a  bit  problematic:  as  the  garbage-can models  in  the  public  policy 
analysis showed, the problems are not necessarily preceding solutions, neither are the policies 
always designed in order to solve an existing problem. We believe that it shall be reformulated: 
instead of the “existing problem” requirement, we introduce “the-decision-makers’-interest-
to-adopt-the-rule” requirement. This interest can derive from their belief that the policy would 
solve a specific problem, or from their personal benefits from the particular solution. What is 
important is that: 1) the external actor is not promoting the norm; and 2) the domestic elite is 
not opposing the norm, but it is active and has an interest to adopt it. 
1.2.2. PROMOTION OF DEMOCRACY
On the  opposite,  we  have a  group of  concepts  concerning  democracy  promotion.  As 
stressed  above,  this  group  consists  of  all  those  concepts  implying  an  active  role  by  the 
international  actors.  The  first  criterion  that  appears  important  in  distinguishing  between 
different modes of  influence is  the use of  violence.  Both Whitehead,  when distinguishing 
control and consent33, and transitions literature underlined the particularity of transitions that 
33 See Whitehead, 1996.
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took place in the periods of warfare34. This induces us to distinguish between cases of regimes 
imposed and controlled from the outside with the use of force, and those cases where the regime 
promotion was not accompanied by warfare. 
This  way,  all  three  “paths  of  re-democratization”  identified  by  Stepan,  as  well  as 
Whitehead’s  “democratization  through  conquest”,  “democratization  through  control”  and 
“democratization  through  imposition”  are  the  concepts  created  to  describe  the  “warfare 
related democratizations”. 
What  we are  left  with  are  concepts  such as:  “democratization  through conditionality”, 
“socialization”, “social learning”, “rule transfer”, “active or passive leverage” (in Vachudova’s 
terms,  2001),  “consent”,  to  list  only  some  of  them.  In  the  different  paragraphs  of 
“International  dimensions  of  democratization”,  Whitehead  (1996)  also  identifies  the 
“democratization  through  decolonization”,  “democratization  through  incorporation”  and 
“democratization through convergence” as the process in which the international role is the 
salient  explanatory  factor.  In  different  parts  of  the  book  the  author  names  at  least  two 
different typologies, the common element of which is the category of the incorporation. It 
appears unclear if the “democratization through incorporation” represents as a subtype of the 
larger category of “democratization through imposition” (together with “democratization by 
invasion” and “democratization by intimidation”). If we assume that this form implies the use 
of force (as the word “imposition” induces us to believe),  what is  the difference between 
“democratization through conquest” and “democratization through incorporation”? After all, 
while considering the cases of Puerto Rico or Hawaii where the incorporation was undertaken 
through the use of military force, the author also includes the case of the German unification 
as  an example  of  the  democratization  (of  the  Eastern Germany)  through incorporation35. 
What are the levels of abstraction of different concepts and in which measure do different 
categories imply the use of force (compare the classifications in “Democracy Convergence: 
Southern Europe” and in “ Imposition of democracy: the Caribbean”,  both in Whitehead 
1996)? 
Such confusion over the concept of democratization-through-incorporation derives from a 
common  feature  this  case  shares  with  another  category,  “democratization-through-
convergence”. This common characteristic is clearly identified by Whitehead: in both cases, 
issues of identity politics arise and the re-definition of the identities take place. Whitehead’s 
34 See Stepan, 1996.
35See Whitehead, 1996, p. 258.
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unease derives from the particularity of the incorporation: on one side, it applies the use of 
force, and we can classify it as “imposition”. But on the other hand, there is an acceptance of 
incorporation,  no  classical  resistance  as  in  the  cases  of  conquest;  moreover,  there  is  the 
process  of  identity  re-shaping36.  It  puts  the  author  in  a  dilemma:  shall  he  consider  the 
incorporation, such action involving the use of force in the cases he analyzed, a sub-type of 
democratization by conquest? Or to distinguish it from this, but if so, how can we account for 
the use of military troops? It seems that Whitehead, as well as the other authors, finds out that 
there  is  a  kind  of  “particular  type of  externally  influenced democratization”  in  which  the 
identities are re-shaped. Evidently, the presence of EU made all scholars come to the same 
conclusion: there appears to be some particularities in the process when a supranational actor 
is involved. For Whitehead, the important factor here concerns the “identities”. And if we 
come  back  to  his  last  category,  unfortunately  less  precisely  developed  than  others, 
democratization through decolonization, we might observe how, even in that case, the “re-
examination” of identities and polity was involved37.
In  the  same volume,  Schmitter  identified  four  “sub-contexts  of  international  context” 
through  which  the  external  actors  might  influence  the  democratization.  Beside  the  three 
concepts  Whitehead used in  his  classification of  approaches  (contagion,  control,  consent), 
Schmitter added a fourth one, conditionality. Two dimensions are taken in consideration: 
• The  dimension  concerning  “basis  for  action”  distinguishes  between  the  “contexts 
involving  at  least  a  threat,  if  not  even  the  use  of  coercive  authority  (control  and 
conditionality), and those whose effects depend on voluntary exchange (contagion and 
consent)”; 
• The  dimension  concerning  “the  number  of  actors”,  where  the  “key  distinction  is 
between the  unilateral  processes of  international  influence  or  power,  in  which  one 
actor  intentionally  or  unintentionally  affects  another  (control  and  contagion),  and 
multilateral ones that involve several, often competing, sources of influence or power 
and  typically  work  through  international  organizations  rather  than  purely  national 
channels (conditionality and consent)” (Schmitter, 1996, pp. 28 - 30). 
As we see, Schmitter’s typology appears somewhat confused: the labeling of the categories 
leads to perplexities  over the meaning of the concepts:  the three categories deriving from 
Whitehead changed their original meaning. The contagion becomes a unilateral process where 
36 See Whitehead, 1996.
37 See Whitehead, 1996.
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the “voluntary basis of the action” leaves some concern about whether the international actor 
is active or not. The conditionality starts to apply only to those cases where coercion is used 
(how do we then account for EU conditionality?). The control on the other hand becomes 
possible  only  in  the  unilateral  relations  (how  do  we  then  account  for  the  International 
Protectorate in Bosnia, or in Kosovo?). Finally, the consent becomes a concept identified by a 
new criterion added to the two already used for classification:
 “A complex set of interactions between international process and domestic groupings that 
generates new democratic norms and expectations from below… that in extreme might lead to 
the irresistible drive to merge with an already existing democracy, in a milder form it underlines 
the desire to protect democracy within a given state by joining a regional block” (Schmitter, 1996, 
p. 30). 
Schmitter’s typology is interesting not only for the types it identified and criteria it used, 
but also for the intuition behind the dimensions that Schmitter used for the classification of 
the concepts. The use of forces is a first classificatory criterion, while the other represents an 
attempt to underline the importance of international organizations rather than purely national 
channels.  Here we can also recognize a dilemma similar to Whitehead’s:  the intuition that 
there  is  a  substantive,  qualitative  difference  between  the  single  state’s  influence  and  the 
international organizations’ influence. 
Another interesting work that was guided by similar questions of international influence is 
Levitsky  and  Way’s  reflection  of  the  two dimensions  of  the  post-Cold  War  international 
environment:  leverage  and  linkage.  “Western  leverage”  refers  to  the  “governments’ 
vulnerability  to  external  pressure,  while  linkage  to  the  West  concerns  “the  density  of  a 
country’s  ties  to  the  United  States,  the  European  Union,  and  Western-led  multilateral 
institutions” (Levitsky and Way, 2005, p. 21). Here again, as we compare the usage of the 
concepts,  the  original  text  and  their  interpretations  in  literature,  we  can  observe  a  slight 
confusion  over  their  meanings.  The  conditionality,  the  diplomatic  pressures,  the  military 
intervention, the socialization, all became the “mechanisms (subtypes) of leverage”, instead of, 
as the authors try to mark in their article, ways in which the international actors may exert the 
leverage38. The authors are not so clear about how we should distinguish between “leverage” 
as vulnerability to external pressure and “leverage” as the label for a series of actions put in 
place by the external actors. We believe that the distinction between the two is useful and 
conceptually necessary. The distinction between the exercise of leverage and the leverage itself 
is similar to the distinction Oppenheim (1958), Dahl (1967), Laswell and Kaplan (1950) make 
38 See Levitsky and Way, 2005.
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between  potential  power and  exercised  power,  between  having and  exercising influence,  as  the 
actors  do not  always exercise  the  power  they potentially  have.  It  is  not  a  mere  linguistic 
punctuality. Only by distinguishing potential and exercised power we can face the question of 
why sometimes the potential power is not exercised. In the field of this research we can, for 
example,  open the question on why the EU did not  use its  potential  powers in the very 
beginning of the Eastern Europe transition, but started to use what Vachudova (2001) labeled 
“active leverage” only in the second half of the '90s. 
Going  further  into  the  analysis  of  Levitsky  and  Way’s  definition  of  western  leverage, 
another observation shall be made. The two authors define leverage as the “vulnerability of 
governments to the external influence”, and further on, they identify the determinants of the 
leverage in “states’ raw size and military and economic strength”. What they use are the same 
dimensions  that  are  identified  by  the  scholars  of  international  relations  as  the  sources, 
dimensions or indicators of the state’s power and their position in the international structure39. 
The same factors  (economic  richness,  size  and  the  availability  of  means  of  coercion)  are 
considered  in  literature  as  resources,  basis  or  spheres  of  influence  of  power40.  From this 
perspective,  the  Western  leverage  seems  to  be  the  mirror  reflection  of  the  target  state’s 
potential  power.  The stronger the national  basis in a specific resource of power  (richness, 
military strength, but also other resources such as links with third actors etc), the lower is the 
western leverage, or better say, the less power the external actor can exercise by acting in the 
39 Krasner  2000,  “State  Power  and  the  structure  of  international  Trade”,  in  Frieden  and  Lake,  2000, 
International Political Economy, London, Routledge pp. 19 – 36; Clementi Marco, 2005, «L’egemonia e i suoi 
limiti», in Rivista italiana di scienza politica, XXXV, 1, pp. 30-56; Gilpin Robert, 1989, Guerra e mutamento nella 
politica  internazionale,  Bologna,  il  Mulino;  Gilpin  Robert,  1990,  Politica  ed  economia  delle  relazioni 
internazionali,  Bologna,  il  Mulino;  Kindleberger  Charles,  1997,  I  primi  del  mondo,  Roma,  Donzelli  editore; 
Mastanduno Michael,  1997,  «Preserving  the  Unipolar  Moment»,  in  International  Security,  21,  4,  pp.  49-88; 
Modelski George, 1978, «The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State», in Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 20, 2, pp. 214-235; Organski F.K. And Kugler Jacek, 1980, The War Ledger, Chicago, The 
University  of  Chicago  Press;  Waltz  Kenneth,  1993,  «The  Emerging  Structure  of  International  Politics»,  in 
International Security, 18, 2, pp. 44-79; WALTZ Kenneth, 2000, «Structural Realism after the Cold War», in 
International  Security,  25,  1,  pp.  5-4.  For  this  point  the  author  thanks  the  kind assistance  of  a  scholar  of 
international relations, Napolitano Jamel, whose knowledge in the field made the above citations possible. The 
above bibliography is drawn by Napolitano’s study on the shift of hegemony. 
40 Thus, Laswell and Kaplan identify both economic richness and coercion as the “values” that might be at 
the base of power and the sphere in which the power is exercised. The same can be said for Oppenheim, who 
distinguishes  the  means  and  modes  of  control.  Thus,  while  dissuasion  and  restraint  are  modes  of  control, 
information, emotive appeal, material reward are the  means  by which control can be exercised. Going further, 
from the theory of power to the comparative politics, we can observe how the richness and  size  (in terms of 
number of members, for example) have been considered as the resources of power in the studies of political 
parties, social and interest groups, social movements and participation. In these cases coercion is omitted as in 
the domestic politics the state keeps the monopoly on violence. 
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respective sphere. The richer the target country, the lower is   the EU capacity to exercise 
influence by using its financial power. 
Another dimension of the international context identified by Levitsky and Way (2005) is 
linkage, or, in other words, the “density of the countries’ ties to the United States, the EU, and 
Western-dominated  multilateral  institutions”  (ibidem,  p.  22).  The  authors  argue  that  the 
degree of  leverage and linkage explains  the importance of  the international  factors  in  the 
process  of  the  democratization.  The  conclusion  is  that  the  higher  the  government’s 
vulnerability to Western influence and the degree of linkage with West, the more important is 
the external factor of democratization and the more successful the democracy promotion. On 
the  other  hand,  high  leverage  without  linkage  results  in  sporadic  international  influence. 
Finally, in those cases where both leverage and linkage are low, the international pressure is 
weak and the domestic factors are predominant in the process. 
The problem with the two dimensions of Levitsky and Way (2005) is that they are not 
independent one from the other. The fourth analytic possibility, low leverage in a situation of 
high  linkage,  is  not  considered.  Two are  the  reasons:  first  of  all,  a  high  level  of  linkage 
produces high leverage. By increasing the number of ties, contractual, formal and informal 
links  between the countries,  the interdependence  of  the  two also grows and so does  the 
leverage. 
However, Levistky and Way’s contribution in the field is important, as the dimensions they 
identify draw the attention onto two other important factors in the study of the international 
dimension of democratization: the resources of power of the “target” government that might 
be used to avoid external influence, and the institutional links between the target state and the 
external actors. 
At the end, we come back to the concepts created while studying the role the EU had in 
the democratization of  the ex-Communist  Europe.  Developed in the sub-field  of the EU 
enlargement literature and literature on europeanization, many of these concepts are marked 
by the ongoing debate on the role of material benefits and values, between rationalism and 
constructivism, between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences. 
The  two  most  important  concepts  developed  in  this  literature  are  the  democratic 
conditionality and democratic socialization. The largest part of literature is dedicated to the 
question about what kind of incentives were more important in democratizing the CEECs: 
was it the set of material benefits, or the EU’s western identity with its symbolic (even moral) 
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value? In order to maximize  its policy  export,  should the EU use external  incentives  and 
conditionality  or the “social  learning” generated by “EU-centered epistemic communities” 
(Magen, 2004, p. 4)? Unlike the literature on the international role of democratization, where 
the core theories are still lacking, when it comes to the EU conditionality and socialization the 
scholars  explored  different  factors  and  created  numerous  analytical  models.  Particular 
attention was given to the process of EU democracy promotion in different countries, and to 
variables such as costs of compliance, the cultural match between domestic and EU norms, 
the existence of viable foreign policy alternatives (or lack thereof) were developed as factors 
influencing  the  outcome.  As  the  mechanisms  of  both  conditionality  and  socialization  are 
included in the EUCLIDA (the relation between the concepts will be exposed later on), we 
will give them more space when developing our analytical framework.
Here we would only like to connect the two concepts of conditionality and socialization 
with the concepts developed in the studies on the international dimension of democratization 
we  examined  above,  and  try  to  establish  the  relation  between  the  different  terms. 
Conditionality is usually defined as the activity where an international actor uses incentives or 
threats in order to make pressure on the domestic  actors,  producing a shift  in their  cost-
benefits balance and bringing to the rule adoption. Socialization is a mechanism deriving from 
the constructivist literature according to which the normative pressure forces the domestic 
elite in search of legitimization to embrace the international norms, while their preferences 
and identities are modeled through the process of social learning. We might observe that the 
two concepts represent the different strategies the international actors might use in order to 
influence  the  democratization  in  a  country.  In  Whitehead’s  “democratization  through 
convergence” both tactics might be applied in order to influence the target government or 
other  domestic  non-governmental  actors,  and  were  described  in  the  analysis  of 
democratization through convergence in Portugal, Spain and Greece. In his work, Whitehead 
brings the examples of what will be later labeled membership conditionality (EC required its 
members to be democratic states) and of what will be labeled socialization (“mobilization of 
the shared political symbols and values in a manner which partially redefined the identities of 
all participants to the convergence process”, Whitehead, 2001, p. 258). 
Schmitter’s type of “consent”, as it was also previously stressed by Whitehead, implies the 
use of conditionality as well as the use of socialization channels, and even the influence on the 
internal distribution of powers. Further on, we might observe that, even in those cases where 
37
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
force is  implied,  some kind of socialization and social  learning might take place.  In some 
cases,  the  military  defeat  and  the  subordination  that  follows  might  bring  to  the  de-
legitimization of the previous norms and practices, facilitating the legitimization, introduction 
and acceptance of norms deriving from the winners in the hope that these new strategies 
(norms, practice, weapon) will help “win the next war”. 
We  can  further  observe  how  different  strategies  might  be  used  simultaneously:  if  we 
consider the nation states not as unitary actors, but as composed of different groups with 
different, sometimes competing interests, we might observe that not only the socialization and 
conditionality  might  be used towards  the  same actors  (national  government),  but external 
actors might also decide to use conditionality  towards one actor and socialization towards 
another.  If  we  consider  Milošević’s  Serbia,  we  might  observe  that  while  pressure  and 
conditionality were used towards the governmental actors, at the same time socialization was 
used  towards  the  opposition  parties.  Moreover,  we  can  observe  how  in  some  cases  the 
socialization of certain actors might cause a change in the domestic distribution of powers. 
This  uneasiness  of  the  dichotomy  and  exclusiveness  between  conditionality  and 
socialization was faced by some authors. For example, Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 
(2003) developed a typology of mechanisms distinguishing between material bargaining and 
social influence depending on the kind of reward offered to the target countries, and between 
intergovernmental and transnational channels of reinforcement. The authors showed how the 
conditionality  allows  other  methods  of  influence,  such  as  the  normative  pressure  and 
persuasion, to be pressed by the promoter with greater confidence, since the rhetorical actions 
are then made in the shadow of the material incentives for compliance. At the base of this 
reasoning  is  the  recognition  that  economic  interests,  but  also  knowledge,  values,  fear, 
geopolitical reasons, emotions, identities etc can all be used in the “trade” where one actor is 
able to influence the other actor’s behaviour through the exchange of these “goods”. Here 
again we might find the reflections on the power in political science useful. We can notice 
how the “goods” used for exchange (knowledge, economic assistance, military relations etc) 
correspond to different “values” in the terms of Laswell and Kaplan, while on the other hand, 
conditionality, influence on the internal distribution of power, or the re-definition of identity, 
which is connected with socialization, represent the forms, modalities in which the power can be 
exercised.  The  “incentives”  and  “threats”  in  Parsons’  typology  of  the  “modes  of  social 
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control”41, or Dahl’s “promises” and “threats”, perfectly match the two identified “types” of 
conditionality: conditionality through reward or through threat. 
We can distinguish the resources of power (economic, military situation, size, geopolitical 
position, technology, authority, symbolic values etc.) of international and domestic actors. The 
identity,  values  and  knowledge  terms  used  in  the  literature  on  socialization  describe  the 
resources of power, and the same is true for the material benefits, security etc. From this point 
of  view,  the  debate between conditionality  and socialization  in  these narrow terms is  the 
debate on which the resources of power are more convincing. 
The conditionality by reward (Dahl’s promises) and by threat (in Dahl’s terminology), as 
well as socialization (when it appears in the form of persuasion and social learning), or the 
influence on the distribution of power are the forms in which the relation between the actors is 
established42. The democratization “through convergence”, or “consent” used by Whitehead 
(1996) might imply both socialization and conditionality. 
Bearing this in mind, we might try to examine the different criteria used by the authors in 
order to identify the possible paths of international  influence on the establishment of the 
specific type of political regime:
• Presence/absence  of  the  external  actor’s  intention/interest  for  the  change  of  the 
regime in the country: spread or promotion? (Whitehead 1996 contagion vs. control 
and consent; Linz and Stepan 1996: zeitgeist and diffusion vs. foreign policy; Morlino 
and Magen 2008:  democratic  example  vs.  democratic  conditionality  and democratic 
socialization). 
• Use  of  force,  warfare  vs.  “peacefare”  (Whitehead  1996  control  vs.  consent, 
democratization  through  conquest,  democratization  through  imposition  vs. 
democratization through contagion; Schmitter 1996 control vs. contagion and consent; 
Stepan  1986:  restoration  after  external  re-conquest,  internal  reformulation  and 
externally monitored installation vs. no possibilities)43. 
41 See also Goio, 2003. 
42 Compare  with  the  following  reflection  over conditionality  by  Mattina:  “Sulla  base  di  quanto  finora 
sostenuto si può, dunque, affermare che la convergenza è il processo che influenza le scelte degli attori politici 
interni  impiegati  nella  trasformazione  da  economica  a  politico-istituzionale,  mentre  la  condizionalità  è  una 
modalità della convergenza…” (Mattina, 2004, p. 27).
43 The  same  criterion  is  also  used  by  Mattina  when  discussing  the  differences  between  USA and  EU 
democracy promotion strategies, where the USA type of “exportation of democracy”, for which military strength 
is a necessary condition (but not necessarily the use of violence), is compared to the more peaceful and less 
intimidating approach of the EU’s “convergence strategy”. (see Mattina, 2004, p. 315).
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• The nature of  the actors  involved  and the type of  relationship  between the actors 
(Levitsky and Way, 2005 high linkage vs. low linkage; Schmitter 1996 nation channels 
vs. international organization; Whitehead 1986: presence vs. absence of the contractual 
links). 
• Tackling  the question of  national  identity  or not (Whitehead 1996:  democratization 
through convergence, democratization through incorporation  44and, we might argue, 
also  the  democratization  through  de-colonization  vs.  cases  that  do  not  imply  the 
redefinition of the national identity, all of which in Whitehead refer to the “warfare” 
methods). 
1.3. INTERNATIONAL ANCHORING OF POLITICAL REGIME 
As stressed in the introduction, our analytical model will be based on the framework that 
Morlino  and  Magen  (2008)  designed  with  the  aim  to  understand  the  result  of  the  EU 
promotion  of  the  democratic  rule  of  law.  The  central  concept  of  their  research  is  the 
international anchoring, defined at the beginning of the work as a process characterizing the 
EU democracy promotion:
“Democratic anchoring is the “process that may be suggested to begin to characterize EU 
democracy  promotion,  that  is,  the  binding  of  domestic  institutions  and  law  to  supranational 
networks of norms and standards and the related convergence of Western European political and 
economic structures” (Morlino and Magen, 2004, p. 11).
 In its last versions,  the authors observe the broader goal of the concept,  defining the 
international anchoring of democracy as:
“A  mechanism  by  which  actors,  be  they  domestic  or  international,  may  influence 
democratization  processes.  It  involves  the  binding  of  domestic  institutions,  policies  and elite 
circles  to  supranational  rules  and  institutions characterized  by  commitment  to  liberal-democratic 
values. ” (Morlino and Magen, 2008, p. 18). 
The difference between the two definitions concerns the level of abstraction: in the first, 
the  authors  concentrate  on  the  EU,  while  in  the  other  they  perceive  the  international 
44On whether or not the “democratization through incorporation” implies the use of force, see the discussion 
above. We can simply distinguish between peaceful and violent incorporation. The peaceful incorporation, a clear 
example of which is the democratization of the Eastern Germany through German re-unification, is an example 
of the peace-fare democracy promotion process during which the domestic identities are re-examined and that is 
undertaken by a single state.  
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anchoring as a concept that can include whichever supranational institution that promotes 
democratization through linkage and boundary removal.
In this section, we will first describe the EUCLIDA model, which we will revise in the next 
chapter to build the EUCLIDA model, by developing the hypothesis concerning the supply 
side. 
The particular advantage and innovation of EUCLIDA was the precious insight on the 
importance of the two phases of the policy-making process, usually neglected in the studies: 
rule implementation and rule internalization. The two are added to the traditionally studied 
phases of rule adoption to build three layers of international anchoring. The distinction of the 
various phases of policy-making and attention given to the rule implementation phase allowed 
both to better evaluate the effective outcome and to analyze the dynamics of the process. The 
authors developed the hypothesis that considers the particularities of the layers, allowing, at 
the same time, the cross-layers analysis. The model allows us to single out the obstacles that 
might appear in the two understudied layers and to study the process of the democratization of a 
certain  country,  and  not  merely  the  international  actors’  efficiency  in  ensuring  the  rule 
adoption. 
The  hypotheses  of  the  analytical  framework  are  organized  around  the  three  layers  we 
described.  The rule adoption means the approval of domestic legislation, the establishment of 
domestic  institutions  as  suggested  by  external  actors,  thus  giving  reality  to  democratic 
anchoring,  regardless  the goal  and intensity  of  the  rule  adopted (see Morlino  and Magen, 
2008).  In  order  to  understand  the  sub-process  that  brings  to  rule  adoption,  the  authors 
distinguish two main actors: the international actors (IA), whose action needs to be met by 
that by the domestic actors, some of whom might be change agents (ChA). The action of the 
international  actors,  as  we  saw,  might  assume  any  form  of  relationships  of  influence: 
democratic  conditionality  and  socialization  both  included.  What  is  a  necessary  condition, 
regardless what strategy is used, is that the action is credible. In other words, the action must be 
combined with the existence of the commitments and resources necessary for its success. The 
credibility is differently operationalized as we pass from one form of action to the other. The 
credibility in the case of the democratic conditionality concerns the credibility of the reward 
and threat,  while  in  the  case  of  social  learning  it  concerns  the  compliance  with  the  rule 
promoted by the EU member states (we will see more on the credibility of the conditionality 
and socialization further on). 
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As the model does not imply the rule  imposition,  the credible action of the international 
actor  should  meet  the  action  of  domestic  Change  Agents  in  order  to  achieve  the  rule 
adoption.  Morlino and Magen stress that, in order to understand the rule adoption in the 
subject states, we should also consider the degree to which “change agents” are present in the 
domestic system. The change agents are domestic actors devoted to the rule adoption, with 
certain resources of power and a certain level of influence on the decision-making process. 
They try to press the decision makers to adopt the democratic rules by increasing the costs for 
reform-recalcitrant elites, and/or engage domestic decision makers in processes of persuasion 
and social learning to redefine their interests and identities. 
A shift in the costs and benefits balance is another important factor of both EUCLIDA 
and EUCLIDA revised. It is a key notion drawn upon a logic of consequence, where the rule 
adoption depends on the calculation of benefits and costs of compliance. The rule adoption is 
possible only when the balance between costs and reward to obtain is positive, or when at 
some point there is a shift in this balance. In the model proposed by Morlino and Magen, the 
notion is unpacked in order to take into account some of the main factors singled out in 
literature.
The  calculation  of  costs  is  influenced  by  the  level  of  misfit  (see  the  literature  on 
europeanization, especially Borzell and Risse, 2000, 2004), the goal of the rule promoted (if 
the rule concerns the “low” or “high” politics), the strength of the domestic opposition to its 
adoption. 
In the calculation of the benefits and balances, the crucial component is the preference of 
the government and other veto players. On a level of empirical analysis, this means that all 
actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo and those who bear the 
significant net costs of rule adoption contexts have to be taken into account and their relative 
strength in different policy areas shall be considered. 
Morlino  and  Magen  pay  special  attention  to  the  shift  of  cost-benefit  balance  in  the 
perception of decision makers. In the framework, the preferences of the decision makers are 
not fixed: the interactions between decision makers and international actors and/or change 
agents may bring to changes in the opportunity structures, to the empowerment of change 
agents, part of the ruling elite, or civil society groups, and to the weakening of veto players. 
This brings to a change in the cost-benefit balance, which may bring to a policy reassessment 
and subsequent rule adoption. 
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Two other factors that Morlino and Magen take into account in order to explain the rule 
adoption are domestic fluidity and the presence of alternatives. Political fluidity is a situation 
of openness of the domestic system to the external influence due to some drastic events such 
as the collapse of an ideological regime (end of a previous paradigm), some deep internal crisis 
or conflict. It is characterized by a situation where there is pressure for the re-orientation of 
state direction (on elite and/or society level). This is often the case when there is a new ruling 
elite, the previous practices and norms are delegitimized, the structure of power deriving from 
the previous norms is undermined, while state leaders are in search for new policy solutions. 
The policy windows are open, while the elite is  more open to external influence. In these 
cases, we should pay particular attention to distinguish between the norm promotion and the 
spreading of the norm, for, as we argued above when discussing the models on “contagion”, 
the  same setting  also  favours  the  spreading  of  the  particular  norm,  which  represents  our 
alternative explanation.
Another important factor of the EUCLIDA model is  the presence of alternatives.  The 
presence/absence  of  economic  and  political  alternatives  to  the  international  actor  may 
undermine its efforts by decreasing the size of promised rewards, entering the cost-benefits 
calculations, and offering an alternative example and source for social learning. We should 
take into account if  the government has (or more accurately,  believes  to have)  an alternative 
source  offering  comparable  benefits.  The  effectiveness  of  the  EU promotion  efforts  will 
increase in those cases where EU is perceived as vital to the state’s economic and political 
well-being, while the influence of other actors is limited. 
When does the rule adoption take place? Morlino and Magen summarize the sub-process 
of rule adoption in the following way:
“When credible actions of IA are complemented by actions of committed change actors, then 
there are changes of opportunities structures, empowerment of change agents or of governmental 
elite or of civil society groups and relative weakening of veto players; if so, there is the possibility 
of a shift in the cost-benefits balance for decision makers; if there is domestic fluidity and no 
presence  of  domestic  or  international  related  alternatives,  then  the  shifts  bring  a  policy 
reassessment; if there is a policy reassessment, then there can be rule adoption. But there is also 
the opposite possibility at every step, of course especially if no policy reassessment occurs. ”
Rule  implementation refers  to  the  development  or  improvement  of  the  rules,  governing 
institutions and administrative structures necessary to implement the adopted changes. This 
means that the layer of the rule implementation is strongly linked to the development of the 
institutional and administrative capacity (see Morlino and Magen, 2008). The sub-process of 
43
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
the rule implementation also requires the credible action of the international actor as well as 
the commitment of the change agents. In the cases we analyze it is important to account for 
those situations where the domestic actors are willing to adopt and internalize the promoted 
rules, but are lacking the necessary action capacity. 
In the phases of rule implementation “the point of departure is the moment when the 
credible  actions  of  international  actors  are  complemented  by  the  commitment  of  change 
agents  with  regard  to  the  setting  up  of  an  institutional  and  administrative  capacity  to 
formulate, implement and enforce the law” (Morlino and Magen, 2008, p. 25). According to 
Morlino and Magen, if the credible action of IA is completed with commitment of the change 
agents,  then  “a  growth  of  knowledge  resources,  of  material  resources  and  learning 
opportunities inside the country takes place” (Morlino and Magen, 2008, p. 25). The growth 
of institutional and administrative capacity and the process of implementation may be filtered 
and occasionally stopped or distorted by the bureaucratic inertia and the lack of commitment 
by the decision makers. In these moments, even the rule adoption is seriously undermined, 
and only further actions by the international actors and change agents can possibly overcome 
these  difficulties.  The  outcome,  as  in  the  case  of  the  rule  adoption,  is  twofold:  the  rule 
implementation in case of success, or the lack of any positive result in those cases where we 
find strong bureaucratic inertia and lack of commitment. 
Finally, the third layer concerns the  rule internalization. Rule internalization represents the 
acceptance  of  the  transferred  rules,  a  slow  and  gradual  process  of  legitimization  of  the 
adopted rules and institutions. Only when rules become internalized, the rule adoption and 
development of the IAC (institutional and administrative capacity) become something more 
concrete than a mere superficial result with no actual meaning. Rule internalization process is 
the most distinctive of all  three layers of the international  anchoring:  it  is  distinctive as it 
concerns essentially cognitive processes at both an elite and mass level, and in this process 
what is crucial is value commitment of the change agents. According to Morlino and Magen, 
in this layer the presence of a previous value commitment of change agents to democracy is 
necessary, better if complemented by the presence of similar values in the civil society. If there 
is some commitment to the pluralistic liberal values, then the rule adoption might bring to the 
further  diffusion  of  those  values.  The  presence  of  domestic  alternatives  to  the  values 
promoted by the democratically-oriented change agents could possibly undermine the process 
of internalization. Another important factor for the rule internalization is the rule adoption. If 
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the rule is adopted, there is a lack of domestic alternatives, and the change agents committed 
to the democratic values are present, then the democratic value can spread, bringing to an 
enlargement of the democratic constituency and some level of rule internalization might be 
achieved. 
Another  important  concept  identified  by  the  two  authors  concerns  the  cycles of  the 
international anchoring and it refers to the tendency in a certain period of time. Anchoring 
being a very long process, there might be periods when the process is going to the direction of 
the anchoring of the democratic rule of law, where different events and moments, occasionally 
close  in  time,  follow  the  same  direction.  It  can  also  happen  that  certain  periods  are 
characterized by long stops or even a reversal of direction. The switch of cycles might be a 
consequence of the feedback of the entire process that caused the change in preferences and 
incentives, but it can be triggered by other factors as well. Distinguishing between different 
cycles is an important innovation of the two authors comparing to the rest of the literature, as 
this way the linearity  assumption of the process is avoided and the “time variable” is also 
taken in consideration, allowing a better understanding of the process and variables that brings 
to a stronger democratic rule of law. 
The three layers  described here are substantially  different,  but yet  strongly interrelated. 
There can be no implementation of a rule that was not adopted, making rule adoption the 
necessary (but surely not sufficient) condition for the implementation. In order to have any 
implementation, the rule must be at least partially internalized, or, in other words, considered 
legitimate, otherwise it will become dead letter on paper. Moreover, the rule adoption and rule 
implementation are strongly linked with the institutional and administrative capacity, making 
the entire process possible  only when that capacity  begins to develop at  least through the 
process of adoption and implementation. In Figures 1 and 2 we bring the summary of the 
entire model made by Morlino and Magen with its different hypothesized connections. The 
figure  2  displays  both  the  connections  between  different  factors  of  the  three-layer  sub-
process, and the connections between the different layers. It  is important to note that the 
process of international anchoring is a complex process, with three different sub-processes 
going on, not necessarily with the same actors involved, surely not necessarily with the same 
outcome.  Such  complexity  makes  such  process  particularly  difficult  and  long:  it  may  be 
obstructed and reversed in many points, as we need a positive outcome in all three layers for 
the development of the democratic rule of law. 
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Figure 1: “The outcomes of EUCLIDA”.
 
 
(source: Morlino and Magen, 2008).
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Figure 2: “EU Cycles and Layers of International Democratic Anchoring (EUCLIDA)”. 
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Legend:
IA = international actors
ChA = Change agents
ChA’s Value commitment = commitment to values such as the rule of law, tolerance of opposition, respect for different opinions, civil and 
political rights. 
IAC = Institutional and Administrative Capacity 
CBB = Cost-Benefit Balance; a shift in CBB is related to a change in opportunities structures, empowerment of ChA or other governmental 
elite, or civil society groups, relative weakening of veto players. 
PA = Presence of Alternatives. 
RA = Rule Adoption: RA concerns the approval of domestic legislation, domestic establishment of institutions. 
RInt = Rule Internalization
RImp = rule implementation
DRoL = democratic rule of law 
Note: the three layers represent differences in the timing of the steps.
Source: Morlino and Magen, 2008.
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2. EUCLIDA REVISED
2.1. ANCHORS AND ANCHORING: ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT AND THE LEVELS OF 
ABSTRACTION
As we underlined in the previous chapter, the concept of the international anchoring is not 
limited  to  the  study  of  the  EU democracy  promotion:  the  authors  themselves  offered  a 
definition independent from the identity of the external agent, allowing any international actor 
satisfying some specific criteria to be engaged in the process. 
Before  further  developing  the  analytical  framework  for  studying  the  process  of  the 
democratization through the international anchoring, we’ll first examine the definitions of our 
core concept and try to identify the general criteria to be used when screening for possible 
agents other than the EU capable to serve as international anchors. 
The concepts of anchors and anchoring of democracy were developed by Morlino in his study of 
the Southern European democratic consolidations, where the basis of the theory of anchoring 
presented in 1998 were further developed. An anchor, as defined by the author, is:
“An institution or a mechanism, entailing organizational elements and vested interests, that is 
able to perform a hooking and binding effect on more or less organized people within a society” 
(Morlino, 2005, p. 745). 
According  to  the  theory  of  anchoring,  the  mechanism  of  anchoring  is  a  top-down 
mechanism by which the elite, by using the intermediate structures (political parties), exercises 
binding effects on the interest groups and society, in a manner to maintain the democratic 
regime.  Such  mechanism  can  serve  as  a  compensation  for  the  bottom-up  process  of 
legitimization that was traditionally conceived as a necessary condition for the consolidation 
of democracy (see Morlino 1998, p. 338-339). According to the theory of anchoring, if the 
strong anchors capable to ensure the maintaining of the regime are present, the consolidation 
is possible also in absence of the bottom-up legitimization. The type of legitimacy (exclusive 
vs. inclusive) in combination with the kind and strength of the anchors allows us not only to 
understand the consolidation in those countries with a low level of legitimization, but also to 
analyze the quality of the democracy established and the possible crisis (see Morlino, 1998, pp. 
338-345; Morlino 2005, p. 744).
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In  the  study  on  the  Southern  European  democratizations,  Morlino  identified  four 
“domestic” anchors of democracy. As under the conditions described above any institution 
can perform the anchoring effect, the author underlines that there is also a possibility that a 
regime becomes externally anchored: 
“…Supranational actor, such as the European Union, and the rules resulting of one or more 
international treaties such as those on human rights or those on the accession process to the 
Union, can exert a strong anchoring effect on political elites and citizens of a country…” (p. 750)
…  “With  an  exclusive  legitimization  and  weakly  developed  domestic  anchors,  some 
consolidation is still possible if limited sovereignty is accepted by governing elites of the country 
through  some  international  agreement  that  keeps  the  regime  democratic,  that  is,  an  external 
anchoring is achieved” (Morlino, 2005, p. 753). 
The concept of the anchors in literature was mainly analyzed in the democratization studies 
and  is  therefore  strictly  linked  to  the  anchoring  to  the  democratic  political  regime.  The 
domestic  anchors  identified  by  Morlino  were  then  necessarily  typical  anchors  for  the 
democratic regime (the links between parties and society described by Morlino are possible 
due to the presence of the democratic rules). Even though in literature the concept was never 
used to explain the consolidation of other types of regime, we can theoretically imagine the 
process  of  the  anchoring  of  an  authoritarian  regime  in  a  certain  ideology,  personality, 
institution  etc,  especially  seen  that  the  undemocratic  regime  usually  lacks  a  bottom-up 
legitimization. The international anchoring, also, is not necessarily linked to the anchoring of 
democracy. We might conceive the Soviet “block” and the communist regimes in Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, etc as anchored to a Soviet block, where the action of promotion 
of such regimes was based not only on force, but also on the socialization channels (like the 
Comintern for example). We believe that the theory of anchoring should be given a wider 
significance in the study of the consolidation of political regimes in general. This is particularly 
important for the concept of the international anchors that, as we will see, is not influenced by 
the type of domestic  regime like with the domestic anchors. This distinction between the 
content of the regime and the process of the consolidation (and/or international promotion) of 
the regime would allow us to open a number of quests for further analysis. To mention only 
some,  we  might  ask  if,  and  under  which  conditions,  there  were  cases  of  international 
anchoring of authoritarian regimes (one possible example would be the communist block), 
and, if yes, we might try to compare the efficiency of different actions when promoting a 
democratic  and  when  promoting  a  specific  authoritarian  regime.  Or  we  can  study  the 
anchoring of democracy and try to examine the impact the process of international anchoring 
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produces  on  the  domestic  anchors45.  Finally,  we  might  study  the  efficiency  of  the 
democratization through international anchoring vs. democratization through  other forms of 
international influence. 
2.1.1. INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR AND ANCHORING: DEFINITION AND CONFRONTATION 
WITH EXISTING TERMS
What  is  the  international  anchor  and  how  is  it  created?  How  does  the  international 
anchoring relate to other concepts identified in the previous chapter? 
While  the anchor of  a political  regime was defined as  an institution able to perform a 
binding effect on more or less organized people within society, the international anchor is an 
institution  (an  actor,  but  also  a  treaty,  organization  such  as  EU  with  a  large  scope  of 
competencies, but also an international convention) at the international level capable to exercise 
a  similar  effect  of  hooking  and binding  the  domestic  political  elite  and/or society  to the 
democratic norms. 
Morlino and Magen in their work define an anchor as:
“…Binding  of  domestic  institutions,  policies  and  elite  circles  to  supranational  rules  and 
institutions  characterized  by  commitment  to  liberal-democratic  values.  In  practical  terms, 
anchoring  involves:  (1)  subscription  to  international  conventions  and  soft-law  on  economic 
regulation,  protection  of  human  and  minority  rights,  anti-corruption  measures,  labor  and 
environmental  rules;  (2)  submission  to  the  jurisdiction  of  supranational  courts  (such  as  the 
European Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Court); (3) formal participation to 
various  international  institutions,  agencies  and  forums;  (4)  involvement  in  collective  conflict 
prevention, crisis management and other collaborative problem-solving activities”  (Morlino and 
Magen, 2008).
 
It represents a creation of the linkages between the target state and the international level 
that,  among  other,  also  implies  the  adherence  to  the  democratic  norms  and  creates  the 
external incentives for the domestic actors to comply. The international anchors, unlike the 
domestic  ones  that  are  democratic  per  definition,  are  not  necessarily  democratic.  This 
practically means that while the “support for the democratic regime” was self-understood in 
the mechanism of the domestic anchors and the material interests were a basis for the relation 
between the anchor, society and groups, the international anchoring must necessarily have the 
dimension of democracy promotion. 
45 Morlino underlined already  in  1998 that the European integrations  might have  a  deep impact on the 
anchors established in the countries of Southern Europe, patronage and gate-keeping role of political parties 
being identified as particularly vulnerable. See Morlino, 1998, p. 345.
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Yet, it would be erroneous to claim that the international anchoring is equivalent to the 
process of democracy promotion. The difference between the two concepts is in the level of 
abstraction, in the outcome they produce and in the focus of the analysis.  The democracy 
promotion includes a  series  of  mechanisms of  external  influence (it  can include both the 
peaceful mechanisms and those implying the use of force), and as such appears more abstract 
than the concept of international anchoring that excludes the use of force. As far as the phases  
of the democratisation process are concerned, the democracy promotion is a process that can 
be  considered  limited  to  the  instauration  of  the  democratic  regime,  while  the  anchoring 
exercises an important influence also in the phase of the consolidation and possible crisis. 
While there are no democracy promotion strategies in place in Slovenia or present-day Italy, 
we can still  claim that the anchors that were developed, domestic or international,  are still 
present and might, in case of a regime’s crisis, get again to play an important role. This takes 
us  to  the  third  important  difference  between  democracy  promotion  and  international 
anchoring:  the  capacity  of  the  anchoring  theory  to  explain  the  domestic  crisis  as  well. 
Concentrating on the international dimension of democratization as a process of building the 
international anchor of the political regime, we also have the possibility to study the crisis as 
well  as  the  de-anchoring  process,  an important  advantage if  compared to other  analytical 
frameworks and concepts. Last but not least, using the international anchoring framework to 
analyse  the  international  influence  on  the  democratisation  process  allows  us  to  make  a 
hypothesis  concerning  the  type  of  democracy  consolidated.  It  is  possible,  in  line  with 
Morlino’s argument about the domestic anchors’ effect on the type of democracy established, 
to hypothesize that the quality  of the democracy consolidated through the process of the 
international anchoring is going to be influenced by the mechanisms that linked the domestic 
and international actors.
The process of international anchoring is also linked to another important process that 
Morlino and Magen labelled “boundary removal”: 
“When we look at the experience of those Central and Eastern European Countries involved 
in the pre-accession process, a key feature of the process appears to be the effective removal of 
boundaries of the nation states involved (physical boundaries, economic, institutional, political-
cultural). This phenomenon involves not only the en bloc acceptance and internalization of EU 
laws and standards in their entirety (its acquis), but a commitment to harmonize the country’s 
domestic and even foreign policy behavior with that of the EU, in the future as well. The process 
of  boundary  removal  entails  extensive limitation (containment  of  national  sovereignty)… The 
process does not entail the mere “removal of boundaries” (as it occurs when a country is invaded 
and its territory incorporated into another political entity), but is fundamentally “constructive” – 
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there is a simultaneous process of removal of “old” national rules and institutions, with “new” 
community rules and institutions” (Morlino and Magen, 2004, p. 11).
The relationship between the anchoring and boundary removal is so close that the second 
can be considered an effect of the first. The process of the boundary removal, which in some 
cases remains on the level of the creation of the political, security, economic, geo-strategic, 
military linkage between the nation state and international level, while in others it might even 
include the full integration into a supranational entity such as the European Union, represents 
a key for understanding both the process of anchoring and the possible crisis. As Morlino 
(1998) stressed, each anchor bears the seeds of its own destruction, and the same is true for 
the  international  anchors  of  democracy.  Some  of  the  seeds  for  the  destruction  of  the 
international  anchor can be found in the process of the boundary removal and in its dual 
nature. 
The dual  nature of  the process of  the  boundary removal,  like  all  international  treaties, 
derives from the fact that while on one side it grants the participants access to some rights, 
privileges or resources, at the same time it  requires  the limitation of the sovereignty.  Any 
binding  international  agreement  or  treaty,  representing  the  commitment  to  act  in  a  certain 
manner, might be seen as the loss of a portion of sovereignty, as a sort of “integration”. The 
creation of supranational rules (be they bilateral treaties concerning only one specific area of 
policy, or the development of “state-like” actors such as the EU) represents the creation of 
the supranational authority to which the nation states decide to subordinate their sovereignty 
in the particular matter. We can conceive it as a change of the “polity” subject to the decisions 
in  a  certain  field  of  policy,  or,  to  put  it  in  Easton’s  terms  (1957),  a  change  in  “political  
community”. Such redefinition of the political community is taking place on both the nation 
state level (the decision to adhere to a treaty and be a part of a larger community) and on the 
supranational level (the new member enlarges the boundaries of the supranational political 
community), which induces us to take into consideration the costs of the linkage on both the 
domestic and on the international level.
This redefinition of the political community through the boundary removal and creation of 
the linkages between the national and supranational level is producing benefits, but it might 
also bring costs to the national elite, or to other actors of the domestic system. As such, while 
it bears the potential to exercise the anchoring effect whenever the linkage is “enriched” with 
the democracy promotion, at the same time the costs it can produce, especially if added to the 
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costs deriving from the democratisation, might become the source of the crisis and reverse the 
process into de-anchoring.
2.2. HOW DOES THE INTERNATIONAL ANCHORING WORK? 
The process of creation (and dismantling) the international anchor implies, as we saw, the 
national state, target of the process of democracy promotion and supranational actor, engaged 
in  the  democracy  promotion  through  integration.  We  excluded  the  cases  where  another 
national  state is  engaging  in  the  democracy  promotion  from the  model,  as  the  short-term 
bilateral relationships are hardly capable of becoming the “institution entailing organizational 
elements and vested interests”46. 
We can describe a process of international anchoring by starting from a point in time when 
the domestic elite,  for some reason, expresses the preference to strengthen the links or to 
become  part  of  a  certain  supranational  organization.  The  incentives  and  origins  of  such 
preference can be many: the normative pressures deriving from the international environment 
or  the  internal  pressures,  the  attractiveness  of  the  benefits  the  supranational  organization 
offers to its members, the incentives and pressures produced by IA to conduce the national 
state to adhere. The incentives to adhere might be different, and we will face the issue when 
discussing the strategies of influence, as well as when discussing the factors concerning the 
domestic and supply side. What matters is that there is an incentive for the domestic elite to 
pursue the creation of the linkage with the international actor in the form of integration or 
establishment of the contractual relations. 
On the supranational level, there are some norms and rules that the members shall comply 
with. Such norms might concern different fields of policy. If some of these norms concern the 
internal political regime, we can speak of international anchoring. For clarity purposes, we will 
refer  to such  norms  with  the  label  “democratization  package”,  distinguishing  it  from the 
norms that do not concern the internal political regime and that we will label as “integration 
package”. When compared to the existing domestic rules, the norms in the “democratization 
package” can have different levels of misfit. In some cases these norms are almost identical to 
the domestic norms, resulting in almost no change (the external actor is not performing a 
46 See Whitehead, 1986.
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regime-anchoring function47). In other cases these norms might even influence the internal 
distribution of powers and the distribution of authorities. If that happens, the domestic elite 
might  start  to  evaluate  their  preference  concerning  the  integration.  They  evaluate  the 
incentives to integrate (deriving from the organization itself or from the adjunctive incentives 
offered by  the  supranational  elite),  compare  them with  the  costs  of  compliance  with  the 
regime-related norms, which would then produce a feedback on the whole process in the 
shape of the further integration going on or not, new incentives being produced or not.
The process is presented and described in Figure 3. It appears to be quite mechanical as its 
only purpose is to illustrate the process’ skeleton, while the detailed hypothesis and factors 
would be subsequently developed. 
Until now, the model is almost identical to the EUCLIDA, and describes the process of 
the EU anchoring of the domestic political regime. But what will happen if we do not make 
any assumptions on the supply side?
The decision to redefine the political  community  concerns not only  the national  target 
state, but also the supranational organization. In the moment of the Eastern Enlargement, 
both the political community and the identity of the European Unity underwent one of the 
greatest and most important changes. It also had consequences on the distribution of powers 
within the Union and on its political authorities, and produced the incentive for a change in 
the political regime of the Union. This opens a number of questions on the incentives and 
interests that guide the supranational actor. Why did Romania and Bulgaria enter the Union, 
while Turkey still appears far away? What is the recently added clause on the “EU’s capacity to 
absorb the new members”? Why aren’t the countries of the EU Neighbouring policy (some of 
them geographically in Europe) offered a perspective of membership? Besides, why are the 
Balkans given a chance, and a very intensive process of rule promotion is going on? What 
would the consequences on the identity, regime, and the authority of EU be after integrating 
Turkey? 
47 Consider, for example, the entrance of already established democracies, such as UK, in the EU (at time 
EC). The UK’s political regime was in line with the democratic norms required by the EU for granting the 
membership.
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Figure 3: “The international anchoring of democracy”. 
Explanation: The supranational political authority, through its actions, produces the incentives 
on the national political authorities (line 1), in order to push them to “ask for” the redefinition of 
the national political community and its integration into the international political community (line 
2). Adherence to the supranational community (line 2) implies the acceptance of the supranational 
norms and rules (in other words, the acceptance of the supranational political regime). 
In the case of the international anchoring, the supranational political regime also contains, 
among others, the norms and rules concerning the domestic political regime. If there is a misfit 
between the domestic norms and promoted norms, the acceptance of these norms produces a 
change in the national political regime (line 3). The change of the domestic political regime can 
influence the domestic elite and the distribution of power (political authorities – line 4), becoming 
part  of  the  cost-benefits  calculations  that  decide  the  authorities’  preference  over  further 
integration (line 5). 
The  green  lines  represent  the  influence  on  the  domestic  political  regime  (democracy 
promotion),  the black lines represent the integration process.  Only the two,  when combined, 
make the process of international anchoring of the domestic political regime.
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The  changes  that  the  supranational  organization  is  subject  to  as  a  consequence  of 
integrating the new members induce us to introduce the concept of the cost-benefits balance 
also on the supranational level and to question the influence the process’ feedback has on the 
incentives of the international actor. For this reason we add in Figure 3 the lines connecting 
the political community, political regime and political authority on the supranational level as 
well, closing the circle of the international anchoring. 
For our analysis of democratisation, the crucial question is for what reason and in which 
measure the supranational actor is interested in the democratisation of the target state. These 
incentives can change over time, together with the change of the incentives for the integration. 
The preferences of both supranational and domestic actors can change, and this produces 
consequences on the course of the entire process. 
We will illustrate this by following a hypothetical example:
Imagine  that  a  certain  supranational  organization  is  strongly  interested  in  the 
democratisation of a certain state in the region due to its security concerns. The domestic 
authoritarian (or “semi authoritarian”) elite is attracted by the supranational actor’s economic, 
political,  military  advantages (the  outcomes of  the supranational  system),  and/or  by other 
incentives offered by the international actor. Let us also assume that the incentives offered by 
the IA are strong enough to compensate for the elite’s costs deriving from the compliance 
(the international actor pressing for democratisation by offering material/social incentives is not 
a new concept in literature). As time elapses, and the transition and even some consolidation 
take place, the international actor’s goal (security) can be reached and the original incentive for 
the further integration of the state can cease to exist (or it might change: for example, the 
discourse that was used to promote the integration in the first period now represents the 
commitment  that  it  is  difficult  not  to  respect).  On  the  national  level,  the  incentives  for 
integration might also change: as the transition takes place, the newly-introduced democratic 
regime  creates  a  new  elite  whose  stability  and  power  in  the  possibly  unstable  political 
environment depends on the rules supported by the supranational actor and the membership 
in the supranational organization. They seek to lock the democratic reforms undertaken in, 
linking the fragile domestic regime to the international level, a step often important for both 
their  domestic  credibility  and  for  their  credibility  to  the  eyes  of  possible  international 
partners.48 In this  case,  what was perceived at  the beginning as  a  cost  of  integration (the 
48 On  the  incentives  the  newly-born  democracies  have  for  locking  the  reforms  in  by  adhering  to  the 
international organizations promoting democracy, see Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006, pp. 140 – 142.
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consequence  on  the  political  regime  and  political  authority),  now  becomes  a  benefit 
(maintenance  of  the  democratic  political  regime  and  authority).  Pevehouse  envisaged  the 
possibility that the domestic actors decide to adhere to democratic IO in order to preserve and 
consolidate the newly established, fragile democracies (Pevehouse, 2002).
Finally,  when full  consolidation  is  achieved  and the  pressures towards authoritarianism 
extinguished, the domestic democratic elite  does not have to account for the international 
guarantees  of  their  power,  as  their  position  is  fully  legitimized,  and  again,  the  necessary 
incentives for the following integration might change again. 
The three  moments  described above are critical  for the  process,  as  the  change of  the 
structures  of  incentives  might  directly  influence  the  efficiency  of  the  strategies  in  place. 
Moreover, the phases of the change of domestic actors incentives correspond to the phases of 
democratisation:  the first phase is  the one prior to the instauration of the full  democratic 
regime (transition),  the  second one  concerns  the  period  of  consolidation,  while  the  third 
phase, in which the external actor is not crucial for the regime’s stability, corresponds to the 
moment of the achieved consolidated democracy. 
Until  this  point,  for  illustrative  reasons  we  used  a  simplified  vision  of  all  the  crucial 
elements involved in the process. We assumed one single supranational  actor,  having one 
system of preferences, a target state was also conceived as the unitary actor, and the promoted 
regime was  conceived  as  “one package of  norms”.  We chose  to use this  mechanical  and 
abstract presentation in order to illustrate and clarify the concept of international anchoring. 
In  the  following  paragraphs  we  will  discard  each  of  these  simplifying  assumptions  and 
examine the crucial elements of the process. We will  sum the factors on the supranational 
level  up in  three  groups:  international  actors’  interest,  international  actors’  capacities,  and 
international  actor’s approach.  Interests  and priorities of the actor involved in the process of 
democracy promotion are, as we will see and as Whitehead already taught us, an important 
factor determining the actions of the international actor. The capacity of the actor (resources 
and institutional capacity),  would influence the choice of strategies and the efficiency of the 
outcome.  Finally,  the  approach of  the  international  actor  consists  of  two  “subgroups”  of 
variables: on the one hand we have the particular  content  of the norms the actor decides to 
promote. How does the IA define democracy and what does it promote? On the other we 
have the strategies an actor has at disposal. How does the actor promote the norms?
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2.3. INTERNATIONAL ACTOR’S INTEREST AND PRIORITIES
Each supranational organization is based on some kind of values and is made with some 
specific goal in the mind of its creators. At its very birth, the organization usually does not 
have any international reputation  or authority to make the membership attractive merely on 
the grounds of its prestige. The first members are guided by the interests, the purpose they see 
in the organization. In the language of the theory of organizations, the organization (in our 
case the  supranational  one)  is  created with some  purpose.  Such purpose is  linked  with the 
interest  the  foundation  members  seek  through  their  adherence  to  the  newly  emerging 
organization,  be it  military,  economic or political.  This original  goal  of the organization is 
important to bear in mind but, as we saw in the example of the EU, as time passes,  the 
organizations take a life of their own, and the interests might change, re-define, develop and 
become richer. Both the inside factors (in this case the member states) and the environmental 
factors can produce the change. For example, while the European common agriculture policy 
was  created  due  to  internal  incentives,  the  European  foreign  and  security  policy  was 
significantly influenced by the Balkan wars and later by terrorism, both factors deriving from 
the environment. 
The system of preferences of the organization, as well as the system of preferences of its 
members – which might diverge – can influence the process of democracy promotion (see 
Whitehead,  1996).  When  we  talk  about  the  process  of  the  international  anchoring  of 
democracy,  we  shall  examine  two  particular  motivations:  the  interests  that  push  the 
organization to accept new members (where do the incentives to integrate and to enlarge 
come from?) and the interests in democratizing the target country. The two will be strongly 
influenced by the  particularities  of  the target  state:  not  all  countries  are equally  welcome, 
which means that we should examine both the organization’s  general  set of interest, and its 
interests in a particular region or state. 
Why does an organization decide to accept new members? In function of  the political 
regime  of  the  supranational  organizations,  the  process  of  enlargement  might  bear  the 
consequences on the internal distribution of power. It can influence the distribution of power 
between the different institutions of the supranational system, as well as the distribution of 
power between the member states. We shall thus wonder  why  to enlarge? In the process of 
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international anchoring, the integration itself can be a goal, or it can be perceived as a price to 
pay in order to democratize a particular state. 
If integration is a goal itself (due to the symbolic, military, economic, geopolitical interests 
of  the  supranational  organization  or  of  its  members),  we  can  expect  that  the  accent  the 
supranational  actor puts on the democracy promotion might be weaker. When democracy 
promotion takes place in such context, we can hypothesize that the IA would be keen to use 
“softer” measures and indicators when assessing the compliance with the democratic norms. 
In  other  words,  whenever  the  interest  to  integrate  and  democratize  are  in  conflict,  the 
integration  will  be  given  precedence  over  the  democratization49.  The  possible  conflict  of 
interests  between the different  institutions  and levels  composing  the  supranational  system 
would only further complicate and undermine the process by imprinting, as we will see later, 
on the determinacy and credibility of the IA’s action.
Another  situation  is  when the  integration  is  used as  a  reward for  complying  with  the 
democratic norms promoted by the IA, whose main interest is to spread democracy. In this 
case,  it  is  particularly  interesting  to understand the  values,  concepts  and interests  that  lie 
behind the democracy promotion. When democracy is conceived as a  mean  for other goals 
(like  an  instrument  of  security  and/or  economic  policy),  the  IA’s  action  might  be 
compromised and might switch to tolerate even the undemocratic elite, if the ultimate goals 
are at stake. On the other hand, where democracy is promoted for the sake of the democratic 
values, the credibility of both conditionality and socialization is higher. 
As we previously underlined, the interests and preferences might change and in some cases 
this change represents a crucial point in the process of the anchoring of democracy. We shall 
be particularly careful to identify these changes and their impact on both the promotion of the 
democracy and integration process. 
2.4. INTERNATIONAL ACTOR’S CAPACITY
The capacity to promote the norms, to put pressure onto the future members, to enforce 
the  decisions  and  to  monitor  the  implementation  all  are  crucial  factors  determining  the 
outcome of the international actor’s activities.  The intention to undertake an action, if not 
completed with the ability to act, is meaningless. The supranational organization’s capacity is a 
49 As Whitehead stressed, not all good things come together.
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product  of  its  characteristics  and  resources.  We  can  distinguish  between  the  material 
resources, the social and normative resources, the organizational resources and the “network” 
resources. 
The material resources are linked to the type of organization and part of the material resources 
comes from the “goods” and “benefits”  the organization  produces  for its  members.  The 
goods the organization produces represent a resource the organization can use to support the 
compliance, and, as such, they influence the number and kind of incentives the organization 
can offer. 
As we will see in the section dealing with the strategies, different strategies are linked to the 
different types of incentives used. In line with the distinction between the social and material 
incentives,  we  can  distinguish  between  the  organizations  based  on  material  goals  vs. 
organization embracing also symbolic values. The organization’s capacity to successfully use a 
particular mechanism of influence would depend on the incentives it can produce50. 
The material values (security, richness, preferential agreements, cooperation in a particular 
area  policy)  are  connected  with  the  policy  areas  in  which  the  supranational  actor  has 
competencies. We can distinguish between the supranational systems with a large number of 
integration  “areas”,  and  those  where  boundary  removal  tackles  only  one  or  few areas  of 
policy.  The areas of policy  the supranational  organization covers  represent the  goal  of the 
integration: the larger the number of policy fields, the larger the goal of the integration. The 
larger the goal of the integration, the more different goods the organization produces for the 
members (but, at the same time, the “larger” the potentially perceived loss of sovereignty). 
The substantial  difference between the EU, whose competencies cover numerous areas of 
policy, and NATO lies, among other, also in the number of policy areas they cover. These 
areas are a potential resource of both benefits and costs, and it will be the empirical research 
to establish how different the domestic actors perceive these dimensions. 
The social and symbolic  values of the organization give the possibility to exercise normative 
pressures or to engage in the process of the social learning. The social and symbolic values of 
50 Thus, Mattina (2004) underlines that it was precisely an incapacity of the EU to create a single European 
foreign and security policy that pushed Europe to follow the “democratization through expansion strategies” and 
to develop foreign politics grounded on aid and economic cooperation as instruments to follow the political 
goals. Mattina stresses: “La scelta di adottare le politiche di aiuto e cooperazione economica ai fini politici nasce 
dal fatto che l’UE è un’organizzazione sopranazionale con un potere centrale poco coeso, dotato di potestà 
limitata, e praticamente privo di mezzi di offesa e dissuasione; perciò strutturalmente incapace di divenire, anche 
in  un  futuro  lontano,  una  potenza  militare  paragonabile  a  quella  degli  Stati  Uniti.  Per  tali  ragioni  l’UE  è 
interessata a sviluppare un sistema internazionale autoregolato da leggi e norme che ne consentono il pacifico 
sviluppo attraverso la cooperazione transnazionale”. Mattina, 2004, p. 315.
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the organization depend on the values upon which the organization is based, on the authority 
and prominence of its members and on the reputation of the organization and its members. 
The UN membership, for example, is a symbol of the state’s sovereignty and independence, 
which made the “seat of UN” one of the most often underlined requests of the newly born 
states.  The EU became a symbol  of democratic  values, tolerance,  diversity,  human rights, 
while the G8 or a permanent membership in the UN Security Council are the symbols of the 
state’s power. The identity of the supranational group, as well as the significance the target state 
is  associating  with  the  supranational  group,  represents  an  important  factor  for  both  the 
democracy-promotion capacity of the institution, and for the strength of the attractiveness it 
represents for the specific target state. We will  see in the section on socialization how the 
“desire  to  be  a  part  of  a  good standing group” can force  the  states  to comply  with  the 
necessary requests to be recognized as a group member.
Another  important  issue  to  include  in  the  analysis  concerns  the  components  of  the 
international  organization.  Which  countries  form  the  organization,  what  are  their 
characteristics, political regime, international authority, economic and military potentials? 
All  these  factors  influence  the  reputation  of  the  organization,  and  can  influence  the 
credibility of its action. The geographical position of the member states (concentrated in a 
region or spread all over the world) is also an important characteristic, as the studies showed 
the  particular  advantage  of  the  regional  organizations  in  the  norm promotion.  Pevehouse 
expressed this point and even used it to exclude the global international organization from the 
analysis. The theoretical ground for such decision was that size matters: according to the author, 
“ …Because regional IOs tend to operate with small numbers and higher levels of interaction 
than  global  organizations,  causal  processes  such  as  socialization,  binding,  monitoring  and 
enforcement are more likely. Moreover, the regional IOs are more likely to possess the leverage to 
press the member states to democratize as the vast majority of economic and military agreements 
are made under the auspices of, or to create, international organizations. ” (Pevehouse, 2002, p. 
520). 
The political regime and the distribution of the authorities on the supranational level, both 
official and empirical, are also an important issue to tackle. For example, if the norm is to be 
promoted through the socialization mechanisms, the very promotion of the norm shall be 
considered legitimate. It is difficult to imagine how an organization ruled by de-iure or de-
facto undemocratic  practices could be perceived as legitimate when promoting democratic 
norms. Again, if the organization is dominated by one (or few) powers, there is a risk that it 
might be conceived as an “instrument” in the power states’ hands (an example can be NATO 
that is believed to be dominated by USA and USA's interests). 
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The level of the organization of the supranational system is also relevant. Is it only a forum 
of the leaders, the international treaty, or does it have a structure, developed institutions, and 
organigram? How much are these structures developed? How independent are they? In which 
measure  are  they  institutionalized  and  entrenched  in  their  own  interests?  What  is  the 
distribution  of  power  between  the  supranational  level  and  its  member  states?  Does  the 
supranational bodies have the decision-making power? How are their decisions implemented? 
Are  there  any  mechanisms  developed  for  monitoring  the  compliance?  Is  there  a  well-
developed institutional  administrative  capacity  on the supranational  level  necessary for the 
enforcement of its decisions and monitoring of the compliance? As we saw, all these questions 
become important as they might influence the determinacy of the conditionality. 
The conditions for membership and expulsion can also influence the IA’s potential for 
democracy  promotion.  Reiter  (2001)  observed  how NATO,  not  having  the  possibility  to 
exclude from its lines the members that overthrow, or switch away from democracy, is not 
capable to make its conditionality credible. On the other hand, organizations such as the EU, 
Organization of American States, Mercosur (Southern Cone Common Market), all contain a 
clause which allows the imposition of sanctions, suspension from participation or suspension 
of benefits in case the members do not comply with the democratic criteria established by the 
organization. 
The procedure of adherence and possible expulsion are meaningful information to take in 
consideration when analyzing the credibility of both the threat and the reward. Who decides if 
a state is to be accepted as a member or not? Is the decision brought by the supranational 
bodies, or can the member states veto the process? If the member states can veto the process, 
which actors  are exercising  this  power,  the  ruling  elite  or  the electorate?  The referendum 
requirements some countries have when it comes to the  change  of international treaties can 
raise concerns about the credibility of the reward51. 
Finally, the level of linkage between the organization and other supranational organizations, 
through both the shared members and the cooperation, might also be an important factor in 
contributing to raise the organization’s power and to increase its leverage on the target state. 
The existence of the linkage between the Council of Europe, EU and OSCE means that the 
coordinated action between these actors can increase the conditionality potentials of each of 
them. The state preference to adhere to one of them can open the door to the influence of all 
51 Here we can recall the 2001 referendum in Ireland, when the voters refused the Nice treaty, bringing thus 
in question also the enlargement to Eastern Europe.
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others.  As the analysis  of the EU documents showed, the EU often uses its  authority  to 
condition the integration process with respect for other international norms, and particularly 
the respect for the various European supranational organizations norms. 
2.5. INTERNATIONAL ACTOR’S APPROACH 
With the  term  approach  we understand both  the  content  and the  strategies  implied  in  the 
process of the democracy promotion. The argument is that both  what  norms are promoted 
and how, through which channels of influence  these norms are promoted, might have an important 
impact on the success of the democracy promotion. The actor promoting democracy assumes 
the existence of a certain link between the promoted norms and the outcomes expected, and, 
on the  basis  of  such assumptions  and on understanding  of  the  domestic  politics,  the  IA 
creates beliefs on what are the best practices to follow in the specific case. For example, we 
can observe how, from the international NGOs, such as human rights watch, to the nation 
states like USA, there is the diffused belief that the very first step to undertake in promoting 
democracy is the promotion of free elections establishing the electoral democracy, active civil 
society and freedom of speech. Yet, as Snyder convincingly argued, this widely accepted recipe 
for democracy (elections, freedom of speech and active civil society) in the context of weak 
democratic  institutions,  often brings  to  the  nationalist  appeals  and to all  obstacles  to the 
democratization the nationalism and possible nationalist conflict might bring to (see Snyder, 
2000, p. 40). 
The content  of the rules promoted can also vary within the template of  the particular 
international  organization  that  defines  the  specific,  target-tailored  content  of  the  rule 
promotion. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2005) find out that the EU approaches to 
the minority rights significantly varied between the candidate countries (particularly in the case 
of Slovakia and Latvia). Finally, it can even vary with time, similarly to Kelly’s “learning by 
doing” concept, where the international  actor, after observing the impact produced by the 
promotion of the specific norm in time T0, adjusts the content of the rule promoted in time 
T1. 
The  above  examples  and  observations  serve  to  illustrate  how  even  the  most  widely 
accepted beliefs about democratization (importance of the free elections) are not always the 
best  practice  to  follow,  bringing  the  causal  beliefs  upon  which  the  IA  is  basing  its 
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recommendations  to  the  centre  of  the  attention.  Being  so,  we  can  hypothesize  that  the 
content of the promoted norms influences the exit of the democracy promotion and that the 
failure to democratize might be a product of the inadequate content of the promoted norms. 
The understanding of what democracy is, which level of democracy we are aspiring to, how to 
reach a certain level of democracy quality and how to measure it, all  are questions that in 
absence  of  a  single,  widely  accepted  answer,  can  significantly  influence  the  process  of 
democracy promotion. We therefore prefer to include the  content of the promoted norms among 
the independent variables, and in this manner to adopt an approach according to which more 
than one type of democracy exist, and the very content of the definition given to democracy 
can influence the exit of the process. 
As far as the strategies of influence  are concerned, here we refer to the different strategies of 
the  democracy  promotion  the  enlargement,  Europeanization,  and  democracy  promotion 
literature explored. The international actor might decide to influence the decision of the ruling 
elite through the conditionality, by offering material rewards or “punishments” to change the 
costs and benefits calculations of the domestic actors, or it might try to influence the domestic 
distribution of power by supporting one actor against the others in order to strengthen the 
pro-democratic forces or even to bring to a change of the ruling elite. It might use the social 
influence  in  order  to achieve  “the  pro-norm behaviour  through the  distribution  of  social 
rewards and punishments” (Flockhart, 2005, p. 97), or it might use the international forums 
and networks as favourable settings for the social learning and persuasion in order to achieve 
the change of identities and preferences. These four channels of action significantly differ in 
the resources they are based on, in the mechanisms they use, in the conditions influencing 
their efficiency and, it is possible to hypothesize, in the outcomes they produce. The decision 
to use one mechanisms of  influence rather than another,  and to use one resource in  the 
process rather  than another,  is  another  dimension of  the IA’s  particular  approach that  is 
important for understanding the exit. 
 
2.5.1. THE CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE
In order to analyze the manners in which the IA can influence the domestic politics we 
identify  four  different  strategies  the  international  actors  might  use  in  order  to  press  the 
domestic elite to comply with the supranational norms: conditionality, social influence, social 
learning  and influence on the  domestic  distribution  of  power.  Each of  these  channels  of 
influence intervenes with the domestic arena, producing, under the specific conditions and in 
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a specific manner, the incentives that might influence the domestic actors’ choices and bring 
to  the  compliance.  Functioning  through  different  mechanisms  and  relying  on  different 
relations of power, these strategies produce different effects on the domestic arena. 
The effects of these strategies are strictly linked with the conflictuality deriving from the 
power-relations that are at the basis of a particular channel of influence. With the term “level 
of conflictuality”, we refer to the probability that a particular action ends up with conflict 
between the domestic actors and the IA. The point becomes much clearer if we think of the 
differences  between  persuading  and  threatening  a  particular  actor  in  order  to  achieve 
compliance. While persuasion and argumentation will not produce a conflict between the IA 
and the targeted domestic actors, the threat might bring to such exit. The conflictuality linked 
to the particular strategy, however, does not necessarily mean that the conflict between the 
domestic and the International Actor will emerge. It refers to the type and the level of conflict 
that  might  emerge,  and  on  the  reactions  of  the  domestic  actors.  When  analyzing  the 
conditionality strategy, Grabbe (2001) underlined, for example, that withdrawing the promised 
reward bears significant risks, as the national government may not respond by improving the 
compliance, but by blaming the IA for unfair discrimination and appealing to the national 
pride.  As  Newton  taught  us,  an  action  is  always  paired  with  reaction,  and  the  level  of 
conflictuality refers to the probability of the reaction that would harm the relations between 
the IA and the particular domestic actors.
Acting  through  different  mechanisms,  the  different  channels  of  influence  produce  a 
different kind of compliance. On the basis of the impact that the IA’s action produces on the 
domestic actor’s preferences, we can distinguish between two types of compliance. The first, 
that we will label “consensual compliance”, refers to the situation where the compliance is a 
product of the interiorization of the norm. As the norm is  internalized, there is no further 
need for the external intervention for ensuring the implementation,  unless in the situation 
when the actor, willing to comply, does not have the necessary resources to do so. Another 
kind of compliance, qualitatively different, is the “controversial compliance”. It is a situation 
when, due to the IA’s action, the actor is complying with the norm he has not internalized and 
does not share. As the action of the IA brought to the compliance without a change in the 
target’s  preferences,  the  actors  will  have  the  incentives  to,  whenever  possible,  avoid  the 
compliance. What can be expected is fake compliance (with compliance only on paper, not in 
the substance),  partial compliance (compliance only with some aspects of the norm, other 
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aspects being neglected), or lack of implementation of the rules promoted. In such situation, 
only  the  subsequent  IA’s  action,  or the  emergence,  on the  domestic  level,  of  new actors 
capable to push the compliance forward can ensure that the norm is properly implemented 
even when the reward was already achieved52. 
In  the  sections  to follow,  we will  examine  the  necessary  conditions  for  each of  these 
channels of influence to produce a positive result, together with the consideration of the level 
of conflictuality a particular strategy produces and the type of compliance we can expect.
2.5.1.1. Democratic Conditionality
The model  of  democratic  conditionality  is  one  of  the  most  developed  models  of  the 
externally driven rule promotion. It is grounded in the rationalist  theory and in bargaining 
logic, both assuming that the actors involved are strategic utility maximizers, interested in the 
maximization of their  own power and welfare.  The external  actor uses its  supremacy and 
power  deriving  from its  capability  of  providing  economic  aid,  political  support,  security, 
access to resources etc.  in order to condition the adoption and implementation of certain 
rules. 
The literature distinguishes two types of conditionality. The first one is reinforcement by reward 
(reactive reinforcement in the terminology of Schimmelfennig, 2001), where the international 
actor grants the reward if the government complies with its requirements, and withholds the 
reward if it fails to comply  (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004, p. 662).  The reward may 
consist  in  economic  aid,  favourable  trade  arrangements,  financial  help,  steps  towards 
integration. The other possibility is to intervene coercively to change the cost-benefits assessment 
and  behaviour  of  the  target  government  by  inflicting  extra  costs  (reinforcement  by 
punishment, see Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003, pp. 496-497; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeir, 2004, pp. 663-664; on the costs of reinforcement by punishment, see Grabbe 2001, 
p. 1021). 
The outcome is  a  result  of  the bargaining  process between the  external  actor and the 
government, the attractiveness of the reward (both in terms of speed and size), the relative 
force of the actors involved, the credibility of the threat and domestic costs of compliance (for 
52 This distinction between consensual and controversial compliance is inspired by the distinction Stoppino 
(2001) made when speaking about the difference of “the will” between the two agents entering the relations of 
power. The author draws a distinction between those cases where the power exercised by A brings to a change in 
the preferences of B and the situation when the exercised power brings to compliance but not to the change of 
the original preferences.
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specific hypotheses developed for each of these variables see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 
2004, p. 664). The determinacy (specificity) refers to the clarity and formality of the promoted 
rule, and is mainly influenced by the content of the promoted norms (see the next section). The 
higher the clarity  and formality,  the easier the monitoring of the implementation,  and the 
clearer the standards towards which both the external actor and the government can measure 
the  performance.  High  determinacy  has  informational,  credibility  and  binding  effect.  It 
provides  the  target  government  with the  road map for  what precisely  should be  done,  it 
increases  the  credibility  of  the  threat  as  it  narrows  the  scope  for  the  interpretation  and 
manipulation  of  the  rule  and  increases  the  monitoring  capacities.  On  another  hand,  it 
increases the credibility  of  the  reward as  it  binds  the international  actor by  removing the 
possibility for the unjust claim that the conditions have not been fulfilled (see Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeir, 2004, p. 664). 
Attractiveness  of  the  reward  is  another  source  of  variation  under  a  strategy  of 
reinforcement by reward. It is usually hypothesized that the shorter the temporal distance and 
the higher the reward, the higher shall the incentive for compliance be53. In the case of the 
international  anchoring,  the  highest  award  the  international  actor  can  offer  is  the  full 
membership, but it is also the one requiring long-term dedicated actors. Some supranational 
systems,  like  EU,  developed different  steps  and “checkpoints”  in  the  integration  process, 
where a series of funds and arrangements “open up” as the country advances on its road to 
full membership. 
The credibility of conditionality refers to the costs and the credibility of the external actor 
in withholding and granting the reward. The superior bargaining power of the external actor 
can contribute both to make its threats credible and to offer certainty about the conditional 
payments. The bargaining power of the external actor in this dimension is a tricky variable, 
sometimes creating centripetal forces: in other words, the incapacity of the external actor to 
withhold the reward without suffering important costs decreases the credibility of the threat, 
but increases the credibility of the reward. 
Moreover,  the  credibility  is  also  influenced  by  the  consistency  of  the  organization’s 
allocation of rewards and strongly dependent on the IA’s interests in democratizing and/or 
integrating the target state. “If the EU were perceived to subordinate conditionality to other 
political, strategic, or economic considerations, the target states might either hope to receive 
the benefits without fulfilling the conditions or conclude that it will not receive the rewards at 
53 See Morlino and Magen, 2008, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005.
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any rate. In both cases, the target state will fail to adopt the EU rules” (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeir, 2004, p. 666). As we included the interests of the IA in the model as one of the 
independent variables,  particular attention should be paid in order to distinguish the cases 
where the domestic actors believe that the reward can be achieved without compliance from 
those cases where, due to the IA’s interests, the conditionality linked with the democratization 
is weaker. In the first case, we speak about the hampered credibility of the conditionality due 
to  the  target  state’s  perception  of  the  IA’s  priorities.  In  the  second,  we  have  weaker 
conditionality (in terms of the size of the reward), which is a product of the IA’s voluntary 
decision  to  associate  the  reward  with  compliance  to  the  issues  that  do  not  concern  the 
democratization process.
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir  consider the “presence/absence of a credible alternative 
source  offering  comparable  benefits  at  lower  adjustment  costs”  (Schimmelfennig  and 
Sedelmeir,  2004,  pp.  665-666)  as  another  important  issue  that  influences  the  credibility. 
Actually,  the  presence  of  alternatives  does  not  directly  influence  the  credibility,  but  the 
domestic actor’s perception of the reward’s size, and, as such, the presence of alternatives, is 
included in the EUCLIDA model as the factor on domestic level  (see the section on the 
EUCLIDA above).
The  last  set  of  variables  usually  included  in  the  models  of  democratic  conditionality 
concerns the adoption costs and the number of veto players. The adoption costs concern the 
distance of the norm promoted from the domestic status quo. Where there is a greater cultural 
mismatch,  the  distance  from the  domestic  status  quo to  the  externally  promoted  rule  is 
greater,  which  increases  the  costs  of  compliance54.  As  this  factor  is  tightly  linked  to  the 
content of the promoted norms, we will consider its impact in the next section. Similarly, the 
preferences and relative power of the veto players that might obstruct the democratization, 
the process of boundary removal or both,55 is a domestic factor already included among the 
independent variables of the EUCLIDA model. 
What impact and what level of compliance can we expect in those cases where the norm is 
promoted through the conditionality channel?
The conditionality, as a strategy of influence, implies a certain level of conflictuality, which 
varies  from  high  to  low  as  we  pass  from  the  conditionality  through  reward  to  the 
54 See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004 pp. 666 – 667; Morlino and Magen, 2008, on the misfit see also 
Borzel and Risse, 2000.
55 On the veto players see Tsebelis, 2002; on veto players in the democratic conditionality see Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeir 2004, on the importance of veto players in studies on europeanization see Borzel and Risse, 2000.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 70
conditionality through threat. While in the case of threat, the level of the conflictuality that 
such strategy causes is so high that the threat is even rarely used by the international actors56, 
the level of conflictuality of withdrawing the promised reward depends on the importance of 
the reward and on the domestic actor’s perceptions on the legitimacy of such action. If the 
reward is not too important and/or if all domestic actors accept the blame for not respecting 
the deal, the withdrawal of the reward might not produce a conflict between the target state 
and the IA. But when the reward is crucial for the target state, when the domestic actors 
consider the IA’s action illegitimate, or when, in order to avoid domestic criticisms, they have 
the  possibility  to  delegitimize  such IA’s  action,  the  level  of  the  produced conflictuality  is 
almost the same, if not even higher, as that produced by the conditionality through threat. 
Besides  risking  to cause a  conflict  between the domestic  and international  actors,  thus 
influencing  the  entire  process  of  the  international  anchoring,  the  compliance  that  can  be 
expected when this strategy is used is also ambiguous. As the conditionality acts upon the 
domestic actors’  costs and benefits calculations without influencing their  values, goals and 
preferences, the level  of compliance will  depend on the further structure of the costs and 
benefits  for  the  stakeholders.  Once  the  reward  is  achieved,  the  original,  unchanged 
preferences  of  the  domestic  stakeholders  might  bring  to  the  obstruction  of  the 
implementation, or even to the re-establishment of the previous practice. If the temporary 
compliance with the norm did not create new change agents on the domestic level, able to 
ensure further respect for the norm, the rule implementation will be seriously hampered and it 
will depend on whether or not the IA continues to exercise strong conditionality in order to 
ensure the implementation. The recent studies on the conditionality channel offer a series of 
empirical  examples  of  such  gap  between  the  levels  of  compliance  registered  in  the  rule 
adoption  layer  and  the  compliance  in  the  layer  of  rule  implementation57,  between  the 
normative  framework  and  the  practice  on  the  grounds58.  We  then  expect  to  register  a 
controversial compliance in cases of norms promoted through the conditionality channel.
2.5.1.2. Socialization
While  the  mechanism of  conditionality  was  at  the  centre  of  the  international  relation 
studies from its very origins (the realist turn in international relations can be dated back to 
56 See Grabbe, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004, 2005.
57 See Morlino and Magen, 2008. See also Checkel, 2000.
58 See Checkel, 2000.
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Thucydides), the concept of socialization only recently gained its space, with the development 
of  the  constructivist  approaches  to  the  IR.  The  same  is  true  for  the  literature  on  the 
democracy  promotion  where,  due  to  the  different  influences  coming  from  the  IR,  the 
europeanization59 and public policy studies, the concept bears the mark of different uses and 
definitions prevailing in different disciplines and schools of thought. 
As we will see, there are competitive definitions of the concept of socialization, reflecting 
the  debate  between  the  “normativists”  (or  “softer”  constructivists)  and  “radical” 
constructivists.60 
On  the  one  hand,  we  have  the  school  of  thought  known  as  “normativist”  or  “soft-
constructivist”,  according  to  which  the  ideas  matter  as  they  constrain the  behavior,  and 
according to which the institutionalized norms limit the behaviour of those actors who are 
assumed to follow the logic of appropriateness (Checkel, 1997). In these studies, the actor’s 
identity  is  external  to  the  theoretical  models,  his  ideas  and  preferences  being  exogenous 
variables. If we turn to the question made by Risse (2000) – “What is actually at stake in the 
constructivists/rationalists debate?” – the approach described enters the dialogue with realists 
by examining what is  the motor of the behavior, the logic of appropriateness or the logic of 
consequence.  We  shall  however  observe  how  the  two  “logics”  are  not  in  fact  mutually 
exclusive: it is possible to argue that those following the logic of appropriateness are acting in 
line with the logic of consequentiality with the only difference that in the calculus of the costs 
and interests the symbolic  values are also included. The “polarity” between this school of 
constructivists and the rationalists becomes not the origin of the interests, as they are assumed 
to be given, but the “strength” of the material and non-material incentives. If we turn to the 
theories of power in order to understand the dynamics in the two mechanisms, we can notice 
how the two actually share a form of exercising power (reward or punishment), but differ in 
values that are at the basis of power and the arenas in which the power is  exercised (see 
Laswell and Kaplan 1950).
59 From the different meanings the  europeanization might refer to, here we use it in line with Bulmer and 
Radaeli, who define europeanization as a “Processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms 
which  are  first  defined  and  consolidated  in  the  making  of  the  EU  public  policy  and  politics  and  then 
incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies”, and it refers 
to the EU effects on the member states.
60 Thus Checkel (1997) distinguishes between constructivists and normativists (both studying the importance 
of the norms and identities), to pass, in 2001, to distinguish “two kinds” of constructivism and two directions of 
the constructivist research, ontologically rather different.
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Another path of constructivism, according to Checkel the “radical constructivism”, argues 
that the ideas constitute the behavior. Our identities, preferences and interests are not given but 
built and shaped by our values and ideas. This brings the actors’ identities and preferences 
inside the model, and the main question of these researches is how the identities, preferences 
and ideas are shaped and changed, social learning being a key to understand the creation and 
change  of  the  actor’s  preferences.  The  concepts  of  social  learning  and  persuasion  were 
previously  developed  in  the  literature  on  public  policy,  where  the  analytical  models 
distinguishing between different types of ideas and conditions facilitating the social learning 
were created.61 
In line with the distinction between the different “constructivists”, we can find different 
meanings of the concept of “socialization” in literature:
• Socialization as a synonym for  social  influence and mechanisms where the ideas are a 
constraining behavior: in this group, we can find Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) who 
stress that the term “applies to the mechanisms that involve diplomatic praise or censure, 
bilateral or multilateral, reinforced by material sanctions and incentives”. To refer to 
social  learning,  the  two  authors  use  the  term  “persuasion”,  where  the  difference 
between the two lies in the level of the interiorization of the rule.
•  Socialization  as  a  synonym for  social  learning  and  persuasion:  this  usage  can  be 
identified in the works of Pevehouse, where the author uses the term “socialization” 
when speaking about learning and persuasion through which the beliefs and identities 
are  changed  (Pevehouse,  2002).  Similarly,  in  the  literature  developed  in  the  public 
policy analysis, where the authors analyzing social learning use the term socialization as 
the “exposure to certain cultural environments that shape our ideas” (Haas 1992, 2004, 
Hall 1993, Sabatier 1999).
• Finally, beside these two more narrow usages, there is a tendency to use “socialization” 
as a wider term, referring both to persuasion (social learning) and to social influence 
(and the constraining mechanisms of the norms). Such use can be found in Flockhart 
(2005, 2006), Kelley, 2004 or Johnston (2001). 
In this study we will use the term “socialization” in its wider meaning, including both the 
identified subtypes, conceiving it as a larger category characterized by the fact that it is based 
61 For a discussion on epistemological causes and implications of the constructivist’s analysis, which considers 
only persuasion as a mechanism of socialization, see Johnston, 2001, p. 495.
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on the norms, ideas, identities and culture, unlike the term “conditionality”, which we will use 
to refer to the channels of influence based on the material bargaining. As Johnston (2001) 
underlined, even though the ideal of socialization consists in the internalization of the norm, 
yet:
“there can be various degrees of internalisation, given that not all actors are always exposed to 
exactly  the  same  configuration  of  social  pressures.  While  pro-social  behaviour  may  be  ideal 
because of its appropriateness, at the opposite end of the spectrum there should be pro-social 
behaviour because of its material consequences (positive and negative). At this point, pro-social 
behaviour cannot be attributed to internalisation or socialization in pro-social norms of the group.
But if the internalisation of pro-social values is the hallmark of socialization, and if the other 
end of the spectrum is behaviour motivated by the calculation of material costs and benefits, this 
leaves a vast amount of pro-social behaviour produced by neither process.” (Johnston 2001, p. 
495).
Johnston identifies two mechanisms of socialization: “persuasion” and “social influence”. 
While persuasion and social learning are accepted forms of socialization, social influences are 
not always considered a technique of socialization. Understanding social influence as a form 
of socialization means understanding the socialization as a behaviour guided by the logic of 
appropriateness, as a pro-social behaviour, independently on the level of interiorization of the 
rule. As Johnston underlined, what makes social influence a kind of pro-social behaviour is the 
fact that the rewards and punishment (used in the process) are social. They are social because 
“only groups can provide them, and only groups whose approval an actor values will have this 
influence. Thus, social influence rests on the influenced actor having prior identification with 
a relevant reference group” (Johnston,  2001,  p. 499).  The socialization is  a mechanism of 
influence where the group influences an actor; it is possible only in a group and it is an effect 
that the identification with a specific group is producing on the actor. 
In line with Johnston (2001), Kelley (2004) and Flockhart (2005, 2006), within the category 
of socialization, we distinguish two “subtypes” of mechanisms. We will refer to the first one 
with the label “social learning”, identifying it in the process under which the actor’s ideas and 
preferences  are  changed.  We  label  the  second  “social  influence”,  identifying  it  with  the 
mechanism through which the norms exercise a constraining effect on the actors. 
2.5.1.2.1. Social Influence
With  this  term,  we  refer  to  the  situations  where  the  actors,  guided  by  the  logic  of 
appropriateness, find themselves constrained by the norms and values. 
“Social influence elicits pro-norm behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and 
punishments” (Flockhart, 2005, p. 97)
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“… Rewards might include psychological well-being, status, a sense of belonging, and a sense 
of  well-being  derived  from  conformity  with  role  expectations.  Punishments  might  include 
shaming,  shunning, exclusion,  and demeaning, or dissonance derived from action inconsistent 
with role and identity. The effect of social influence is an actor’s conformity with the position 
advocated by a group as a result of real or imagined group pressure. The difference between social 
influence processes and persuasion is neatly summarized by the phrase Festinger used to describe 
compliance  due  to  social  pressure:  “public  conformity  without  private  acceptance”  (cited  in 
Booster,  1995;  p.  96).  Persuasion  would  entail  public  conformity  with  private  acceptances.” 
(Johnston, 2001, p. 499)
As we could see  from these  passages  by  Flockhart  and Johnston,  the  main  difference 
between social  influence  and persuasion  concerns  the  stability  of  the  actors’  preferences. 
While  in  the case of  persuasion the subject’s  preferences are  changed  as a  consequence of 
learning and persuasion, in the case of the social influence the behaviour is modified, while 
identity and the actor’s preference are not. In the case of the social influence the rule is not 
completely internalized, yet the actor complies even without material incentives. 
In the case of the external promotion of democracy this means that the IA offers social 
incentives (in the shape of reward or criticism, back-patting or opprobrium) in order to force 
the compliance. It can be traced in the notes and reports issued by the IA where criticisms or 
appraisals are expressed, while their impact can be observed in the domestic reactions they 
caused. 
Under which conditions is social influence efficient?
The first condition for the norm to constrain behavior is that a rule is accepted as a norm 
in the environment the target identifies himself with. The second necessary condition for this 
mechanism  to  take  place  is  that  the  targeted  actor  is  searching  for  this  environment’s 
legitimization (see Flockhart, 2005, Morlino and Magen, 2008). According to Finnemore and 
Sikkink  (1998),  the  states  comply  with  norms  because  they  look  for  the  international 
legitimacy, or they try to demonstrate that they adapted themselves to the social environment, 
that they “belong” to the group in which they identify themselves. 
This brings us to the hypothesis about the factors influencing the outcome of the social 
influence strategies. 
The first factor concerns the level of the norm’s institutionalization on the supranational 
level and in this case the level of the diffusion of the norm, its acceptance and interiorization 
among  the  other  members  are  decisive.  If  a  promoted  norm  is  widely  respected  in  the 
member  states,  the  target  state  would  perceive  it  as  an  obligatory  norm and the  norm’s 
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strength in constraining behaviour would be high62.  Otherwise,  it  would be perceived as a 
simple rule that might even be broken, which would decrease the constraining effect of the 
norm. 
Another  factor  on  the  supply  side  concerns  the  “promotion  of  the  norm”.  If  the 
supranational  organization  promotes  the  compliance  with  a  certain  norm  in  a  manner 
considered legitimate, if there are no “double standards”, if the monitoring of compliance is 
guided by precise criteria, the promotion of the norm would be considered legitimate and the 
compliance more probable (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004). 
On the “target side”, an important factor is represented by the strength of the elite’s and 
citizens’ preferences to be a part of the particular supranational environment. This means that 
if the actors declare their devotion to the external norms, or declare their belonging to the 
environment, the norms of that particular organization become constraining. The measure in 
which these norms will constrain the national states will depend on:
• The level of the identification of the target state with the international environment in 
question, or the authority the international environment exercises in legitimizing the 
domestic regime. The identification of the state with a certain unity (elite and public 
opinion, or at least “declared” identification of the elite and public) would produce the 
impulse  to  “show  that  you  belong”  and  would  incentivize  the  state  to  comply 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; also Flockhart, 2005, 2006; Johnston, 2001).
• The level of misfit between the norm promoted and the internally diffused norms: if 
the promoted norm is in conflict with the domestically widely accepted values, it would 
be difficult to consider it legitimate and appropriate  (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 
2004; Borzel and Risse, 2000). 
Beside the cases where the actors consider themselves constrained by the norms without 
the  external  actors  exercising  any pressure  (and  they  act  according  to what  Weber  called 
“anticipated  reactions”),  in  this  category we have also those cases where the  international 
actors  decide  to condition  the  domestic  elite  with symbolic  incentives  in  order  to ensure 
compliance. It is a mechanism by which some kind of external accountability is put in place. 
A  study  conducted  by  Schimmelfennig,  Engert  and  Knobel  (2003)  found  that  the 
“conditionality  through  reward  by  the  use  of  the  social  incentives”  rarely  brings  to  the 
compliance  and that  “back-patting”  is  rarely  capable  to  motivate  the  domestic  elite.  The 
62 See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004, 2005.
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authors  underlined  that  the  tactics  of  “appraisal”  were  functioning  only  in  the  cases  of 
countries  seeking  the  EU  membership,  but  in  these  cases  it  was  the  membership 
conditionality  to  make  them  eager  to  comply.  The  exit  of  the  “conditionality”  through 
“appraisal” appears to be influenced by the strength with which the nation states are looking 
for the membership in a certain supranational organization. 
Yet,  before  discrediting  social  influence  as  a  possibly  efficient  strategy  of  democracy 
promotion, we shall examine if the social incentives are more efficient when used to threaten 
the  actor’s  international  reputation  or  legitimacy  (here  we  remember  the  importance  the 
démarche  had  in  Maciar’s  Slovakia).  The  possibility  that  the  efficiency  of  the  symbolic 
incentives  change  as  we  pass  from reward  to  threat  comes  from the  particularity  of  the 
mechanism  of  social  influence  combining the  symbolic  values  (status,  psychological  well 
being, sense of belonging, identification, legitimacy) with the reward and threat as form of the 
relation of power.
While  not  being  directly  correlated  with  the  immediate  material  gain,  the  international 
status of the country is still considered to be a highly coercive and important dimension (see 
Gilpin,  1981).  The  status,  legitimacy,  identity  are  all  symbolic  values  and  as  such  are 
recognized in the theories of power as important “values”, or “sources of power”, the actors 
can use. As all other sources of power, the symbolic values are also potentially transferable 
into  other  sources of  power  (see Laswell  and Kaplan,  1950).  The scholars  studying  power 
relations taught us how resources can be used, exchanged and spent to gain  other  kinds of 
resources. And while the gain in status might not be immediately turned into material gain 
(Johnston  2001),  and  as  such  reward  through  social  incentives  is  not  so  efficient 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel, 2003), we can hypothesize that the loss of the previously 
enjoyed status might result in a significant loss of power the decision makers might fear. 
For the external actors’ disapproval to influence the internal actor’s behavior by threatening 
it with opprobrium, it is necessary that the target actor seeks the international legitimacy. This 
link is illustrated in Serbia’s  example:  while  Milošević’s  regime was not constrained by the 
international  community’s  disapproval,  as  Milošević  was  not  seeking  the  international 
legitimization63, in the case of the subsequent, so-called “democratic” elites, the vulnerability 
to such action is higher. The strength with which the external actors can use this strategy 
depends on the resources of the domestic actors’ legitimacy. When the domestic elite bases its 
power on the devotion to the values including the promoted norm or the identity  of the 
63 For this point see also Flockhart, 2006.
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supranational community (deriving material benefits in terms of electoral support from the 
international status they enjoy, for example), their legitimacy can be easily undermined by their 
failure to pursue these proclaimed goals. Where the basis of their power is not linked to the 
symbolic  values produced on an international  level  but on other sources, the international 
community disapproval would not influence their domestic legitimacy. 
Beside influencing the international status of the particular state, the international actor’s 
criticisms can also influence the status the ruling elite enjoys at home. This is particularly true 
when the promoted norms concern the democratic values and institutions. When the state 
(and in particular, the electorate) is aspiring to democracy, external criticisms which reveal the 
undemocratic nature of the political  regime pose a serious problem for the political  elite’s 
legitimacy. By revealing the lack of compliance with the democratic norms, the international 
actor undermines the domestic basis of the government’s legitimacy, inducing high costs to 
the ruling elite. For this reason the social influence as a strategy of democracy promotion is 
particularly relevant in the cases of hybrid regimes where the ruling elite adheres, at least on 
paper, to the democratic values. In such cases, the international actor’s opprobrium, besides 
inducing the loss of the international status, can also bring to the loss of the domestic status 
for the ruling elite, causing high costs to the domestic elite. In these cases, particular attention 
should  be  paid  to  empirically  distinguish  the  cases  of  compliance  due  to  the  domestic 
institutionalization  of  the  norm  from  the  compliance  provoked  by  the  international 
institutionalization  of  the  norm.  It  is  quite  difficult  to  assess  the  international  actors’ 
contribution in promoting a specific norm in those cases where the domestic electorate was 
also pushing for compliance. 
Under what conditions can we argue that it was due to the supranational environment’s 
adherence to a certain norm and not due to the domestic pressures, or domestic pressures 
combined with supranational ones, that the target state decided to comply?
First of all, in line with Checkel’s argument (2001), we should include the prevailing pattern 
of domestic decision-making process in the analysis. According to Checkel,  the weaker the 
civil society and the lower the levels of vertical accountability, the weaker is the constraining 
effect of the norms promoted by the domestic society. In these cases, only the international 
actor can successfully  exercise the social  influence,  while  the impact of  the domestic  civil 
society is secondary. 
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The international factor is decisive also for the compliance with those norms not diffused 
in the domestic society or in conflict with the internally legitimated norms. In such situation, 
the compliance is mainly guided by the external factors, and the good response of the state to 
the societal incentives offered is a sign of the high constraining effect of the international 
norm in question.  In these cases,  the state accepts the norm only  due to its  desire to be 
accepted in the “good standing society”. 
Let us now turn to the level of compliance we can expect as the outcome of this strategy. 
The social influence brings to the compliance through opprobrium by changing, with the use 
of the social incentives, the domestic actor’s costs and benefits calculations. As we already 
underlined, there is no full  interiorization of the norm. As a consequence, the compliance 
achieved  is  the  controversial  compliance  where  the  actor  still  maintains  the  original 
preferences.  The main difference with  the  controversial  compliance  achieved  through the 
conditionality  resides  in  the  fact  that  in  the  case  of  the  social  influence  the  actor  is 
constrained, by his identity and the ideology he adheres to, to maintain at least an image of 
compliance with the norm he declares to share. In practice this means that further compliance 
will depend on whether or not the lack of compliance can be revealed to the public. When, 
due to the weak domestic society, lack of intra-institutional accountability and partial media 
freedom, the ruling elite is capable to mask the lack of full compliance with the norm, the 
outcome of these strategies in terms of the rule implementation will  be unsatisfactory and 
linked to the external actor’s capacity to further promote the compliance.
2.5.1.2.2. Social Learning
With  the  label  social  learning,  we  refer  to  a  situation  where  training,  persuasion  and 
learning take place, bringing to a change in the actor’s preferences, ideas and identities. 
The process of social learning implies the absence of the perfect information. Often based 
on the studies in cognitive psychology, the developed models were concentrated in studying 
the cognitive and value systems of individuals and the conditions bringing to the change of 
the ideas.
One of the central factors influencing the exit of the social learning process concerns the 
content of the promoted norms. The promoted norms can be of different nature and can 
differently relate to the domestic actor’s ideas and values, which influence the outcome of the 
persuasion. According to Hall (1993), Sabatier (1993) and Kuhn (1970), the ideas are divided 
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in those concerning the core values and ontological assumptions, and those more technical, 
concerning the secondary believes. Their models hypothesize that the learning conditions and 
influence differ as we pass from the issues concerning the “paradigm and deep-core beliefs” 
(the  most  abstract,  and  almost  impossible  to  change  according  to  these  authors)  to  the 
“specific  settings  of  instruments  and secondary  aspects”  (the  most  specific  and easiest  to 
change ideas). 
In the field  of  the international  relations,  Goldstein and Keohane (1993)  distinguished 
between normative and cognitive ideas, a distinction similar to Weber’s one between goals and 
means64.  According  to these authors,  while  social  learning  is  possible  in  the  realm of  the 
cognitive ideas and the change of means can be achieved, the change of the values and of the 
goals determined by these values is almost impossible. 
In the  europeanization  literature,  this  factor  can be found under the label  of  “level  of 
misfit”, the concept embracing the distance between the domestically diffused values and the 
internationally promoted norm. The larger this misfit, the more the compliance is difficult. 
Borzell and Risse would argue that a certain (medium) level of misfit brings to the change and 
social learning, while in the cases of very large misfit the compliance is rather difficult. 
As far as other conditions favouring the social learning are concerned, the constructivists’ 
literature  offers  plenty  of  factors  influencing  the  outcome.  The  persuasion  is  thus  more 
successful:
• In those contexts where the actors do not have strong beliefs and preferences in the 
specific area. This situation is usually found when the persuaded one is in a new and 
uncertain environment, generated by the newness of the issue or by a crisis or serious 
policy  failure,  in  which he is  cognitively  motivated to analyze  the new information 
(Checkel, 2001). The less the actors are certain about the nature of the problem and 
about  their  own interests  and preferences,  the  more they  are  likely  to be  open to 
persuasion and arguing. 
• When  the  core  values  and  beliefs  of  the  persuaded  one  are  coherent  with  the 
persuader’s message (Checkel 2001, see also the literature on misfit, for more detailed 
hypotheses about the different levels of conflicts, see Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993; 
Hall, 1993). If the argument could be made to resonate with some listener’s previous 
attitudes or experiences and/or previously accepted norms and principles, the process 
64 See Weber, 1922.
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of adopting the promoted norm would be easier. The consistency of the persuaded 
one’s value system and promoted norms with the beliefs and values of the listener is an 
important element, as the norms inconsistent with the target actor’s beliefs and values 
would imply a strong resistance to the argumentation and persuasion. 
• When the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuaded 
one  belongs  or  wants  to  belong,  or  when  he  enjoys  the  authority  of  being  a 
professional in the field, when he can legitimately claim moral authority and knowledge 
and  when  he  is  perceived  as  a  neutral  actor,  not  pursuing  the  material  benefits 
(Checkel, 1997, 2001; Finnemor and Sikkink, 1998; Sabatier, 1999; Ulbert, Risse and 
Muller, 2004). From this point of view, the IA’s interests and priorities in promoting 
the external  anchor are a meaningful  element influencing his  credibility  when using 
persuasion as a channel of influence.
• The low level of politicization of the setting in which the persuasion takes place can 
also favour the learning process (Checkel, 2001). According to Sabatier (1999), the fora 
in which persuasion and learning are more probable are the professional fora rather 
than the open ones. According to the author, the social learning across belief systems is 
most likely when there is a forum which is prestigious enough to force professionals 
from  different  “advocacy  coalitions”  to  participate  and  which  is  dominated  by 
professional  norms  (See  Jenkins  Smith  and  Sabatier,  1993).  The  setting  in  which 
persuasion  takes  place  and  the  existence  of  the  epistemic  communities  and  trans-
national fora were also underlined by Haas (1992, 2004).
• The analytical  tractability  of  the  issue  also  influences  the  probability  of  successful 
persuasion.  The  process  of  social  learning  in  a  situation  of  conflict  between  the 
promoted  norm and domestic  norms is  easier  on  those  issues  for  which  accepted 
quantitative data and theory exist. This means that the problems involving social and 
political  systems  are  less  conductive  to  policy-oriented  learning  than  the  natural 
systems (or technical details) (Jenkins Smith and Sabatier, 1993). 
• The last factor to be included here is the consistency and coherence of the persuaded 
one’s belief system and its consistency with reality. If the persuaded one’s beliefs are 
incoherent and easily challengeable on the ground of internal incoherency of reasoning, 
or of low correspondence with reality, then learning would be facilitated as the “old 
beliefs” would be dismantled. (Sabatier, 1999)
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Beside  these factors,  we should also account  for  the  contribution  of  Borzel  and Risse 
(2004)  who  added  the  presence  of  the  domestic  change  agents  and  norm  entrepreneurs 
engaged  in  the  persuasion  and advocacy  as  an  important  factor  for  the  adoption  of  the 
external norms. While the presence of the change agents is included in the EUCLIDA revised 
model as an independent variable on the domestic level, their relation with the external actors 
is particularly relevant for understanding the impact of the social learning mechanism. Very 
often,  the  change  agents  active  in  the  field  were  subject  to  the  social  learning  strategy 
undertaken by the external actor who practically  forms  the domestic change agents that will 
further push the process of the rule promotion from within. 
What level of compliance can be expected from the usage of the social learning strategy? 
Based on persuasion rather than on threat,  with social or  material  incentives,  this  strategy 
produces  no  conflictuality  as  the  targets  are  free  to  listen  to  the  argumentation  of  the 
persuader or not. Further on, as the strategy consists in changing the target actor’s preferences 
through the changes in his value system, identities and beliefs, in the case of the success of 
this  tactic,  there  is  a  strong  interiorization  of  the  norm,  resulting  in  the  persuaded ones’ 
sincere intention to fully  comply.  The compliance of  the persuaded ones is  “consensual”, 
while  the  compliance  on  the  state  level  can  vary  (from  consensual  to  conflictive  or  no 
compliance at all) in function of the strength of the persuaded ones to influence the domestic 
course of policy.
2.5.1.3. Influence on the Domestic Distribution of Power
The influence on the domestic distribution of power is a rather under-theorized strategy in 
the field of studies on the external promotion of the democracy. Such lack of attention for 
this channel of influence is mainly caused by the rare usage of such strategy, mainly due to its 
costs  and  its  high  level  of  conflictuality.  The  students  of  the  EU democracy  promotion 
identified only few cases where such strategy was used: among those most often cited, we find 
Meciar’s  Slovakia  and  Milošević’s  Serbia,  with  some  less  specific  references  to  Croatia, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Bosnia as well65. In these works the strategy was referred to under the 
label of “empowerment” (Vachudova, 2001), “domestic empowerment” (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier,  2004),  “differential  empowerment  of  domestic  actors”  (Schimmelfennig  and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). Finally, in the literature on Europeanization we can find the “change in the 
domestic  opportunity  structure  and  interest  constellation”  as  one  of  the  mechanisms  of 
65 See for example Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, 2005; Vachudova, 2001.
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Europeanization (see Knill  and Lehmkuhl,  2002).  Even though there were different labels 
available for this channel of influence, we refused the label “empowerment” as it is limitative: 
the empowerment of some actors is only one shape of this strategy. Its other aspect consists 
in actions aiming to decrease the power of the specific actor. We then decided to label the 
strategy for what it actually represents: the influence over the distribution of power in the 
target-state’s political arena.
What are the mechanisms behind this channel of influence, how can this strategy bring to 
compliance and how is it exercised?
The influence on the domestic distribution of power is based on a very simple logic: in 
order to ensure the compliance, the IA decides to bring to the power those actors that share 
the IA’s agenda or that, for some reason, are more vulnerable to the IA’s conditionality and 
social influence than other domestic actors. 
As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier explain: in the case of differential empowerment, 
“Certain domestic actors have independent incentives to adopt EU rules, which might stem 
from the utility of EU rules in solving certain policy problems to the advantage of these domestic 
actors, or, more generally, in increasing their influence in the political system. However, in the 
previous  domestic  equilibrium,  these  actors  did  not  have  sufficient  power  to  impose  their 
preferred  rules  on  the  other  domestic  actors.  Conditionality  then  changes  the  domestic 
opportunity structure in favour of these domestic actors and strengthens their bargaining power 
vis-à-vis their opponents in society and government” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 
11).
The two authors link the differential empowerment to the conditionality and consider it 
one  type  of the conditionality strategy, not recognizing that the two are actually significantly 
different  in  the  mechanisms  through  which  the  compliance  is  achieved.  Such  position  is 
mainly a product of the under-theorizing of the empowerment which, rather than an analytical 
category, appears to have the function of the ad-hoc explanation in order to account for a few 
rare cases. 
Yet,  the  conditionality  and  the  influence  on  the  domestic  distribution  of  power 
substantially differ. While the first targets the domestic actor’s costs and benefits calculation 
trying to bring the change of the domestic actor’s decision, the second tackles the actors and 
their power directly, in the most extreme cases trying to bring to a change in the ruling elite66. 
66 According to Stoppino, we can distinguish between different strategies on the basis of the object that specific 
strategy aims to influence. From this point of view, the EU conditionality influences the actor’s alternatives of 
behaviour,  while  the  influence on the distribution  of power influences the  environment  in  which the  actor 
operates. The mechanisms of the two strategies fully corresponds to the types of power identified by this author, 
with  the  difference  concerning  the  labels  used.  Conditionality,  as  intended  in  the  studies  on  the  external 
promotion of democracy, corresponds to the categories “remuneration and constraint” (intended as reward and 
threat), while the influence on the distribution of power corresponds to Stoppino’s category of conditionality, the 
term used by the author in order to underline that the change tackles the conditions under which the actor 
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While conditionality is a strategy that tackles only those actors to whom reward (or threat) was 
offered,  the  influence  on  the  distribution  of  power  is  a  strategy  that  tackles  each  single 
political actor, as power is the relational property67 and the strengthening of one actor equals 
to the relative weakening of others.
The level of conflictuality produced by these two strategies also differ, and is much higher 
in the case of the influence on the distribution of power due to the losses suffered by some of 
the actors. Finally, the type of compliance also differs. If the strategy is successfully exercised, 
resulting in the rise to the power of the elite who shares the IA’s agenda and who fully adheres 
to  the  promoted  norms,  the  compliance  is  consensual,  as  the  new  ruling  elite  is  fully 
internalizing  the  norms.  A  further  IA’s  action  is  necessary  only  in  order  to  ensure  the 
maintenance of the new setting, while there is no need for further norm promotion actions. 
Yet, achieving full success of this strategy is extremely difficult. First of all, the high level of 
conflictuality will cause the reaction of the actors who suffer the losses, who might try either 
to compete for the IA’s support or to delegitimize the IA, or even to undertake severe actions 
against the domestic actors who enjoy the IA’s support. Meciar’s response consisted in using 
the  nationalistic  rhetorics  to  undermine  the  EU,  Milošević's  in  undertaking  measures  of 
oppression against the domestic opposition and making the use of coercion more severe. 
Secondly, by acting on the actor’s environment, the change in the distribution of power 
might bring to unpredicted changes in the domestic actor’s short-term preferences. This is 
particularly true when the IA’s influence on the domestic distribution of power is directed 
against the opposition, aiming to ensure the permanence at the power of a specific group. In 
such asset,  the ruling elite  that extracts benefits from the IA’s intervention might become 
interested in maintaining the status quo in order to keep drawing benefits. 
Third, in order for this strategy to bring to the full  compliance,  it is necessary that the 
actors who got to the power thanks to the IA’s intervention are fully devoted to the norms 
promoted  by  the  IA,  sharing  its  agenda  and interests,  a  condition  difficult  to  achieve  in 
practice. More often, the result is the rise of the elite who most identifies with the IA and is 
most vulnerable to its influence, but whose political platform might be slightly divergent. In 
such asset, further IA’s action (conditionality, social influence, persuasion etc) will be needed 
operates. See Stoppino, 2001, pp. 133-161.
67For the concept of relational property and distinction between relational and dispositional properties, see 
Elgie, 1998.
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in order to bring to the compliance,  and the actors that lost  their  power due to the IA’s 
influence might further obstruct the change. 
Finally,  as showed by Knill  and Lehmkuhl,  2002,  the direction of the domestic change 
achieved through this strategy (concurrency with IA’s objectives or drifting away from the 
IA’s objectives) is unpredictable and subject to the domestic factors. Such finding is in line 
with Stoppino’s  consideration  of  the  difficulties  to successfully  predict  the  impact  of  this 
strategy in the complex social context. In these cases, the outcome can be easily reversed due 
to the strategies’ indirect influence (it does not target the rule, but the decision makers who are 
supposed to adopt the rule) and due the numerous factors that intervene with the outcome68.
2.5.2. THE CONTENT OF THE PROMOTED REGIME
Another  element  of  the  IA’s  approach  is  the  content  of  the  norms/regime the  IA  is 
promoting.  The question of  the content  of  the norms promoted,  even though apparently 
superfluous as it  is  clear that the analytical  framework was designed in order to study the 
promotion of democracy, is an important question to tackle, seen that democracies are of many 
kinds. The credibility of the conditionality, as well as the process of social learning, are both 
favoured when the promoted norms are precisely operationalized and clear road maps are 
drawn. How an international  actor  defines democracy,  which dimensions of  democracy it 
decides to include among the promoted norms, as well as how it operationalizes the  concrete  
meaning of  these dimensions,69 would depend on the  practices  and norms in  the  current 
member states, on the interests and on the causal beliefs of the international actor. 
The level of democracy of the member states is an important factor influencing the content 
of  the  promoted norms.  We can  imagine  that  the  lower  the  democracy  standards  of  the 
existing member states, the weaker the definition of democracy the organization adopts and 
the weaker the potential  of the organization for democracy promotion.  The generally  low 
quality  of  democracy among the  member  states  means that  the less  democratic  members 
would block the adoption of binding democratic norms. The level of the similarities between 
the political regimes and in the interpretation of the term democracy would further influence 
both the number and the content of the norms included in the set of supranational norms. 
This was one of Pevehouse’s key factors when establishing which regional organizations are 
68 See Stoppino, 2001, pp. 143-145, 158-161.
69 For example, operationalizing the particular dimensions of democracy means answering to questions such 
as:  when is  a  judiciary  really  independent?  When are  the  elections really  free?  We can see  how the  EU is 
promoting the New Public Management approach in the administrative reforms, and the bureaucratic model of 
judicial organization.
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more likely in democracy promotion: “The more homogeneously democratic the regional IO, 
the more likely it will press the offending states.” (Pevehouse, 2002 a, 2002 b). 
The content of democracy that is promoted is a factor that significantly varies when we pass 
from one supranational actor to another. This factor can even vary across time: due to the 
process of the integration and to the access of new members, to some external factors and to 
the possible process of convergence of the old members, the definition of democracy the IA 
is promoting might even change. We can observe how democracy, as defined by EU when 
integrating  Spain,  Portugal  and  Greece,  appears  much  less  precise  in  comparison  to  the 
definition given to the same concept when approaching the Eastern Europe, which brings us 
to conclude that instead of democracy promotion we shall speak of the particular type of democracy  
promotion. 
As the revised EUCLIDA model hypothesizes that the linking between democratization 
and  integration  offers  the  possibility  for  a  cross-process  compensation  of  the  costs  and 
benefits, beside the “democracy promotion package”, we should include also the content of 
the “integration package” into the analysis. With the label “integration package”, we refer to 
the  norms  promoted  by  the  IA  that  do  not  concern  the  democratization  process.  The 
international organizations which are active in the several fields of policy might, beside the 
democratic norms and values, promote the norms in the field of the economic policy, foreign 
policy, security and military policy or any other dimension (from the environmental protection 
to  the  norms  regulating  the  production  of  the  goods).  We  can  notice  that  while  the 
membership in the Council  of Europe is  conditioned only by adhesion to the democratic 
values and respect for human rights, the membership in EU or NATO requires a compliance 
with a series of norms that do not concern the democratization process. Some of the norms 
promoted  in  the  “integration  package”  are  standard  for  all  member  states,  some  might 
concern a specific country70. The content of the “integration package”, together with the IA’s 
interests and actions in the boundary-removal process and the domestic developments (impact 
on the relevant domestic actors) caused by the integration, might create an important feedback 
on both international and domestic actors. If positive, such impact can contribute to positively 
change  the  domestic  actor’s  costs  and  benefits  balance  and facilitate  the  democratization 
process.  However,  when  the  implications  of  the  integrations  process  are  negative,  it  can 
70 We can think about the EU’s promotion of the compliance with the ICTY in Serbia, or the requirement 
made to Macedonia to solve the name dispute with Greece, or the recommendation made to the Balkan states to 
participate to the regional initiatives, all being political issues, but none directly concerning the democratization 
process.
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influence the IA’s interests and preferences, increase the costs of the domestic actors and 
intervene in the democratization process. 
How does the content of the promoted norms influence the process of anchoring?
As the norm promotion takes place only where there is no similar norms on a domestic 
level, one of the most important factors of the content is the manner in which the promoted 
norm is  related  to  the  relevant  domestic  asset.  The  distance  between the  content  of  the 
promoted norms and the domestic rules in the particular field is known in literature as the 
level  of  “misfit”  (Bulmer  and  Radaelli,  2005) and it  represents  the  “adaptation  pressure” 
(Borzel  and  Risse,  2000).  As  we  saw  when  discussing  the  mechanisms,  the  exit  of  the 
democracy promotion strategies depends, among other, also on the level of the misfit,  or, 
better say, on the distance from the domestic status quo (rationalists’  logic) or its distance 
from  the  domestically  diffused  values  (constructivists’  logic).  As  the  content  of  “the 
democratic package” and of the “boundary removal package” varies, the level of the misfit 
with the domestic institutions can also vary, significantly influencing the exit. 
Besides analyzing the impact of the misfit and the possible re-distributive effects of the 
particular  norm,  we  should  also  pay  attention  to  the  re-distributive  effects  of  the 
democratization and integration processes and of the anchoring process in general. From this 
perspective,  not  only  the  content  and impact  of  the  single  promoted norm,  but  also the 
manner in which the re-distributive effects of the different promoted norms are combined 
and the manner in which the overall  costs and benefits are summarized can influence the 
process of anchoring. Sometimes even adding one single norm in the democratization or the 
boundary removal package can produce a significant shift of the costs and benefits for the 
domestic actors, influencing the entire process of the external anchoring. 
Further on,  the level  of the specificity  of  the norm is  also an important aspect  of  the 
content. When the promoted norm is more general and the countries are given the possibility 
to define by themselves the specific  instruments that would bring to democratization,  the 
problem of the misfit is less severe. On the other hand, when the norm is more general, the 
space for maneuvering the target states increases, which diminishes the credibility of the IA’s 
action.  This  bring  us  to  hypothesize  that  the  precisely  and  well-defined  content,  while 
increasing the credibility of the international actor, at the same time, in case of large misfit 
between the national and supranational norm, also increases the severity of the misfit. 
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Not only the definition of the democracy adopted by the supranational organization, but 
also the number of dimensions this definition covers and the prescribed timetable can influence 
the process. 
Starting from the definition the organization gives to democracy (a low-quality electoral 
democracy, or a fully-developed consolidated liberal democracy?), we shall also examine the 
dimensions  of democracy the supranational actors are covering. We can imagine that different 
supranational organizations may cover different dimensions of democracy, some adopting a 
rich definition of democracy (to include not only political, but also civil and even social rights 
for example), while the others might promote only one or two dimensions. The compliance of 
the particular state with different dimensions and promoted norms might differ. In some areas 
it might be quite a smooth process, while in others it can face serious difficulties, as the level 
of misfit with the existing norms and the salience of a particular problem in the domestic 
politics differ as we pass from one area of policy to another. 
Analyzing the criteria defining democracy as conceived and promoted by a supranational 
organization allows us to understand how come some actors are less efficient in democracy 
promotion. Do they use a one-size-fits-all approach, not being sensitive to the target state’s 
particularities? Are important dimensions left out? Or maybe there are too many dimensions, 
so that the costs of the process are too high? We can also study how the different schedule of 
the norms promotion can influence the process: shall  we first pursue the  difficult issues, or 
begin  with  those  more acceptable  to  domestic  actors  and then increase  the  pressure  and 
requirements as the process evolves? Finally, we can also study the relation between the scope 
of  integration  we  described  as  the  number  of  policy  areas  the  supranational  system has 
authorities in and the goal of the democracy it promotes. 
Beside the goal (number of dimensions covered), we shall also pay attention to the strength  
of  the  anchor  created.  As  we  saw  when  describing  Morlino  and  Magen’s  EUCLIDA 
framework,  the  rule  adoption  is  only  a  part  of  the  policy  process.  The anchoring  of  the 
democratic  regime,  as  Morlino  and  Magen  underlined,  covers  three  different  layers:  rule 
adoption,  rule  implementation  and  rule  interiorization.  The  authors  also  proposed  the 
hypothesis  on the  process in all  three layers.  In the previous paragraph,  we also saw the 
characteristic of the IA that can influence the process of the rule promotion. Here we shall 
only define the concept of the strength of the anchor, which can be illustrated as the outcome 
achieved in each of the three layers. Not all international organization are keen or able to also 
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monitor the process of the rule implementation and interiorization,  which only means the 
formal influence on the domestic regime, and only partial change. The three sub-processes are 
mutually interrelated, but do not necessary take place together. The intensity and strength of 
the anchor depends on the outcome in all three processes. 
2.6. THE HYPOTHESES 
At this point, we can try to integrate what we described above with the already existing 
framework of EUCLIDA. We decided to maintain the factors of the EUCLIDA that concern 
the domestic environment, integrating the factors on the supply side we described above in 
the framework. We unpacked Morlino and Magen’s “credible action of the IA” and included 
the  IA’s  interests,  capacities,  strategy  and content  of  the  promoted  norms  as  the  factors 
influencing  the process on the supply side.  The factors on the supply  side are correlated, 
influencing one another: the choice of the channel of influence, beside being influenced by the 
IA’s approach, will bear the mark of the IA’s interests and capacities, while the content of the 
promoted norms will reflect the IA’s interests that, filtered through the IA’s causal beliefs, are 
operationalized in the concrete recommendations. All these factors would influence the level 
of the credibility of the IA’s action. The more credible the IA’s action (and consequently the 
more  positive  the  development  in  each  of  the  previously  mentioned  supranational  level 
factors),  the better  the chance to have a successful  process.  However,  the factors  on the 
supply side are not enough to explain the exit. In order for the IA’s action to have an effect, 
beside its credibility, a series of other domestic conditions is also necessary. First of all, the 
“actions of the IA shall be complemented by actions of committed change agents.  If  this 
happens, the changes of opportunities structures, the empowerment of change agents or of 
governmental elite or of civil society groups and relative weakening of veto players might take 
place.  If  so,  there is  the possibility  of  a  shift  in  the cost-benefit  balance  for the decision 
makers.  If  there  is  domestic  fluidity  and  no presence of  domestic  o  international  related 
alternatives, then the shifts bring a policy reassessment. If there is a policy reassessment, then 
there can be rule adoption. But there is also the opposite possibility at every step, of course 
especially if no policy reassessment occurs” (Morlino and Magen, 2008, p. 48). The content of 
the internationally promoted norms would influence the identity of the Change Agents, the 
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identity of the veto players in the domestic system, as well as the level of opposition to the 
rule adoption (see Figure 4). 
The same conditions decide the International Actor’s credibility of action when it comes to 
the layer of the rule implementation. It  will  be the interest of the IA to decide with what 
strength  and  in  which  measure  the  IA  will  insist  on  the  rule  implementation,  while  the 
capacities  he  has  at  hand  (the  possible  developed  capacity  in  monitoring  the  rule 
implementation being of crucial importance) would influence the credibility of his actions (see 
Figure 5). 
Figure 4: “EUCLIDA REVISED: Factors and the Rule Adoption”.
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Figure 5: “EUCLIDA REVISED Factors and the Rule Implementation”.
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At this point, we can turn to the hypothesis concerning the process of anchoring and the 
feedback it produces. In the first part of this chapter, we defined a process of international 
anchoring of democracy as a particular form of the democracy promotion where the process 
of  creation  of  linkage  with  the  international  actors  opens  the  possibility  to  influence  the 
domestic political regime. 
The  two  processes,  namely  the  process  of  boundary  removal  and  the  democracy 
promotion,  are  combined  together  in  the  more  complex  process  of  the  international 
anchoring.  The structure  of  interests  of  both the  international  and domestic  actors  are  a 
crucial element for the framework, and should be assessed in the dimensions concerning both 
the regime change and the boundary removal. 
Depending on the definition the supranational actor gave to democracy and on the content 
of the norms it decides to promote in the particular target state, the level of “misfit” between 
the supranational and domestic political regime might vary. The larger the misfit, the stronger 
the impact on the domestic political regime, as well as the pressure and possible change in the 
distribution of authorities at the national level (so the costs of rule adoption for the domestic 
elite increase). Besides, the system of preferences of the supranational actor would decide with 
what force  the  international  actor  would pursue the compliance,  while  its  capacity  would 
influence the efficiency of the strategies used. The pressure and costs of the democratization 
for  the  domestic  decision  makers  would  depend  on:  international  actor’s  definition  of 
democracy and its misfit with existing norms; the system of interest and preferences of the IA 
which would decide with what pressure the IA would seek the effective rule adoption; the 
institutional capacity of the IA to monitor the implementation; the costs and benefits balance 
of the domestic actors; presence and absence of the Change Agents promoting the norm and 
Veto players obstructing the change; the presence of alternatives and the stability/fluidity of 
the political environment. 
If the compliance produces high costs for the domestic elite, the incentives deriving from 
the integration process and the rule promotion strategies adopted by the supranational actor 
have to be strong in order to “keep the boat of the regime near the island of democracy”. Of 
particular importance is the process of the boundary removal,  where we should assess the 
implications that the creation of the linkage has for the target state and its key actors. Where, 
as  it  is  the  case  with  the  EU,  the  acquisition  of  the  membership  and boundary  removal 
process imply the adoption of norms other than those included in the “democracy package”, 
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the costs and benefits, as well as the strategies used in promoting the rules of the “integration 
package”, should also be included in the analysis.
Both  the  democracy  promotion  strategies  and  the  integration  processes  have  their 
consequences and feedbacks: the domestic elite, perceiving the costs and benefits of its adherence 
to the IA, can decide to  re-assess  its preference towards the integration process. If the costs 
prevail, the “input to integrate” can decrease (domestic elite changes the preference towards 
integration),  or it can completely disappear71.  In this case, for the process to continue, the 
supranational  authorities  have  to  undertake  further  actions,  more  credible  and  more 
incentivizing, settling the content of the anchoring in a manner to produce a more favourable 
distribution of costs and benefits. 
The feedback does not only influence the domestic actors, but can exercise its influence on 
the supply side as well. Undertaking the democracy promotion by offering the creation of the 
linkage with the IA means that the IA in question has some particular interests in the target 
state  (be  it  the  interest  to  spread  the  democracy,  economic,  strategic,  security  or  other 
interests). The domestic developments thus influence the IA’s perception of the target state 
and can bring to changes in the independent variables on the supply side (re-definition of 
interests  and priorities,  change of  the strategy or change of  the content  of  the promoted 
norms).  The action  of  the  IA,  and the  entire  process,  will  be  strongly  influenced  by  the 
feedback of the process of international anchoring. 
71 An example is the recent change of Serbia’s prime minister towards NATO: as a consequence of the NATO and 
especially USA approach to Kosovo, Koštunica completely changed his preferences and now opposes Serbia’s integration 
into NATO. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TO CONDUCT
3.1. CHOICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTOR: EUROPEAN UNION
The empirical part of this study would be concentrated on analyzing the democratization 
process in Macedonia and Serbia, and the role the European Union played in the process of 
the anchoring (and de-anchoring) in the international regime of these two democracies.
The choice to concentrate on the European Union derives from a series of practical and 
theoretical arguments we will expose in this section
First of all,  such choice was guided by the EU’s “fame” as one of the most important 
supranational  actors  involved  in  the  democratization,  particularly  in  Europe72.  A series  of 
empirical studies showed how the European Union influenced the democratization in Eastern 
Europe and how it strengthened its influence on the neighboring countries in the last decade. 
As Pevehouse argues, the EU, as a regional  IO, is  far better suited for the promotion of 
democracy than the other, globally active International Organizations. Moreover, as the level 
of the diffusion of the norm within  the IA influences the credibility and the outcome of the 
norm-promotion,  the  fact  that  the  old  EU Member  States  are  all  old,  well-consolidated 
western  democracies  increases  the  credibility  of  the  EU when  promoting  the  democratic 
norms73. 
As one of the important factors of the revised EUCLIDA theoretical model is the strategy 
used, the choice of the IA was also influenced by its capacity to use any of the four strategies 
identified.  According  to  the  existing  literature,  the  EU both  possessed  and  used  a  good 
capacity to credibly use any of the channels of influence mentioned. Due to its organizational 
capacities, interests and geographical position, the EU is the potentially most successful actor 
in democracy promotion, and a crucial factor in explaining the (lack of) democratization in the 
Balkan area (see Magen, 2004, p. 24). The particularity of the EU, deriving from its “more 
than an IO, less than a state” nature, contributed to increase its capacity to efficiently use the 
conditionality channel of influence as it increased the value of the reward it can offer (see 
72 See Pevehouse, 2002; Vachudova, 2001; Magen, 2004; Reiter, 2001; Pehe, 2004.
73 Such internal acceptance of the norms the IA is promoting is particularly important for the socialization 
strategies. See Flockhart, 2005, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004.
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Magen, 2004, p. 22-23, on the costs of exclusion, see Vachoudova, 2001, pp. 10-11)74. This 
“attractiveness” of the EU membership and the desire for the membership the CEES showed 
in  the  first  years  of  the  Nineties  opened  a  door  to  the  EU  influence.  As  the  process 
developed,  the  EU  learned how  to  better  use  its  influence  on  the  aspirant  candidates, 
developing  the  institutional  capacity  necessary  to  effectively  use  conditionality  as  an 
instrument of foreign policy75. In present days, as Magen stresses, the capacities of the EU to 
promote democracy through conditionality are superior to the capacity of other international 
institutions,  as  “no  International  Organization  established  such  elaborate  and  intrusive 
democracy and rule of law standards, or has monitored their implementation so strictly as the 
European Union” (Magen, 2004, p. 24). 
Similarly,  the  EU’s  supremacy  in  terms  of  prestige,  identity,  values  and  prosperity, 
combined with the well-developed strategies for deliberation and socialization, turns the EU 
into one of the potentially most successful actors in the use of the socialization channels. 
Last, but not least, the EU is one of the most influential international actors engaged in the 
democracy promotion in the two analyzed countries. If we analyze the data on the financial 
assistance to Macedonia and Serbia, we see how the EU assistance in both countries amounts 
to more than 50% of the total international aid received. A similar importance of the EU 
emerges from the analysis of the FDI origins in the two countries and the partners of the 
foreign trade. Beside the other neighbouring countries, the most important trading partners, as 
well as the investors in the two countries, are the EU Member States. This high level of the 
economic links  between the Balkan states  and the EU can significantly  influence the EU 
leverage  on  the  target  states,  making  the  EU  the  most  relevant  international  actor  in 
influencing the Balkan states.
However, the fact that the EU is potentially the most influential actor in the Balkan states 
does not mean that it is the only actor promoting the democratic values in the target states. a 
series of universal International Organizations (NATO, World Bank, IMF, UN) as well as of 
the regional organizations (the most relevant of which are OSCE and the Council of Europe) 
74 The success of conditionality is in function of the credibility and size of the reward. As far as credibility is 
concerned,  the last  enlargement has  shown that  the EU is  capable,  as  well  as ready,  to  give  the  reward in 
question. During the '90s, the European Union also developed more concrete criteria to be fulfilled by potential 
members in order to join the club, and in many cases the rule to be promoted is well specified, which increases  
the determination of conditionality and thus also its credibility. But the real importance of the EU as an external 
actor capable of promoting democracy seems to be the size of the reward: while USA, NATO or World Bank are 
also capable of offering credible rewards in order to promote the democratization, the size of the reward offered 
by the EU is far more attractive. Unlike the USA, the EU is able to offer the membership to the very institution 
as the highest possible reward.
75 For the change of the EU’s approach towards the CEE, see Vachudova 2001.
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are active in both the analyzed countries. For this purpose, when tracing the process of the 
democratization in Macedonia and Serbia, we will also pay attention to the influence of other 
IAs as well, underlining, when relevant, their initiatives and role in promoting the democratic 
norms in the two countries. Moreover, we will pay attention to the joint action of the EU with 
these organizations (in particular with the Council of Europe and OSCE). As we saw in the 
section dedicated to the IA’s organizational capacities, the capacity of the IA to undertake the 
joint action with other international actors increases the resources and capacities of the IA. 
Indeed, as we will see, the EU often promoted the compliance with the norms promoted by 
other regional organizations and made use of their assessments and monitoring mechanisms. 
3.2. WHAT DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRATIZATION?
Studying  the  international  anchoring  of  a  political  regime  in  empirical  terms  means 
studying the anchoring of the specific norms and rules the political regime is made of. Studying 
the international anchoring of  democracy  in empirical terms means studying the establishment 
of the democratic norms or, in other words, of the norms and rules that are typical for the democratic  
regime.
In practical terms, this means that if we are to study democratization we shall first define 
which rules and norms shall be put in place if democracy is to be established. Moreover, as we 
are  studying  the  international  anchoring  of  democracy,  we  shall  be  able  to  compare  the 
solutions adopted by the international actor (the content of the rule promoted, one of the 
explanatory factors in the model) to what we consider the most important dimensions of 
democracy. Only this way we can distinguish, among the norms promoted by the IA, which 
are the norms promoted as a part of the “democracy promotion” and which are the norms 
that, as not necessary for the democratization, were included among the requirements due to 
the IA’s particular approach or interests and are part of the EU’s integration package. 
This is why we need to define the core dimensions of the democracy to be included in the 
analysis, and we cannot limit ourselves to analyse only those areas where the IA is active. This 
will allow us to empirically access the democratization process in the studied countries and the 
role of the IA in the process, creating an in-depth analysis not only of the process of the 
international  anchoring of democracy, but also of the particular countries’  democratization 
path. At the same time, it will allow us to compare the content of the norms promoted by the 
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IA with our definition of democracy in a way to account for the possible influence on the 
process deriving from the particular IA’s approach to the issue. 
As the content of the norms promoted (and its differences compared to the definition we 
adopt) is  one of our explanatory factors,  when searching for the operational  definition of 
democracy and its core dimensions to be used in the study, we shall  pay attention to the 
dimensions  of  democracy  used by the  IA we are studying.  For example,  adopting  a  very 
narrow definition of electoral democracy and analysing the activities of an International Actor 
engaged  in  the  promotion  of  high-quality  democracy  implies  that  we will  register  a  large 
amount of norms to be analysed as “political requirements that don’t concern democracy”. 
Otherwise,  adopting  a rich definition of democracy and assessing the influence of the IA 
promoting nothing more than the electoral democracy would lead us to conclude that the 
actor is not influential as it is active only in few dimensions. We therefore believe that the 
operational  definition  of  democracy  shall  be  as  near  as  possible  to  the  one  used  by  the 
international actor we are analysing as an anchor.
In the 1993 Copenhagen criteria we find that the “stability of the institutions guaranteeing 
the democracy, rule of law, human rights and protection and respect for the minority rights” 
are  the  political  criteria  with  which  compliance  is  mandatory  for  any  country  aspiring  to 
membership. 
More particularly, we can notice how these dimensions of democracy are operationalized in 
the monitoring reports and the documents underlying the particular requirements.
In the European Partnership, the political requirements are grouped in “democracy and the 
rule  of  law”,  “human  rights  and  protection  of  minorities”  and  “regional  issues  and 
international obligations”. In the “democracy and rule of law” category the issues are grouped 
in the following dimensions: 
• Constitutionalism
• Governance
• Elections
• Public administration
• Judicial system
• Anti-corruption policy
Human  rights  and  protection  of  minorities  is  structured  to  include:  observance  of 
international human rights law, civil and political rights, minority rights, cultural rights and the 
protection of minorities.
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The dimensions  of  democracy,  as  they  appear in the EU documents,  are very  near to 
Morlino  and  Magen’s  five  dimensions  of  the  democratic  rule  of  law76.  Under  the  label 
“democratic rule of law” the two authors includes the following five dimensions:
1) Independent judiciary
2) Institutional and administrative capacity to formulate, implement and enforce the law 
(operationalized  in  a  manner  to  cover  the  assembly,  government,  civil  service, 
mechanisms of accountability, constitutional issues)
3) Effective fight against corruption, illegality and abuse of power by state agencies
4) Police respectful of rights and civilian control over the security forces
5) Protection  of  civil  freedoms and political  rights  (here,  beside  other  rights,  also the 
independence of media and freedom of association are included).
While the five dimensions of Morlino and Magen’s concept of the democratic rule of law 
tackle all  dimensions of the minimal definition of democracy (electoral democracy), at the 
same time they include the judicial  independence,  efficient  democratic institutions and the 
fight against corruption and illegality as the dimensions that were identified in literature as 
necessary to support democracy. Moreover, it also includes the civil control over the security 
forces  in  order  to ensure  that  the  democratically  elected  elite  has  the  effective  power  to 
govern.
The  importance  of  these  dimensions  for  democracy  were  underlined,  even  though  in 
different forms and differently grouped, by other authors as well. Mattina (2004) includes the 
following dimensions in his study of the democratization of the CEEC: rule of law and the 
institutional reform (the respect for the law and protection of the basic civil and economic 
rights,  modernization  of  the  public  administration,  judicial  system  reform  including  the 
guarantees for the judicial independence, strengthening and reform of the security sector in 
order to enable them to efficiently fight the corruption and organized crime, the establishment 
of  an  efficient  police  respectful  of  human  rights),  the  human  right  guarantees  (human, 
political,  civil  rights),  political  participation  (in  particular,  the  author  here  refers  to  the 
development of the local governments and of the civil society)77.
76 A similar definition of democracy can be found in Merkel who, when describing the “partial regimes of the 
embedded  democracy”  identifies:  electoral  regime,  political  liberties,  civil  rights,  division  of  powers  and 
horizontal accountability and the effective power to govern as the five dimensions (five partial regimes) upon 
which democracy is based. Yet, we find this definition not suitable for the purpose of this study as it poses a 
strong accent on the human, political and civil rights while the dimensions which matter in the approach of our 
international actor appear to be secondary. 
77 See Mattina, 2004.
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Linz and Stepan (1996) identified five arenas of democracy: active and independent civil 
society, political society, rule of law (including constitutionalism, respect for the law, limitation 
of  the  ruling  elite  power,  and  the  necessity  for  judicial  independence),  the  administrative 
apparatus at hand for the democratic government and the economic society. The first four 
arenas include, directly or indirectly, all five dimensions identified by Morlino and Magen. The 
fifth arena, the economic society, in our opinion should not be included in our operational 
definition of the salient  dimensions of democracy. We do not mean to discuss the causal 
relationship between democracy and economy in detail: we believe that given the sensitivity of 
the international democracy promotion and motivations driving the IA’s actions, we shall not 
include any economic requirement or norm into our definition of democracy. We’ll treat the 
economic requirements as a separate set of norms, part of the linkage process, that might 
change the domestic actor’s costs and benefits balance, but not as a part of the democratic 
norms. The same is true for the international relations of the target state and its modes of 
foreign  policy.  Many  authors  underlined  that  the  democracies’  foreign  policy  shall  be 
democratic. Thus, for example, Magen stresses that:
“A  more  nuanced,  longer-term  understanding  of  democratization  processes  widens  and 
deepens the canvas beyond procedure and formal institutions,  to include questions of genuine 
democratic  accountability,  the  quality  of  justice  and  administration,  effective  rule  of  law  and 
regulatory structures, protection of human and minority rights, intolerance towards corruption, 
economic performance and even modes of foreign policy behavior.” (Magen, 2004, p. 7). 
Here again, as the interests  and motivations  of the external actor are one of our explanatory 
factors, we cannot embrace such a large definition of democracy that would allow the issues 
concerning  countries’  foreign  policy  to  be  considered  as  salient  dimensions  for  the 
democratization process. 
For these reasons we embrace Morlino's definition of the Democratic Rule of Law and 
decide to organize our analysis to represent, for each of our cases, the developments in the 
dimensions central to the democratic rule of law. 
The first four chapters in the empirical part are dedicated to the existence of democratic 
and administrative institutions able to formulate, implement and enforce the law, and aims to 
examine the “system of governance”, the constitutional design, the relationship between the 
institutions and their functioning. The constitution (chapter 4), the parliament, the executive 
and their relationship (chapter 5), as well as the he questions of the decentralization and local 
governments and the state bureaucracy and civil service (chapters 6 and 7), will be faced too. 
While the international actors are often recommending the new public management reforms 
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in  the  fields  of  the  administration  reform,  we do not  consider  the  NPM as  a  dimension 
defining democracy. The same is true for the internal organization of the state: independently 
on the approach assumed by the international actor, we do not believe that a particular setting 
(parliamentary  vs.  presidential  democracy,  majoritarian  vs.  consociative,  unitary  state  vs. 
decentralization, bureaucratic vs. agency-based civil service) is to be a-priori considered more 
democratic. What we are interested in is the existence of, relationship between and effective functioning  
of  the state’s institutions.  In our analysis we will  pay particular attention to distinguish the 
issues relevant for the separation of power between the different institutions and different 
levels of governance (as a key for the horizontal accountability) from those issues concerning 
the  internal  organization  and  procedures  of  the  institution.  Here,  as  in  the  chapter  five 
concerning the judiciary, while the internal organization, procedures and overall functioning 
are  often  linked  to  the  institution’s  independence  and  role  in  the  constitutional  system, 
however separating the two might be of particular importance when trying to understand the 
possible failures in the democratization process (the link between the particular dimension 
analysed and the democratization process will be explored in the introductory sections of the 
relative chapters). 
In chapter 8 we will analyse the process of establishing an independent judiciary system, 
where we will distinguish the dimension that concerns the capacities of the judicial system from the 
dimension that concerns the judiciary independence. The (lack of) administrative capacity of the 
courts can often represent a huge obstacle to the reform, and it shall be kept as separated as 
possible from the question of the relationship between the different branches of power. The 
question of the corruption, illegality and abuse of power would be faced in both the specific 
section  concerning  the  judiciary,  and  in  the  more general  chapter  9  concerning  the  fight 
against corruption. 
The  chapter  9  will  be  dedicated  to  the  fight  against  corruption,  and  here  we  will 
concentrate on analysing the level and type of corruption, distinguishing between the lower-
level, administrative corruption and state capture. We will trace the origins of the corruption 
and identify the domestic mechanisms that favour it, turning then to the development and 
implementation of the anti-corruption legislations and of the mechanisms aiming to limit the 
elite’s abuse of power and establish the intra-institutional accountability.
In line with Morlino and Magen’s dimensions of democratic rule of law, but also in line 
with the EU democracy promotion package, we dedicate the chapters 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 to 
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the protection of human, political  and civil  rights. Particular attention shall be paid to the 
instruments,  legislative  framework  and institutions  put  in  place  in  order  to guarantee  the 
protection of the basic human, political and civil rights. In this section the right to vote, the 
media freedom and the development of the civil  society associations and their role in the 
decision-making process will be given particular attention.
Finally, the last dimension of the democratic rule of law concerns the security sector and 
covers the police service and civilian control over the military forces to which we dedicate, 
respectively,  the  chapters  15  and 16.  The developments  in  establishing  a  police  which  is 
efficient in its fight against crime and, at the same time, respectful of the human rights will be 
traced.  The chapter  16 will  be  dedicated to the  security  sector  where  we will  analyse the 
process of establishing the civilian control over the armed forces. The effective power of the 
elected officials to govern would be assessed by examining the role of the security sector and 
its relationship with the civil institutions. The intelligence agencies and the military represent a 
crucial actor in every democratization process as their submission to the civilian control, while 
crucial, can be established only in accordance with these forces. The inner contradiction is 
present in the military and intelligence service reform, as the effective democratic control over 
the security sector implies a high level of transparency in the functioning of these agencies for 
which the security reasons of the country do not allow.
3.3. WHAT ADDITIONAL DIMENSIONS?
As underlined when describing the theoretical framework of this work, the particularity of 
the process of international anchoring is that it combines two otherwise distinct processes 
(democracy promotion and the creation of linkages with the external actor). In practical terms, 
this means that, to the costs and benefits deriving from the regime change, the costs and 
benefits deriving from the “boundary removal” shall be added.
As the two countries included in the analysis aspire to the EU membership, the package of 
the norms promoted by the EU covers not only the democratic norms, but also a series of 
other dimensions. Among the conditions that an aspirant member of the EU should fulfill, we 
find a series of economic requirements, the adoption of the acquis communitaire organized in 
more than 30 chapters (the negotiations with Turkey and Croatia include 35 chapters), as well 
as specific political criteria that differ from country to country. These requirements, while not 
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directly  tackling  the  rule  of  law  in  the  country,  might,  however,  exercise  an  important 
influence on the country’s relation with the international actor. The costs and benefits the 
actor are subject to due to the compliance with these norms enter the overall calculation of 
the  costs  and  benefits,  and  might  even  influence  the  actor’s  preference  concerning  the 
integration process. As such, the developments in these fields are important factor that can 
exercise the influence on our independent variables and as such, indirectly, influence the EU 
promotion of the democratic norms.
As the range of this thesis does not allow us to include the entire EU integration package, 
we will  select only a few dimensions considered most relevant for the development of the 
anchoring process. A preliminary analysis showed the particular relevance of the following 
dimensions: 1) economic issues, 2) specific  political  requirements 3) the promotion of the 
EU’s institutions  and promotion of  the  compliance  with the  requirements made by  other 
International Organizations.
Economic  issues  have  a  particular  role  in  the  process  of  the  EU anchoring  and  the 
democratization processes in two states, and they cover several dimensions. The integration 
with the EU has its economic dimension, often considered the most important dimension of 
the state’s adhesion to the EU. The economic interests of the state, but also the interests of 
the economic elite (the two do not necessarily converge) represent one of the most important 
aspects of the integration process and, as such, these interests and the developments in the 
economic sphere, exercise an important influence on the domestic actor’s costs and benefits 
balance. In which measure the membership perspective can push the compliance forward with 
the norms promoted by the EU will depend also on the national and business elite’s economic 
interests.
In this section, we will also cover two other economic issues which, even though they do 
not  concern  the  “integration  package”,  are  included  in  this  section  to keep  similar  issues 
together. The first of these issues concerns the EU’s financial assistance to the state. The EU’s 
democracy  promotion  activities  are  often  combined  with  the  financial  assistance  and 
incentives offered in order to facilitate the reforms. While analyzing the developments in the 
dimensions concerning democratization we will also tackle the financial support, in the section 
devoted to the economic issues we will tackle the general problem of the capacity of the EU’s 
financial support to influence the domestic policy. Finally, in this section we will also examine 
the economic elite’s interests in the field of democratization. The economic elite’s preferences 
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concerning  the  change  of  the  domestic  political  regime  are  one  of  the  important  issues 
influencing  the  democratization  process.  As  Morlino  underlined,  the  consolidation  of  the 
democracy needs the economic elite to accept the new setting (see Morlino, 1998, 2005). For 
this purpose, we will examine the economic elite’s capacity to influence the decision-making 
process, its relations with the political elite, and, finally, the interests of the business in the 
process of democratization. Where the economic elite is capable to decide the course of the 
state’s  policy,  the  support  of  the  economic  elite  would  be  a  necessary  condition  for 
democratization. Where the political elite is stronger than the economic elite, such influence 
would  be  less  decisive,  even  though  the  relevant  economic  actors  can  still  influence  the 
process. 
We dedicate another dimension of the integration process to the most relevant specific 
political requirements that the EU addressed to the two countries. In Serbia’s case, the EU 
political requirements covered a series of issues: cooperation with ICTY, Kosovo's status and 
respect for the UNSC Resolution 1244, respect of the Dayton Peace Agreement, relationship 
with Montenegro, good neighbourhood relationship with Croatia being the most important 
ones. The limited space of this study forced us to choose only some of these issues, so that we 
included  the  two that  in  a  preliminary  analysis  appeared to be  the  most  relevant  for  the 
process of anchoring Serbian democracy: cooperation with ICTY and the status of Kosovo. 
As  in  part  of  the  period  covered  by  this  study  Serbia  and  Montenegro  were  in  a 
federation/State Union, even though the relationship with Montenegro is not included in the 
study,  some  of  its  aspects  will  emerge  when  speaking  about  the  dimensions  of 
democratization and the differences between republics’ and state level. As far as Macedonia is 
concerned, the most relevant specific political requirement that the EU made to Macedonia 
concerned the name dispute with Greece. 
The third dimension included in this part concerns the EU requirements for strengthening 
the domestic institutions specialized in fostering the process of the countries’ integration (like 
the Agency for  the EU integrations, the Parliamentary committee for the EU integrations, the 
Council  for  the  EU  integrations  and  similar)  and  the  promotion  of  other  anchors  of 
democracy. By requiring that the state constitutes particular bodies with the task to deal with 
the integration process, the EU is creating the domestic change agents whose main task will be 
to make the entire process easier, promoting and supporting the EU agenda at home. Even 
though the EU includes these requirements in the section on the system of governance and 
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administrative  capacity,  these  norms  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  democracy-promotion 
package, as by no means the democratization necessarily means opening an office for the EU 
integrations.  Similarly,  the EU’s requirements that the state adheres to other supranational 
organizations, signs a particular treaty or adheres to a particular regional initiative, represent 
the opening of new anchors linking the state to the international environment. Rather than 
promoting democracy, such requirements might positively increase the country’s compliance 
with the EU agenda and represent a precious resource for strengthening the EU’s interest. 
When the EU promotes the adhesion to another IA who shares the EU agenda and who 
conditions its membership with the compliance with particular norms, the pressure on the 
domestic  elite  increases and the other IA’s  strategies are added to the EU’s strategies  for 
promoting the particular norm. Moreover, this allows the EU to indirectly use the other IA’s 
resources, particularly the monitoring mechanisms and the financial assistance that the partner 
is using towards the target state.
3.4. THE CHOICE OF CASES
The empirical part of this study will concentrate on the democratization process in Serbia 
and Macedonia. Aside from the political relevance of the Western Balkan countries, that since 
the end of the cold war represented the symbol of the pseudo-democracies engaged in the 
atrocities of the ethnic conflict in the very heart of Europe, such choice was guided by a series 
of methodological and theoretical reasons. 
First of all,  the existing literature studying the impact of the international actors on the 
democratization  of  the Balkans  is  still  under-developed.  The study of  the EU role  in  the 
democratization  outside  the  CEEC  was  surprisingly  underdeveloped,  seen  this  actor’s 
activities in the field. This neglect was caused mainly by the separated development of the 
research on enlargement and studies of democratization. On the one hand, the literature on 
enlargement was guided by the debate between rationalism and constructivism, on the other, 
as we already saw above, the study of democratization treated the international influence, at 
best, as marginal. Only recently, with creation of the EU policies directed to the neighbouring 
states and with the Balkan states gaining the potential candidate status, the scholars started to 
make first steps in studying EU democracy promotion in non-member states. They finally 
started to perceive the enlargement as a powerful instrument of foreign policy and rejected the 
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assumption according to which the EU enlargement process, due to its temporal and spatial 
limitations, cannot offer us any generalizable lesson concerning the democracy promotion (see 
Magen 2004 pp. 3-12; Morlino and Magen 2008).
This resulted in research designs that try to understand the impact of the EU democracy 
promotion on non-member states in the light of the different relations these states have with 
the European Union. In the field, the most ambitious project is the one designed by Morlino 
and Magen that considers not only the supply side, but also tries to unpack the black box of 
the national state, surpassing the divisions between different approaches and disciplines, and 
taking  into  account  not  only  the  formal  rule  adoption,  but  rule  implementation  and rule 
internalisation as well. They concentrate their attention on four countries: Romania, Turkey, 
Serbia  and  Ukraine,  each  representing  a  different  status  of  EU relationships  (respectively 
perspective member, negotiating candidate, potential candidate and  European neighbouring 
country),  so  as  to  offer  a  better  understanding  on  how  the  differences  in  force  of 
conditionality, opportunities for elite socialization and immediacy of incentives for compliance 
influence the outcome of the externally driven rule of law promotion. No comparative study 
analysing the differences and similarities in the outcome between the states with similar status 
towards the EU are present in the field. As we will see, until December 2005 both Serbia and 
Macedonia enjoyed the potential candidate status. Macedonia was guaranteed the candidate 
status as an act of political recognition (negotiations, however, still unopened), while Serbia 
was offered the signature of the political  agreement in 2008, even though not fulfilling all 
criteria,  in  compensation  to  the  SAA  whose  implementation  was  blocked  by  The 
Netherlands’s insistence on cooperation with ICTY. The two countries can be analysed as 
sharing the same status in the first period (2000 – 2005), after which one advances in the 
integration (2006 – 2008), offering a possibility to study how the status in the relation with IA 
influences the compliance with the norms promoted and the process of democratization. 
The two countries are also well-suited to satisfy a series of other criteria we considered 
relevant when choosing the cases.
Enjoying  the  status  of  potential  candidate,  the  two  Balkan  countries  are  theoretically 
supposed  to  be  much  more  influenced  by  the  EU’s  democracy  promotion  strategies, 
conditionality in particular, than it is the case with the countries to which the neighbouring 
policy is applied or the countries outside Europe. The researches in the field underlined that 
the more intensive is the relationship with the IA, the nearer and more credible is the reward 
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and, hence, greater the external incentives for accommodation of the EU requests78. On the 
other  hand,  with  the  intensifying  of  the  relationships  between the  state  and the  EU,  the 
sinking cost of redrawing a reward for the EU increases and the credibility of threats in case 
of non-compliance decreases. The cases we chose for this study, potential members, satisfy 
the criteria of the strong external incentive for the rule transfer: being granted the status of 
potential candidate, the credibility of the reward is high, and, seen the geopolitical position, 
the costs of being excluded are also enormously high79. They are higher than in the case of 
other neighbouring states that have alternatives in their foreign policy80 and were not granted 
the possibility of membership. Moreover, as we stressed, the credibility of the threat is higher 
than in the case of negotiating candidates. 
At the same time, in both cases democracy is still very fragile and the anchors keeping the 
democratic  regimes  are  of  the  great  importance.  As  our  goal  is  to  study  the  process  of 
democratization,  it  is  obvious  that  we  chose  fragile  and  unstable  democracies  or  hybrid 
regimes. The electoral democracies and hybrid regimes are particularly interesting cases for 
studying  the  influence  of  external  actors.  They  are  characterized  by  the  existence  of 
undemocratic  practices  and  legacies,  the  internal  factors  undermining  the  democratic 
consolidation  and  full  establishment  of  the  rule  of  law,  which  makes  the  democracy 
promotion necessary. On the other hand, the existence of the relatively fair electoral process 
and  some  degree  of  pluralism  opens  the  possibility  for  the  IA  to  rely  on  the  domestic 
electorate and weak civil society associations in a two-level game that brings the ruling elite under 
pressure to pursue the democratic reforms. 
As  the  Copenhagen  criteria  established  in  1997  during  the  Luxembourg  summit,  the 
country should be characterized by “the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule  of  law,  human  rights  and  respect  for  and  protection  of  minorities”  in  order  for 
negotiations on the Membership to be opened, countries like Croatia or Turkey, that already 
opened the negotiations for the membership, were excluded from the choice of the cases. 
Macedonia's  case is  therefore particularly  interesting,  as  the country’s  negotiations  are still 
blocked exactly due to the lack of compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria81. Indeed, 
78 On the size and speed of reward see Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir 2004, p. 665; on mechanisms and 
constraints of the EU influence see Grabbe, 2001.
79 See Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir 2004, pp. 665-666.
80 On the influence of the presence of other alternatives, see Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeir 2004, p. 666.
81 The shortcomings in political criteria that contributed to postpone the opening of negotiations concerned 
irregularities  of  the  elections  as  well  as  the  lack  of  independence  and  political  neutrality  of  both  public 
administration and judiciary.
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according to the different data sets aiming to assess the level of democratization, Macedonia is 
much closer to Serbia (and in some dimensions its level of democracy is even lower than in 
Serbia),  than to the countries  that  fully  enjoy  the  status  of  the  negotiating  candidate  (see 
Tables 1, 2, 3). In the Freedom House data set it is classified as Partly Free, and scores 3 points 
on both civil rights and political liberties dimension. 
The two countries are also very similar if we consider the scores on different dimensions of 
democracy, as represented in Table 2: the largest differences concern the media independence, 
judicial independence, and civil society development.
The scores  on Bertelsmann transformation index  depict  very  well  the  fragility  of  both 
Serbian  and  Macedonian  democracy.  The  BTI  status  index  combines  the  scores  on  the 
political  transformation  and  the  economic  development,  as  it  is  build  to  measure  the 
development  of  the  establishment  of  the  market-based  democracy.  In  the  status  index, 
countries  with a score from 7 up have good prospects  for consolidation of market-based 
economy (lower limit  from 7 up to 8,20)  while  those that  are nearer to 10 are judged as 
market-based democracies, consolidated or in process of consolidation. The countries scoring 
somewhere between 5 and 7 are judged as countries presenting deficiencies  in terms of a 
market-based democracy. As we can see from Table 3, even though both countries pass the 7-
point limit on the result in political  transformation,  they are both very near to the line of 
passing to the deficient cases, which well illustrates the fragility of their regimes. 
In analyzing Macedonia’s case, we will consider the period during which Macedonia was a 
potential candidate, sharing the same status with Serbia, (2000 – December 2005), separately 
from the period  when it  achieved  the  status  of  negotiating  candidate  to  nowadays  (from 
December 2005 on). Such approach allows us to face the question rising from the comparison 
of the level of democratization in Serbia and Macedonia: considering the fact that Serbia is 
considered a more democratic  country than Macedonia  in many dimensions,  how can we 
explain  the  differences  in  the  relations  with  the  EU?  Last,  but  not  least,  considering 
Macedonia, we can also analyze the differences in the outcome of democracy promotion in 
Macedonia  before  and after  December  2005,  as  well  as  between the  states  with different 
relationships with the EU.
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Table 1: “Relationships with EU and level of freedom in the Balkan area, 2005”1.
1 Source: Freedom House, “Freedom in the world country ratings 1972 – 2006”. 
Table  2:  “Democracy  rating  by  Freedom house  in  2006  of  the  states  included  in  the 
study”2.
Serbia Macedonia
Level of democracy 3.71 3.82
Electoral process 3.25 3.25
Civil society 2.75 3.25
Independent Media 3.25 4.25
National democratic governance 4.00 3.75
Local democratic governance 3.75 3.75
Judicial Framework and independence 4.35 3.75
Corruption 4.75 4.75
2 Source: Freedom House, country reports 2006
Table 3: “Bertelsmann transformation index (BTI) 2006 for the countries included in the 
study and Croatia”.
Result in political transformation Status index Ranking
Croatia 9.10 8.71 11
Macedonia 7.55 7.08 29
Serbia  and 
Montenegro
7.40 6.95 33
Another advantage in choosing Serbia and Macedonia for a comparative study comes from 
the  fact  that  the  two  cases  are  as  homogenized  as  possible  in  the  traditionally  studied 
dimensions of democratization, making them a well-fitting comparable couple82. Belonging to 
the  same geographic  region  and,  more  importantly,  sharing  the  similarities  in  a  series  of 
cultural, historic, economic and political features, the cases we chose allow us to keep some of 
the  variables  considered  crucial  in  the  literature  on  democratization  under  control.  The 
economic underdevelopment in the period immediately prior to the end of the communist 
82 On the importance of the comparability of the cases in the small N research designs, see Lijphart, 1971, p.  
687. See also Collier, 1991, p. 123-124.
Political 
Rights:
Civil 
Liberties:
Status: Relations with EU:
Bosnia: 4 3 Partly free. Potential candidate.
Albania: 3 3 Partly free. Potential candidate.
Macedonia: 3 3 Partly free. Negotiating candidate.
Serbia  and 
Montenegro:
3 2 Free. Potential candidate.
Croatia: 2 2 Free. Negotiating candidate.
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regime,  the  transition  initiated  by  the  old  authoritarian  elite  and  the  victory  of  the  ex-
communists in the first free elections, the armed conflict and the multi-ethnic character of the 
state,  combined  with  the  nation-building  policies  undertaken  by  both  countries  after  the 
dissolution of SFRJ and the breakdown of communism, all these are dimensions in which the 
two countries are very similar (see Table 4).
Table 4: “Domestic factors of democratization”. 
Serbia Macedonia
Type  of  the  previous  authoritarian 
regime:
1945  –  1989  one-party  communist  regime,  with  some  characteristics  of 
totalitarianism.
1989 – 2000 pseudo-democracy with some characteristic of the authoritarian regime 
with nationalistic mobilization.
2000 instauration of democracy.
1945  –  1989  one-party  communist  regime, 
with some characteristics of totalitarianism.
1990 instauration of democracy.
The  break  of  the  previous  regime 
caused by:
Military defeat; Economic crisis; Opposition supported by the international actors. Collapse of communism and dissolution of the 
SFRJ. 
Ethnic violence and conflicts: Yes. Yes.
Process of nation state building: Yes. Yes.
Resolution of the ethnic tensions: No (Kosovo issue, Preševo valley issue). Only  apparently  (the  inter  ethnic  tensions 
between Macedonians  and Albanians  are  day 
to day reality, ethnic violence being a constant 
threat).
Presence of militant ethnic groups: Yes. Yes.
Previous  experience  with  mass 
democracy:
Partially (in the mid-XIX century the universal suffrage and elections for the national 
assembly were established, but a fully developed consolidated democracy has never 
been established).
No.
Previous statehood experience: Yes. No.
The actors initiating the democratic 
transition:
Communists (1990).
Democratic opposition and civil society with support of external actors (2000).
Communists (1990).
The first elections won by: Ex Communists. Ex Communists.
Ruptura pactada : Yes. Yes.
Process  of  the  constitution  design: 
presence of all relevant actors.
No (constitution of 1992 drafted without inclusion of the opposition parties,  the 
constitution of 2006 drafted without consultation with national minorities).
No, until  the Ohrid framework where in the 
“peace  conference”,  as  a  result  of  armed 
conflict  and  pressures  of  the  international 
community  the  amendments  required  by  the 
Albanian minority were introduced.
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While the EU was promoting the democratic norms in both countries and the prospect of 
the membership was offered to both Serbia and Macedonia, the exit of the anchoring process 
and the features of the democratization in two countries differ83.  Serbia is among the first 
cases where the process of  de-anchoring  of the EU anchor took place and it is the only case 
where the signature of the SAA was delayed due to the lack of internal support and strong 
opposition to the EU integration. If, instead of pointing at Kosovo's issue as a cause of such 
exit, we try to trace the events that brought to Serbia’s refusal to sign the political agreement 
offered by EU in February 2008, we can notice that this decision had its roots already in the 
very beginning of the transition in 2001 and that, rather than speaking of a radical change 
caused  by  the  Kosovo  issue,  the  developments  followed  the  pattern  described  by  the 
anchoring  (de-anchoring)  theory:  each  anchor  contains  the  seeds  of  self-destruction,  and 
under specific conditions, as anchoring is taking place, these seeds of self-destruction might 
develop as well. As far as the democratization process is concerned, while the status of two 
countries,  as  assigned  by  the  Freedom House  and  BTI  index,  is  similar,  there  are  some 
interesting  differences  between  the  countries.  Our  preliminary  analysis  showed  that  the 
mechanisms  that  hamper  the  democratization  in  the  two  countries  differ,  as  well  as  the 
dimensions in which the progress is slow. While Macedonia appears to be characterized by a 
very positive answer to the EU in the rule adoption,  it  shows particular difficulties  in the 
implementation layer. On the contrary, there are hints leading to believe that in Serbia both 
the adoption of the rules in line with the EU requirements and their implementation were 
rather difficult. As the research will concentrate on rule adoption and rule implementation, 
such finding of the preliminary analysis is particularly encouraging for the choice of cases, as it 
allows us to use both Mill’s “method of agreement” and his “method of difference” in order 
to test the possible need or sufficient conditions. 
Finally, Serbia is the one of the rare cases where the EU tried to influence the domestic 
distribution of power, which gives us the opportunity to study the impact of this strategy and 
to compare the outcomes with the Macedonian case where such strategy was not used. On the 
other hand, Macedonia is the only case (except for the international protectorates in Bosnia 
and Kosovo) where, beside democratization, the EU was, and continues to be, involved in the 
peace-building process. Including Macedonia in the analysis allows us to study the democracy 
promotion in the context of a strongly segmented society and to examine the particularities of 
83 As underlined by Soifer, the process-tracing technique in the N=2 studies is best pursued if the chosen 
cases differ both on the causes and outcome side. See Soifer, 2006. See also the part on the method. 
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the democracy promotion in the unstable settings characterized by inter-ethnic conflict and 
threat of inter-ethnic violence.
The cases  we chose  appear  to bear great  theoretical  importance,  as  they challenge the 
optimistic perspective upon which most of the studies were based, namely the assumption 
that  the  integration  with  EU is  always perceived as  a  reward that  opens  the  door  to the 
successful democracy promotion process. In other words, as Magen (2004) stressed: 
“With the exception of  Croatia,  the Balkan “potential  candidates”  carry a  daunting legacy 
characterised  by  chronic  political  instability,  socio-economic  underdevelopment  and  terrible 
ethnic  violence.  These  challenges  pose  difficult  tests  for  democracy  promotion  through 
enlargement,  and  the  experiences  of  these  countries  and  international  protectorates  over  the 
coming decades will provide valuable material for developing theory about democratisation and 
democracy promotion” (Magen, 2004, pp. 19-20). 
For all these reasons we believe that our choice to concentrate on Macedonia and Serbia, 
beside  casting  more  light  over  countries  that  were  rarely  included  in  the  analysis  on  the 
international  influence  on  democratization84,  also  offers  the  possibility  to  enrich  our 
theoretical understanding of the international dimension of the democratization due to the 
particularities of the two countries analyzed.
3.5. METHOD, DATA AND THE RESEARCH DESIGN
The two main methods we will use in this study are comparison and process tracing. Such 
choice was directly influenced by the goal of our study, by its subject and by the number of 
cases we chose to analyse. 
The main goal of our research is to examine whether and how the EU influenced the 
process of democratization in Serbia and Macedonia. Such question goes beyond the causal 
effect, which is only part of the problem. Once we assessed the relevance/irrelevance of the 
EU’s influence, we are also interested in  how exactly the EU influenced the democratization 
process, or, if the EU tried but failed to influence the process, why it failed. Finding that the 
EU promoted democracy in a particular case and that the country got democratized, while 
showing  the  co-variation,  however,  is  not  enough  to  claim  the  causal  inferences,  not  to 
mention that would not be enough for answering the quest of our study.  According to the 
84 There are almost no studies on the EU engagement in democratizing Macedonia, while Serbia was only 
recently included. See Dallara, 2008.
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literature  on  the  process  tracing  that  is  significantly  growing  in  the  last  decades,  such 
technique allows us to escape the problems that the co-variation poses, as it  allows us to 
strengthen the claim of the causal effect by supporting it with the explanation of the causal 
mechanism85. Our quest follows Sayer’s statement: “What we would like... is the knowledge of 
how the process works. Merely knowing that ‘C’ has generally  been followed by ‘E’ is  not 
enough; we want to understand the continuous process by which ‘C’ produced ‘E’ if it did” 
(Sayer, 192, pp. 106-107, cited in Bennett and George, 1997b).
The very  quest  of  our  study is  formulated in  such  manner  to  unpack the  mechanism 
through which the EU was influencing the two countries. Many of our independent variables 
influence each other, and all of them can work together to bring to the specific outcome. 
Further on, as we could see in the chapter on the theoretical framework, the variance in each 
variable  is  significant,  and  the  observed  values  can  go  from  absent  and/or  particularly 
negative,  to  present  and/or  particularly  positive  with  all  the  different  shades  in  between. 
Taking for example conditionality, which is based on offering a reward for the compliance, it 
can vary from absent to very important reward, from credible to less credible or not credible 
at all. The change agents can be present and with a decisive impact on the decision-making 
process, or present and influential, present but weak or completely absent and so on. In some 
cases a single factor (when particularly present) can turn into the sufficient condition, but if 
this is not the case, all other factors in the framework will turn out to be relevant, reinforcing 
or weakening each other in producing the particular outcome. For this reason we will use both 
the  comparative  (Mill’s  "method of  agreement"  and  his  "method of  difference")  and the 
process tracing  method. With the  first,  we will  try  to assess  the presence/absence of  the 
sufficient or necessary conditions that make the change. With the second, we will try to trace 
how the set of factors brought to the specific outcome.
Not only the question around which this research is built, but also the very subject induced 
us to opt for the process-tracing technique. As Bennett and George argue, the process-tracing 
method that allows the understanding of the causal mechanisms is particularly useful when the 
goal is to examine the decision-making process86 and it has particular values for further policy 
interventions:
85 For a discussion on causal mechanisms and causal effects and the capacity of the process tracing method to 
reveal the causal mechanisms, see Bennett and George,1997, 1997b; Falleti, 2007.
86 See also Falleti, 2007.
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“Causal mechanisms are also relevant to policy interventions because the ability to predict 
outcomes may not confer the ability to affect them through manipulable variables. For example 
even if it continues to hold up to empirical scrutiny, the observed correlation that democracies do 
not engage in wars with one another even though they have frequently fought wars against non-
democratic states is only a starting point for policy prescriptions. It would be best to understand 
both  the  causal  mechanisms  behind  the  apparent  democratic  peace  and  those  behind  the 
emergence of democracy, and to identify those mechanisms that policy interventions can affect. 
Indeed, some studies suggest  that transitional  democracies are quite  war-prone and may fight 
other democracies (Snyder and Mansfield, 1995)” (Bennet and George, 1997b). 
We find this passage particularly interesting, not only for its relevance in our discussion on 
the importance of  the process tracing method, but also due to the example  that  the two 
authors  use,  for,  as  we  will  see,  the  problem  of  the  peace  and  democratic  transition  is 
particularly relevant for Macedonia's case.
Finally, the small number of cases included in this study also influenced our decision to use 
the  process  tracing  and comparative  methods.  As  several  authors  underlined,  the  process 
tracing is the most appropriate method for those researches with a small number of cases, 
exactly due to its purpose to reveal the causal mechanisms87. In small-N research designs, the 
main  problem comes  from the unfavorable  relation  between the  number  of  independent 
variables and the number of cases88. Moreover, the small-N research design can not use the 
covariance as an evidence of the causal inference, which then makes it necessary to turn to the 
causal mechanisms and to trace the causal paths in order to explain the particular outcome. 
This brings us to a reflection of how many cases we have in this research. The number of 
the  countries  included  in  the  study  is  two,  which  means  that  our  quest  concerning  the 
international anchoring of democracy and the EU influence on the democratization process 
will be assessed by referring to the two countries included in the analysis. However, in line 
with Lijphart’s suggestion according to which one of the ways of strengthening the evidence 
consists in increasing the number of the cases, we will use the periodization, which identifies, 
within the single cases, different periods or cycles. This will allow us to assess both the spatial 
and temporal variance89 and to compare the two countries as well as the different cycles in the 
single country. Our tasks on the state-level analysis will consist in assessing the outcome by 
observing whether the development in the different dimensions of democratization creates a 
single-country  pattern,  and  whether  there  are  significant  patterns  on  the  level  of  the 
independent  variables  that  explain  the  outcome registered.  In  practice,  for  the  dependent 
87 See Bennett and George, 1997a; 1997b, Bennett and Elman, 2006.
88 On the problem concerning the number of the independent variables and number of the cases, see for 
example Lijphart, 1971.
89 For the periodization of cases and temporal-variance see Bartolini, 1991.
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variable  on  the  state-level  (democratization),  we  will  use  the  outcome  in  the  different 
dimensions  of  democratization  as  the  components  contributing  to  the  sort  of  index  of 
democratization. For the independent variables on the state-level, we will use the main trend 
(when there is such trend) of the independent variables in order to create the sort of index for 
each independent factor. Once the national patterns are identified, we will be able to make a 
cross-country analysis.
Similarly, we will try to assess whether on the state level there are specific cycles in which 
the developments followed the same direction. Once, if available, the periods are registered, 
we will be able to undertake the diachronic comparison, assessing how in the specific country 
the change of a particular factors produced (or failed to produce) a specific outcome.
Beside the state-level analysis, we will also be able to make a cross-issue comparison. In the 
section dedicated to the choice of the dimensions of democratization to include in the study, 
we identified 13 different areas of policy grouped in five dimensions: 1)  Judiciary system; 2) 
Institutional  Administrative  Capacity  (including  constitutional  issues,  form of  government, 
territorial  organization  and decentralization),  civil  service;  3)  Fight  against  corruption  and 
organized crime; 4) Human, political and civil  rights (covering: freedom of expression and 
independence  of  the  media,  freedom of association  and development  of  the  civil  society, 
protection  of  human  rights  and  institution  of  the  ombudsman,  right  to  vote  and  the 
minorities’ rights); 5) Security sector (covering: the police service and civilian control over the 
military forces).
This practically means that for the purpose of the research a cross-issue analysis covering 
13  different  areas  of  policy  can  be  undertaken.  Indeed,  beside  aiming  to  explore  the 
differences and similarities in the democratization path in Serbia and Macedonia, we will also 
be able to apply the revised EUCLIDA analytical framework to each of this areas of policy 
and create 26 different stories of external norm promotion. This will allow us to examine in 
details when and how the international actor influenced the domestic change, what are the 
factors  bringing  to the  compliance  with the  internationally  promoted norm and how our 
independent variables combine one with the other in a chain that brings to a specific outcome. 
Moreover,  some of  these areas of  policy  have different  venues  and can register  different 
developments. For example, as the police service concerns both the efficiency of the police 
forces and the protection of the human rights, the developments in two venues can follow 
different paths. The same is true for the territorial organization where the development of the 
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local self-government and the regionalization can follow different dynamics. These are only 
the two most immediate examples,  but in each other area of  policy  it  is  possible that  an 
uneven change took place in the different sub-areas concerning the same issue, and whenever 
the analysis  reveals  different patterns within a  same dimension,  we will  consider  the sub-
venues of the particular issues as distinct cases to include in the cross-issue comparison. 
Including the cross-issue analysis will allow us to examine whether there are cross-country 
similarities that can be explained by the particularities of a specific issue, and it will allow us to 
offer a rich assessment of the outcome of the external norm promotion. Further on, it will 
also allow us to examine those known as “deviant cases” in the single states. We underlined 
above that for the cross-country comparison we will concentrate on the prevailing national 
patterns. However, it is possible that some dimensions do not follow the general state pattern. 
It is possible,  for example, that in some dimension the outcome is particularly positive or 
negative, or that some of the independent variables are particularly relevant in one dimension 
but not in others. The cross-issue comparison will allow us to identify such cases and seek the 
explanation of the registered particularities.
We shall conclude this chapter with a few words on the data and organization of the work. 
The  empirical  part  is  divided  into  two  sections,  the  first  being  dedicated  to  the 
democratization process and the second to the most relevant issues of the integration process. 
The assessment of the developments in each area of policy included will  follow the same 
pattern. As our main variable is the change, we will have to assess the status quo in the initial 
period of time (for both cases in 2001, even though for Macedonia, when relevant, we will 
observe the developments in the Nineties as well), pondering on the particular problems in 
each dimension and the mechanisms that brought to a particular status quo. The changes will 
then be tracked, describing the reforms that took place (or, in those cases where there were no 
changes registered, describing the final failure of the reforms) and following the process that 
brought to the change. While in tracing the process we will pay attention to the factors of the 
EUCLIDA, the main goal of these sections will be to tell the story of the specific reform and 
on the factors that brought to the change, regardless if these are part of our independent 
variables or not. Such approach, inspired by the inductive process-testing methods, will  be 
useful to check for the existence of other relevant factors that were not included in the model, 
but that might be decisive for explaining the changes, allowing us to test whether or not there 
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are alternative  explanations to our model90.  After  exploring  the changes and assessing the 
current status quo, we shall summarize the influence exercised by the EU and make a short 
theory-guided process-tracing summary for the specific area of policy in the specific country. 
The theory-guided process tracing the assessment will fully explore the capacity of the revised 
EUCLIDA framework for explaining the changes registered in a particular field. Once the 
developments  in  both  Serbia  and Macedonia  are  described,  we will  make a  cross-country 
comparison for the specific area of policy, offering tables summarizing the main findings in 
the appendix, comparing the two countries’ particularities and offering the tables summarizing 
the EUCLIDA factors.
As the integration process is not part of our dependent variable, but its development is 
relevant for our independent variables, the chapters in this part will follow a slightly different 
pattern. We will  mainly concentrate on the EU requirements in these dimensions and the 
impact that the development in these areas had for the overall process of anchoring.
Various sources of data will be used. The most important for assessing the status quo will 
be the official documents (constitutions, national legislations and regulations, reports of the 
state institutions, governmental law-drafts). The reports of the relevant NGOs, both national 
and international, also represent an important source of information for following the changes 
in the specific fields. The secondary literature and the works of the Macedonian and Serbian 
scholars will be used for researching the necessary information, but also for the research of 
the alternative explanation to be tested against EUCLIDA framework. The preferences of the 
particular actors will be traced from the public statements of the politicians and other relevant 
actors, from the party programs, the electoral platforms, the speeches in the assembly, the 
media, interviews given and other written documents. In order to follow the debate that marks 
the particular change, we will follow the important media in the countries. In particular, we 
will use B92 for Serbia and Utrinski Vesnik in Macedonia, the choice made due to prestige 
these media enjoy and the fact that, due to the foreign ownership, the two are considered to 
be the media with the lowest interference by the domestic politics. This practically means that 
while we can expect the less politicized reporting on the domestic developments, due to the 
foreign ownership, attention should be paid to all those issues that concern the international 
actors and in particular the EU. Finally,  both media offer very rich on-line archives which 
represent a very precious source of information. Whenever possible, the information found in 
90 On the inductive-process tracing, theory-guided process tracing and the methods that are in between the 
two, see Bennett and George, 1997b.
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the media, the secondary literature, the NGO’s reports will be validated by the confrontation 
of the information achieved from different resources.
For assessing the variables on the supply side, we will  use the EU’s official documents, 
press releases, statements of the Commissioner for Enlargement and other political leaders 
when relevant. Here again, the secondary literature will  also be used, in order to trace the 
useful  information,  check  for  alternative  explanations  to  EUCLIDA and  understand  the 
factors that might have influenced the factors on the supply side.
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Part II
 Democratization and the Rule of  Law in Serbia and Macedonia 
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 122
123
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
"The strength of the Constitution lies entirely in the  
determination of each citizen to defend it. Only if every single  
citizen feels duty-bound to do his share in this defense are the  
constitutional rights secure." 
Albert Einstein
In the following paragraphs we will trace the process of the constitutional reforms in the 
two countries in order to examine the process of research for the political consensus that lies 
at the basis of any democracy91. Even though not all democracies have a written constitution 
and not in all cases the constitution has the position of a supreme law limiting the legislature’s 
powers of the ruling majority92, still, in any democratic society there is a written or unwritten 
agreement, supposed to represent what is known as the “political compromise”, which defines 
the political community and the rules of the game. In the ideal circumstances, the constitution 
or any similar document should be the expression of a deeper political consensus over polity 
and over the minimal democratic procedures for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. We 
can thus argue that even when a political regime is based on the constitution prescribing clear 
rules of the game, if such constitution is not an expression of the political consensus among 
all relevant political actors, we can question both the level of democracy in such system and its 
sustainability, as the unsatisfied elements of the society might push for change. 
For this reason, the adoption of the constitution was often perceived in literature as one of 
the crucial  moments of the democratization process and,  according to many scholars,  the 
constituent  process,  its  context,  the  timing,  the  actors  involved  and  the  interests  they 
91 Even though democracy can be perceived as a  regime where the uncertainty over  the content of the 
decision-making  process  is  institutionalized,  still,  as  Bobbio  (1991)  argues,  the  decisional  uncertainty  in  the 
democratic regimes is  limited  by the compromise over the rules for the peaceful resolution of conflicts.  The 
content of the compromise that lies at the basis of the political regime varies from one polity to another, but we 
might  argue  that  in  all  cases  some  minimum agreement  over  the  dimensions  and  borders  of  the  political 
community, the definition of polity (“The people can not decide until somebody decides who are the people”, 
Jennings,  1956, cited in Rustow, 1970, p. 351),  and the rules of the game, the procedures for the “peaceful 
resolution of the conflicts” are a necessary part of this agreement.
92 Lijphart perceives this problem as the problem of the sovereignty of majority and rights of the minority. 
The process of amending the constitution, as well as the process of changing this basic consensus, in the author’s 
model, becomes one of the elements distinguishing between the majoritarian and consensual types of democracy. 
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represented can be  decisive  for  the  exit  of  the  process  of  the  democratization.  Linz  and 
Stepan underlined that the conditions under which the constitution is adopted represent one 
of the explanatory factors for the future of the democratic transition process. Moreover, the 
specific  constellation  of  actors  present  during  the  process  will  also  decide  the  particular 
content of the solutions adopted. 
In the following paragraphs we will  trace the constitutional  changes in the two studied 
countries.  While  the  content  of  the  constitutions  regulating  the  specific  questions  will  be 
examined in other chapters (for the parts of the constitution concerning the judiciary see the 
section on the judicial system, for the protection of human rights see the section on human 
rights, etc.), in this section we will examine the building up of the political consensus, paying 
attention to the existence of anti-constitutional sentiments and actors seeking for their change 
and impact. As the constitution represents the basic consensus in the society and its amending 
often requires particular procedures, in case it has some authoritarian, undemocratic elements, 
it can become a serious obstacle for the democratization process. The necessity to amend the 
constitution  in  order  to  foster  the  democratization  process  can  become  a  window  of 
opportunity  used  by  the  minority  groups  holding  veto  power  to  push  their  own agenda 
forward. For this reason we will pay attention also to the possible existence of constitutional 
solutions that are harmful for the democracy and whose change is necessary for the process of 
democratization. 
4.1. SERBIA: CONSENSUS OVER THE NON-SOLUTION
4.1.1. CLOSING AND OPENING THE WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY: WHY NOT BEFORE 
AND WHY NOW?
When Milošević’s regime fell in October 2000, Serbia found itself with a constitution that 
reflected the realities and interests of the Serbian communistic elite in the aftermath of the fall 
of  communism  and  before  the  dissolution  of  the  SFRY.  The  changes  that  the  country 
underwent  in  the  '90s  (the  Socialistic  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  disintegrated;  the 
creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; the establishment of the UN protectorate on 
part of the territory) and the change of the political regime in 2000 created an urgent necessity 
for the redefinition of the basis of the state. Finally, the document was not harmonized with 
the  constitution  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia  of  which  Serbia  was  part,  which 
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seriously undermined the constitutional order of the country93. The document was strongly 
delegitimized, all political actors calling for the necessity of the constitutional reform94.
As  Vukašin  Pavlović  stressed,  while  the  countries  in  transition  usually  need  about  six 
months to accomplish the  constitutional  reform,  in  Serbia  we needed 6 years95.  The best 
moment for a constitutional reform in Serbia surely was the day after the 5th October 2000, 
when a series of favourable social and political circumstances came together: the old regime 
parties were weakened, there was a large consensus for reforms, the new ruling elite had no 
wasted interests in the existing institutions and was open to new, democratic solutions. This 
moment was lost, mainly due to the certitude that the constitutional reform should start from 
the federal level, meanwhile implementing the existing constitution which, due to the pseudo-
democratic nature of Milošević’s regime, was an acceptable transitional solution96. Yet, as the 
growing Montenegrin support for the independence and the blockage of the institutions at a 
federal level delayed the constitutional reform of the Federation (finalized only in February 
2003 with the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of the State Union),  this transitional 
period in Serbia  was also prolonged.  The Serbian Democratic  Opposition (DOS) was not 
capable of surviving that long, and by the time the reform was on the agenda, the positive 
energy of the 5th October 2000 had already disappeared. 
At  the  beginning  of  2003,  the  discussion  on the  procedure  to amend the  constitution 
started97. The dilemma was the same as in the fields of judiciary and administrative reform: 
shall the transition be undertaken in continuity with the previous periods, or shall it continue 
with the October revolution and make a clear cut with the previous period? In the field of the 
constitutional  reform,  the  dilemma continuity/discontinuity,  beside  its  obvious  moral  and 
political implications, also had some very practical sides. The amending procedure prescribed 
by the constitution required a very large consensus, absent in Serbia  since the division of 
DOS, which meant that – should the continuity approach be adopted – the numerous veto 
players would make the process difficult and time-consuming. On the other hand, violating 
the prescribed procedure would create a precedent undermining the legality of the new act, 
and, most probably, would bring to the exclusion of the significant actors from the process of 
93 On the constitutional reform of the FRY – State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, see Baracani, 2005. See 
also Dallara, 2008.
94 For the argumentation of the necessity for the constitutional reform in Serbia see Koštunica, 2002.
95 Cited in: Jovetić and Rusovac, 2005.
96 See Samardzic, 2005.
97 For the debate over the procedure for the constitutional changes see the archive of B92 for the period of 
the spring 2003. On the analysis of the different procedures for the constitutional change, see Hiber, 2002.
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constitution building. The debate over the content of the new constitution was concentrated 
on the solutions concerning the political regime (election of the president), the definition of 
the state (national or citizen formula) and territorial organization. The definition of the state 
and the territorial organization represented were linked with the most salient dimension of the 
political conflict in Serbia: nationalism vs. citizenship/or democracy98. 
The debate on the constitutional reform was stopped in summer 2003 when, after Đinđić's 
assassination and in a state of emergency, Serbia fell  into a deep political  and institutional 
crisis, and the DOS coalition was broken due to inner conflicts and scandals99. 
After the parliamentary elections in December 2003, the distribution of the seats in the 
assembly  gave  the  nationalistic  SRS  the  power  to  veto  any  initiative  requiring  qualified 
majority, increasing the ideological distance between the actors whose support was necessary 
for the adoption of the new constitution. The new parliament assigned the task to work on 
the constitutional draft to the parliamentary commission by the end of March 2004, but the 
same old issues remained the Apple of Discord. 
The dispute over the procedure prevailed in the debate over the constitutional  reform, 
cohabitation between president and hostile prime minister further complicating the process: in 
some moments Koštunica proposed to give the assembly a status of “constitutional assembly” 
with a specific mandate to adopt the new constitution, while the president proposed to call for 
elections for the constitutional assembly. In 2005, and in the first half of 2006, the activities 
over the constitutional reform were sporadic, mainly due to the lack of political consensus. 
Both the prime minister  and the president  drafted their  own constitutional  proposals,  “to 
serve as a starting point in negotiations”. 
In  July  2006,  after  almost  six  years,  the  first  “positive”  news  could  be  heard:  the 
parliamentary commission of experts agreed on the first half of the document (protection of 
human rights), while the question of the definition of the state was left to be solved in the 
parliament. 
98 The prevailing of these three topics in the debate over the new constitution was underlined already in 2002, 
by Pajvančić, where the political system, the territorial organization and the definition of the state emerged as the 
three points of disagreement in the different proposals of the constitution analyzed by the author. See Pajvanic, 
2002. About the critical issues in the debate over the constitution in the first period of negotiations in 2003 see 
also http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=06&dd=21&nav_id=111845. 
99 The  constitutional  commission  fell  into  a  crisis  due  to  the  discordance  between  its  members 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=06&dd=21&nav_id=111869,  to  be  finally 
dismissed in November 2003. 
See: http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2003&mm=11&dd=20&nav_id=125310.
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At the beginning of September the spokesman of the DSS, Aligrudić, announced: “We are 
near to the adoption of the new constitution, which draft might be finished already by the end 
of the autumn”100.  Only two days later,  the president of the parliament Predrag Marković 
promised that “the draft of the constitution will be finished by the end of the week”101, that 
the teams were working on the two proposed documents, as well as on the proposals and 
amendments suggested by SRS. The final result was that the last changes in the draft were 
made on 29/09, and the day after, on September the 30th, the document was adopted in the 
parliament with unanimity. 
4.1.2. THE CONSTITUTION RE-WRITTEN
Seen that the constitutional reform was on the agenda ever since October 2000, and the 
work started in March 2003, seen the notorious discordance of the Serbian political elite, such 
development was rather surprising and unexpected. It induces us to wonder what conditions 
brought to such wide consensus, one of the very few in Serbia's long history of continuous 
internal conflict102. 
September 2006 was a particular moment in which a series of circumstances made the 
political interests of different stakeholders converge towards the constitutional reform:
• in May 2006 Serbia became an independent state through the secession of Montenegro 
and  the  final  dissolution  of  Yugoslavia  (State  Union  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro), 
increasing the already urgent need for a constitutional reform;
• the negotiations of the SAA with the EU were ceased in May 2006 due to the Serbian 
failure to ensure the positive assessment of its cooperation with ICTY;
• G17  plus,  one  of  the  three  coalitional  partners,  announced  that  the  party  would 
withdraw from the ruling coalition if the SAA negotiations were not re-opened until 
the 01st October 2006103. A withdrawal of support from G17+ to Koštunica’s minority 
government would cause the fall of his cabinet and most probably new parliamentary 
100See:http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2006&mm=09&dd=02&nav_id=210373&nav_category=11. 
101See:http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2006&mm=09&dd=04&nav_id=210572&nav_category=11 
102 On the constitutional reform in Serbia, see also Dallara, 2008.
103 On  the  positions  of  G17+  and  its  threat  to  withdraw  its  support  to  the  minority  government  see 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/u_fokusu.php?id=122&start=480.
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elections, including the new electoral  competition as a part of the actor’s costs and 
benefits calculations; 104
• due  to  the  strong,  but  salient  diplomatic  activities  oriented  to  re-opening  the 
negotiations even without the arrestment of Mladić, and due to the unofficial  news 
published in the media on the 1st September, and never commented by the EU or by 
the Serbian government, the government received the news that there was the chance 
that the negotiations would be re-opened at the beginning of October105; 
• at the beginning of September it became more and more clear that the solution for the 
final status of Kosovo was to be found before the end of 2006; 
• Koštunica’s government and the parties composing the ruling coalition were losing the 
popular support. The ordinary elections were scheduled for December 2007, and all 
parties  in the opposition had an interest  for the elections  to take place as soon as 
possible.  According  to  some authors,  this  desire  was  even more  pronounced  than 
before, due to the privatization of some important national firms scheduled for 2007106. 
In such a political climate, the constitutional reform could be useful for a series of short-
term political  goals,  and all  relevant  actors  had something to gain if  the constitution was 
adopted.  The political  moment was particularly  positive:  being  the constitutional  reform a 
subject of the EU priorities, if there was any hope that the negotiations would be re-opened, 
the Serbian government needed as much positive judgment as possible, seen the situation with 
ICTY and the constitutional reform could be spent to obtain more positive assessment of 
Serbian reforms. The government’s survival would also be ensured. If the negotiations were 
not re-opened, the constitutional reform would ensure that G17+ would not withdraw his 
support in such an important moment as the constitutional reform. The new elections would 
be scheduled, satisfying the opposition’s requirements, but not due to the dismissal of the 
assembly.  Moreover,  the  constitutional  reform  would  be  an  important  achievement  for 
Koštunica  to  underline  during  the  electoral  campaign107.  The  whole  process  of  the 
constitutional reform and scheduling of the parliamentary elections could also serve as a good 
argument in postponing the negotiations over the status of Kosovo (see further), while the 
104 According  to  Lutovac,  this  was  the  main  reason  why  the  constitution  was  adopted  (interview  with 
Lutovac, 2006. b92).
105 http://www. b92. net/info/vesti/index. php?yyyy=2006&mm=09&dd=01&nav_category=11&nav_id=210240.
http://www. b92. net/info/vesti/index. php?yyyy=2006&mm=09&dd=02&nav_category=11&nav_id=210335.
106 Interview with Lutovac, 2006, b92.
107 This was precisely what actually happened.
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Kosovo issue  and the  re-emerging  nationalism could be  once  more cheaply  used to gain 
support for both the referendum on the constitution and for the parliamentary elections. All 
these  factors  pushed  the  Serbian  political  leaders  to  force  their  deputies  to  vote  for  the 
document some of them did not even have time to take a look at.
In order to block any opposition to the constitution, the document was represented as a 
“way to defend Kosovo”108, as in the preamble of the constitution Kosovo was defined as an 
integrated part of the Serbian territory, meaning that any document giving independence to 
Kosovo would be against the Serbian constitution if not approved by a 2/3 majority in the 
parliament. Consequently,  the lack of time for public  discussion over the constitution was 
justified on the grounds of urgent national interest and the referendum for constitution was 
almost proclaimed the referendum for Kosovo. The nationalistic rhetorics were again abused, 
as  in  the  times  of  Milošević,  to  ensure  the  popular  consensus109.  At  the  same time,  such 
rhetorics also served as an instrument to capture all other political parties and relevant actors: 
obstructing the constitutional reform meant being against the state’s highest national interest. 
It was no surprise that, by October 2006, the violence against the parties and NGOs calling 
for the boycott of the referendum was almost double110. 
In Serbian diplomacy and international politics, the constitutional reform and scheduling of 
the parliamentary elections served as an argument for postponing the negotiations over the 
status of Kosovo (this was confirmed by Martti Ahtisaari as well as by Xavier Solana, who 
proposed  to  postpone  the  discussion  on  the  status  of  Kosovo  until  the  parliamentary 
elections111, as it was feared that the further radicalization of the Serbian electorate, prior to 
the parliamentary elections, would bring the nationalists to power). Moreover, some actors 
thought to use the uncertainty of the elections and nationalistic  threats as an argument to 
obtain the re-opening of the SAA negotiations as one more impetus for Serbian voters to opt 
for the democratic forces (Tadić tried to use this argument in order to obtain the re-opening 
108 See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/u_fokusu.php?id=122&start=495&nav_id=211785.
109 It is surprising how the process of the adoption of the 2006 constitution reassembles the process of the 
adoption of Milošević’s constitution in 1990: the same lack of debate, the same nationalistic rhetorics, the same 
research of support in the name of a higher national interest and in order to “save” Kosovo, and, according to 
the  critics  of  the  act,  the  same solutions  being  the  points  shared by  the  two constitutional  reforms  Serbia 
underwent since 1990.
110 About the cases of violence against LDP and the civil and political actors opposing the constitution, see 
B92 for the period of autumn 2006.
111 http://www.  b92.  net/info/vesti/index.  php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=05&nav_id=214271&nav_category=11
Only 3 days after the adoption of the new constitution in parliament, the Council of Europe had withdrawn from 
the agenda the discussion about Kosovo's status where the position to proclaim the conditioned independence 
was proposed. 
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of  the  negotiations,  which  was  used  as  an  incentive  for  the  creation  of  a  pro-western 
government112).  This  way the  negotiations  over  the  constitutional  principles  were  in  large 
measure supported by political short-term calculations. Those who were less advantaged by 
the mere adoption of the constitution saw some of their own priorities included in the text of 
the  document  in  exchange for  support  to  their  document.  Particularly  interesting  are  the 
interests of SRS in the adoption of the constitution: beside the inclusion of some of their 
principles in the text of the constitution (the Kosovo issue, the definition of the nation) and 
potential gains from the new parliamentary elections, this party finally gained recognition as a 
possible partner in government, as their “involvement in the process of adoption of the first 
democratic  constitution”  testified their  support  to  the  Serbian democratic  political  regime 
making. 
As far as the content of the adopted document is concerned, we shall underline that many 
of the questions dividing the Serbian political elite were not solved by the new constitution. 
The most  difficult  questions,  such as  the  territorial  organization,  the  decentralization  and 
status of the autonomous provinces were offered no solutions. The parts of the text referring 
to the territorial organization are complicated, in many points ambiguous, unclear and with 
loopholes opening the doors to contradictory interpretations. Moreover, the constitution left 
many  crucial  problems  concerning  decentralization  to  be  settled  through  ordinary  laws, 
creating  a  situation  where  the  simple  parliamentary  majority  could  change  the  territorial 
organization of the country. Similarly, the articles on the judiciary left a series of loopholes 
undermining the constitutional guarantees of the judicial independence, once more leaving it 
up to the fragile ruling majorities to decide what level of independence the judiciary would be 
given (please see the section on the judicial reform in Serbia). 
Of particular importance is the constitutionalization of the imperative mandate: “in order 
to discipline the deputies” the legislator gave, through the article 102, the possibility for the 
deputies to “give their mandates to the parties”. The already strong party leaders were given 
full  control  over their  party’s deputies,  thus increasing the ruling parties’  control  over the 
assembly, and, indirectly, over all other institutions (like judiciary) appointed by the assembly 
(please see the section on the parliament). Further on, the lack of consensus over the foreign 
policy modeled the part concerning the international law and its integration into the domestic 
112 Within the EU there was a disagreement over the use of such tactics: Italy, Austria, Slovenia and Hungary 
pushing  for  the  re-opening  of  the  negotiations  in  order  to  give  new  “impetus”  to  Belgrade.  See 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=17&nav_id=215673&nav_category=11.
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legislation resulting in the controversial  formulations of the Article 194. Not only was the 
supremacy of the international law not included (in the light of Serbia’s aspiration to enter the 
EU,  this  solution  complicates  the  procedure  for  integrating  the  EU agreements  into  the 
domestic legislative system), but the constitutionality of the international agreements Serbia 
signs  and  ratifies  shall  also  be  examined  (this  way  opening  a  further  veto  point  in  the 
absorption of the international arrangements into domestic legislation). Finally, there appears 
to be a discordance on whether the newly prescribed procedure for the constitutional reform 
is  more  or  less  difficult  than  the  one  established  in  the  previous  document.  During  the 
campaign for the referendum, all political actors underlined that the new procedure is simpler, 
as it avoids the referendum. Yet, the article 203 prescribed the two-steps process, where a 2/3 
majority decides that the constitutional reform shall initiate, then the same qualified majority 
has to vote for the changes, while the referendum is mandatory for changing 154 out of the 
205 articles  of  the constitution  (the  parts  concerning  the  preamble of the Constitution, the 
principles of the Constitution, the human and minority rights and freedoms, the system of authority, 
the proclamation of the state of war and emergency, derogation from human and minority rights in 
the state of emergency or war or the proceedings of amending the Constitution).
One of the main criticisms to this document concerned the fact that it did not introduce 
significant changes. According to some, it is the same constitution designed by Milošević in 
1990.  For  those  who  concentrate  only  on  the  parts  of  the  political  system  this  can  be 
considered true: no drastic changes in the design of legislative and executive were introduced, 
which means that the future implications of the constitution on the distribution of power 
between political parties and the possible implications for the party system will be minimal. 
This is an expected outcome, seen that the constitution was designed almost exclusively by 
four already consolidated political parties, all having wasted interest in preserving the existing 
structure of powers. The document was also criticized for the low quality level of the text that 
in  some  places  is  unclear,  repetitive,  even  contradictory  and  subject  to  different 
interpretations113.
Among  the  changes  considered  positive  by  the  domestic  actors  and  the  international 
community, we can find the comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
constitution, some of them far above the minimum standard requisites. The introduction of 
113 “… The new Constitution has all the hallmarks of an over-hasty draft which does not do justice to the 
previous standards”, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission)’s opinion on the 
constitution  of  Serbia  adopted by  the  Commission  at  its  70th plenary  session  (Venice,  17-18 March 2007) 
opinion number 405/2006.
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the constitutional basis for the work of the Ombudsman and civil control over the army are 
also welcomed changes. The introduction of the principle of the civilian control over the army 
and the restriction of the presidential powers in the period of the state of emergency/state of 
war were also considered positive developments. 
Serbian leaders and analysts, as well as the Venice Commission, also welcomed the change 
of the procedure for the recall of the president, that under the new constitution is no longer 
“a mission impossible”.
 4.1.3. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
Since the end of Milošević’s regime, both the constitutional framework of the FRY and the 
constitutional framework of Serbia were subject to EU criticisms and requests for reform. In 
this  paragraph  we  will  try  to  trace  the  recommendations  of  the  EU  concerning  the 
constitutional reform. 
During  the  first  period  of  transition,  from October  2000  until  March  2002  when  the 
Belgrade Agreement114 was signed, the EU activities in the field were concentrated in ensuring 
the  survival  of  Yugoslavia.  The  EU mediation  between  Belgrade  and  Podgorica  was  an 
important element for ensuring the creation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 
February  2003.  Once  the  Constitutional  Charter  of  the  State  Union  was  adopted,  the 
republican constitutional reform came onto the agenda. The constitutional reform was thus 
recommended in the annual report in 2003, and included, among the priorities listed in 2004, 
the  EU  partnership  with  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  Beside  the  harmonization  with  the 
Constitutional charter, the constitutional reform in Serbia was also supposed to address the 
problem of the status of  Vojvodina  and territorial  organization,  the lack of  constitutional 
appeal  for  the  protection  of  human  rights  and  constitutionally  grounded  Ombudsman. 
However,  no 2004 short-term priorities  explicitly  concerned the territorial  organization or 
constitutional status of Vojvodina, and in the field of the Ombudsman the EU only requested 
the  “adoption  of  the  legislation  setting  up  the  ombudsman  office”.  The  language  of  the 
conditionality was rather general, mentioning only “a constitutional reform in line with the 
Constitutional Charter”, while the particular issues (such as territorial organization or judicial 
independence), even though expected to be solved through the constitutional reform, were 
kept separated.
114 The Belgrade Agreement is the term used to refer to the agreement between the two constitutive republics 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the formation of Serbia and Montenegro.
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In the 2005 feasibility study, the constitutional reform is seen as one of the necessary and 
most urgent steps to take. In line with the adoption of the twin-track approach, and as the 
dissolution  of  the  State  Union  became  a  more  and  more  realistic  expectation,  in  these 
documents  the  constitutional  reform  is  for  the  first  time  no  longer  linked  to  the 
harmonization with the Constitutional  Charter,  but to “the  European standards”. It  seems 
that, during 2005, the constitutional reform represented a necessary condition for signing the 
SAA: Labus, at the time vice-president of the government, clearly underlined that “During the 
negotiations  it  became  clear  that  the  adoption  of  the  new  democratic  constitution  is  a 
necessary condition for the signature of the SAA115”. 
While in the feasibility study the constitutional reform results as one of the key priorities 
needed to be met, in the 2006 report the constitutional reform is included among the short 
term priorities, but does not belong to the list of the key short term priorities. It is important 
to  underline  that,  at  the  beginning  of  2006,  the  negotiations  with  Serbia  were  already 
questioned because of the lack of cooperation with ICTY to be suspended in May 2006. 
During  the  constitutional  reform,  particularly  in  autumn  2006,  the  international 
community,  EU included,  kept  themselves  aside  from the  domestic  developments116.  The 
sensitivity of the moment (lack of ICTY cooperation and the Kosovo issue reopening) meant 
that the IA decided to accept the reform that,  even though it  showed clear signs of fake 
compliance,  was  too  sensitive  to  be  intervened  upon.  On 02/09  the  EU welcomed  the 
achievement  of  the  political  agreement  for  the  new  constitution  and  did  not  give  any 
assessment on the document, underlining that the EU’s assessment would be available as soon 
as they received and analyzed the official translations (expected for 08.11, ten days after the 
referendum). 
In  Tab.1  we  summarize  the  EU’s  priorities  that  directly  or  indirectly  concerned  the 
constitutional  reform.  We  should  underline  that  at  the  time  the  EU  partnerships  were 
published,  both  the  protection  of  the  human rights  and the  civilian  control  over  security 
forces  were  among the  authorities  of  the  State  Union.  The EU recommendations  to the 
republic of Serbia on the constitution aimed to anchoring the republic level document to the 
Constitutional  Charter  and ensuring its  implementation.  The Constitutional  Charter of the 
state union was praised to be a very good legislative framework for the protection of the 
human rights. 
115 Labus’ statement at the press conference, 12. 07. 2005.
116 See also Dallara, 2008.
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4.1.4. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
As stressed by the Venice Commission, as well as by the EU Commission in the 2006 
report, the constitution adopted in September 2006 is only partially in line with the European 
standards, and this partial compliance has serious consequences on the compliance in other 
dimensions of the rule of law as well. 
In this paragraph we’ll represent the distribution of our independent factors. 
The  constitutional  reform  was  among  the  EU  priorities  from  the  first  days  of  the 
transition, but only after the adoption of the twin-track approach in 2005 it  was detached 
from the issues  concerning  the  survival  of  the  State Union.  This  moment  was of  crucial 
importance, as since then the Serbian ruling elite became really responsible for its actions, and 
so the  determinacy  of  conditionality  significantly  increased.  At  the  beginning of  2005 the 
constitutional  reform was considered a necessary condition  for the signature of  SAA, the 
external pressure for the constitutional reform in that period can be considered high, but the 
internal  veto  players  undermined  the  reform.  As  the  lack  of  cooperation  with  the  ICTY 
caused the ceasing of SAA negotiations between Serbia and EU, the conditionality linked to 
the constitutional  reform lost its importance. Yet, suspending the SAA negotiation had an 
indirect influence in the constitutional reform, as it completely changed the cost and benefits 
balance for all actors included in the process. According to some authors (Lutovac, interview 
with Antonela  Riha for Poligraph,  29 September 2006),  the EU’s action created domestic 
instability and fluidity which was further “stressed” by the re-opening of the negotiations for 
Kosovo's status and the Montenegrin independence. 
The actors interested in promoting the change117 succeeded to redefine the constitutional 
reform in a manner to pose it as a perfect solution for the problems existing in that moment 
and to change the costs and benefits balance for all political parties involved in the process. 
As for the presence of alternatives, they concerned particular provisions and mainly came 
from  the  interests  of  the  political  parties  in  maintaining  the  status  quo  (judicial  (in) 
dependence, deputies’ dependence on parties). In these fields we can recognize a clear sign of 
social  influence,  as  the  ruling  elite  was  cautious  enough not  to  adopt  the  norms directly 
criticized by the Venice Commission, showing a tendency to comply at least apparently118. 
117 Koštunica insisted so much on the new constitution of Serbia already since 2000, that the “constitutional 
reform” was recently ironically proclaimed to be “Koštunica’s dream”.
118 See the section on the judiciary.
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For the Serbian new constitution to satisfy the European standards, further amending is 
necessary. Some changes can be introduced through the ordinary legislation (as we will see in 
the field of the judiciary), but here again the lack of constitutional guarantees for some basic 
democratic principles (like the judiciary independent, for example, or the free mandate) can 
persist  as  a  serious  problem.  Seen  the  polarization  of  the  Serbian  elite,  and the  qualified 
majority  required  for  amending  the  constitution,  the  possibility  that  the  necessary 
constitutional changes will be adopted is very low. The political elite in Serbia, the new and the 
old government,  all  appear united in not considering  the constitutional  reform computed. 
While most of the political leaders in the campaign for the referendum on constitution were 
underlining that “the document is acceptable, and, even more important, we will easily change 
it  after  the  elections”,  now  no  one  is  mentioning  the  necessity  to  clarify  some  of  the 
constitutional shortcomings. As we can read in the government’s action plan for meeting the 
EU  priorities,  in  the  field  concerning  the  European  partnership  priority  to  amend  the 
constitution  in  line  with  the  European standards,  the  government  simply  states  that  “the 
assembly of Serbia on September the 30th adopted a constitution that was further confirmed 
by  the  referendum  on  November  the  8th after  which  the  Constitutional  Law  for  its 
implementation was adopted”. 
4.2. MACEDONIA: IN SEARCH OF NATIONAL UNITY 
4.2.1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT NATION STATE OF MACEDONIA
The creation in 1903 of the short-lived Kruševo Republic  represents the first effort  to 
create a Macedonian state, but it was doomed to fail only 10 days after its creation under the 
attack of the Turkish troupes crashing the Macedonian rebellion against the Ottomans. The 
Balkan wars in 1912-1913 opened again – for a short time – a hope for the creation of an 
independent  state.  The Macedonian elite  signed the memorandum for the creation of  the 
Macedonian state and handed it out to the British minister of the foreign affairs, but in the 
Bucharest Peace Conference such document found no place. Instead of independence, the 
geographic region called Macedonia was divided between the regional powers (Serbia, Bulgaria 
and Greece).  Due to the unfavorable environment and the presence of the three regional 
forces with territorial claims over its territory, Macedonia was forced to wait another forty 
years  in  order  to  be  given  the  status  of  the  republic  of  the  constitutive  nation  in  Tito’s 
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Yugoslavia119. Finally, almost one century after the Kruševo republic, on November the 17th 
1991,  the  deputies  elected  in  the  first  pluralistic  elections  ever  organized  in  Macedonia 
adopted the constitution of the independent republic of Macedonia. 
Since 1991, the constitution underwent few changes. The most important of these changes 
was the 2001 constitutional reform that incorporated the provisions of the peace agreement 
(Ohrid Framework Agreement, OFA), when the supreme act of the Macedonian state finally 
obtained the  official  legitimacy to the  eyes of  its  most numerous ethnic  minority.  In this 
section  we  will  face  the  issues  concerning  the  Albanian-Macedonian  relations  and  the 
amendments to the constitution that took place in the '90s, while  we dedicate the second 
paragraph to the changes that took place after the Ohrid peace agreement.
One  of  the  most  important  constitutional  issues  after  the  dissolution  of  Yugoslavia 
concerned the definition of the titular nation. As in the SFRY Serbs, Croats,  Macedonian, 
Slovenes  and Montenegrins were  all  given the  status  of  titular  nations,  the dissolution  of 
Yugoslavia brought into question the position these ethnic groups would have in secessionist 
republics.  At  the  same time,  the  nation  state-building  logics  of  the  secessionist  republics 
induced the new elite to choose the definition of the newly forming states on ethnic-national 
rather  than  civic  principles120.  Like  all  other  countries  in  the  region,  the  Macedonian 
constitutionalists  opted  for  the  nation-state  formula.  Underlining  the  historic  and cultural 
particularity  and the  right  to self-determination  of  the  Macedonian  nations,  the  preamble 
defines the state as the national state of the Macedonian people, but it also underlines its civic 
and democratic character, granting equal rights to all the minorities (Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, 
Romas and other) who live in the country.
In the rest of the document,  the constitution adopted a civic  concept of the state and 
attempted to create a  framework for the effective  equality  of  the minorities  based on the 
protection of their ethnic, cultural and religious identity. The human, political and civil rights 
were given full guarantees in the constitution (the direct applicability, constitutional court as 
the  guarantee  of  these  rights  and  constitutional  basis  for  establishing  the  ombudsman 
institution were all included), with particular attention being paid to the minority rights in an 
effort to avoid the tensions that the other Yugoslav republics were experiencing.  The free 
119 On the causes that induced Tito to opt for the inclusion of Macedonia as a constituent nation and on the 
creation of Macedonia as a mean to introduce more balance within Yugoslavia see Buck, 1996.
120 For their brilliant analysis of the fall of the communism, the dissolution of the Yugoslavia and the role the 
nationalism  played  in  these  processes,  please  see  the  works  of  Valerie  Bunce,  in  particular,  1999.  On  the 
nationalism and ethnicism in the constitutions of the states formed after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, see Spizo, 
1999, and Hayden 1992. 
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expression of ethnic identity was adopted as the fundamental value of the constitutional order, 
while the minorities were given the right to establish institutions of art and culture, scientific 
and other similar associations, the right to primary and secondary education in the minority 
language,  and  the  right  to  the  official  use  of  minority  language  in  those  units  of  self-
government where the national minority constitutes a majority. In order to avoid inter-ethnic 
tensions, the article 78 prescribed the creation of the Council for Inter-Ethnic Relations with 
an advisory  role,  prescribing  that  the assembly should take in  consideration the Council’s 
opinions and recommendations. The form of government prescribed by the constitution was 
a semi-presidentialism, with limited powers granted to the directly elected president and the 
prime minister as the head of the executive.  The protection of the constitutional  order is 
assigned to the constitutional  court with the assignment to assess the constitutionality  and 
legality of the acts, to protect the human, political and civil rights of citizens, and to decide in 
the disputes between the state institutions. Such setting, a particular mix between the ethnic 
and civic principles and solutions that can not be found in other constitutions of the former 
Yugoslav republics, was mainly a consequence of the mix between Gligorov’s and SDSM’s 
pragmatism and VMRO’s radical  nationalism in approaching the question of the Albanian 
minority. In front of the necessity to seek for the VMRO support for the constitution and, at 
the same time, to conceal the Albanians’ malcontent, Gligorov accepted the definition of the 
state as the nation state, but opted for the mechanisms for the protection of the human rights, 
establishment  of the Council  for the ethnic  minorities,  included the calls  for the peaceful 
cohabitation with minority nations and practically created the tradition to include the Albanian 
political elite into the government in order to accommodate their interests.
However,  the  guarantees  offered  by  the  constitution  did  not  succeed  in  ensuring  the 
support of the Albanian ethnic minority that boycotted the referendum on the constitution. 
Their main dissatisfaction concerned the status of national minority (instead of, as they would 
prefer, the status of the constituent nation in a bi-national state or the civic definition of the 
state), the failure to guarantee high education in Albanian language (see also the parts on the 
minority rights), and the failure to include the use of the Albanian language in the assembly. 
The question of the status was of the crucial importance. The Albanian minority claimed that 
under all Yugoslavian and Macedonian governments their interests were underrepresented and 
their ethnic group was discriminated, basing on such claims the belief that the status of the 
national  minority  they  were  given  in  the  constitution  would  open  the  door  to  further 
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discriminations. Another salient issue was the failure to ensure the university education in the 
Albanian language, perceived by Albanians as a main cause for the de-facto discrimination in 
the  employment  and  their  underrepresentation  in  the  administration  (please  see  also  the 
section on minority rights). The Albanian political parties therefore boycotted the process of 
state-building and continued to challenge in their requirements the constitution adopted in 
1991. The requirements for the territorial independence of the Albanian ethnic minority, the 
formation  of  the  Illiria  Republic  and  the  referendum  requiring  the  Albanian  autonomy 
organized in 1992-1993 contributed to bring to negotiations over the new constitution which 
would accommodate the Albanian requirements121. An agreement between the ruling SDSM 
and president  Gligorov  with  the  Albanian  representatives  was  found  over  the  document 
defining Macedonia as a civic state, but the procedure for the amendment of the constitution 
did not allow its adoption in the assembly. The article 131 of the constitution prescribed a 
three-step  procedure  requiring  the  qualified  2/3  majority  for  the  decision  to  initiate  the 
amending procedures and for the adoption of the amendments. The VMRO thus successfully 
blocked  the  initiative  in  the  assembly  in  1993,  while  the  lack of  political  will  brought  to 
successive failures in bringing the document back onto the agenda (see Buck, 1996).
Beside this failed effort to accommodate the Albanian minority requirements, there were 
two other constitutional changes during the '90s: the first took place almost immediately after 
the  independence,  when  the  name  dispute  with  Greece  was  opened.  The  secession  of 
Macedonia from the Yugoslavia rose concerns in the neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria. The 
geographical region known with the name of Macedonia includes not only the territory now 
known as  the  Republic  of  Macedonia,  but  also the  region  labeled  as  Pirin  Macedonia  in 
southwestern Bulgaria and Aegean Macedonia in Greece. The coincidence between the name 
of the nation state and larger geographic region, combined with the old, preexisting conflict 
over the territory between Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, caused fear for the territorial integrity 
in  the  two neighbours  of  the  newly  born  country122.  As  Greece  successfully  blocked  the 
international recognition of the Macedonian state, the assembly in 1992, seeking to calm the 
Greek preoccupations, adopted two amendments explicitly underlining that Macedonia does 
not have any territorial pretensions on the neighbouring states. 
121 See Buck, 1996, also Daskalovski, 2004.
122 On the relations between Macedonia and its neighbourhood and on the implications the unfavorable 
regional situation had on Macedonian inner and external politics, see Bozzo and Simon-Belli, 2000. 
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The second set of amendments was introduced in 1998 due to the strong pressure of the 
judiciary  against  the  constitutional  limitation  of  the  maximum period  of  duration  of  the 
detention  of  90  days.  According  to  the  criminal  courts,  that  was  an  unrealistically  high 
standard for the protection of the person’s freedom in cases of serious crimes. The results of 
the  implementation  of  such  a  standard,  which  was  unique  in  the  contemporary 
constitutionalism,  was  that  a  great  number  of  criminals  that  committed  the  most  serious 
crimes, due to the expiry of the maximum period of detention prescribed by the Constitution, 
were released from custody in order to defend themselves and they never appeared before the 
courts. 
4.2.2. THE RESEARCH FOR THE NEW CONSENSUS
Even though the constitution was even prized as a positive example of the minority right 
protection in the Balkans, it was not supported by the Albanian ethnic minority that, from the 
very  adoption  of  the  constitution,  voted against  it.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Nineties,  the 
Albanian  criticism  of  the  constitution  concerned  the  following  three  point:  the  status  of 
minority,  the  failure  to guarantee  high education  in  Albanian  language,  and the  failure  to 
include the use of the Albanian language in the assembly. The period of the Nineties and the 
escalation of the ethnic violence in 2001 brought to the radicalization of these requests. After 
long  negotiations  with  the  Albanian  national  minority’s  representatives,  mediated  by  the 
NATO and the EU, fifteen amendments were included in the framework peace agreement 
signed by the four party leaders. The agreed amendments were supposed to be adopted within 
45 days of the cessation of hostilities. The most important changes introduced concerned: the 
preamble;  the  use  of  language;  the  territorial  organization  and  decentralization;  the 
introduction of the double majority principle that gave the Albanians veto power in numerous 
fields  of  policy;  the  equal  representation  of  ethnicities  in  public  bodies,  the  minorities’ 
inclusion in the Security Council and the increase of minority representation in security forces 
(for more details see the relevant chapters). The constitutional reform undertaken as a part of 
the OFA thus had an important re-distributive effect, significantly strengthening the position 
of the Albanian ethnic minority.
Even though the amendments were agreed between the political leaders who controlled the 
2/3 majority in the assembly necessary for the constitutional reform, the process was not as 
smooth  as  it  was  supposed to be.  First  of  all,  we shall  underline  the  lack  of  democratic 
atmosphere that brought to the constitutional reform. Far from being an expression of basic 
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consensus and of the will of the citizens, it was a deal tied through the international mediation 
and in a situation of urgent necessity to cease the violence. The leaders signing the agreement 
were supposed to immediately present the agreed amendments to the national assembly and to 
“take  all  measures to ensure the adoption of  these amendments within  45 days from the 
signature of the Framework Agreement” (article 8.1 of OFA). The public discussion that was 
opened before the final adoption of the amendments was nothing more than the period given 
to  Macedonian  majority  to  swallow  the  bitter  pill123.  The  incumbent  VMRO  and  prime 
minister, even though being among the guarantees of the OFA, made ambiguous statements 
concerning the agreement and the constitutional changes, trying to play the nationalistic card 
for the forthcoming electoral campaign. The most salient issues for the Macedonian majority 
during  the  period  dedicated  to  the  “discussion”  were  based  on  the  same  nationalistic 
perspective  upon  which  the  minority  was  basing  its  requirements.  The  preamble  (where 
Macedonia was defined on civic and not ethnic principles) and seventh amendment (that gave 
all religious communities the same status), were perceived as attacks on the Macedonian ethnic 
identity  and  newly  gained  statehood.  The  Macedonian  ethnic  community  perceived  the 
amendments as a  step towards the establishment of  the bi-national  state and towards the 
federalization that might end up in a disintegration similar to that of Kosovo. The discussion 
over the preamble completely blocked the process, as the Albanian parties, after realizing that 
the preamble wording is not acceptable for the Macedonians, withdrew their deputies from 
the assembly, and started to require the status of constituent nation, further contributing to 
the destabilization of the process. The strong intervention of the international  community 
(and the EU in particular) was needed in order to find the solution in a new formulation that 
was  promoted  by  the  EU’s  special  envoy.  The  Albanian  side  accepted  the  reformulated 
amendment only after the promises of the EU envoy concerning the position of the Albanian 
students  and  the  amnesty  for  all  crimes  committed  by  the  Albanians  during  the  2001 
violence124.
The amendments were finally adopted by 94 out of 120 deputies, and the 2/3 qualified 
double majority was achieved.
Since  the  2001  amendments,  the  Macedonian  constitution  was  revised twice.  The first 
revision  took  place  in  the  2003  due  to  the  EU requirements  to  allow  the  use  of  special 
investigative  techniques  and  the  newly  elected  government’s  intention  to  investigate  and 
123 See Gaber-Damjanoska and Jovevska, 2001.
124 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2001.
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prosecute the “tapping” affair125. The article 17 of the constitution that forbids tapping was 
changed in December 2003 when the XIX amendment, harmonized with the European legal 
system, was adopted.
In  2005,  a  new constitutional  reform took place  in  order  to  meet  the  EU’s  pressures 
concerning  the judicial  independence.  In the light  of  Macedonia’s  intention to submit  the 
request for the EU membership, the judicial reform (see the section dedicated to the judiciary) 
was pushed and the constitution was to be amended. As the procedure for the amendment 
required  the  2/3  qualified  majority,  this  was  perceived  by  the  parties  as  the  window  of 
opportunity to push forward their requirements, conditioning their support for the necessary 
amendments.  Among  the  most  radical  proposals  was  that  from  the  Albanian  parties  to 
introduce  the  figure  of  the  vice-president  elected  in  a  manner  to  allow  equal  ethnic 
representation and the requirement to wider the application of the double majority voting for 
the election of the president of the assembly (in order to ensure that one of the three leading 
positions – prime minister, president of the republic and president of the assembly – is given 
to an ethnic Albanian). Further on, the amendments concerning the judiciary rose both inter-
ethnic  and inter-party  conflict  over  the  different  alternatives  offered (see  the  part  on the 
reform of the  judiciary).  However,  in  the light  of  the  candidacy for the  membership,  the 
political leaders showed some will for compromise and the eleven amendments (XX-XXX) 
were adopted in December 2005. 
Whether  the  constitutional  reform in  Macedonia  is  finished,  it  is  still  to  be  seen.  The 
continuous  ethnicization  of  the  issues  and  radicalization  of  the  minorities’  positions  is  a 
serious risk for Macedonia’s fragile consensus.
4.2.3.  THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE BUILDING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FRAMEWORK
As we saw, in almost all cases of constitutional changes in Macedonia (the only exception is 
the  1998  amendment)  the  international  dimension  had  an  important  role.  The  first 
constitutional change was introduced in hope to obtain the recognition of the country under 
125 In 2001, the opposition found out that more than 100 persons from public life were being tapped by the 
security services. The incumbent VMRO did not open the investigation (as the leadership of the party and the 
president of the republic were involved, as the investigation undertaken in 2003 has revealed). After their arrival 
to power, SDSM undertook the necessary steps to find the responsible after the scandal. The question of the 
tapping that at time was not properly regulated, allowing the use of the technique only to those cases when the 
state’s security is at stake, and thus hampering the investigation of the organized crime, corruption and other 
criminal acts, was consequently opened. See Gaber – Damjonovska and Jovevska, 2003.
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its constitutional name, the third was fully mediated by the IA, the forth and the fifth followed 
the EU’s requirements. 
Of particular importance is the international community’s role in 2001. The EU, NATO 
and USA not only assumed an important role of mediator in the negotiations that brought to 
the cessation of hostilities  and the signature of OFA in 2001,  they were also involved in 
ensuring the implementation of the document. In such purpose the IA used all existing means 
of influence: beside technical support and legal assistance, the international community and in 
particular the EU exercised strong pressures on the domestic actors to accept the changes. 
They served as  the guarantee for the commitments given by the  actors  in  a manner  that 
increased both the pressures to comply, and the credibility of the promises given. In this light 
it  is  significant to mention that,  according to the domestic  authors,  the foreign diplomats 
showed great interest in getting the vote lists from the sessions of the Macedonian assembly, 
in order to see how the single parties voted on the OFA constitutional amendments126. The 
implementation of OFA and of the constitutional amendments introduced as a part of OFA 
was  the  main  core  of  the  international  intervention  in  Macedonia.  We  can  see  how the 
implementation  of  the  framework  agreement  and  of  the  principles  it  underlined,  was 
promoted and included as a condition in different areas of policy, from the administration 
reform (equal  representation)  to the  decentralization,  minority  rights,  police  etc.  Even the 
assistance to the human resources in the private sector included the respect of the principles 
of the equal representation as a condition for accessing the EU grants. We can thus conclude 
that  in  the  measure  in  which  the  constitutional  issues  were  linked  to  the  OFA,  the 
constitutional reform and its implementation became a core of the IA intervention, subject to 
all different strategies with a pressure exercised in a very credible manner. 
The change of the Article 17 of the constitution was also subject to the EU pressures in the 
field  of  the  fight  against  organized  crime.  Among  the  “Priorities  need  attention  in  the 
following 12 months” from the Commission Report 2003, we find the following requirement: 
“address the obstacles that forbid the use of any kind of special investigative techniques”. 
Even  though  weak,  the  pressure,  combined  with  the  domestic  window  of  opportunity, 
brought to the successful rule adoption. 
Finally, the constitutional amendments that were adopted in 2005 were strictly required by 
the international community. The appointment of the members of the high judicial council by 
the assembly was identified already in the first SAA reports as a factor contributing to the 
126 See Jovevska and Gaber-Damjanovska, 2001.
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increase of the politicization of the judiciary, but the solution of the problem through the 
constitutional  change of  the  procedure  for  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  HJC was 
explicitly  required  only  since  the  2004  European  partnership  (we  find  the  requirement 
repeated  in  the  2006  Association  partnership,  but  it  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
document, adopted in January 2006, did not take in consideration the changes that took place 
in December 2005).
4.2.4. ASSESSMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
As  we  saw,  the  international  actors  played  a  crucial  role  in  almost  all  cases  of  the 
constitutional  change  in  Macedonia,  particularly  since  the  armed  conflict  in  2001.  The 
assistance,  legal  advise,  conditionality,  negotiations  and  arbitrary  between  the  ethnic 
communities, were all used by the international actors and the EU in particular in order to 
ensure the compliance. 
The most important of all constitutional reforms surely is the one that took place in 2001. 
It was a change, we might say, pushed forward by the international community in the effort to 
ensure the settlement of the ethnic violence that  took place. The IA’s action, undoubtedly 
seen the situation, were security-guided. It is questionable in which measure the highest state 
act that is  supposed to represent the consensus and the basis  for the state functioning is 
democratic  if  adopted  under  external  pressures  and  in  a  rush  to  cease  the  violence.  The 
procedure of the adoption of the constitution (lack of true public debate), the context that 
brought to the constitutional change (violence and fear of new hostilities), the prevailing of 
the nationalistic argumentation in the debate that guided both the proponents of the change 
(ethnic Albanians) and the actors opposing the change (Macedonian majority), all these are 
sources of serious concern when we assess the democratic potentiality of the constitutional 
change adopted. On the other hand, neither the previous document was adopted in a better 
atmosphere, since it did not enjoy the support of the largest minority in the country, which 
brought to the events of 2001. Some authors, like Brier (2002, 2003, 2005),  argue that the 
OFA (and the  consequent constitutional  changes)  actually  institutionalized  the ethnicity,  a 
situation that, instead of a solution to the conflict, brings to its consolidation. That known as 
the “May agreement” unfortunately testifies in favor of Brieber.
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The  “May  agreement”  is  an  agreement  between  DUI  and  the  at  time  ruling  VMRO, 
adopted after the institutional crisis caused in 2007 by the DUI127. The origins, content and 
even the act of creation of this document were kept in silence but, as not only the media but 
even the political elite continues to refer to it, its existence is more than certain. It was said to 
be  a  document  drafted  in  mediation  of  the  international  actors  who  guarantee  for  its 
implementation128.  The  recently  formed  coalition  DUI-VMRO,  its  functioning  and  the 
behavior of the relevant actors (like DUI’s acceptance to delay the implementation of the part 
of the Law on Municipal Borderlines that refers to Struga and Kičevo, or the adoption of the 
Law on Use of Language, much opposed by the Macedonian majority) all appear to follow in 
the footsteps that media claimed to be prescribed by such deal. Beside the complete lack of 
democratic potential of such document (seen that it is unofficial) and the consequences for 
the rule of law the existence of such “unofficial constitution” represents, the existence of such 
document brings to the question the stability  of the fragile  consensus Macedonia is  based 
upon. Even if  such document remains only an “inspiration” for the preferable courses of 
politics, or if it takes the shape of some new constitutional re-arrangements, respecting the 
democratic procedures, it would still testify the fragility of the very basis of the Macedonian 
state. When responding to the criticisms of OFA, the SDSM party leader underlined that the 
constitution, after all, is always a product of compromise and, like all compromises, it might 
not be the best solution, but still it is a solution. Yet, we might observe, not all solutions are 
meant to last. So how much exactly is the Macedonian “solution” durable and stable?
4.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The  research  for  the  consensus  in  the  two  cases  we  chose  for  this  analysis  followed 
different logics,  expressing the particularities of each case studied. In Macedonia's case the 
main problem concerned the definition of the political community and research towards what 
Rustow labeled the “national unity” (1970). The lack of Albanian support to the constitution 
adopted in 1991 represented a deficiency in the birth of the political community that marked 
the Macedonian process of democratization. In that light, the biggest constitutional reform 
Macedonia undertook in 2001 as a product of the Ohrid peace agreement bears some of the 
127 On OFA, power-sharing mechanisms, May Agreement and their impact upon the inter-ethnic conflict in 
Macedonia, see Lebamoff and Ilievski, 2008.
128 See Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2007.
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elements potentially threatening for the process of democratization. While considered in line 
with the international  standards, mediated and pushed forward by the international  actors 
promoting peace and democracy in Macedonia, the power-sharing mechanisms built in the 
historical agreement between the Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority was 
considered by authors like Bieber the institutionalization of the ethnicization, a solution that 
brings  to  the  maintenance,  instead  of  the  depoliticization  of  the  ethnic  conflict.  Such 
argument, when combined with the strong criticisms Goio (2008) advanced towards Linz’s 
and Lijphart’s thesis of the possibility to use the federalization, power sharing and building of 
multiple identities in order to fight back the threat of nationalism, brings us to question the 
sustainability  of the agreement between the Albanian ethnic minority  and the Macedonian 
majority.  Instead of introducing the civil  criteria, the content of the OFA and the changes 
introduced in  the  Macedonian  constitution  contributed to the  consolidation  of  the ethnic 
divisions.  It  locked  the  struggle  for  power  within  the  ethnic  groups,  reinforcing  the 
segmentation already present in other fields (civil  society, media, religion, culture, language 
and even schools and universities). By making two distinct political segments that interact only 
at the highest political level, two worlds that communicate as less as possible129, two political 
elites that do not compete against each other but divide their ethnic quotas, the Macedonian 
consociational democracy is left to and maintained by nothing more than the intra-ethnic log 
rolling in the multi-ethnic ruling coalitions. In the following chapters we will see how such 
situation is reflected in the specific fields of policy.
While power appears as the only interest keeping the leaders of the Macedonian political 
segments together, the Macedonian citizens’ aspiration for the NATO and EU membership 
appears  to be  the  only  glue  holding  the  fragile  Macedonian  national  unity.  Based on the 
international project of the Euro-Atlantic integrations and on the power-seeking ruling elite, 
the Macedonian peace appears rather unstable, especially in case the EU/NATO integration 
does not take place (see the recent events with the Macedonian membership in NATO) or 
making questions over the functioning of the Macedonian state after such goal is achieved130. 
It  is  no  surprise  then  that  the  constitutional  reforms  in  Macedonia  saw  the  EU  and 
129 It is astonishing for example that no academic works on the Albanian political parties are available in 
Macedonian language, or that the domestic political scientists report that they know very little about the Albanian 
political block due to the closure and communication barriers between the ethnic communities, the ethnically 
based universities included.
130 “They all say: EU, NATO. And no one wonders what to do after Macedonia entered the EU and NATO. 
Macedonia has no other projects, no other development directions, no other values to follow other than the 
integrations. But what are we going to do once we achieve it?”, interview with Hristova, Skopje, August 2008.
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international  actors as the main initiators  in the process. The relative ease with which the 
constitution was amended in 2003 and 2005, even though the temptation to use this window 
of opportunity to push forward their own agenda was strong among the leaders of the small 
political parties, reflects the high degree of the Macedonian leverage towards the international 
community. 
In  Serbia  we  also  find  inherited  deficiencies  prevailing  in  the  process.  The  Serbian 
constitutional reform in 2006 is one of the examples on how the delays in undertaking the 
reform can turn the constitution writing, this crucial moment of the state-building process, 
into a  subject  of  short-term political  bargaining.  Unlike  the case of  Macedonia  where the 
constitutional reform reserved important roles to the international community, both as the 
initiator of changes and as the mediator and the guarantee of the commitments in the case of 
the  2001  constitutional  reform,  in  Serbia’s  case  the  international  actors  did  not  play  a 
significant role in the process of the constitutional reform. The nature of the process (high 
politicization,  the prevailing  of the short-term interests,  the hasty procedures) emptied the 
process of the constitution adoption from its nature of “search for consensus”, leaving the 
most  conflictive  issues  dividing  the  Serbian  political  actors  unsolved.  The  territorial 
organization and the status of the judiciary were both left behind to be solved by the ordinary 
legislation, this way creating a situation in which the constitution is nothing more than the 
consensus over the fact that no consensus was possible.
The prevailing  of the domestic  actors and domestic  themes in the process produced a 
situation in which, unlike in Macedonia, the constitutional reform was not perceived as a step 
towards  the  EU integrations,  neither  as  part  of  the  democratization  reforms,  making  the 
compliance with the European and international standards and the democratic potentials of 
the document a sporadic element. We thus register the ambiguous result, the constitution only 
partially  being  assessed  in  line  with  the  international  standards,  and  the  “desirable”  and 
“democracy-oriented  changes  introduced”  cohabiting  with  the  solutions  undermining  the 
democratic practices (like the article 102).
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Table 1: “The constitutional reform in Serbia and Macedonia”.
SERBIA MACEDONIA
Lack of constitutional 
reform 2000-2006.
Constitution 2006 2001
Main input for the 
change:
Domestic. Domestic. External/domestic.
IA’s interests in specific 
field:
Democratization. Democratization. Security.
Conditionality: Weak, sporadic. Weak, sporadic. Strong, decisive, continuous.
Was consulting, advice, 
technical support of 
external experts made 
available, and was it used 
in the law drafting?
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Were the 
recommendations made 
by the IA accepted?
- Partially. Yes.
In publicizing the 
adoption of the law, was 
the government 
underlining its 
compliance with the 
international norms, or 
was it seeking the 
external legitimization of 
the law in other ways?
- Yes. No.
Domestic input for the 
change:
Present: (regime change) 
2000.
Present: Regime change 
2000; Independence of 
Montenegro; 
Negotiations for 
Kosovo; Political 
moment. 
Present (OFA).
Domestic actors pushing 
for the reform:
All (DSS). DSS. Albanian ethnic minority.
Level of conflictuality of 
the issue:
High. Medium (important 
issues left unsolved).
High.
Type of conflict and 
main line of the conflict::
Inter-party. Inter-party. Inter-ethnic.
Did the issue concern the 
deep divisions in society?
Yes: continuity vs. 
discontinuity, territorial 
organization.
No. The difficult issues 
are avoided.
Yes: ethnic conflict.
Is the existing status quo 
strongly delegitimized by 
all relevant actors?
Yes. Yes. No.
Two or more alternative 
solutions present?
Yes (continuity vs. 
discontinuity).
- No.
The procedure of law 
drafting:
- Behind closed doors. 
Intra-party bargaining.
Behind closed doors. Intra-
ethnic bargaining.
Outcome:
No change. Constitution still failing 
to meet EU standards 
(particularly concerning: 
imperative mandate, 
decentralization, 
judiciary).
Constitution in line with EU 
standards (1991, 2001, 2005)
(The national consensus is 
still fragile. Some 
constitutional provisions 
represent a source of further 
ethnicization).
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In Tab.1 we bring the summary of the main motors for the constitutional change in the 
two countries (we bring the data for the most important cases: lack of constitutional reform in 
Serbia  2000-2006,  constitutional  reform  in  Serbia  2006  and  constitutional  reform  in 
Macedonia  2001).  The  differences  are  striking:  the  security-guided  IA  in  the  case  of 
Macedonia exercising strong influence and being the main promoter of the change, compared 
to  the  weak  influence  of  the  democracy-guided  IA  in  the  case  of  Serbia  where  the 
constitutional  reform was a product of  the domestic  window of opportunity  and political 
leadership’s short term preferences. 
APPENDIX 
Table 2: “EU priorities and the constitutional issues in Serbia”.
Report 2002 The constitutional stalemate must be clearly solved through constructive cooperation within a reconstructed and functional federal state
Undertake the decentralization and reforms of local government, as well as other constitutional revisions”.
Report 2003 Amendment of the republican Constitutions, by autumn 2003, in line with the Constitutional Charter. As part of this constitutional reform, promised 
decentralization and reform of provisional and local government should be, as relevant, adopted and implemented.
EU partnership 2004 Review the republican constitutions in line with the Constitutional Charter.
2006 EU partnership Short term priorities: Revision constitution in line with European Standards.
2007 EU partnership Key priorities: Ensure that the constitution and Constitutional Law are implemented in line with European standards 
Short term priorities: Align legislation and institutions with the new Constitution.
2008 EU partnership Key priorities: Ensure that the constitution and Constitutional Law are implemented in line with European standards 
Short term priorities: Align legislation and institutions with the new Constitution.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia.
Table 3: “EU priorities and the constitutional issues in Macedonia”.
Report 2002 Implement the Framework Agreement of the 13th August 2001.
Report 2003 Continue to accelerate the implementation of the Framework Agreement of the 13th August 2001.
EU partnership 2004 Short term priorities: Prepare necessary constitutional and legislative amendments to guarantee the independence of the body in charge of their 
selection and career development.
2006 EU partnership Key  short-term  priorities:  Adopt  the  constitutional  amendments  needed  to  implement  the  reform  of  the  judicial  system,  in  line  with  the 
recommendations of the Venice Commission.
Short term priorities: Ohrid Framework agreement has been given a particular section where among the short term priorities we find: Ensure the 
effective implementation of the legislative framework adopted in accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, with a view, inter alia, to promoting 
inter-ethnic  confidence-building.  —  Complete  the  necessary  legislative  framework  to  implement  the  decentralization  process  and  ensuring  that 
municipalities have the necessary means to implement their new competencies.  — Adopt and begin to implement a medium-term strategic plan for 
equitable representation of minorities in the public administration (including in the judiciary) and public enterprises. 
2007 EU partnership Short term priorities: Support implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement with a view,  inter  alia,  to promoting inter-ethnic confidence-
building.
2008 EU partnership Short term priorities: Support implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement with a view,  inter  alia,  to promoting inter-ethnic confidence-
building.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia.
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Table 4: “EC funding in constitution (OFA) reform in Macedonia”.
Year Amount Program
2004 2 millions Assistance to the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.
2005 0.2 millions Support to the Sector for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement.
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006.
Table 5: “The process of the constitution adoption and the constitutional issues in Macedonia and Serbia” (author's elaboration).
Factors Mk Ser
Did all relevant political parties participate to the 
constitutional reform?
1991: No (Albanians excluded).
2001: Yes.
1991: No (only the communist elite). 2006: Partially (National minorities 
parties and some parties of the Serbian majority were excluded from the 
final negotiations over the constitution).
Was the public debate undertaken offering the civil 
society the possibility to discuss the solutions?
1991: - 
2001; Yes.
1991: No.
2006: No.
Are there anti-regime parties considering the 
constitution illegitimate and requiring the change?
1991: Yes (Albanian minority).
2001: No.
1991: Yes (all oppositional parties).
2006: Partially: LDP questions some of the constitutional solutions 
calling for the harmonization with EU standards.
Does the constitutional revision require the qualitative 
majority?
Yes. Yes.
Does the constitutional revision require the support of 
the ethnic minorities?
Yes. No.
Does the constitutional revision require the 
referendum?
No. Yes.
The most conflictive constitutional issues? Inter-ethnic relations (definition of the 
polity).
Territorial organization (Kosovo's status included).
Is the constitution considered in line with the European 
standards?
Yes. Only partially.
The constitutional issues hampering democratization ? 131 Yes: the political influence over the judiciary; The imperative mandate.
131 There is a possibility to question to what extent the power-sharing mechanisms, built into the Macedonian constitution as a part of the OFA agreement, will contribute to 
preserve the peace and consolidate democracy. Even though authors like Lijphart or Linz would argue that such mechanisms can help the peace and democracy building in the 
divided societies, students of the phenomenon of nationalism like Goio make a strong argument against that, mainly based on revealing the logical inconsistencies in Linz’s 
work, thus questioning the capacity of the power-sharing mechanisms and multi-level identities to overcome the nationalist divisions (see Goio, 2008). Concretely in the case of 
Macedonia, Bieber (2003, 2005, 2002, 2004) will argue that the OFA represents some elements of the institutionalization of the ethnicization, a rather dangerous mechanism 
alimenting instead of decreasing the nationalistic logic. The question mark in this cell of the table indicates the uncertainty over the exit. The Macedonian constitution might 
become a source of peace and stability for the country as it offers mechanisms protecting the right of the Albanian minority, but the same solution might become a source of 
instabilities due to its potentiality to nourish the distribution of power incentives on ethnic basis, thus bringing to the persistence of the nationalistic rhetorics. To remember 
Rustow, we can argue that “The hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of the political community”. The Macedonian democracy was born with 
serious problems in defining its own political community, it lacked national unity due to the failure to integrate the Albanian minority and, consequentially, even after the OFA 
these inefficiencies, together with the medicine used to cure it, represents the key point of concern for the Macedonian future. 
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Table 6: “The constitutional amendments 2001 and 2005 in Macedonia: explanatory factors concerning the IA” (author's elaboration).
OFA (2001) Amendments on judiciary 2005
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature 
of an important international treaty, integration process, access to the 
funds?
Yes (the donors’ conference for Macedonia conditioned 
by respect for OFA). 
Yes.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the 
important steps in the integration process took place?
No. Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU's key short-term priorities? - Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU's short-term priorities or was it included 
among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports?
Yes. .
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption 
of the laws?
Yes (The funds for the different programs have made the 
implementation of the OFA principles as a key condition 
and thus, indirectly, of the constitutional amendments).
Not directly (but the judicial reform 
was conditioned. See the section on 
judiciary).
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general:
2.2 millions (the data refers to the amount for the 
Secretariat for the implementation of OFA, not calculating 
the support for the implementation of the particular 
provisions of OFA (see the other sections).
-
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole 
of EU assistance to the country:
- -
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary element for maintaining the peace. Necessary for the democratization process.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security. Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and 
abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders?
Yes (5). -
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made 
available, and was it used in the law drafting?
Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? - Mainly.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations 
successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the 
domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
- Yes (see the chapter on the judiciary).
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its 
compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking the external 
legitimization of the law in other ways?
No (it was the compliance with OFA to be underlined). Yes. (4)
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Table  7:  “The  constitutional  amendments  of  2001  and  2005  in  Macedonia:  explanatory  factors  concerning  the  domestic  level”  (author's 
elaboration).
OFA (2001) Amendments on judiciary 2005
Domestic input for the change: Present (OFA agreement). Absent.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Albanian ethnic minority. -
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High. Low.
Type of conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-ethnic. -
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes. -
Type of the issue (salience – positional): Positional. X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Macedonian ethnic majority. X
The main beneficiaries of the change: Albanian ethnic minority. X
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? No. -
Two or more alternative solutions present? - -
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid. Fluid.
Table 8: “The constitutional amendments of 2001 and 2005 in Macedonia: outcomes” (author's elaboration).
OFA (2001) Amendments on judiciary 2005
The procedure of law drafting: Behind the closed door (peace agreement). Open discussion.
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation:
Institutionalization of ethnicity? (see the table 4, main 
text).
-
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Representatives of the ethnic groups.
The status (2008): Mainly implemented. Implemented.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: - -
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Table 9: “The blockage of the constitutional reform 2000-2006 and constitutional  reform 2006 in Serbia:  explanatory factors concerning IA” 
(author's elaboration).
Lack of constitutional reform 2000-2006. Constitution 2006
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds?
No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the 
integration process took place?
No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU's key short-term priorities? - -
Was the issue part of the EU's short-term priorities or was it included among the priorities 
needing attention in the SAA reports?
Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No. No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: - -
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the 
country:
- -
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary step in the democratization process.1
Necessary step in the 
democratization process.1
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the 
domestic stakeholders?
- Yes.
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in 
the law drafting?
Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted?
Partially (the inclusion of the 
international advisors only for 
the drafts, not for the final 
document).
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize 
the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
- -
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the 
international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
- Yes.2
1) See for example the Commission SAA report 2005 on Serbia and Montenegro where the constitutional and legal uncertainty are perceived as an obstacle for the rule of law. 2) 
See  for  example:  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=18&nav_category=11&nav_id=215838,  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2006&mm=10&dd=17&nav_category=11&nav_id=215782.
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Table 10: “The blockage of constitutional reform 2000-2006 and constitutional reform 2006 in Serbia: explanatory factors, domestic level” (author's 
elaboration).
Lack of constitutional reform 2000-2006 Constitution 2006
Domestic input for the change: Present: the change of regime 2000 and delegitimization of 
the actual document.
Present: Regime change 2000; Delegitimization of the 
existing document; Independence of Montenegro; 
Negotiations for Kosovo; Political moment (see the main 
text).
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: All (DSS). DSS.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High. Medium.*
Type of conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-party Old-new elite. Inter-party.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes: continuity-discontinuity, territorial organization. The difficult issues are avoided.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: X X
The main beneficiaries of the change: X X
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by 
all relevant actors?
Yes. Yes.
Two or more alternative solutions present? Yes (continuity vs. discontinuity). -
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the 
perspective of power of the central actors)
Fluid 2003; Stable 2004-. Stable.
* While the constitutional reform in Serbia was actually a very conflictive issue, seen that it was supposed to tackle the two most difficult political issues, territorial organization 
and judiciary reform, here we consider the level of the conflictuality low due to the fact that the constitution actually avoided to face these questions. It was thus only due to the 
decision not to decide on these two difficult issues that the level of conflictuality diminished and made the constitution adoption possible. 
Table  11:  “The  blockage  of  the  constitutional  reform  2000-2006  and  constitutional  reform  2006  in  Serbia:  explanatory  outcomes”(author's 
elaboration).
Lack  of  constitutional 
reform 2000-2006
Constitution 2006
The procedure of law drafting: - Behind closed doors. Intra-party bargaining.
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:
- Strengthening of the party control over the assembly, lack of independent judiciary, failure to specify the 
territorial organization.
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies:
Political parties and the ruling elite.
The status (2008): - Waiting for the implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Overall, there has been progress on adopting legislation to implement the new constitutional framework. 
However, further reforms are needed to ensure that the constitutional provisions, notably on the judiciary, 
are implemented in line with European standards.
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5.THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT: 
ASSEMBLIES, GOVERNMENTS, 
PRESIDENTS AND PARTIES
"Power always has to be kept in check; power exercised in  
secret, especially under the cloak of national security, is doubly  
dangerous."
William Proxmire
The goal  of  this  section would be to describe the forms of  government established in 
Serbia and Macedonia in order to highlight the institutional settings in the two countries. We 
will assess the functioning of the legislative and the executive, the two key institutions in any 
representative  democracy,  paying  particular  attention  to  possible  deficiencies  in  the 
functioning of these institutions that might hamper the process of democratization.
If democracy is a political  regime “in which the individuals  obtain the decision-making 
power through the competition for the votes of the citizens”,132 and if, to say it with Dahl, the 
elected officials should see their decisions put into practice133, then the institutions with the 
legislative and executive power and the citizens’ control over these institutions become a key 
of the democratic process. It is no surprise that the political science and philosophy dedicated 
many volumes to the problem of the accountability, responsibility and responsiveness of the 
ruling  elite,  analyzing  the  different  institutional  settings  and  their  capacity  to  safeguard 
democracy, both in terms of the maintenance and functioning of a specific institutional asset 
(seen the  experience  of  Weimar,  can  we  argue that  the  presidentialism  with  premier  is  a 
particularly fragile institutional setting?), and in terms of ensuring the “quality” of the output 
the democratic procedures produces (is the parliamentarianism with the proportional electoral 
system more “democratic” than the presidentialism with the majoritarian electoral system? Is 
the majoritarian model of democracy a democratic solution for the pluralized societies?).
The impact the form of government produces on the functioning of the democratic regime 
was widely examined in literature (here we will only remember the works of Lijphart (1984), 
132 See Schumpeter’s definition of democracy, 1954.
133 See Dahl, 1971.
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Linz (1990), Shugart and Carey (1992), to mention only some of those who made the form of 
government  a  key  of  their  focus  for  understanding  how democracies  work).  Finally,  the 
functioning  of  the  parliament  and  executive  was  identified  as  one  of  the  keys  for 
understanding  the  quality  of  the  democratic  regime  established.  In  our  representative 
democracies, the key question is how to ensure the accountability and responsiveness of those 
who are given the power to rule, which brings the institutions and procedures of the regime to 
the  focus of  the attention of  the  researcher.  The researches on the  quality  of  democracy 
therefore underlined the importance of the procedural dimension of democracy and of the 
functioning of the democratic institution, giving institutions and processes a key position in 
the analysis (on the procedural democracy and the quality of democracy, see Morlino, 2004a, 
2004b). For Brusis and Thiery (2005), the quality of democracy can be directly linked to its 
institutional  design,  where  the research is  concentrated on how the  particular  institutional 
settings can help pass the deficiencies in the democratic regimes.
For this reason we dedicate this section to the description of the forms of government in 
the  two countries  studied.  We  will  describe  the  constitutional  designs  in  Macedonia  and 
Serbia,  to  turn  then  to  the  particularities  in  the  two  countries.  In  Serbia's  case  we  will 
underline the party control over the mandates in the assembly, strongly criticizing this solution 
and arguing that it contributed to the corruption of the political regime in which the decision-
making  power  is  moved from the democratically  elected  representatives  to the  oligarchic 
leadership of undemocratic political parties. The strengthening of the party control over the 
assembly and, indirectly, over all institutions appointed by the assembly (judiciary included), 
concentrated the power in the hands of a few political leaders, further hampering Serbia’s 
fragile democracy and contributing to its degeneration to state capture and “feudalization” of 
the  government  as  described  by  Pešić  (2006).  In  Macedonia's  case  we  will  pay  particular 
attention to the salience of the ethnic division that brought to the existence of two parallel 
party systems. The politicization of the ethnicity and the introduction of the power-sharing 
mechanisms  in  OFA  that,  according  to  authors  like  Bieber  (2004),  resulted  in  the 
institutionalization of ethnicity, brought to a situation in which the further ethnicization of the 
political debate is a profitable electoral strategy to follow134. We will therefore underline how 
the ethnicization of the politics  was used to exclude the society from the decision-making 
process, to hide the decision making from the eyes of public and to allow the “rule of deal”, 
134 See also Snyder’s discussion of the perils of power sharing and the mechanisms that bring to the further 
radicalization of the inter-ethnic conflict in democratizing states. Snyder, 2000.
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corruption and satisfaction of narrow personal interest,  in some cases even at cost of the 
country’s peace (as it was the case in Macedonia in 2001, see the section on corruption). We 
will  also  mark  some  of  the  developments  that  took  place  in  both  countries,  mainly  in 
increasing  the transparency and efficiency  of  the parliament  and assembly,  to  turn to the 
influence  the  international  actors,  EU  in  particular,  exercise  on  the  functioning  of  the 
institutions in two countries. 
The role of the EU in these cases can be considered twofold. On the one hand, the EU 
included  the  increase  of  transparency  and  efficiency  and  proper  functioning  of  the  state 
institutions (parliament and government in particular) among the issues to be faced through 
the  democracy  promotion.  While  not  making  any  particular  requirement  concerning  the 
choice of a particular  form of government (a sensitive  issue tackling the very core of the 
national sovereignty), EU required the proper functioning of the existing institutions. We will 
see how in both countries the transparency in the functioning of the national assembly was 
successfully fostered by the international actors.
On the other hand, we should account for the influence the very process of integration 
into the EU might have exercised. The integration process, during which the harmonization 
of  the  domestic  legislations  and  adoption  of  the  thousands  of  the  acquis  should  be 
undertaken, leaves little room to the national assemblies, moving the decision-making process 
towards  the  executive.  “Turning  the  assembly  into  a  rubber  stamp”  is  an  effect  already 
identified in the literature dealing with the European enlargement towards the East135. Finally, 
as we will see, the very presence of the international actors might exercise a systemic influence 
on the decision makers. The presence of an international  actor interested in the domestic 
developments also represents a resource, a potential alley or opponent, turning into a factor 
the domestic actors take in consideration when developing their strategies136. If neglected, the 
systemic influence exercised by the presence of international actors active in the country might 
seriously  hamper  the  international  actor’s  agenda,  as  it  might  annul  the  effect  of  the 
international actor’s actions.
135 See Morlino and Sadursky, 2008.
136 On the international environment and its systemic influence on the domestic decision makers see Bozzo 
and Simon-Belli, 1999.
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5.1. SERBIA: MECHANISMS OF THE PARTITOCRACY
5.1.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
Since  the  1990  constitution,  the  Serbian  national  assembly  is  a  one-chamber  legislative 
body made of 250 deputies elected according to the proportional system with the d’Hondt 
formula.  After  the  ten  years  of  multipartism  (even  though  limited  by  the  authoritarian 
tendencies of Milošević’s regime) and the registration of more than 200 political parties, the 
census of 5% is introduced in 2000 in order to limit  the high fragmentation of the party 
system. The small parties however persisted, capable to work their way into the parliament by 
supporting larger partners in exchange to see some of their own representatives on the list. 
The constitutional and legal framework put in place gave Serbian parliament also the task 
of electing, dismissing and controlling the government, linking the governments to the will of 
the assembly’s majority. Vote of confidence and mis-confidence, interpellation, questions to 
the government or single ministers, regular reports and the power to form the commissions to 
question the executive’s work, all are instruments made available to the assembly in order to 
allow it to keep the executive accountable for137. 
As far as the executive power is concerned, Serbian political system is characterized by the 
dual  executive,  where the  presence of  the  directly  elected president  and a  prime minister 
responsible  to  the  government  induces  us  to  classify  the  country  as  a  semi-presidential 
system138. 
The head of  the  executive  is  a  president  directly  elected for a  5-year mandate.  As the 
legitimacy  of  the  president  derives  from  popular  vote,  the  dismissal  procedure  is  rather 
difficult:  the qualified 2/3 majority  in the assembly and the sentence of the constitutional 
court declaring the president guilty for violating the constitution represent the political and 
juridical  safeguard of his  mandate. While  the constitutional  court  safeguards the president 
from the will of the assembly, the prime minister keeps the initiative and veto power in case 
the president tries to dismiss the assembly, creating a situation where the two institutions, 
137 See Fish 2006 for the indicators of the strength of the parliament.
138 Please see the tables in the Appendix for the summary of the characteristics of the political system and for 
a comparison of the political systems in Serbia and Macedonia. On the notion of semi-presidentialism, please see 
Duverger 1978, also Lijphart, 1984, Sartori, 1994, Shugart and Carey, 1992.
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assembly  and  president,  are  independent  one  from the  other,  even  in  those  cases  when 
cohabitation might create the blockage of institutions139. 
The  presidential  powers  over  the  Serbian  government  are  weak:  the  only  power  the 
president has is  the nomination of the candidate to prime minister.  The 2006 constitution 
changed  the  1990’s  formulation  of  this  power  with  some  significant  consequences:  it 
prescribed that the candidate shall be assigned after consultation with “parliamentary groups”, 
and not as previously,  according to the will  of the parliamentary majority.  The importance of this 
change became obvious in the first half of 2007 when different interpretations of provision 
were  the  subject  of  conflict  between  Tadić-Koštunica,  and  caused  a  deep  political  and 
institutional crisis. The formulation adopted in constitution gave the president more space to 
influence the election of the candidate, as it appeared to give the parliamentary groups and 
assembly only a consultative role (interpretation that was pushed forward by the president). 
However, the “duel” Tadić-Koštunica showed that the success of the president in exercising 
this  power  will  depend on the  distribution  of  seats  and,  as  a  result  of  Serbia’s  polarized 
pluralism type of party system, of the position the actors involved occupy in the party system. 
While the elections held in spring 2007 revealed the president’s weakness in maximizing his 
preferences in the process of government formation, those of the first half of 2008 showed 
the  president’s  strength  towards  a  future  hostile  government,  as  he  is  able  to  veto  the 
formation of an undesired government, postpone the government’s formation and, finally, 
thanks to the features of the party system and distribution of power, he also achieved the 
creation of ruling a coalition which is favorable to him. The Law on the President, adopted in 
December 2007, did not give further clarification of this provision, as the law only states that 
the president is obliged to give the mandate to a candidate “capable to ensure the election of 
the government”. There is no clear criterion for establishing whether or not a candidate is 
capable  to gain the  assembly’s  support  and,  in  the  context  of  a  fragmented party system 
without defined majorities, such omission increases the presidential influence in the process, 
turning him into an important veto point in the government’s formation. Seen the short time 
period that  passed since the introduction of  the  norm, it  is  still  too soon to assess  what 
interpretation  will  become  consolidated  in  practice.  The  tendency  registered  until  now, 
however,  indicates  that  the  president  will  try  to maximize  the  possibilities  offered by  the 
139 On the importance of the relationship between the executive and legislative for the classification of the 
political system and the critic, see Elgie, 1998. Shugart and Carey, 1992, who make one of the two dimensions of 
their typology of political systems of the level of the president’s independence from the assembly. 
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solution, inducing us to believe that the consolidated practice will, most likely, be that which 
favors the president.140
The legislative powers of the president are also rather weak: the 2006 constitution limited 
the previously existing possibility to rule by decrees during the state of war or emergency and
limited powers to declare the state of emergency. The legislative initiative is not given to the 
president, while his veto can be annulled by the simple majority in the assembly voting the 
same bill for the second time. The president has no powers in budget designing, and limited 
powers in the foreign policy.  Even though narrow, as it  was shown during the period of 
Tadić-Koštunica  cohabitation,  the  powers  left  to  the  president  can  be  used  by  a  strong 
politician, in a manner to exercise a significant political influence141. 
The government is guided by the prime minister that, according to the existing legislation, 
is  not  one  of,  but  the  first  of  the  ministers.  According  to  the  constitution  and Law on 
Government,  he  enjoys  the  discretional  power  in  choosing  the  ministers  (president 
nominating only the prime minister, assembly voting the prime minister, government and its 
program  in  block),  ministers  being  responsible  to  both  the  assembly  and  to  the  prime 
minister, the prime minister having the power to “give instructions” to the ministers and to 
dismiss them. 
The government is appointed, controlled and dismissed by the assembly. All instruments of 
control of the government known in the parliamentary systems are available to the assembly: 
individual  questions  to  government  and  its  members,  interpellation,  vote  of  confidence, 
obligatory monthly reports as well as the possibility to ask for reports on specific issues and to 
form commissions for examining the work of government. The short deadlines prescribed for 
the formation of the new government, the possibility to propose the dismissal of the assembly 
and the power to resign are guaranteed to the government in order to balance the powers 
given to the assembly. 
The legislative powers of the government are large: according to the 2006 constitution, the 
government  “designs  and  implements  the  national  policy”.  Moreover,  it  is  given  the 
instruments necessary for the control of the assembly’s agenda, but not the powers to protect 
the legislation from the amendments or to completely block the other initiators142. 
140 For the links between the type of the powers of the president and the party systems, see Shugart and 
Carey, 1992, Muller and Strom, 1999.
141 On the indicators of the presidential power in a political system see Shugart and Carey, 1992, see Tsebelis 
and Rizova,  2005,  for  the  discussion  on the  presidential  power to  veto the  bill.  See  Metcalf,  2000 for  the 
measures of the presidential powers.
142 See Ieraci, 2003, for the mechanisms of the control of agenda.
161
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
As  far  as  the  number  and  organization  of  ministries  are  concerned,  according  to  the 
Serbian legislation each cabinet gives its own design and organization of ministries, making the 
number of ministries and their competencies a subject of the coalition agreement. 
5.1.2. THE IMPERATIVE MANDATE
All of the above described normative mechanisms are subject to modifications deriving 
from the link between the parties and their deputies in the assembly. The particularity of the 
Serbian political system consists in the “loopholes” in the legislative framework that allowed 
the political parties to exercise full control over the deputies by controlling the mandates. The 
party control over what was supposed to be a free mandate is ensured through the legislative 
measures that converted the nature of the relationship between the deputy and the party from 
“political”  to  “legal”  kind  of  relations  (see  Jovanović  2005,  2007),  substituting  the 
“representatives of people” with “representatives of parties” (Miljković-Matić,  2005).  Until 
2003  this  was  achieved  due to  the  Article  88.1  of  the  electoral  law that  gave  parties  the 
possibility to take away the mandate of the disobedient deputy by expelling him from the 
party. After 2003, when the constitutional court proclaimed the Article 88.1 unconstitutional, 
the control  was re-established thanks to the provisions  that gave parties  the possibility  to 
assign the mandates without respecting the order of the candidates in the electoral list. This 
control over the distribution of mandates was used by the parties to force the candidates to 
sign the blank resignation from the position of deputy in order to be assigned the mandate. 
Finally, the 2006 constitution gave the constitutional guarantee to such practice as the Article 
102 “offered the deputies the freedom” to irrevocably make their term of office available to 
the political  party upon which proposal they were elected a deputy. Even though strongly 
criticized by all international and national actors engaged in the promotion of democracy, the 
provision  is  still  in  force,  justified  by  the  party  elites  as  a  necessary  mean to  fight  back 
corruption and “deputy trade” in parliament. In practice, it  was (ab-)used by governments 
with narrow majority in order to stay in power, to ensure the adoption of the legislation and to 
avoid control over the party leaders occupying the seats in the government143, while since it 
was  given  constitutional  guarantees,  it  became  a  subject  to  the  negotiations  for  the 
143 As we will argue in the section dedicated to the decentralization and local self-government, the inclusion of 
this provision into the Law on the Local Elections annulled the effects of decentralization, seriously hampered 
the  local  democracy  and  the  principle  of  the  local  self-government  and  pushed  the  entire  decision-making 
process on all levels of government in the hands of the few party oligarchs.
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government formations, so as to increase the credibility  of the commitments taken by the 
coalitional partners.
In order to make the position of the deputy, emptied of political influence, more attractive, 
the political parties on the other hand offer their deputies, beside high wages and economic 
incentives, positions in the managerial boards of different state-owned companies which are 
highly economically profitable positions. Such exchange is allowed by the Law on Conflict of 
Interest adopted in 2004 that does not consider the deputies’ involvement in managing the 
public and private companies as a conflict of interest (see the section on the corruption). 
The  party’s  control  over  the  deputies’  mandate  modified  the  functioning  of  the 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability and had a strong impact over the executive-legislative 
relationships in Serbia. It brought the legislative and the assembly majority under the complete 
control of a narrow party leadership (a seriously worrying solution for Serbian democracy, 
particularly seen the very low level of democracy within the parties, see Goati, 2006), resulting 
in a situation where the only threat to the government is from within, not from outside the 
ruling coalition, no matter what kind of scandals the ministers get involved in. In a situation 
where the president  doesn’t  have any de iure,  while  the parliament doesn’t  have de facto 
powers to dismiss the government, the stability of the government depends on the stability of 
the ruling coalition, and thus on the party and electoral system. 
Already during the '90s, the Serbian party system was considered fragmented (too much 
fragmented even for the newly born, not institutionalized party system), while at the end of 
the '90s the domestic analysts started to describe it as a system of polarized pluralism, even 
though it still wasn’t institutionalized and, according to Sartori’s own criteria, not classifiable 
party system144. This tendency towards polarized pluralism after the change of regime finally 
came into light by establishing the centrifugal competition and the three-pole system, with 
extreme positions  on both ends,  and a  centre,  represented by  DSS.  The large ideological 
distance between the center and the two extreme poles, combined with the strong antagonism 
between SRS and the international community, produced limiting effects on the uncertainty of 
the electoral competition and created what Sartori labeled the “peripheral turnover”, resulting 
in irresponsible opposition (SRS) and equally irresponsible central governmental actor (DSS), 
strongly motivated to avoid the establishment of mechanisms of accountability.
Due to the polarization and fragmentation of the party system, the governments in Serbia 
were always coalitional, characterized by narrow majority, usually several political partners and 
144 See Goati 1992, 1994, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002.
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large ideological distance between the coalitional members. Usually, the government depends 
not on the agreement between two larger, but also most distant parts of coalition and on small 
coalitional partners, but sometimes also on parties with one or two candidates, who succeeded 
in getting to the parliament by forming an electoral coalition with bigger parties. This makes 
the control parties keep over their deputies a crucial mean in the negotiating process, as well 
as later, during the ruling period. During the negotiations over the ruling coalition after the 
2008 parliamentary election, the control of blank resignations was also subject to the intra-
party  negotiations,  when  the  control  of  the  deputies  became  a  mean  for  increasing  the 
credibility of the commitments made in the negotiation process. 
The peripheral turnover, the coalitional governments and the polarized pluralism type of 
system exercised a negative influence on the responsibility of both opposition and, even more 
important,  of  the  governing  parties145.  Combined  with  the  concentration  of  power  in  the 
hands of the party leaders and lack of mechanisms for the accountability, such setting opened 
the possibility for abusing of power and produced what some authors called “feudalization of 
the Serbian government”: the ministries became the spheres of influence, divided between 
parties in a manner that the entire sector, controlled by a particular ministry, became a “fief” 
belonging  to  the  coalitional  partner146.  Unlike  what  was  the  case  in  the  first  Đinđić’s 
government, where junior ministries were assigned so as to “keep tabs on partners”, in both 
Koštunica’s governments the principle of “mono-color ministries” prevailed. The coalitional 
agreement distributes, according to strength, the ministerial portfolios and all positions in that 
field of policy (manager and members of the manager boards of all civil service agencies, all 
sub-units of the administration of that ministry included) to one political party that gains full 
control over a certain sector of policy. The political party’s extremely strong control over the 
MP’s  and over  the  policy  area  means  that  in  case  the  party’s  interest  in  the  field  is  not 
respected, or in case of interference, the party will use its MP’s to overthrow the government. 
The non-interference in the other party’s fief (unless necessary for establishing own influence) 
thus became a principle to follow in the relationship between the coalitional partners. Such 
non-interference was the approach the government adopted even in those cases when the 
ministers were accused of corruption and abuse of power against which strong evidence was 
collected. Politicization of the judiciary, party control over the assembly and the principle of 
145 See Sartori 1972 on the effects polarized pluralism has on the responsibility of the ruling elite.
146 On the feudalization of Serbian governments see Pešić, 2006.
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non-interference  safeguarded  ministers  involved  in  a  scandal  from  any  legal  or  political 
consequences and allowed them to continue their mandates147. 
While Serbian governments are relatively immune to the outside control, they are extremely 
vulnerable to the turbulences in the relationships between the political parties caused by their 
vote-seeking strategies and the shakes caused by external events and “hot issues”. In Serbian 
recent history, a situation of deadlock in all institutions (from judiciary to the assembly and 
administration) caused by conflict of the parties over some issue it is not rare: all activities and 
reforms,  procedures and legislations  are suspended until  the conflict  is  solved,  as  they all 
become a potential resource to use in the negotiations.
5.1.3. DEVELOPMENTS
Beside the control of the political parties, other shortcomings Serbian parliament needed to 
face immediately after the instauration of the democratic regime in 2000 were:
• The lack of transparency;
• The lack of administrative capacity and low efficiency,  due to the shortage in staff, 
training, in technical and financial means;
• The lack of effective control over the government;
• The lack of adequate public consultation in the legislative process;
• The recurrent blockage due to political conflict between the deputies, obstruction by 
the opposition, opposition parties leaving the parliament, the low rate of presence of 
the deputies in sessions causing the lack of quorum and delays in work.
• The lack of political, and in some cases even basic, culture of the deputies. 
While there were no positive developments as far as the control of the political parties over 
the deputies is concerned, and the lack of specialized staff and inadequate behaviour during 
the  parliamentary  sessions  are  still  a  serious  weakness  of  the  assembly,  the  transparency, 
working conditions, possibility to exercise control over the government and the competencies 
of  the  committees  in  the  legislative  process  are  all  considered a  positive  change.  We can 
consider the adoption of the new procedures of work in the assembly in 2002, the Law on 
Access to Information of Public Interest in November 2004 and the amendments introduced 
to  the  working  procedures  of  the  assembly  (especially  those  adopted  in  June  2005  that 
147 See the reports of the commission for the fight against corruption. 
165
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
increased  the  committees’  competencies  in  the  decision-making  process)  as  particularly 
significant changes introduced in the work of the parliament. 
The raison d’etre of these changes differs as we pass from transparency to efficiency issues. 
In the case of transparency, the efforts and measures introduced aimed to change the negative 
picture  citizens  had  of  the  parliament.  The  negative  assessment  and  lack  of  trust  in  this 
institution  gave  the  impetus  for  the  actions  undertaken  for  increasing  transparency  and 
initiatives of bringing the parliament closer to the citizens (web presentation of the parliament 
with the very data base dedicated to the legislations, open parliament initiative, students’ visits 
to the assembly and divulgation of informational materials etc). 
The introduction of measures aiming to increase the transparency of the functioning of the 
legislative did not produce the desired effects as far as the citizens’ view of the institution is 
concerned.  While  transparency really  increased148,  the lack of trust remained a reality.  The 
number of citizens that have full trust in legislative was only 8% in 2005, while citizens having 
full or at least some trust in this institution accounted for 20%, making the parliament the less 
credible of all institutions (judiciary 29%, government 35%, president 43%, military and police 
44% of citizens expressing full or some trust in these institutions). Moreover, the level of its 
credibility didn’t change much since 2000: while the level of trust seemed to increase (from 
18% with full or some trust in 2000 to 28% in 2005), the level of mistrust also increased (from 
59%  in  2000  to  65%  in  2005).  The  harsh  criticisms  advanced  by  the  citizens  remained 
unchanged:  the lack of political  culture,  of  responsibility,  corruption and laziness,  and the 
belief in the complete irrelevance of the national assembly in the legislative process being the 
most often underlined issues in the interviews149.
As far  as  the  changes introduced in  the  working  procedures are  concerned,  they  were 
mainly the product of the effort to increase the legislative capacity and efficiency, through the 
strengthening of the committees, and especially by lowering the requirements for the quorum 
in order to avoid the assembly’s blockage. The decision on the parliamentary procedure in 
2004 also regulated the question of the parliament’s control over the government, praised in 
148 Working  reports  of  the  assembly  as  well  as  of  the  assembly’s  committees  are  published,  the  web 
presentations  offer  access  to  all  legislations  adopted  and  in  procedure,  the  reports  on  the  sessions  of  the 
parliament and committees, information on deputies, parties and their activities. The information is not always 
issued in a transparent manner (the statistical and methodological inconsistencies of the assembly’s report makes 
it almost impossible to use for analytical purposes and does not give the possibility of time-cross comparison), 
but the situation did improve since the initial period after 2000).
149 The most illustrative is the statement that “the assembly is like a soap opera, it is a circus, and the deputies 
are worse than children. They are just wasting our time and money.” See Golubović, Spasić, Pavićević, 2003, p. 
67.
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the reports as a positive step. This seems to be one of the changes introduced in the research 
for external legitimacy, while the real intention of the legislator was to make the provision 
non-operational. The actual control of the assembly over the government did not increase, as 
the deputies still lack the liberty from their political parties to exercise effective control of the 
government.  The  unconstitutional  manipulation  of  mandates  in  order  to  create  a 
parliamentary  majority  in  the  moment  a  small  party  of  the  ruling  coalition  withdraws  its 
support to the government, in August 2005, is a clear sign that the intention was clearly not to 
increase the assembly’s control over the government.
As far as the organization of the executive is concerned, it underwent almost no change 
since 2000. The Law on the Election of the President made the election procedure simpler 
and the conditions more realistic and easy to meet (see the section on elections), while the 
constitutional  reform  changed  the  procedure  of  dismissal  and  took  away  the  exclusive 
presidential powers during the state of emergency, powers that were considered undemocratic 
and that were abused by Milošević’s regime.
5.1.4. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN SERBIA
As far as the actions of the EU in the field are concerned, the tables in the appendix bring 
the priorities concerning the functioning of the assembly and executive expressed in the EU 
reports and partnerships with Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro). The suggestions advanced by 
the EU mainly concerned the legislative, and remained at the level of recommendations rather 
than conditionality, as in no case there were specific requests concerning the assembly or the 
executive  expressed  as  short-term  or  key  priority.  Through  the  socialization  channel  and 
financial support,  some influence was exercised over the assembly, mainly in increasing its 
transparency and capacities.  The socialization  process involved  not only  the  EU,  but also 
other international actors, OSCE, CoE, the national governments, the USAID as well as other 
agencies. The EU directly provided the assistance and undertook the socialization by including 
the Serbian parliament in the network of the European assemblies, and it also took indirect 
steps through the actions of member states. Finally, the EU’s financial contributions were also 
significant, improving the working conditions in the assembly. 
The  EU  did  not  make  any  concrete  requirements  concerning  the  design  of  Serbian 
executive, aside from the call made in 2003 to Serbian “government and parties to focus on 
the reform responsibilities rather than on the party’s political issues” (EU annual report on 
Serbia and Montenegro, 2003). Criticisms of party control over the parliament, of executive 
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influence over the judiciary, of politicization of the civil service and of all other aspects and 
mechanisms of Serbian “partitocracy” are expressed indirectly in the paragraphs about those 
institutions where the parties were exercising their influence.
While the official recommendations in the questions of the constitutional design are almost 
absent, the unofficial pressures the EU exercised on the government’s formation were very 
strong, with important implications for the functioning of the Serbian institutions (and, as we 
will argue in the conclusions of this work, for both the process of democratization and of 
Serbian integrations in the EU). 
These pressures were mainly caused by the existence of a strong nationalist party (SRS), 
hostile towards European integration and favoring the “shift towards the east” (Russia, China) 
in Serbian foreign policy. The presence of such actor, perceived by the EU as the main threat 
to Serbian democracy and openly threatening all EU's potential interests in Serbia150, created a 
situation in which the colors of the ruling coalition became of crucial importance for the IA. 
Since the very beginning of the conflict  DSS–DS, EU was pushing and requesting for re-
conciliation and conflict  settlement in the name of values such as reform, democracy and 
progress. As this split made the agreement between the “pro-European” parties difficult, both 
2004  and  2007  government  negotiations  were  marked  by  strong  pressures  coming  from 
Brussels aiming to keep the nationalists away from power and ensure the creation of a pro-
European government. In the May 2007 crisis, the election of the ultra-nationalist Nikolić to 
president of the assembly, due to Koštunica, was perceived as a security threat by all western 
actors, who started to make pressures, using conditionality, remuneration and threat to ensure 
the creation of “pro-democratic government”. The threat to end cooperation with Serbia was 
combined with the delay in signing the visa agreement, due to “technical problems” and with 
the fall of Belgrade stock market, that demonstrated the preference of the capital for the stable 
settings the EU is conceived to guarantee. At the same time, the requests for the creation of a 
“pro-democratic”  government  and  the  promises  about  the  re-opening  of  the  SAA 
negotiations as soon as the “pro-European government is established” were coming from the 
EU, showing Brussels’ preferences clearly to both Serbian leaders and citizens151. 
150 The nationalists are perceived as a security threat for Europe, due to the role Serbian nationalists had 
during the Balkan history in the Nineties. Moreover, SRS’ political agenda is strongly antagonistic towards the 
EU, calling for “eastern” orientation in Serbian foreign policy and questioning the western investments in Serbia, 
thus adding the threat to the potential geo-strategical and economic interests of the EU in Serbia to the already 
mentioned security threat they are perceived to represent.
151 The EU influence on the  government  formation doesn’t  consist  only  in the  involvement considered 
“necessary” for maintaining of the “pro-reformist” parties, it also, even though in a less official manner, tackles 
the distribution of portfolios. The May 2007 crisis revealed that, during the negotiations ongoing between DS 
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How  shall  we  assess  the  role  of  the  EU  in  the  creation  of  “pro-democratic”  ruling 
coalitions and in “keeping the ancient regime away”? It is a rather difficult task: in the extent 
to  which  nationalists  represent  a  threat  to  Serbian  democracy,  such  intervention  surely 
contributed in maintaining the democratic regime. But at the same time the influence EU 
exercised over the domestic distribution of power produced a systemic effect, modeling the 
preferences and strategies of the actors present.  It  thus became a mechanism that further 
strengthened  the  central  actor  of  the  political  system,  strengthening  the  already  negative 
features on the electoral accountability produced by the polarized pluralism type of system. In 
the conclusions of this work we will argue that it was precisely the systemic, undesired effect 
of  the  influence  the  EU  exercised  over  the  domestic  distribution  of  power  to  model 
Koštunica’s preferences in both democratization and integration process. 
 
5.2. MACEDONIA: ONE ASSEMBLY, TWO WORLDS
5.2.1. THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT
The Macedonian national assembly is made of one chamber with 120 deputies elected with 
the proportional formula (according to the constitution the number of deputies goes from 120 
to 140, yet in all 5 legislations the number of deputies was 120). 
In the semi-presidential design of Macedonian political regime, the assembly is given a large 
range of powers in some provisions, unusual even for the semi-presidentialism, which make 
the Macedonian case one that, in different scales of regime types, is classified very near to the 
parliamentary systems152. The particularity of Macedonian national assembly, when compared 
to other political systems, is the provision according to which only the assembly can dismiss 
itself, thus making the parliament responsible only to itself, which then results into very stable 
legislatures that, except in 2008,  always finished their mandate. According to the domestic 
authors, this provision is “an obvious disadvantage for the proper balance of powers between 
the parliament and the executive that could involve the electoral body as a final arbiter in 
matters of substantial disputes on policy and of legitimacy. The lack of this essential element 
of parliamentary model is not to be concerned as a tendency towards presidential one, but 
and DSS, the EU officials were insisting on DS keeping control over the security sector. This statement was then 
used by Koštunica (recently  more and more shifting towards nationalism, also negating his “pro-European” 
orientation in some cases) in the political struggle against DS, in some moments even used to justify Tadić’s 
betrayal by supporting SRS.
152 See Kasapović, 1997.
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rather  as  a  relict  of  the  previous  "assembly"  or  council  model  and  a  tendency  towards 
predominance of the parliament over the executive.” (Spirovski, 2001, p. 2. On the dangers of 
Macedonian  parliamentarianism  see  also  Todorovski,  2008).  This  self-accountability  of 
Macedonian assembly was also identified as a source of lack of responsibility from both the 
parliament and, indirectly, the government, resulting in inefficiency, deficit in functioning and 
lack of consultation with the electorates and civil societies registered. The rules of procedures 
of Macedonian assembly  adopted in  July 2002 sought to solve  the problems by imposing 
higher fines for the deputies not attending the sessions153. 
As another resource of strength of the assembly towards the president we find the simple 
procedure for overpassing the presidential veto where the president can veto only the laws 
that were not adopted by the 2/3 majority, and even then, the majority in the assembly is 
enough to overpass it.  The requirement that the presidential  decree shall  be signed by the 
president of the assembly as well, and the position of the head of the executive given to the 
government rather than to the president, further weakened the Macedonian president.
The presidential powers in the process of the government formation are also very weak, 
the power to entrust the candidate to prime minister from the party that gained the majority 
being turned into purely symbolic by the capacity of Macedonian party and electoral system to 
create clear majorities in the assembly. The government formation, control and dismissal are 
entrusted to the assembly making the president’s role in the process symbolical. As it is usually 
the case with the semi-presidential systems, in the cases where the parliamentary majority is of 
the same party as the president,  the presidential  influence over the government formation 
depends  on the intra-party  dynamics.  During  Gligorov's  presidency,  while  he  enjoyed  the 
support  of  the  assembly’s  majority  as  well,  or  in  the  period  of  the  “expert,  non-political 
government in 1991, the role of the president was decisive and the system was functioning as 
a  presidentialism.  During  the  first  half  of  Trajkovski  presidency,  1999-2002,  as  the 
government  was  headed by  Georgijevski,  a  president  of  VMRO, the  balance  was  shifted 
towards the prime minister. At the same time, during the periods of the cohabitation,  the 
confrontation  between  the  president  and  prime  minister  are  significant,  and  president  is 
limited to play a far less influential role. The high levels of the independence of the president 
and  assembly,  in  which  the  parliament  can  not  be  dismissed,  while  the  impeachment 
procedures  gives  the  veto  power  to  the  constitutional  court,  appears  to be  of  enormous 
importance in these periods of cohabitation. The strong conflictuality between the SDSM and 
153 See Grabev – Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2002.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 170
VMRO clearly showed the perils of such system, resulting in serious blockages both in the 
period of Gligorov-Georgijevski cohabitation (1998-1999)154, and during the last cohabitation 
Crvenkovski-Gruevski.  The  government  headed  by  Gruevski  does  not  even  recognize 
Crvenkovski  as  the  president,  the  members  of  the  incumbent  VMRO  call  him  “mister 
Crvenkovski”, refusing to refer to him as the president, the ministers refuse to be present in 
the  parliament  during  the  presidential  speeches,  and  in  many  instances  (like  the  re-
establishment of the diplomatic relations with Serbia after a two months crisis provoked by 
Macedonia's recognition of Kosovo, or like in the last turn of negotiations over the name 
dispute with Greece) the lack of cooperation resulted in the internal political crisis, mutual 
accuses  and  blockage  of  the  institutions155.  Such  situation  brings  to  a  series  of  conflicts 
between the  ruling  and oppositional  parties,  which  than often bring  the  president  to use 
discretionally his own powers (as for example Crvenkovski’s amnesty to the party-fellow Zaev, 
accused of corruption and abuse of power in summer 2008156, or similar Trajkovski’s amnesty 
to the Dimovska, accused of the tapping affair157), and induce the opposition to block the 
assembly (in the history of Macedonian parliamentarianism the boycott of the parliament by 
the opposition is often used by the Macedonian, as well as by the Albanian parties).
The assembly is given a wide range of instruments to control the government, which gives 
further strength to the assembly in the balance of power between the executive and legislative. 
The investiture vote (with a possibility to influence the government’s composition through the 
individual vote for the ministers), the vote of no-confidence (both to the whole government 
and to individual ministers), the interpellation procedure, the deputy’s question, the regular 
reports to the assembly, survey committees, all these are the instruments the assembly can use 
to exercise its function of control over the government. 
While control and questioning of the ministers were widely used (only in a one-year period, 
from November 2005 to December 2006, 230 deputies questions were made, compared with 
154 On cohabitation Gligorov – Georgijevski, see Spirovski, 2001.
155 I thank professor Lidija Hristova for drawing my attention to cohabitation as a source of instability. For 
the conflict president-government on the name dispute, see: http://www.utrinskivesnik.com.mk/default-mk.asp?
ItemID=1E10F8337830FC4A9B1BD4EE96B5EE59, http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?
ItemID=9E2CC11ED9E33544BF7AA8DDBC328639, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=30&nav_category=167, on the conflict over the reaction on Tadić’s call to Macedonia 
to send a new ambassador to Belgrade, see: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Skoplje-bira-diplomatu-za-
Beograd.lt.html, http://www.pobjeda.me/citanje.php?datum=2008-11-17&id=153113. 
156 See 
http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/print/bs/features/setimes/articles/2008/09/22/reportage-01, 
http://www.naslovi.net/2008-08-04/politika/abolicija-kao-drzavni-udar/767305. 
157 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2003.
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138  for  Serbia  in  a  three-year  period  from  2003  to  2006158),  the  power  to  dismiss  the 
government was almost never exercised (except for the first, “expert” government, formed by 
non-political  experts  in  1991  that,  not  sharing  any  political  powers,  was  voted  the  non-
confidence as soon as it got in between the president and the assembly, see Spirovski, 2001). 
Macedonia, the same as Serbia, represents an important example for studies concentrating on 
the proper manner of defining the concept of “change in government”. The discussion of 
“what shall  be considered a change of  government”, that  in literature was given different 
answers (“change in the figure of the prime minister”,  “change of the coalitional  partners 
independently  on  prime  minister  changes”,  “change  of  any  component  of  the 
government”159), finds its empirical relevance in our two cases.
Thus, if we take Macedonia for example, we can notice how, except for the first, expert 
government  and for  the  fourth legislature,  Macedonian  prime ministers  have enjoyed  full 
terms in office, representing highly stable governments. During the fourth legislature, we can 
count five changes on the position of prime minister (three if we do not count Šekerinovska’s 
mandate, who exercised the role of acting PM twice while waiting for the appointment of the 
new prime minister), while the changes in the ministerial positions were minimal.
Yet, if we consider any government’s reshuffle as a change of the government, in the third 
legislature, that previously appeared a stable, full-term government for the four years headed 
by Georgijevski, we can count seven reshufflings of the government, some of which including 
also the creation of a large coalitions of the national unity. 
Again, in none of these cases it was a national assembly to vote a non-confidence to the 
government, even though these cases were usually accompanied by the internal crisis in the 
ruling coalition either due to crisis among the partners, or to crisis inside the parties, and the 
consequential government reshufflings were products of the newly negotiated balance, where 
the  parliamentarian  majority  was  used  only  as  a  rubber  stamp  to  give  legitimacy  to  the 
agreements achieved among the parties leadership. 
The rubber-stamp nature of Macedonian national assembly also emerges from the analysis 
of the data concerning the deputies’ question, deputies’ legislative initiative and the time for 
discussing the bills. The deputies’ question is used exclusively by the opposition parties, while 
the legislative initiative of the deputies is successful only when coming from the deputies of 
158 Data source: The report on functioning of Macedonian national assembly 2006, the Report on functioning 
of Serbian national assembly, December 2006.
159 For the different criteria for counting the government formation, see Muller and Strom, 1999, p. 12.
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the ruling coalition (about 10% of the adopted legislation in the period November 2005 – 
June 2006 was proposed by deputies, compared to 2.3% for Serbia. In all cases the deputy 
proposing the legislation was from the ruling coalition,  bills  proposed by the oppositional 
deputies all being refused). 
An efficient legislative activity (133 laws examined, 104 of which adopted in the 6-month 
period November 2005 – June 2006, represent nearly half what Serbia’s assembly adopted, 
which is 260 laws, in the three-year period January 2003 – January 2007) is combined with a 
tendency  to  use  the  “shorter”  legislative  procedure.  The  number  of  laws  adopted  in  the 
ordinary  procedure  represents  only  12.5% of  the  total  legislation  adopted160,  while,  if  we 
compare the number of documents examined in the assembly (242 documents examined in 
November 2005 – June 2006) with the duration of the sittings (400 hours, 30 minutes), we can 
notice a very low average for the discussion dedicated to the single documents adopted (1.8 
hours)161.
As the process of the integration with the EU goes on, and as the packages of laws aiming 
to  bring  the  national  legislation  in  line  with  the  EU standards  and  with  the  acquis  are 
prepared, the whole decision-making process is further shifted to the government that became 
the crucial actor in the legislative process. The NGO representatives underlined that the law 
drafting procedure in the government became more and more important, leaving the assembly 
with almost no influence on the legislation content as almost all legislation is now adopted by 
the shortened procedure with only one reading in the assembly162. This de facto strengthening 
of the government’s influence vis-à-vis the assembly is thus an interesting phenomenon of 
Macedonian parliamentarianism, where the practice registered in the reality is far from the 
intention of the fathers of Macedonian constitution whose intention was to create a strong, 
independent and influential national assembly.
5.2.2. THE ASSEMBLY IN THE SETTING OF INSTITUTIONALIZED ETHNICITY
The particularity making Macedonia’s parliamentary and political life difficult is the nature 
of its fragmented party system, divided on ethnic lines in two ethnic party “sub-systems”. We 
160 Only 13 out  of  the 104 laws were adopted in  the ordinary  procedure,  51 laws were adopted in  the 
“shorter” procedure, 11 in the urgent procedure and 29 ratified. The main difference between the “shorter” and 
ordinary procedure lies in the time the deputies are left to get familiar with the materials for the session: “shorter 
procedure”  means that  the  10-day  period,  from the  moment the  materials  and agenda are  delivered to  the 
deputies until the session itself, is shortened. Urgent procedure means that as soon as the urgent procedure for a 
law proposal is approved by the assembly, the law is scheduled on the agenda.
161 Data from the official reports issued by the National assembly of Macedonia, 2005 – 2006, 2006.
162 Interview with Klekovski, August 2008.
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can  thus  find  the  majority-Macedonian  parties  with  a  rather  high  potential  for  forming 
electoral  coalitions  (often  aggregating  the  minority  parties  of  Turks,  Bosniaks,  Serbs, 
Bulgarians, Greeks and other minorities) and on the other side the Albanian minority parties 
that  create  another  party  sub-system,  not  incline  to  forming  cross-ethnic  coalitions163. 
Macedonia's  party  system  is  further  organized  around  what  can  be  labeled  the  left-right 
dimension, with two bigger parties, VMRO and SDSM, representing the fundaments of the 
center-left and center-right political block. However, attention should be paid to the fact that 
the “left” and “right” in Macedonia, and particularly, the left and right orientation of SDSM 
and VMRO are quite disputable. While VMRO shows a clear inclination towards the rightist, 
more nationalistic rhetorics, it still  includes some economic solutions typical for the left, a 
situation that makes it difficult to position the party according to the classical meaning of the 
left-right as dimension covering  both  social  and economic issues164.  The positioning of the 
SDSM  poses  even  stronger  controversies.  As  reported  by  Macedonian  author  recently 
undertaking the research on the political identities of the electorate and parties in Macedonia, 
the SDSM has some problems with its ideological identity.  In the interview with professor 
Hristova it was underlined that the positioning of the SDSM is problematic, the party even 
experiencing  difficulties  in  offering  a  comprehensive  party  program. It  is  however  usually 
considered  to  be  the  party  of  the  “left-center”,  a  classification  deriving  mainly  from  its 
heritage  (previous  communist  party),  and  deriving  from  its  more  tolerant,  civic-oriented 
approach to  the  ethnic  questions.  Summarizing  the  data  from the research  of  Laver  and 
Benoit, we can see how the dimensions in which the SDSM and VMRO were positioned in a 
manner to sign some significant ideological distance are: decentralization (SDSM 6.9 – VMRO 
12.1), nationalism (SDSM 6.5 – VMRO 17.5), religion (SDSM 18 – VMRO 4.2), urban-rural 
(SDSM 7.1 – VMRO 14.1), social (SDSM 8.7 – VMRO 17.3), and, obviously, the approach 
towards the former communists (SDSM 3.8 – VMRO 14.8). We can notice how the conflict 
between the two parties is structured on the dimension the Laver and Benoit labeled “social 
liberalism vs. conservatism”, rather than on the classical conception of the left-right defined in 
economic terms. It is interesting to notice, however, that, according to Laver and Benoit’s 
data,  in the most salient  dimension of politics  the two parties share similar  positions:  EU 
163 See Gaber – Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2001.
164 On the meaning of the left-right and the different “content” the notions of the left and right might assume 
in different countries it is helpful to consult the rich literature existing on measuring the party positions and 
discussions on which dimensions do contribute to the “left-right” collocation. See for example Laver, Benoit, e 
Garry,  (2003),  Franzmann  e  Kaiser,  (2006),  Gabel,  e  Huber,  (2000),  Budge,  Klingemann,  Volkens,  Bara, 
Tanebaum, (2001). 
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membership  (SDSM 18.5  –  VMRO 17.4)  and  privatization  (SDSM 13.6  –  VMRO 16.1). 
Similarly, we should also be careful with the distance between two parties registered on the 
dimension “decentralization”: seen that in the period the data were collected the SDSM was 
the  incumbent  party  and  decentralization  was  among  the  most  salient  issues  on  agenda, 
VMRO strongly opposing the Law on Territorial Organization, the positioning reported by 
the domestic experts included in the survey might have been biased on this dimension. 
The  several  small  parties,  entering  and exiting  the  party  scene,  complete  this  difficult 
puzzle, many of which surviving only thanks to the adhesion to one of the two blocks. The 
ideological baggage of these parties is even more difficult to assess, as there were even the 
cases of the former left-wing parties entering in the “right-wing” coalition and vice versa,165 
creating difficulties not only in assessing these parties’ ideological positions, but also making 
the coalitional blocks a tricky indicator of the bigger parties ideological positioning. Combined 
with  the  trend  to  fragmentation  of  Macedonian  party  system  (still  active,  see  Gaber 
Damjanovska  and Jovevska,  2006),  is  an  “anomaly”  identified  by  some domestic  authors 
according to which, in a country with one of the most favourable electoral systems for the 
small  parties,  such  trend,  created  by  the  electorate’s  almost  “irrational”  strategic  voting, 
produces the strengthening of the big parties and the weakening of the small ones166. 
The  ideological  distinction  in  the  Albanian  block  is  even  more  confused,  as  the 
competition between the two main parties, DUI and DPA, is mainly based on valence (rather 
than  positional)  issues,  mainly  following  the  logic  of  directional  (and  not  spatial) 
competition167. The intensity of the preference and its salience become crucial element of the 
electoral  strategies,  producing a situation in  which,  rather than moderating,  candidates  are 
motivated to radicalize their requirements and discredit the opponent in order to gain the 
image  of  credible  protectors  of  the  Albanian  national  interests.  The  “Albanian  question” 
prevails  in the electoral campaigns, while the economic issues are hardly mentioned in the 
party  programs,  making  the  positioning  of  the  Albanian  parties  on  a  left-right  scale  very 
difficult168.  With this  precaution we can distinguish between the DPA, born as the radical 
165 Thus,  Gaber-Damjanovska  and  Jovevska  (2006)  when  commenting  Gruevski  coalition  claim:  “It  is 
obvious that the political configuration of the parties gathered around Nikola Gruevski is quite a diverse one, so 
if one excludes the common party interest to get a share of power, negotiations seemed quite a difficult task to 
accomplish…  Odd combination with VMRO seems the coalition with the New Social-Democratic Party that 
derived from SDSM, and maintained its left provenience.” (Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006, p. 5).
166 See Saveski, 2005.
167 For spatial theory see Downs, 1957. For a criticism of the spatial theory and for the valence issues see 
Stokes, 1963. For the directional theory of issue voting see Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989. 
168 Kadriu, 2008.
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Albanian nationalistic party, placing itself on the right, and DUI, a party formed by the leader 
of the terrorists involved in the 2001 violence, whose positioning is less certain due to its 
effort to underline their “civil, less nationalistic, pro-European orientations”, and to position 
itself on the center/center-left169. An unwritten practice was established, according to which 
the winning Macedonian party/coalition, even when with enough support in the assembly to 
rule alone, always includes a party of the ethnic Albanians in government, and in this practice 
until  2008  the  coalitions  formed  generally  respected  the  collocation  on  a  left-right  scale 
between the Albanian and Macedonian partners, SDSM choosing PDP and after 2001 DUI, 
and VMRO forming a coalition with DPA170. It is difficult to claim that such coalitions were 
based  upon  the  ideological  positioning  of  the  parties,  seen  the  general  difficulties  in 
positioning the Macedonian political parties we discussed above. However, it is interesting to 
notice that, for example, Kadriu collocated DUI on the center-left, while Laver and Benoit 
positioned it on the center. In any case, the DUI appears to be slightly on the “left” to the 
DPA.  Particularly,  some  of  dimensions  dividing  the  SDSM  and  VMRO  also  see  the 
collocation of the DUI and DPA in a manner that makes DUI the less worst choice to the 
SDSM and DPA more attractive to VMRO (so, in the dimension of nationalism, DUI scores 
11.1,  DPA 15,9;  religion:  DUI  9.7,  DPA 4.8;  urban-rural:  DUI  13.5,  DPA 14.8;  former 
communists: DUI 9.1, DPA 11.6; social: DUI 15.7, DPA 18,7). It is evident that while there is 
almost  null  ideological  distance  between  DUI  and  DPA,  however,  DUI  in  almost  all 
dimensions in which SDSM and VMRO are taking a distant positions assumed the position 
slightly  nearer  to SDSM.  To this,  the  personal  animosities,  particularly  between DUI and 
VMRO  should  be  added.  As  Gaber-Damjanovska  and  Jovevska  (2006)  underlined,  “the 
hardest  potential  coalition  mouthful  for Gruevski  is  DUI,  as  VMRO was  very  vigorously 
against this party when it was in power, commenting on the former crisis situations, objecting 
most of the systemic change performed for harmonization of the system with the Framework 
Agreement, opposed the amnesty of UCK fighters and objected the position this party got 
afterwards in government. What’s more, VMRO would find it  quite hard to explain to its 
most  committed  voters  how potential  cooperation  with  DUI may  be  achieved.”  (Gaber-
Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006, p. 6).
169 Thus, in the Laver and Benoit data set, the party seems to be placed on the centre, while Kadriu, 2008, 
positions the party on the left-centre. While it is difficult to position the party in an “absolute” sense, we can 
however claim that DUI is to be positioned on the left if compared both to his Albanian opponent DPA and 
Macedonian centre-right party VMRO.
170 As far as Laver and Benoit’s collocation of DUI at the centre is concerned, we might question to what 
extent such collocation was a product of the fact that DUI was in the coalition with the centre-left SDSM.
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Yet, in 2008 such coalition between VMRO and DUI was created (mainly as a product of 
the strong pressures coming from DUI for the “vote of the Albanians to be respected”, that 
during  2007  systematically  boycotted  the  institutions  on  all  levels  creating  a  significant 
blockage of the political system. See also further, see the section on constitutional framework, 
see the section on minority rights). While the impact of this “marriage” for the analyses of the 
left-right positioning is low, seen the inadequacy of the left-right scale for understanding the 
Macedonian political spectrum as we described above, it is an important sign of the emerging 
new potential trend: the one of the introduction of the “key” for the creation of the ruling 
coalition according to which the winners from the two ethnic blocks should both be included 
in the government. The inclusion of such provisions would bring to the further ethnicization 
of the process of the government formation and it is seen by the domestic authors as a step 
before  the  creation  of  the  non-territorial  ethno-federation  (see  Gaber-Damjanovska  and 
Jovevska, 2006). As these two authors underlined, since the independence in 1991 the practice 
to include an ethnic Albanian party was consolidated, while the choice of the party to include 
into the government was a matter of the will of the winning party, with traditional partnership, 
program closeness in positions and/or daily pragmatic politics being the key criterion171. Such 
practice then allowed divided ethnic groups to identify common interests,  or at least their 
ruling elite to bargain for the division of portfolios, allowing the political cleavage to “soften” 
the  ethnic  division  between  the  two  blocks,  creating  links  between  the  Albanian  and 
Macedonian party systems. DUI’s insistence on “respecting the Albanian vote”, is shifting the 
consolidated practice  of  compromise  into an unwritten  rule according  to which the ruling 
coalition must include the winner from the Albanian block. Such solution, if really established, 
would undermine any possibility for the social, economic or whatever interest base to offer 
the identification alternative to the ethnic one. 
DUI’s capacity to force such reinterpretation of the previously established practice was 
mainly a product of the following three factors that joined together to increase this party’s 
bargaining  position.  First  of  all  we  should  account  for  the  DUI’s  strength  in  the  local 
governments. Seeking to press the VMRO-DPA government, DUI withdraw its majors from 
the association of cities and municipalities (ZELS), threatened not to use the Badinter rule in 
the municipalities were ethnic Albanians were in majority and used the local governments to 
171 In 2006 the electoral victory of VMRO was celebrated by the supporters of the Albanian party DPA, 
showing the presence of a certain level of ideological, left-right identification serving as glue between the two 
divided ethnic groups.  Such event clearly testifies the existence of the  expectation  that the right-wing VMRO 
would include the Albanian right-wing DPA in the ruling coalition.
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criticize the government creating a serious delay in the process of decentralization (see the 
section on decentralization). It also tried to obstruct the adoption of the Law on Police (see 
the  section  on  security)  and  afterwards  it  declared  it  will  not  comply  with  the  law  and 
obstructed the appointment of the heads of police in the 16 municipalities controlled by DUI. 
Their requirements were partially backed by the argumentation that SDSM used in 2002 to 
justify the coalition with the former NLA fighters, when the party claimed that such coalition 
is  unavoidable  seen  that  DUI  represents  the  strongest  Albanian  party172.  In  2006,  the 
international community initiated to press for such solution, unofficially calling Gruevski to 
include the biggest Albanian party in the government. Finally, the opportunities created by the 
Badinter majority introduced by the OFA, a mechanism that gave the ethnic minority the veto 
power in a series of issues and that made the party controlling most of the ethnic minority’s 
vote  a  strong  stakeholder173,  further  increased  DUI’s  bargaining  position.  The  “Badinter 
majority”  is  a  system of qualified majority,  where the decisions  are taken by the absolute 
majority (which might be the ordinary or 2/3 qualified majority in the assembly) within which 
the majority of the representatives of national minorities must be included. The issues to be 
decided by the “Badinter rule” are defined by the OFA agreement and by the constitution, the 
council for inter-ethnic relations being given the power to decide in case disputes about the 
procedures arise. As it was a source of continuous conflict between Macedonian and Albanian 
political elite, the question was recently settled by the Law on the Committee for the Inter-
Ethnic  Relations  (adopted in  2007),  prescribing  a  list  of  more than 40 laws requiring  the 
double  majority  (see the  section on the  minority  rights).  The conflict  still  persists,  as  the 
process of ethnicization of politics as a main source of power for the Albanian leaders induces 
the  ethnic  minority  to  maximize  its  requirements  (the  “May”  agreement,  which  further 
increases the autonomy of the Albanian minority, is an illustration of this trend that brings 
under  continuous  reexaminations  the  “political  agreement”  upon  which  Macedonian 
democracy  should  resign).  Rather  than  creating  consensual  democracy,  the  power-sharing 
mechanisms  introduced  into  the  Macedonian  political  system appear  to  contribute  to  the 
institutionalization  of  ethnicity,  exposing  Macedonia  to  the  never-ending  problem  of  the 
ethnic divisions with negative effects produced on democracy by nationalism174. 
172 See Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006. 
173 The more votes of “the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia” a single party controls,  the stronger is  such party's  bargaining power in all  issues 
requiring the Badinter majority. 
174 On OFA, power-sharing mechanisms, May Agreement and their impact upon the inter-ethnic conflict in 
Macedonia, see Lebamoff and Ilievski, 2008.
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As “consensus” became impossible to reach (seen the incentive of ethnic Albanians to 
maximize their  requirements)  and “control” was neither  an acceptable nor possible  policy 
option, Macedonia was left with nothing but “exchange” as one of the three mechanisms that 
according Hislope can ensure the inter-ethnic peace. Indeed, in his work about the “causes of 
the  inter-ethnic  peace”,  Hislope  (2003)  identifies  the  “exchange”  in  the  “informal, 
spontaneous self-interest of political actors and everyday people who find cooperation and 
exchange  more  beneficial  than  confrontation”  (Hislope,  2003,  p.  6),  and  corruption  and 
clientelism in the mechanism used by the elite “to grease the wheels of inter-ethnic coalition 
government”  (idem,  p.  10).  Corruption  therefore  became an  “accommodating  device that 
helps otherwise implacable foes maintain cordial relations” (idem, p. 10). 
The nationalism and the ethnic rhetorics were used to move the decision-making process 
from the  assembly  and  public  to  closed  doors  behind  which  to hide  the  logrolling  deals 
between the narrow elite dividing the spheres of interest. The ethnicization of the issues is 
used by the political elite, both Albanian and Macedonian, to legitimize the exclusion of other 
groups from the decision-making process.  In the name of the “peace and stability  of the 
country” and in order to “find a solution for the difficult problems of vital interest for the 
ethnic groups”, the few leaders distribute the state resources among themselves in “back hall” 
agreements175.  This  brings  to  a  dislocation  of  power  from the  institutions  to  the  narrow 
political  elite,  the  narrow  leadership  of  the  political  parties  becoming  the  centre  of  the 
decision-making  process176.  Similarly  to  what  was  registered  in  Serbia  (only  realized  with 
different  mechanisms),  here again we find the  principle  of  the  “rule  of  deal” replacing  the 
principle of the rule of law. Linked with this is the parallel politicization of those institutions 
that, as we will see in the single sections dedicated to judiciary, police, administration, takes 
place at all levels and derives from the perception the winning parties have on the state and 
the state resources. The state institutions, their financial resources, powers and administration 
all serve the party and its leading personnel, to be used for partisan or personal needs. The 
institutions become an instrument of the party, an instrument for partisan goals, and a mean 
for side-payments to the party members through the recruiting of the staff by partisanship 
criteria177.  The  politicization  of  the  institutions  and  the  spoiled  system are  present  in  all 
spheres, on local and central level, from the schools to the judiciary and security, representing 
175 See Dimitrova, 2004, pp. 173 – 174.
176 See Hristova, 2005, p. 114.
177 See Hristova, 2005, p. 115.
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the most often criticized characteristic of Macedonia’s fragile democracy178. The poverty and 
high  levels  of  unemployment  induce  the  citizens  to  trade their  political  participation  and 
electoral vote in exchange for the solutions of their existential problems and for a job in the 
state institutions179. 
It is important to underline that while the power-sharing and its central characteristics like 
strengthening of the political elite, bargaining between the leaders of the participating ethnic 
groups, the deference to those leaders on the part of each group’s ethnic rank-and-file, the 
bureaucratic appointments are considered by some authors (like Lijphart) as the key towards 
the inter-ethnic peace, Macedonia is lacking some of the prerequisites that according to the 
same author are the bases for the power-sharing. Differently from what is recommended, in 
Macedonia there is an economic disparity between the ethnic groups180, there is no external 
threat common to all groups (even though, as we will see, the foreign policy and prospective 
EU and NATO membership had played a role of unifying the divided elite),  there are no 
overarching loyalties that reduce the exclusiveness of ethnic attachments (see the section on 
constitution) and, most importantly, there is no prior tradition of compromise181. 
As  we  will  see  in  the  conclusive  chapter,  the  introduction  of  the  power-sharing 
mechanisms in Macedonia,  resulted in the further ethnicization of  the  politics,  increasing, 
instead  of  calming,  the  ethnic  identifications  and  salience  of  the  inter-ethnic  conflict. 
Moreover, it strengthened the political elite whose power is over the limits of the democratic 
practices, allowing them to successfully avoid any mechanism of the accountability. Far from 
the  “deference  to  the  political  elite  on  the  part  of  each  group’s  ethnic  rank-and-file”,  in 
Macedonia  the  social  discrimination  follows  the  party  lines182 (rather  than,  as  it  could  be 
expected, the ethnic lines) where the strength of the personal ties with the ruling party is a key 
to success and development, and for many ordinary citizens, the only mean to survive a deep 
economic crisis.
Seen that the clientelism is a key feature for success, we register a strengthening of the 
“old”,  well  established  parties  (with  already  established  relations  with  the  business/lobby 
178 The politicization has been identified as the main problem Macedonia is facing in a series of interviews 
with Macedonian scholars and representatives.
179 As Hristova underlined in the e-mail interview, the parties are turned into an employment office. 
180 A very interesting study illustrating the disparities of the economic opportunities between Macedonians 
and Albanians can be found in the report of the European Stability Initiative for 2002, “Ahmeti’s village, the 
political economy of inter-ethnic relations”.
181 For the list of the characteristics of power sharing and for the factors favoring the power-sharing, see 
Lijphart, 1990, pp. 497-498, in Snyder, 2000, p. 329.
182 Hristova, 2005.
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groups),  followed  by  the  increasing  stake  in  the  electoral  competition.  The  rubber-stamp 
national  assembly,  the  prevailing  of  the  executive,  and the  bargaining  for maintaining  the 
power under any condition (which produces the frequent re-shuffles of government with the 
relative stability of the main partner) all are consequences of such settlement. In the case of 
Macedonia, and particularly (but not exclusively) in the case of the ethnic Albanian parties, 
serious breach of the electoral rules, electoral campaigns sometimes coupled with violence, use 
of  threat  (in  some cases  even  threat  with  violence)  for  pursuing  personal  interests,  often 
boycott  of  the  assembly,  and,  most  dangerously,  the  use  of  the  ethnic  rhetorics  and 
nationalism in order to keep support, are no surprise in an environment devastated by the 
economic crisis and, more importantly, the “unaccountable” political elite. 
The influence of the political parties in all spheres of life combined with an electoral system 
favouring  small  parties  and  settling  low  thresholds  for  the  new  entries183 represents  an 
incentive  and opportunity for the fragmentation of the party system we mentioned at the 
beginning of this section, a process registered not only in the periods prior to the elections, 
but with equal intensity present in the time between two election rounds184. The fragmentation 
is produced by both the creation of new and, more often, “old” parties splitting when, due to 
the  lack  of  democratic  procedures  within  the  parties,  the  internal  disputes  are  solved  by 
“exiting”.  In the periods between two elections this  often happens with the parliamentary 
parties, resulting in the re-coloring of the assembly (when few deputies leave the party to form 
a new one) and sometimes in the consequential reshuffling of the governments. As Gaber-
Damjanosvka and Jovevska stressed, “these regroupings and frequent transfers of MPs from 
one party to another determine a very different assembly composition at the beginning of its 
constitution, up until the moment of starting the elections. Shifts of this kind may not be 
explained as ideological differences within the parties, or by conquering a new ideological area 
not  yet  covered  in  the  left/right  party  scale.  Instead,  the  impression  is  that  personal 
disagreements  between  party  colleagues  are  solved  in  this  manner”185.  The  fragmentation 
without ideological diversification makes it difficult for the small parties to gain significant 
electoral  support  (registered by  Saveski  as  an “anomaly”),  pushing  them to seek electoral 
coalitions  with  one  of  the  two  larger  parties.  This  finally  results  in  the  asset  where  the 
elections produce clear majorities in the parliament and “bi-partisan” dynamics in the periods 
183 Saveski, 2005.
184 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006.
185 See Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006.
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of stability of the blocks (we mentioned this bi-partisan dynamics when analyzing the powers 
available to the president), but at the same time represents a source of institutional instability 
that, according to Mirčev, is a “fundamental, regressive characteristic of Macedonian electoral 
democracy” (Mirčev, 2005, p. 4). 
5.2.3. DEVELOPMENTS
In the development of the Macedonian parliament we can notice how, while  the main 
features  described  above  have  not  changed,  its  functionality  and  transparency  appear 
significantly increased over these years. Of particular importance was the adoption of new 
rules of procedure that entered in force with the fourth legislature, introducing a series of 
sanctions and rules aiming to discipline the deputies and to increase their participation to the 
assembly sessions. Being introduced as a necessity deriving from the Framework Agreement 
(in order to regulate the matters of use of the Albanian language and Badinter majority), the 
adoption and changing of  the rules  of  procedure  turned into a  particularly  difficult  issue, 
mainly due to the different interpretations of the Framework agreement offered by the two 
ethnic groups. The rule of procedure also introduced three new committees: the Committee 
for the Inter-Community Relations, the Committee for the Fight against Corruption and the 
Committee for the EU Integrations,  and provided for the inclusion and regulation of  the 
double majority principle established by the Ohrid Framework Agreement. 
The fourth legislature saw not only the entering in force of the new rules of procedure, but 
was  also  marked  by  positive  developments  concerning  the  transparency  and  legislature 
cooperation with the civil society. In collaboration with the association named MOST, a series 
of programs aiming to strengthen the parliament and ensure its cooperation with the civil 
sector were initiated and put in place (collaboration is still  taking place).  Among the most 
important initiatives in this cooperation are the opening of the office for the contact between 
the NGO and assembly in 2004 and the creation of the judicial resource center in 2004, which 
made more than 1000 legislative acts and official documents available online. Programs for 
organizing the meeting between deputies and citizens were organized as well.
Recently, the process of changing the rules of procedure came again onto the agenda, the 
main goal being the increase of the assembly’s efficiency and the settling of the blockage of 
the assembly created due to the negative political climate. The crucial issues in adopting the 
new rules of procedure concerned: the use of Albanian language by the chairs of committees 
(still not regulated), the definition of the issues to be adopted by the double majority (here 
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again the conflict is between the minority and majority, as each side is pushing for its own 
interpretation of the Framework agreement), and the shortening of the time for discussion (an 
issue that  would increase the  government’s  possibility  to “defend” the  agenda and would 
strengthen the  government,  strongly  criticized  by  the  opposition).  The  proposal  was  also 
advanced by the VMRO during their government with DPA in 2006-2007, according to which 
the number of the seats in parliament shall be increased in order to grant the mandates to the 
less  represented  national  minorities  (Serbs,  Turks,  Romas,  etc.)186.  The  logic  behind  such 
proposal of the ruling majority consisted in the effort to neutralize the blocking impact that 
the combination of the Badinter rules and the characteristics of the Albanian party sub-system 
created.  By  introducing  the  seats  for  the  members  of  the  minorities,  the  number  of  the 
necessary Albanian votes for the Badinter majority would decrease to nine, giving the veto 
power to the Albanian minority, but not to a particular Albanian political party. The decision 
was  obviously  strongly  criticized  by  DUI,  who  is  currently  enjoying  the  veto  power  in 
Macedonian assembly, and who succeeded in obstructing the introduction of such practice.
The new rules of procedure were adopted in July 2008, prior to the voting of the new 
government, in a seating of the assembly where no representatives of the opposition were 
present. The new rules of procedure further strengthened the possibility for the government 
to control the legislative process, as the time for discussion of the deputies is further limited, 
while the deputies are supposed to apply for discussion 24 hours before the session begins. 
The procedure of the appointment of the government is  shortened to one day, while  the 
discussion over the budget can not last more than 3 days. The control of the parties over the 
deputies appears slightly decreased, as the rules prescribed that the assembly can decide to use 
the secret ballot on any issue (unlike previously, when the secret vote could be required only 
for appointment procedures).  If  implemented,  this provision might undermine the parties’ 
control over the deputies. The issue of the use of Albanian language was not regulated, and 
the support of DUI was achieved only due to the promises that the Law on the Languages 
would be adopted (it was, indeed, adopted few days later).
186 On the status of the minority deputies as a part of the current Macedonian dilemmas see Gaber and 
Jovevska, 2008.
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5.2.4. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND MACEDONIAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT
As we saw, there were no significant changes in the functioning of Macedonian assembly, 
except the change of the rules of procedure in 2002 and 2008 and the implementation of the 
programs initiated in collaboration with the NGO named MOST.
The  developments  in  this  field  were  not  subject  to  conditionality  until  the  last  EU 
accession partnership where, due to the blockage in the assembly’s work, the required reforms 
were  obstructed.  While  in  the  previous  reports  the  Macedonian  assembly,  except  for  the 
political  disputes  among  parties  and  criticisms  to  the  electoral  procedures,  was  given  a 
generally  positive  assessment,  in the 2007 report  we find criticisms against  the institution, 
concerning the failure to clarify the use of the Albanian language by the chair committees, the 
and in the following 2007 accession partnership we find the requirement to “enhance the 
capacity of parliament, notably by increasing its resources.”
However, the international actors exercised a significant  indirect  impact on some negative 
developments  in  Macedonian  assembly.  As  we  already  saw,  the  prevailing  of  the  ethnic 
cleavage in shaping the party system and the further ethnicization of politics brought to the 
structural  inefficiency  where  the  decision  making becomes a  privilege  of  the  narrow elite 
circles engaged in the back-hall bargaining over the division of the state resources. According 
to some authors,  the Ohrid Framework agreement and the insistence on compliance  with 
OFA  partially  contributed  (but  surely  not  created,  seen  that  since  its  independence  the 
Macedonian elite had such elitist, untransparent approach to the policy making) to the further 
ethnic  institutionalization  and  strengthened  the  tendency  to  “ethnicize”,  while  its 
accommodation reinforced the already existent political practice of deal-making away from the 
public scrutiny187. The ethnically based institutions, where the “power sharing” between the 
ethnic groups and decentralization are envisaged as a basis for facing the inter-ethnic tensions, 
creates the possibility and incentivize a further ethnicization of the issues as, instead of over-
passing the ethnic distinctions, they become built in the political system188. Moreover, even 
though the official requirements were not made, the EU significantly pressed for the ethnically 
based key in the government formation: already in 2006, the EU was suggesting to VMRO to 
include in its government DUI, as an electoral winner from the Albanian block, promoting a 
187 Dimitrova, 2004, Vankovska, 2002. On the ethnic institutionalization, see Bieber, 2002, 2003. On this, for 
example, Vankovska would claim that the ethnicization of the problems is a mean used by the politicians when 
their constituencies bring their accountability into question. See Vankovska, 2004. On Macedonian constitutional 
design and built-in power-sharing mechanisms, see Maleska, Hristova and Ananiev, 2007.
188 For a criticism of Linz’s argument over the possibility to use power-sharing, federalization and creation of 
multiple identities as a mean of fighting back the nationalism, see Goio, 2008.
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solution similar to the ones typical for the non-territorial ethnic federalism189. What was not 
done in 2006 came in 2008, when DUI made a strong campaign requiring “respect for the 
Albanian  vote”.  This  brought  to  a  coalition  that  even  though  can  not  be  labeled  “non-
ideological”,  seen  the  low level  of  the  ideological  distance  between  Macedonian  political 
parties, was however judged as “impossible” seen the high level of animosities and a long 
history  of  conflict  between  the  two  parties.  Finally,  the  necessity  to  bring  the  domestic 
legislation in line with the international standards, the pressure to introduce the reforms within 
the  pre-established time frame and the harmonization of the domestic legislation with the 
acquis all further contributed to decrease the role of the assembly in the legislative process 
(interview with Klekovski, August 2008).
On the other hand, the international actor also contributed to some positive developments 
we registered, mainly through the socialization channels.  The parliament was exposed to a 
series of potential situations for socialization in the western norm and value, increasing the 
learning  possibilities  and  fostering  the  introduction  of  the  best  practice.  As  an  indirect 
influence of international actors we can include the very actions of the association MOST, 
because even though a domestic  NGO, MOST is  almost completely  financed by external 
donors, mainly NDI, USAID, Canadian government, even if some of its activities (in the field 
of electoral monitoring) are sponsored by OSCE and government of the EU members states. 
Secondly, the NDI was also directly involved in the process of socialization of Macedonian 
assembly  by  supporting  the  assembly  with  a  manual  for  the  deputies  and  by  organizing 
courses for deputies on the assembly duties for each new legislature.
The Macedonian assembly’s delegations took part to a number of international forums, the 
most important among which are: The Council of Europe’s assembly, the OSCE assembly, 
Interparliamentary  union,  CEI,  NATO’s  assembly,  Francophony,  European  Parliament, 
Western European Union. It also has well developed bilateral cooperation with the assemblies 
of  different  countries.  Linked  to  this,  we  shall  underline  the  activities  of  the  Venice 
Commission, whose experts were engaged in the process of assessing many of the adopted 
laws, the very assembly’s rule of procedures included.
189 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006.
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5.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
In the previous paragraphs we described the forms of government and party systems of the 
two studied countries and described the mechanisms that hampered democracy in their cases. 
In both Serbia and Macedonia, the politicization, corruption and dislocation of the decision-
making from the state institutions  to the undemocratic  leadership of political  parties took 
place. In Serbia’s case, the entire constitutional design of the balance between the executive 
and legislative is modified by the establishment, institutionalization and legitimization of the 
political party’s control over the mandate. Combined with the unsatisfactory solutions in the 
Law on the Conflict  of Interest  and the lack of  its  implementation,  such practice further 
strengthened  the  narrow  political  leadership  of  the  ruling  parties.  The  lack  of  other 
mechanisms of horizontal accountability (lack of an independent judiciary for example, and 
the  lack  of  politically  independent  institutions  and  state  bodies),  the  lack  of  democratic 
practices  within  parties  and  the  polarized  pluralism  system,  combined  with  the  external 
influence on the distribution of power limiting the electoral accountability, all contributed to 
what Pešić labeled “state capture” and “feudalization of the government”. 
The state capture  is  a  characteristic  underlined by  many authors as  the  key  feature  of 
Macedonia  as  well  (see  Hislope  2002,  Labovik  2005,  Hristova  2005).  However,  the 
mechanisms of state capture in Macedonia differ from the ones we found in Serbia, the key 
problem in the Macedonian case being the ethnicization of politics bringing to a very difficult 
reach of  national  consensus  between the  majority  and the  Albanian  ethnic  minority.  The 
Macedonian constitutional design, especially after the 2001 ethnic violence, included some of 
those mechanisms that were aiming to ensure peace and stability through the principles of 
power-sharing.  As  we  will  see  in  this  work,  the  entire  EU  activity  in  Macedonia  was 
concentrated  on  supporting  the  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement.  Unfortunately,  such 
mechanisms made the ethnic division a profitable electoral strategy to follow, bringing the 
fragile consensus, on which the Macedonian democracy resides, under continuous pressures. 
In  this  light,  the  “May  agreement”,  the  continuous  proposals  to  re-examine  the  electoral 
system,  as  well  as  the  recent  debates  over  the  introduction  of  some  kind  of  collegial 
presidency based upon the ethnic key, all makes it difficult to find a basis for Macedonian 
peace  and stability  over  the  “consensus”  mechanism described  by Hislope.  The decision-
making  process  is  therefore  a  victim  of  the  “vital  ethnic  interests”  covering  the  narrow 
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personal interest of the ruling elite. The final outcome is similar to what we had in Serbia, with 
the rule of law being replaced by the rule of deal.
Being  the  inner  politics  a  delicate  issue  to  deal  with,  the  matters  concerning  the 
constitutional  design  were  not  subject  to  the  explicit  EU conditionality,  even  though  in 
Serbia's  case the imperative mandate was strongly criticized by both the EU and the CoE 
experts.  The  EU  democracy  promotion  strategies  in  this  field  mainly  concentrated  in 
promoting the transparency, efficiency and offering financial support through the socialization 
channels. The low conflictuality of these issues favoured the rule adoption, transparency and 
the institutional capacity of the institutions in both countries scoring positive developments.
Table 1: “Form of government and IA’s activities in Serbia and Macedonia”
Serbia Macedonia
Form  of 
government, 
party  system, 
government 
formation.
Transparency, 
efficiency, 
capacity  of  the 
government  and 
assembly.
Form  of 
government, 
party  system, 
government 
formation.
Transparency, 
efficiency, capacity 
of the government 
and assembly.
IA  promoted  the 
norms:
No  (it  rather 
promoted  the 
actors).
Yes. Yes  (power 
sharing).
Yes.
IA’s interest: Security. Democratization. Security. Democratization.
Channel of influence: Influence  on 
domestic 
distribution  of 
power.
Socialization, 
assistance.
Conditionality. Socialization, 
assistance.
Rule promoted by the 
IA adopted:
- Yes. Yes. Yes.
The  main 
shortcomings/proble
ms in the field:
Polarized 
pluralism, 
peripheral 
turnover,  lack 
of  inter-
institutional 
accountability,
Imperative 
mandate.
- Power-sharing 
mechanisms 
that 
institutionalize 
the  ethnicity 
and  incentive 
the  further 
ethnic division.
-
Assessment  of  IA’s 
impact:
Negative 
(strengthening 
the  impact  of 
the  polarized 
pluralism  due 
to choice of the 
strategy).
Positive. Negative 
(further 
ethnicization 
due to the IA’s 
content).
Positive.
In the introduction, we mentioned that the literature on Europeanization advanced a thesis 
according  to  which  the  process  of  the  European  integration,  due  to  the  necessity  to 
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harmonize  the  domestic  legislation  with  the  EU  normative  framework,  brings  to  the 
establishment of “speed track” procedures, this way producing a strengthening effect on the 
executive. In the two countries under exam, seen the already prevailing role of the executive, 
such impact, even if present, only served as an excuse for the already established practice of 
marginalization of the parliament. 
Finally, in Serbia’s case, we underlined the negative impact the use of the “influence on the 
domestic  distribution  of  power”  strategy  exercised  on  further  hampering  of  the  electoral 
accountability  and  on  modeling  the  short-term  preferences  of  the  central  actors.  In  the 
conclusion of this work we will underline how the prevailing of the security concerns over the 
democracy promotion tactics induced the EU to accept Serbian fake compliance. Similarly, in 
Macedonia,  the  unofficial  EU insistence  on  accepting  the  ethnic  key  in  the  government 
formation further strengthened the already existing  trend of  the  institutionalization of  the 
ethnicity. 
APPENDIX
Table 1: “EU priorities concerning the Serbian parliament”.
Report 2002: Constitutional reform. The efficiency of the parliamentary structures should be 
improved. Parliamentary procedures should be made more efficient. The reform 
of electoral laws in line with CoE and OSCE standards (which include, among 
other, the recommendation to cancel the articles ensuring party control over the 
mandates).
Report 2003: Revision of the constitution in line with the constitutional charter. Improved 
functioning of democratic institutions. More efficient parliamentary procedures 
and functioning. Improvement in administrative capacity at all levels of 
government. The reform of the electoral laws in line with CoE and OSCE 
standards (which include, among other, the recommendation to cancel the 
articles ensuring party control over the mandates.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
Table 2: “EU priorities concerning the Macedonian parliament”.
2007 EU partnership 
with Macedonia
Enhance the capacity of parliament, notably 
by increasing its resources.
2008 EU partnership 
with Macedonia
Enhance the capacity of Parliament, notably 
by increasing its resources.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 3: “Serbian and Macedonian form of government” (based on relevant legislation, author's elaboration).
Serbia Macedonia
Assembly
Number of chambers: 1 1
Number of deputies: 250 120-140
Permanent Committees: Yes. Yes.
Duration of mandate: 4 years. 4 years.
Veto power to the ethnic minorities (qualified majority on the 
ethnic grounds):
No. Yes.
Veto power to the political minority (qualified majority): Yes (absolute majority, 2/3 majority for 
constitution).
Yes: 2/3 majority.
Can be dismissed by: President + Prime Minister. Assembly.
Power to dismiss the president: Limited (veto to the CC). Limited (veto to the CC).
Power to appoint the government: Yes. Yes.
Vote of (mis)confidence: Yes. Yes.
Power to question the government and its members: Present. Present.
Interpellation: Present. Present.
Obligation of government to submit regular reports to 
assembly:
Present. Present.
The mandate belongs to the: Party. Deputy.
President
Election: Directly elected. Directly elected.
Mandate (duration and limitations): 5 years max 2 mandates. 5 years max 2 mandates.
Power to legislative initiative: Absent. Absent.
Power to convoke the session of assembly: Absent. Absent.
Power to influence the parliamentary agenda: Absent. Absent.
Power to veto the bill: Limited (simple majority over votes the veto). Limited (simple majority over votes the 
veto).
State of emergency: Present (1991).
Limited by the veto of PM and President of 
assembly (2006).
Present.
Powers during the state of war/state of emergency: Rule by decrees (1991).
Rule by decrees together with PM and President of 
the assembly (2006).
Power to dismiss and appoint the 
government. Government has the 
powers to rule by decrees during the 
state of war/emergency.
Special powers in the field of the foreign policy: Limited (appoints the diplomats together with PM). Present (appoints the diplomats).
Power in budget design: Absent. Absent.
Power to dismiss the assembly: Limited (PM veto). Absent.
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Power to appoint the candidate for PM: Present (limited by the necessity to consult the 
parliamentary majority).
Present (limited by the necessity to 
consult the parliamentary majority).
Power to dismiss the government: Absent. Absent.
Powers in the security sector: Position of the Commander in Chief. Position of the Commander in Chief.
Government Type of government (majority large, minimal, minority 
government):
Large majority 2001-2002.
Minimal majority 2002-2003.
Minority government 2004-2007.
Minority government 2008 -.
Large majority (inclusion of the Albanian 
ethnic minority).
Type of government (according to the composition): Multi-party (coalitional) government. Coalitional (intra-ethnic coalition) 
government.
Government duration (in months, change of the prime 
minister is calculated as the change of government):
30.3 (since 2000). 30.4 (since 2000).
Government duration (change of the coalitional partners as the 
change of government):
18 (since 2000).
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Table 4: “The form of government development in Serbia, external factors” (author's elaboration).
Issues concerning the transparency, 
efficiency, institutional capacity
 Issues concerning the balance of 
power, political system, imperative 
mandate
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps 
in the integration process took place? - -
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU a short-term priority or among the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA reports? Yes. -
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No. No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general:
10 millions (training for administration and 
MPs on the EU integration, Parliament 
functioning and acquis).
-
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU 
assistance to the country: - -
Reform perceived by the IA as: institutional capacity building.
internal affair (except for the 
imperative mandate, recently 
strongly criticized).
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. democratization
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power 
by the domestic stakeholders? - -
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it 
used in the law drafting? Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly. No.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to 
external criticisms?
- -
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance 
with the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in 
other ways?
- -
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Table 5: “The form of government development in Serbia, domestic factors”(author's elaboration).
Issues concerning the transparency, efficiency, 
institutional capacity
 Issues concerning the balance of power, 
political system, imperative mandate
Domestic input for the change: present (need to foster the efficiency). -
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: civil society, government for the efficiency. Weak - civil society.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low. High.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: - Rulers vs. Ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No. No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience. -
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: - Political parties, ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: - Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant 
actors? - -
Two or more alternative solutions present? - -
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of 
the central actors) - -
Table 6: “The form of government development in Serbia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
Issues concerning the transparency, 
efficiency, institutional capacity  Issues concerning the balance of power, political system, imperative mandate
The procedure of law drafting: - Away from the public.
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation: -
Imperative mandate, state capture, strengthening of the party control over the assembly, 
hampered parliamentarianism.
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies: - Political parties, ruling elite.
The status (2008): - Hampered parliamentarianism, state capture.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Strong critics of the imperative mandate and party control over the deputies.
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Table 7: “The form of government development in Macedonia, external factors”(author's elaboration).
Issues concerning the transparency, 
efficiency, institutional capacity
 Issues concerning the balance of 
power, political system, imperative 
mandate
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds?
Issues concerning the transparency, 
administrative capacity, efficiency and 
similar
The issues concerning the 
decision-making process, the state 
capture, the balance of power 
between institutions
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps 
in the integration process took place? No No
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? Yes -
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA reports? No No
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes No
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: no No
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU 
assistance to the country:  -
Reform perceived by the IA as: - -
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: part of the institution building process an internal matter, too delicate to tackle
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power 
by the domestic stakeholders? democratization security, diplomacy, strategy
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it 
used in the law drafting? - yes
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Yes yes
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to 
external criticisms?
Mainly no
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance 
with the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in 
other ways?
- -
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Table 8: “The form of government development in Macedonia, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
Issues concerning the transparency, efficiency, 
institutional capacity
 Issues concerning the balance of power, 
political system, imperative mandate
Domestic input for the change: Framework Agreement (requiring the redefinition of the parliament's rule of procedure). No substantial change.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Weak - civil society. -
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low.  
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: - Rulers vs. ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No. -
Type of the issue (salience - positional): - -
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: - Political parties, ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: - Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant 
actors? - -
Two or more alternative solutions present? - -
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of 
the central actors) Fluid. Fluid.
Table 9: “The form of government development in Macedonia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
Issues concerning the transparency, 
efficiency, institutional capacity  Issues concerning the balance of power, political system, imperative mandate
The procedure of law drafting: - -
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:  
The state capture, ethnicization of the politics, institutionalization of the ethnicity, 
corruption.
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies:  Ruling elite, political parties.
The status (2008): - -
The EU comment in the 2008 report: - -
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6. THE DECENTRALIZATION
“For the ordinary man is passive. Within a narrow circle  
(home life, and perhaps the trade unions or local politics) he feels  
himself master of his fate, but against major events he is as  
helpless as against the elements”
 George Orwell, 1940.
A  Serbian  sociologist  and  politician,  Svetozar  Marković,  underlined  that  “important 
interests of the state overlap with the interests of the people and municipalities, so that the 
whole country should be organized as the union of the free municipalities” (from Matić, 2006, 
p.  397)  already  at  the  end  of  the  XVIII  century.  The  procedural  conception  of  the 
representative democracy does not prescribe any particular territorial  design as a necessary 
condition for democracy.190 Yet, if we take into consideration other dimensions of the quality 
of democracy, like responsiveness (representing the outcome) or freedom and equality (the 
content of democracy), we can easily conclude that the decentralization is a mechanism that 
contributes  to  increase  the  quality  of  democracy.  In  the  representative  democracies,  the 
smaller the political unit, the bigger the influence of the single citizens on the election of the 
representatives and the closer the decision-making institutions to the citizens. In the small 
units the voice of the citizen is more easily heard, his preferences are more easily expressed, 
the participation is both easier and more attractive. Other things being equal, we can argue 
that in the smaller political units both the responsiveness and the accountability of the ruling 
elite increase thanks to the increase of the single citizen’s  power191.  The bigger democratic 
capacity  of  the  smaller  political  units  represents  one  of  the  core  liberal  arguments  in 
190 The discussion about the risks and benefits of centralization and decentralization was and still is rather 
vivid, and maybe the best approach is Sartori’s, according to whom the best solution is the one that best fits in 
practice, so we can argue that a particular territorial organization in the specific country can not and should not 
be  analyzed  outside  its  context,  each  country  having  its  own  best  solutions.  This  means  that  rather  than 
concentrating on a particular pattern of territorial organization as the best for democracies, we should assess the 
functioning of the institutions in practice, understanding how the government is organized in a specific country 
and comparing the outcomes of such solutions, not the solutions themselves. See Komšić, 2007.
191 Heywood thus brings the following four arguments for decentralization: 1) participation to political life; 2) 
opening of the institutions, increase of the democratic responsiveness and more direct contact with people; 3) 
legitimacy  of  government;  4)  freedom,  division  of  power  and  creation  of  a  net  of  checks  and  balances. 
(Heywood, 2004: 304-307, cited in Komšić, 2007, p. 219).
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underlining  the  benefits  of  the  decentralization  and  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  for  the 
development of democracy. The local government was identified as the “cradle of democracy” 
(Chandler  and Clark,  1995,  p.  767),  while  the  socialization  and educational  function were 
attributed to the local level politics, where the local democratic institutions are conceived as 
the place where the citizens are educated in democracy and the democratic participation. It is 
no surprise then that the international organizations engaged in the democracy promotion all 
included the recommendations concerning the development of the local self-government. 
The territorial organization and the distribution of power between the center and periphery 
were a core of interest  for many analyses. The conflict  between the center and periphery 
represents one of the four political cleavages identified by Rokkan and is seen as crucial for 
the  explanation  of  the  state  and  nation-building  process,  as  well  as  for  explaining  the 
dissolution of the states (see Bunce, 1999, 2006). It is then surprise that the decentralization of 
the central power, the high levels of autonomy and the strengthening of the units of the local 
self-government were advised as instruments for settling the intra-group (and in particular 
intra-ethnic)  conflict  in  those  contexts  where  the  demographic  distribution  offers  the 
possibility for territorial solutions based on power-sharing192. 
The heterogeneous societies, the nationalism developed due to the overlapping between 
the democratization and the nation-state building  process and the presence of  territorially 
concentrated ethnic minorities requiring the territorial re-organization brought to the situation 
where  in  both  Macedonia  and  Serbia  the  territorial  organization  of  the  country  and  the 
distribution of power between the center and periphery is a crucial dimension of the political 
conflict.  In  line  with  Linz  and  Stepan,  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  being  the  territorial 
organization in the two countries linked with at least two of the obstacles to the democracy 
consolidation identified by the authors, understanding the decentralization process is crucial 
for explaining the level of democracy established in the two countries. As we will  see, the 
national particularities that induced to the search for territorial solutions to the inter-ethnic 
conflict  brought  to  the  situation  where  the  international  and  domestic  experts’ 
recommendations in the field were often neglected or modeled by the intra-party and intra-
ethnic conflict. The different results we register in Serbia and Macedonia193 can be explained 
192 See  Malevska,  Hristova  and  Ananiev,  2007.  The  decentralization  and  federalization  as  one  of  the 
characteristics of the consociational model of democracy, advised for the socially heterogeneous societies by 
Lijphart (1984). 
193 In  this  dimension as  well  Macedonia  scores  positively  in  terms of  compliance  with the  international 
standards.
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mainly by the capacity of the militant Albanian minority in interpreting the decentralization as 
one  of  the  key  issues  of  Macedonian  peace  and  stability.  Consequentially,  the  prevailing 
opinion  that  decentralization  is  the  key  to  Macedonian  peace  will  bring  to  a  very  strong 
pressure and credible, decisive actions from the international community. 
6.1. SERBIA: CENTRALIZING EFFECTS OF DECENTRALIZING MEASURES
6.1.1. EARLIER PERIODS AND SOME SPORADIC CHANGES
The decentralized government and the autonomous, developed local self-government units 
were part of the old Serbian tradition. Their origins go back to the periods of the ottoman rule 
when the units of local self-government represented a kind of “compensation” for the lost 
statehood and, at the same time, were a basis from which the rebellions against the Turks were 
conducted. After the liberation and creation of the national state, the nation-building politics 
and the authoritarian tendencies of the Serbian leadership resulted in the centralization of the 
country and gradual dismantling of the previously existing system of local self-government. 
Near the end of the XIX century the national elite, inspired by the experiences of the French 
revolution, successfully pushed the ideas of decentralization forward. Put into practice, these 
ideas  resulted  in  the  decentralization  of  power  and the  strengthening  of  smaller  units  of 
territorial organization in the constitution of 1888. The system of government prescribed by 
this document also included the democratic principle of the election of the local legislative and 
executive  organs.  In  the  period  between  the  1888  constitution  and  World  War  II,  the 
distribution of power between the center and the periphery continuously oscillated between 
the tradition of the democratic local self-management and the centralistic tendencies of the 
more or less strong authoritarian national leaders194. 
The communist  regime,  after  a short  period of  centralization and establishment  of the 
power  during  the  40s-50s,  also  opted  for  decentralized  forms  of  government,  gradually 
increasing the autonomies of the different units of territorial  organization.  The process of 
decentralization undertaken by Tito had particular consequences on the territorial organization 
of  Serbia.  With  the formation of  the Communist  Republic  of  Yugoslavia,  the borders  of 
Serbia were redesigned, forming the Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia off those parts that 
194 See Matić, 2006, also Šević, 2005.
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in the kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were considered Serbian territory195. Further 
on, on the territory of Serbia two autonomous provinces were established, decentralizing the 
northern region of Vojvodina and the south-western region of Kosovo and Metohija196.
The  autonomy  of  the  two  provinces  constantly  grew,  to  reach  its  peak  in  the  1974 
Yugoslavian constitution,  that gave the 3rd-level  territorial  unit the status often enjoyed by 
those  units  of  highly  decentralized  federations:  only  defense  and  monetary  policies  were 
entrusted to the government of the Republic of Serbia. The provinces enjoyed the de facto 
decision-making power, had a “provincial government” and not only “the executive council”, 
had their “constitution” and not “statute”, had the control over the police and secret agencies, 
independent pension and health and other social funds197. 
The Serbian 1990 constitution significantly narrowed the autonomy of the provinces. The 
status of province was  granted to these territories due to their special national, historical and 
cultural  characteristics,  establishing  the  province  as  a  political/ethnic  rather  than 
administrative unit198. Their already narrow competencies were further limited during the '90s 
through the lack of implementation of constitutional liberties. As in many areas of policy, the 
1990 constitution left the distribution of competencies between different levels of government 
ambiguous. This allowed for the already centralistic constitution to be interpreted in an even 
more  “centralistic”  manner,  a  step  justified  by  the  necessity  to  fight  back  against  the 
secessionist aspiration of minorities. The ongoing conflict in Kosovo served as an excuse to 
suppress Vojvodina as well, where any request for larger autonomy was considered a sign of 
separatism. 
After the change of regime, the Vojvodina Hungarian minority, as well as Serbs aspiring to 
greater independence, increased the pressures for the re-establishment of the 1974 autonomy. 
The Law on the Autonomous Provinces was adopted in 2002 on the proposal of the Vojvodina 
province’s  assembly  and  it  is  still  in  force.  As  the  improvement  of  the  “constitutional  and 
legislative provisions concerning decentralization and the organization of local authorities and 
the autonomous regions199” was included among the conditions Serbia should fulfill in order 
195 Both Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina existed as territorial units until 1918, when the assemblies 
in the two countries voted their adhesion to Serbia. Macedonia did not exist as an independent territorial unit 
except for the ten-day long Kruševo Republic in August 1903, and it was associated to Serbia after the Balkan 
wars. 
196 See Simić, 2003.
197 See Simić, 2003.
198 We shall underline that a similar conception of the province was a basis on which the Vojvodina and 
Kosovo and Metohija have been designed as the autonomous provinces in the constitution of FRY in 1946. 
199 See CoE opinion No 239.
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to ensure the FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’s membership in CoE, the adoption of 
the  Omnibus  Law was  also  one  of  the  “steps that  surely brought Yugoslavia  nearer  to its 
membership to the CoE”200.
The Omnibus Law on the Autonomous Provinces was supposed to be just the first in a 
series of steps in a process that would bring Vojvodina to the levels of autonomy enjoyed in 
1974. Even if the law itself was limited in its goal and considered insufficient by the regional 
elite, its adoption in the Serbian national assembly was accompanied by a long debate and it 
was voted with very narrow majority,  obtained thanks to the personal commitment of the 
Prime Minister Đinđić (119 votes for, sufficient due to the fact that 14 deputies did not take 
part  to  the  assembly).  The  support  in  the  assembly  was  ensured  thanks  to  the  increased 
bargaining  power  of  19  Hungarian  deputies  who successfully  threatened  the  government, 
exchanging their support to the ruling coalition for the adoption of the Omnibus Law201. 
A similar pattern of decentralization/centralization cycles can be registered at the level of 
cities and municipalities. The 1990 constitution envisaged the municipalities as levels of local 
government,  granting  them the  regulative  power  in  what  was  known  as  the  “communal 
services” and (ambiguously unspecified) competencies in fields such as health, education, local 
media. During the Nineties the competencies and autonomy of the local governments were 
continuously undermined202, their already narrow autonomies being further reduced after the 
local elections in 1996. The victory of the democratic opposition in many municipalities and 
biggest cities turned the units of local self-government into strategic points for opposing the 
regime, so that, in response, the center strengthened the control and took those few powers 
previously enjoyed by the local elite away. 
While  the  constitutional  definition  of  the  municipalities’  competencies  only  slightly 
changed after the regime change, the interpretation of these competencies and autonomies 
was significantly broadened with the 2002 Law on Local Government, adopted due to internal 
(the local governments) as well as external (especially CoE) pressure. The necessity to urgently 
face the difficulties met in the functioning of the municipalities,  some being even close to 
bankruptcy,  the  promises  for  the  decentralization  that  were  the  core  of  the  democratic 
200 See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2002&mm=01&dd=28&nav_id=55888.
201 Savez  Vojvođanskih  mađara,  skupštinska  informacija,  09.  01.  2002,  http://www.  vmsz.  org. 
yu/sh/skupstinskeinfo/cikk. php?id=5, izjava Veselinova za javnost, 14. 01. 2002: Vlada neće pasti ako se ne izglasa 
omnibus.  http://www. mediaclub. cg. yu/dnevnevijesti/arhiva/2002/januar/22srb1. htm,  http://www. koalicijavojvodina. 
org. yu/arhiva/press/press_jan02. htm.
202 According  to  some  authors,  the  territorial  centralization  that  took  place  in  the  '90s  was  based  on 
Milošević’s need to exercise full control over all aspects of life, including, also, the control of the corruption 
channels established both on the level of the central as well as the local government. See Vuković, 2002.
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opposition  electoral  campaign  during  all  the  '90s  and  in  2000,  and  the  strong  domestic 
delegitimization of the existing status quo represented the inner inputs for the change. The 
inclusion  of  the  decentralization  among  the  conditions  for  the  CoE membership  was  an 
external factor that contributed to the rule adoption203.
The most visible improvements were registered in the field of the fiscal autonomy. During 
the '90s, in line with the centralization undertaken by Milošević, the local governments were 
made financially dependent on the revenues from the central budget, while their economic 
status was further undermined after 1996, when the right of municipalities to own property 
was abolished and property was seized by the central government. With the change of regime 
at  the  end  of  the  2000,  the  financial  situation  of  the  local  governments  improved.  The 
municipalities’ share in tax revenues gradually increased in 2001, 2002, 2004 resulting in the 
increase of the budget, while in 2006 the Law on the Financing of the Local Self-government 
and the constitution gave local governments the power to determine the rates of the property 
tax and to collect it, the power to raise direct revenues and to manage the public assets. The 
right to own property, after strong international pressures, was finally re-established with the 
2007 Law on the Local Self-government. Nevertheless, these positive legislative developments 
in the field of the fiscal  decentralization still  did not bring to a significant change, as the 
implementation is slow and difficult. The power given to the municipalities to collect taxes, 
due to the obstructions  from the central  government and administration,  was delayed for 
more than three years. The side legislation necessary for the property to be given back to the 
municipalities is still not in place. In the meantime, the municipalities are faced with serious 
financial problems: while the republican bodies are not interested in collecting taxes on behalf 
of  the  municipalities,  the  lacks  of  the  property  rights  hamper  the  development  as  the 
municipalities can not rise the favorable grants made available by the EBRD204.
Given the level of centralization introduced by Milošević during the '90s, it should be no 
surprise that the relation of accountability between the center and the periphery is biased in 
favour of the central government. The control exercised by the center was finally limited and 
regulated  in  2002  by  the  Law  on  the  Local  Government  which  increased  the  financial 
independence, but the 2005 Law on Government re-established the control of the center by 
giving the government the power to annul the local acts in case of suspect unconstitutionality. 
203 For  the comments  on the  draft-law,  see Simić,  2001.  For the  presentation of  the draft-law with the 
explanation of the principles guiding the adopted solutions, see Protić, 2001.
204 From the interview with the member of the Conference of the Cities and Municipalities, 21-07-08.
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The central government was also given the power to dismiss the municipal assembly in case it 
failed to call for a session in more than three months, or it failed to adopt the budget, and this 
provision,  combined with the effects  of the institutional  design of  the local  governments, 
became a source of political games between the ministry of local self-government, mayors and 
local assemblies.
6.1.2. THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM WITHOUT THE CHANGE
The Omnibus Law on the Autonomous Provinces, the Law on the Local Self-government 
and the other legislation introduced in the period 2000-2006 represented the ad-hoc answers 
to  the  urgent  problem  of  the  territorial  re-organization.  Both  the  domestic  and  the 
international  actors  believed  that  the  questions  of  the  local  autonomies  shall  be  solved 
through the constitutional reform, this way justifying the maintenance of the status quo and 
the  introduction  of  sporadic  changes.  The  unsolved  problem  of  the  Kosovo  status, 
Vojvodina’s  requests  for  autonomy  and  belief  that  decentralization  is  a  step  towards 
secession205,  combined  with  the  struggle  for  power  between  the  local  and  central  elite, 
contributed for the territorial organization to become one of the most salient and polarized 
conflicts  in  Serbian  political  life.  The  question  of  the  territorial  organization  blocked  the 
constitutional reform in Serbia, delaying the process until a series of circumstances resulted in 
the  decision  to  adopt  the  constitution,  which  leaves  the  questions  linked  to  the 
decentralization unsolved (see the section on the constitutional reform).
The failure  of  the  new “fathers  of  the  Serbian  nation”  to settle  the  disputes  on local 
autonomy  is  particularly  visible  in  those  parts  of  the  constitution  that  concern  the 
autonomous provinces. As stated by the Venice Commission, “this part of the Constitution 
seems  not  very  coherent.  On  the  one  hand,  there  are  generous  provisions  of  principle, 
including  the  right  to  provincial  autonomy  and  local  self-government  and  on  substantial 
autonomy of Autonomous Provinces, while on the other, these principles are not adequately 
guaranteed” (Venice Commission opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, 2007). 
As far as the division of competencies between the State, the autonomous provinces and 
the units of local self-government is concerned, the constitution adopted in 2006 also stayed 
ambiguous as the large autonomy expressed in principles is not filled with any substance.206 
The ambiguously formulated principle of subsidiarity in the Article 177 is combined with a list 
205 The dissolution of Yugoslavia is the example with which the advocates of centralization are arguing.
206 See the opinion of the Venice commission on the constitution of Serbia.
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of competencies of the autonomous province in the Article 183, some of which are also listed 
among the central government’s competencies. The goal of the provincial autonomy is neither 
precisely defined nor given adequate constitutional guarantees, leaving a matter to be settled 
through legal acts of lower rank207. The strong pressures coming from Vojvodina, together 
with the centralist tendencies of the center combined with a high level of conflict about the 
decentralization, makes such non-solution very destabilizing as every new ruling majority can 
decide to change the status of the provinces.
As a positive change, the 2006 document introduced (even though with weak guarantees) 
the principle of the fiscal autonomy, gave the province the right to use symbols, abolished the 
republic’s veto power and completely left the design of the AP’s system of governance and 
electoral system to the competencies of the AP. 
One of the most important changes introduced by the new constitution concerns the very 
meaning of the concept of autonomous province. The 1990 constitution conceived the status 
of the AP as a particular status to be  granted to Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija  “in 
accordance with  the  special  national,  historical,  cultural  and other  characteristics  of  these 
territories”.  No mechanism for setting up new autonomous provinces was envisaged. The 
category of the AP was conceived not as a mean for better management and governance, 
neither as an administration unit, but as an “ethnical” and “political” unit. In this light, the 
2006 document opens the possibility for another interpretation of the term. The constitution 
defines  the  AP  as  a  unit  of  territorial  organization  together  with  the  municipalities.  The 
citizens are given the right to provincial autonomy and self-government, the right that limits the 
state power and that can be subject  only to the supervision of constitutionality and legality 
(more about supervision of AP and municipalities in the next paragraph). It states that Serbia 
has two APs (Vojvodina and Kosovo), and envisages the procedure for the creation of new 
autonomous provinces as well as for the abolishment of the existing ones. The interpretation 
of the concept of the autonomous province thus changed from the status granted by the state 
to two particular regions due to their “historical and cultural” particularities,  to the  right of 
citizens to provincial autonomy. However, this shift in the understanding of the concept, even 
though embedded in the constitution, was not enough to allow the necessary regionalization 
in Serbia. The failure of the decision makers to allow the regionalization of Serbia, or at least 
to allow the creation of the APs on the territory of central Serbia, is one of the most serious 
problems underlined by the representatives of the local self-government. The status of the 
207 On the autonomy of Vojvodina in the new Serbian constitution, see Komšić, 2007.
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Autonomous Province, even though, as we saw, unsatisfactory for Vojvodina which aspired to 
the 1974 independence,  would allow the regions  of central  Serbia  access to the necessary 
resources for the regional  development.  The bigger discretion in the decision making, the 
bigger portion of the budget, and the bigger share in the revenues from the privatization208 
enjoyed by the APs would allow the municipalities to put in practice the development plans 
they  are  allowed to  adopt,  but  that  they  lack the  resources  to implement.  “Even though 
constitutionally granted, the right to provincial autonomy can not be exercised seen the still 
present  nationalistic  rhetorics  (mainly  due to the  experience  with Kosovo).  Any effort  to 
exercise  this  right and create  the  provinces  in  Central  Serbia  is  politically  impossible  and 
would be prevented from the centre by further using the nationalistic rhetorics”209.
The general  ambiguity  of  the  constitution  in  regulating  the  territorial  organization  also 
influenced the articles concerning the units of local self-government. Similarly to what it was 
like with the APs, here again the large autonomy guaranteed in principle is left unprotected or 
even  undermined  by  less  decentralizing  solutions.  The  relations  between  the  centre  and 
periphery remained ambiguous, combining the principle of the right to local self-government 
with  the  mechanisms  of  the  central  control.  The  municipal  assembly  is  conceived  as  the 
maximum  expression  of  the  constitutionally  granted  right  to  local  self-government,  a 
provision that will be later used to justify the abolishment of the directly elected mayor (see 
further). At the same time, the democratically elected municipal assembly can be dismissed by 
the central government under conditions left unspecified in the constitution, and its acts can 
be put out of force whenever the central government doubts their constitutionality and may 
remain suspended until the constitutional court decides upon them. 
In the matters concerning financial autonomy, the constitution again failed to guarantee the 
municipalities the right to own property and the right to taxation. The power to raise direct 
revenues  and  to  manage  the  public  assets  represented  a  novelty  introduced  by  the 
constitution. Among the new competencies we find the protection and improvement of human 
and minority rights, the power to establish municipal symbols and to decide on their use, as well as 
the power to prescribe sanctions related to the violation of municipal regulation. The Constitutional 
Law prescribed that other issues concerning the territorial organization were to be settled through 
ordinary legislation, to be adopted before December 2007. The Constitutional Law in particular 
208 The municipalities are given only 5% of the revenues from the privatization, while the AP’s share is an 
additional 50%, which then means that, from the privatization in central Serbia, 95% of the revenues go to the 
central level, while from the privatization in Vojvodina only 45% are left to Belgrade.
209 From the interview with Ćirkovićović, August 2008, Niš.
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required  the  adoption  of  the  new  Law  on  the  Local  Self-government,  the  new  Law  on 
Territorial Organization and the new Law on Local Elections. 
The 2006 parliamentary elections,  the difficulties  in the government formation and the 
status of Kosovo negotiations marked the period after the adoption of the constitution. In 
such politically  turbulent  period,  the  search for  political  consensus  over  one of  the  most 
controversial reforms in Serbia was very difficult.  After the government formation in May 
2007,  the  procedure  of  drafting  a  set  of  laws  concerning  the  reform  of  the  local  self-
government started off in the ministry for the local self-government. The interest groups, the 
Conference  of  the  Cities  and  Municipalities  of  Serbia  (a  body  representing  the  local 
municipalities) and the international consultants were all included in the drafting process. The 
law draft was supposed to be sent to the public debate in September 2007 and to be adopted 
in  October the same year.  The most severe debate concerned the  choice  of  the electoral 
system at the local level, as some political parties and the ministry involved in the drafting 
procedure were requiring the passage to the majoritarian electoral formula, while the others 
(like G17+) were pushing for the maintenance of the proportional system. 
Even though prepared in time,  the laws were not adopted as  planned,  the delay being 
mainly caused by the conflict over the scheduling of the presidential elections that divided the 
ruling majority. The legislation on the territorial organization became an instrument of the 
intra-party bargaining and was subordinated to the short-term strategies and preferences of 
the political elite.  The law proposals were re-written in order to ensure the support of the 
political stakeholders and the amendments and changes were introduced in the original drafts, 
making the adopted documents different from the ones submitted to the public discussion. 
The package of the laws introduced in 2007 brought some important changes. Complying 
with the strong international pressures, the legislator finally allowed municipalities the right to 
own property. The municipalities also gained power in the field of social protection and in the 
field of media (included the media in the national minorities’ language), while the cities were 
given control over the community police. Criteria for establishing the municipalities and cities 
based on the population size were prescribed, lowering the central level’s influence in granting 
the municipality or city status to the territorial units.
At the same time, this trend in the increase of the levels of the autonomy was followed by 
structural changes that annulled the effects of the decentralization process. First of all,  the 
2007  legislative  reform  did  not  bring  substantial  changes  in  the  central  government’s 
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instruments of control on the local government. The power to suspend the acts due to suspect 
unconstitutionality and the power to dismiss the local assembly were maintained. Further on, 
the 2007 Law on the Local Self-government introduced radical changes in the institutional 
design  of  the  local  level  governance,  modifying  both  the  mechanisms  of  the  horizontal 
accountability on the municipality level and the periphery-centre relationship.
The difficulties, experienced by many municipalities in handling the conflict between the 
directly elected mayor and a majority which was hostile to him in the municipal assembly, 
were used to radically  change the existing institutional  design based on the large executive 
powers of the directly elected mayor, dual executive and municipal council accountable to the 
assembly. With the 2007 legislation, the mayor is no longer directly elected, but is appointed 
by  the  municipal  assembly.  He  becomes  a  head  of  the  city  council  whose  members  he 
proposes to the assembly. The whole executive is made accountable to the assembly, while the 
executive competencies, previously enjoyed by mayors210 are shifted to the municipality/city 
councils.  The  Law  on  the  Local  Self-government  dismantled  the  previously  established 
balance  of  power  between  the  mayors  and  the  assembly.  It  introduced  the  clearly 
parliamentarian type of governance on a local level and strengthened the local assemblies as 
the institutions that “express the citizens’ right to local self-government” (Article 180 of the 
Constitution of Serbia).
While all municipal executive organs are made responsible to the assembly, the changes in 
the Law on Local Elections ensured that the deputies in the local assemblies are put under the 
control of the political parties. Following the Article 102 of the constitution, the Article 47 of 
the Law on Local Elections allowed the stipulation of the contract regulating the relationship 
between local deputies and the titular of the electoral list. At the same time the Articles 41, 42, 
43 and 48,  due to their imprecise formulation,  left the assignment of the mandates to be 
decided by the parties. The Law on the Local Self-government thus shifted all lines of the 
accountability on the local level to the assembly, while the Law on Local Elections turned this 
“highest organ” into an instrument in the hands of the political parties. The result is that many 
zones within the same municipality do not have a representative in the assembly, which then 
often results in the negligence of the interests of these zones, pushing the power away from 
the citizens.
210 In particular: implementation of the acts adopted by the assembly, initiative in proposing the acts to the 
assembly,  responsibility  in  implementing the  competencies  that  were transferred  from central  to  local  level, 
implementation of the budget, appointment of the heads of department in the local administration.
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This way, the central question of the accountability of local institutions becomes on one 
side the question of the relationship between the coalitional partners in the local government, 
on the other the subject of the dynamics of the party’s inner conflict between the central and 
local  leadership.  In  the  authoritarian  environment of  Serbian  parties211 this  situation  is 
favouring the narrow party leadership in the centre. The domestic annalists feared that the 
formation  of  the  local  governments  will  become the  subject  to  trade  in  the  government 
formation process on a national level. The events that marked the election of the mayors after 
the 2008 local elections, and in particular the events concerning the appointment of the mayor 
of  Belgrade  in  summer  2008,  are  clear  illustrations  of  “the  centralizing  effect  of  the 
decentralization reform” undertaken in 2007. The institutional/administrative decentralization 
of  the  powers  between  the  different  levels  of  government  was  combined  with  the 
centralization of the inner party- powers and the modification of the institutional design to 
reduce the impact of the reforms.
 6.1.3. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The  process  of  the  SAP  negotiations  and  democracy  promotion  in  Serbia’s  case  also 
included the promotion of the decentralization process and the strengthening of the units of 
local  government.  The  financial  support  of  the  EU and  CoE  made  available  to  Serbian 
municipalities played a crucial role in the development of the Serbian municipalities, brought 
by Milošević’s regime in a situation of severe financial austerity (see Table 4 in the appendix). 
As far as the conditionality is concerned, the credibility of the EU conditionality in the field 
was  hampered  by  the  EU’s  approach,  according  to  which  the  matter  was  linked  to  the 
constitutional reform (see for example the SAA reports). The consequence of such approach 
was  that  in  the  European  Partnerships  with  Serbia  we  do  not  find  explicit  priorities 
concerning  the  territorial  organization  of  the  country,  and  instead,  the  call  for  the 
constitutional reform was supposed to cover the territorial organization as well (see Table 3 in 
the  appendix).  The  legislations  adopted  during  the  period  2000-2006,  aiming  mainly  to 
provide the ad hoc solutions in order to manage the growing internal pressures, were prized 
by the EU, resulting  in  rather positive  assessments on the  developments  in  the field  and 
increased pressures for the constitutional reform. 
211 For the centralized, personalistic, almost authoritarian practices of the Serbian political parties, see Goati, 
2006. The party control from the centre and the weakness of the local branches of the party when facing the 
central  organization  have  also  been  registered  in  the  interviews  with  the  representatives  of  the  local  party 
branches undertaken in August 2008 by the author in the city of Niš. 
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When the long-awaited for constitution was finally adopted, it became clear that the elite 
was not able to overcome the differences on the issue, which then resulted in unclear articles 
about the territorial organization. Consequentially, the 2006 Commission report stressed that 
the  goal  of  the  territorial  decentralization  is  one  of  the  parts  of  the  newly  adopted 
constitutions that are subject to serious concern (for the detailed criticism of the provision on 
the territorial organization see the report of the Venice Commission).
At this point it is important to underline the crucial role the Council of Europe played in 
the adoption of the 2002 legislations. Including the Law on the Local Self-government as a 
necessary condition for Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)’s membership in the Council of 
Europe brought the issue of the territorial  organization onto the agenda. The necessity to 
bring Serbia’s legislation in line with the European Charter on Local-Self Government was 
also underlined by the government during the exposition in the National Assembly of the law 
proposal212.  The  positive  constellation  of  the  domestic  factors  ensured  the  smooth  rule 
adoption  and  the  compliance  with  the  international  standards.  The  technical  assistance 
provided by the CoE experts in drafting the legislation, the resources made available for the 
Serbian municipalities, the continuous monitoring procedure underlining the necessity for the 
shortcomings to be removed, together with the insistence that Serbia ratified the Convention 
on the Units of the Local Self-government, represented a crucial external support for pushing 
forward the decentralization process. 
 6.1.4. ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORMS
The process of decentralization in Serbia is one of the most difficult reforms to undertake, 
mainly due to the unsolved territorial issues the country is facing. Of particular importance is 
the  very  negative  experience  with  decentralization  in  former  Yugoslavia,  where  a  gradual 
decentralization undergoing since the '70s was identified as one of the factors that helped the 
dissolution  of  the  state.  In  a  multi-ethnic  state  faced  with  secessionism,  the  territorial 
organization easily becomes a matter of high-level politics. The Kosovo problem threatening 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  country  completely  blocked  the  reform  of  the  territorial 
organization. The few changes introduced in 2002 through the Omnibus Law on Vojvodina 
were a product of a delicate political moment in which, due to the conflict between the DSS 
and the DS, the Hungarian minority party’s support to the government became indispensable 
allowing the party to push forward the Law on Autonomous Provinces. Too high levels of 
212 Simić, 2001.
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conflictuality over the issue first caused a delay in the constitutional reform (see the previous 
sections) and hampered any effort to move away from the status quo. The constitution from 
2006 left the problem unsolved, and it still remains so. 
To the particularly negative domestic asset we shall add the lack of the international actor’s 
credible action in the promotion of the rule. As the territorial organization of the government 
is usually settled through the constitution, the international actor insisted on the more general 
constitutional reform. Moreover, the sensitivity of the question, seen its link with the Kosovo 
issue, contributed to make any promotion of the regionalization a sensitive political issue. 
As far as the units of the local self-government are concerned, some positive developments 
were  registered  and  a  series  of  legislative  acts  adopted  since  2000  slowly  and  gradually 
increased the powers, competencies and independence of the municipalities. However, as we 
saw,  the  stakeholders  at  the  centre  succeeded  in  keeping  control  even  after  the 
decentralization  reform.  The decentralization  that  saw the  power  moving from central  to 
local-level  authorities  was combined  with the  strengthening  of  the  party  control  over  the 
individuals occupying the position of the local authorities.
The international actors were more influential in the process of the strengthening of the 
local municipalities than they were in promoting the regionalization. The adoption of the Law 
on the Local Self-government, but also the introduction of the right to own property, can be 
counted as a success by the IA combined with the domestic change agents pushing for the 
reform and, in 2002, with the strong delegitimization of the existing status quo. However, the 
loopholes  in  the  2006  constitution  and in  the  Law on  Local  Elections  showed how the 
domestic actors can avoid the effects of the rules adopted by obstructing the implementation 
(the case of the financial autonomy) or by using the legislative loopholes to annul the effects 
of  the  introduced  change.  In  some  aspects  we  might  argue  that  the  legislative  changes 
introduced in December 2007 represented a step back, as instead of the narrow competencies 
of the institutions controlled by the citizens it introduced institutions with larger competencies 
and far lower democratic legitimacy.
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6.2. MACEDONIA: A KEY FOR THE INTER-ETHNIC (LACK OF) PEACE
6.2.1.  GENERAL PROBLEMS,  EARLIER PERIODS,  OFA  AGREEMENT AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES
The decentralization  and territorial  organization  in  the  multi-ethnic  societies  are  often 
strictly linked to the status and position enjoyed by the different ethnic groups. Such link is 
even stronger when the territorial concentration of the ethnic groups allows for conceiving 
decentralization as an inter-ethnic power-sharing mechanisms, and when the autonomy of the 
territorial unit becomes the synonym for the autonomy of the ethnic group. This was precisely 
the case in Macedonia, where the ethnicization of the debate over the decentralization made 
the political temperature rise almost to the point of new ethnic violence, threatening the entire 
process of peace-building. Consequently, as we will see, the involvement of the international 
community was crucial in ensuring that the disputing sides maintain their commitments. 
Even prior to the 2001 ethnic violence and the Ohrid agreement, the local self-government 
issue  in  Macedonia  attracted  the  attention  of  the  international  actors.  The  lack  of 
implementation of the 1995 Law on the Local Self-government and of the European Charter 
of Local Self-government (signed and ratified in 1997) resulted in strong criticisms expressed 
by  the  CoE in  its  reports.  The  failure  to  properly  put  into  practice  the  mechanisms  for 
accommodating  the  Albanian  ethnic  minority  as  envisaged  by  the  legislation,  the  lack  of 
financial  resources  and  the  growing  economic  pressure  on  the  Albanian  majority 
municipalities after accommodating the flux of the refugees in 1999, all these contributed to 
the escalation of the 2001 conflict. The decentralization and the greater local autonomy were 
among the main requirements from the Albanians during the armed conflict in 2001. Unlike 
decentralization as part of the administrative and public service reform aiming to meet the 
citizen’s  needs,  and  unlike  decentralization  as  a  reform bringing  the  power  closer  to  the 
citizens, unlike decentralization as a process of the re-distribution of power between the local 
and  central  elite,  in  Macedonia’s  case  decentralization  meant  power-sharing  between  two 
ethnic  groups.  Since  the  2001  violence  and  the  signature  of  the  Ohrid  agreement,  the 
decentralization became a key question in Macedonian political life and a core stone of the 
international activity and pressures in Macedonia. 
Disappointed with the failure to establish a multi-ethnic state in Bosnia, the international 
community became increasingly reluctant to the territorial autonomy requirements advanced 
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by the Albanian nationalist forces in the negotiations for the cessation of fire in 2001. Seeking 
the solution for the post-conflict  Macedonia,  some civil  principles,  values and approaches 
prevailed over the ethnic ones and the territorial solutions to the ethnic issues (prevailing in 
the Dayton agreement) were replaced by the effort to maintain the civic features of the state 
(see  Bieber,  2004).  The  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement  thus  underlined  that  there  are  no 
territorial solutions to ethnic issues, that Macedonia’s territorial unity can not be questioned 
and that the solution of the ethnic controversies are to be found through the empowerment 
of the local self-government (OFA, basic principles, 1.2 and 1.5). In line with the conception 
of  the  power-sharing  mechanisms  as  instruments  for  the  inter-ethnic  peace213,  the 
decentralization became a mantra through which the inter-ethnic tensions in Macedonia were 
to be solved. The autonomy of the units of local self-government was supposed to bring the 
decision-making  process  closer  to  the  citizens,  this  way  encouraging  the  participation  of 
citizens  to the  democratic  life  and allowing  the  local  development  and promotion of  the 
respect for the communities’ identity (see Dimitrova, 2004). 
Yet, as we will see, until the present days, the decentralization process did not bring to the 
settlement of the inter-ethnic tensions.  On the contrary, by building in the very OFA the 
instruments ensuring the ethnicization of the issue, the decentralization was, and continues to 
represent, a source and example of further institutionalization of ethnicity. 
The problems that marked the introduction of the constitutional amendments offered the 
first concrete demonstration of the difficulties that Macedonia will (continue to) face. Even 
though the  amendments  to be introduced were already agreed upon and precise  wording 
included  in  the  OFA,  even  though  the  political  parties  that  signed  the  peace  agreement 
enjoyed enough support in the parliament to ensure the adoption of the changes, still  the 
constitutional reform in Macedonia did not go as smoothly as predicted (see the section on 
the constitutional reform). 
The  constitutional  amendments  prescribed  by  OFA included,  among  others,  two  that 
concerned  the  territorial  organization  of  the  country.  The 14th amendment  related  to  the 
article  114  aimed  to  ensure  the  minority’s  veto  for  the  issues  concerning  the  local  self-
government,  territorial  organization,  local  finances,  local  elections  and  the  city  of  Skopje, 
while the 15th amendment related to the articles 115 and 117 gave a broader definition of the 
competencies of the local self-governmental units. The adoption of the Law on the Local Self-
government, Law on Local Finance, Law on Municipal Boundaries, with the general guideline 
213 See for example Lijphart, 1984, or Malevska, Hristova and Ananiev, 2007.
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principles for the content of the legislation and the time table for the reform, were all included 
among the central parts of the OFA’s annex B concerning the agreed legislative modification.
The electoral strategy of VMRO, which was then in force, contributed to the prevalence of 
the nationalistic rhetorics in the public debate dedicated to the ratification of the OFA and the 
adoption of the constitutional amendments. In such asset, even though decentralization was 
not the central point of the debate on ratification (see the section on the constitutional reform 
and the section on the minority rights), it was still mentioned as one of the issues rising the 
concern of the Macedonian majority. The main fears expressed during the public debate over 
the  constitutional  amendments  concerned  decentralization  as  a  possible  “step  before 
federalization”  and,  seen  the  “Balkan  experience”,  as  a  threat  to  Macedonia’s  unity, 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity.  What  Macedonians  feared  the  most  was  a  potential 
“Kosovo” in western Macedonia. 
6.2.2. THE REFORMS OF TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION
These  fears  of  decentralization  considered  a  step  short  of  territorial  disintegration  re-
emerged  a  few  months  later,  during  the  discussion  over  the  Law  on  the  Local  Self-
Government. The draft law was prepared by the Ministry of Justice, headed by the Albanian 
minority party, and represented an effort to maximize the relatively vague instructions built in 
the OFA. Beside the provisions concerning a transfer of the competencies in the health care 
and education policy areas to the local level, the Macedonian majority was also dissatisfied by 
the inclusion of the concept of “common administration”.  The “common administration” 
concerned the mechanism for cooperation and association of the local communities among 
themselves. While advocated as a solution for strengthening the local self-government and as 
a  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  financially  weak  communities,  it  was  perceived  by 
Macedonians as an instrument introduced by the Albanian nationalists with the aim to bring 
the  de  facto  regionalization  of  the  country.  Through  the  “common  administration”,  the 
concentration of the Albanian minority in the western parts of the country would result in the 
creation of autonomous territorial areas under the Albanian domination, which further on, 
through the scenario of pressures and possible violence, could advance the requirements for 
the federalization and cantonization. 
As the Albanian parties showed lack of will to seek for consensus, a new political crisis on 
ethnic grounds emerged. The international community was forced to mediate the negotiations 
and a special EU envoy was engaged to find an acceptable solution for both ethnic groups. 
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The inclusion of the rule adoption among the necessary (but yet not sufficient) conditions for 
the so long-awaited for donors conference contributed to the adoption of the law at the end 
of January 2002 (See Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2002).
The adopted law gave large competencies to the local self-governments in the fields of 
public services, culture, education, social welfare, health care, environment, urban and rural 
planning, economic development and local finance. Unlike the previous legislation, that did 
not give the local level any financial independence, it envisaged, in line with the OFA, that the 
Law on the  Local  Finance  would  be  adopted  in  order  to  give  the  municipalities  a  large 
economic  independence.  Seen  the  low level  of  development  and  the  lack  of  institutional 
capacities of the existing municipalities, it was decided that the newly assigned competencies 
shall be passed from the central to the local level in 2004. In the meantime, the Law on the 
Fiscal Decentralization, the Law on the City of Skopje, the harmonization with the sectoral 
legislation and, most importantly, the Law on the Municipal Borders, were to be adopted in 
order for the effective decentralization of power to become functional. 
Even though according to OFA the Assembly was supposed to “adopt a revised Law on 
Municipal Boundaries by the end of 2002, taking into account the results of the census and 
the  relevant  guidelines  set  forth  in  the  Law  on  the  Local  Self-government”,  the 
decentralization  process  was  postponed  due  to  the  unfinished  census  of  the  population 
(completed only in December 2003). This delay in respecting the schedule prescribed by OFA 
raised malcontent among the Albanian population and was used by the Albanian opposition 
parties for delegitimizing DUI (the Albanian party in the government). In the effort to gain 
support from the unsatisfied Albanian population, these parties used the nationalistic rhetorics 
to further ethnicize the problem and to accuse DUI for betrayal of the Albanian national 
interests. This increased the pressure on the Albanian ruling party by limiting its possibility to 
give concessions to its Macedonian counterpart and forcing it to increase its requirements214. 
The maximization of the Albanian requirements (the calls  for cantonization, federalization, 
Albanian right to self-determination and even threats of violence were heard) contributed to 
the  radicalization  of  the  Macedonian  positions,  nourishing  the  majority’s  fear  of 
decentralization. 
214 Yet, it is possible to argue, in line with the dynamics of the two-level game described by Putnam, that such 
situation  actually  increased  DUI’s  bargaining  power  towards  Macedonians.  The  argument  here  is  that  the 
pressure exercised by the Albanian oppositional parties, whichever its effect on DUI’s bargaining power, made it 
impossible for DUI to follow any logic other than the ethnical one.
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The  discussion  on  the  territorial  organization  was  thus  ethnicized  even  prior  to  the 
beginning of the discussion on the law, and it became perceived as the life-time opportunity 
for  pursuing  the  ethnic  and  party  interests  by  the  parties  involved  in  the  process.  In 
Macedonia, the Law on the Municipal Boundaries was seen as a mean to pursue the ethnic 
interests,  the  units  of  self-government  being  perceived  not  as  units  of  the  citizens’  self-
government,  but  as  units  of  the  ethnic  groups’  self-government.  The  whole  debate  on  the 
territorial organization was conducted on the grounds of what the party leaders claimed to be 
the interest of their ethnic group, the solutions being proposed and opposed only in light of 
their capacity to satisfy the “vital ethnic interests”.
Such  prevailing  of  ethnical  rather  than  political,  economic,  technical,  administrative 
concerns in the process was, at least partially, a consequence of the inadequate solutions built 
in  the  peace  agreement.  Even  though  the  OFA  prescribed  that  the  boundaries  of 
municipalities  shall  be  drawn by  the  local  and  national  authorities  with  the  international 
participation,  even  though  it  envisaged  the  local  self-government  as  the  civic  question  
concerning the principle of good democratic governance, the peace agreement, through some 
provisions, brought the demographic composition of the future municipalities to the centre of 
the debate on the territorial organization. It linked the law adoption with the census and its 
results and linked the language usage and the decision-making procedures on the local level 
with the ethnic composition of the community. Last, and most important, the application of 
the  Badinter  qualified  majority  to  the  adoption  of  the  laws  concerning  the  territorial 
organization “implicitly introduced organization as a key for the solution of the intra-ethnic 
conflict” (Malevska, Hristova and Ananiev, 2007, p. 33).
This way, to the almost inevitable partisan calculations (the incentive to drive the municipal 
borders in order to maximize the cross-municipalities distribution of electoral support), and to 
the  conflict  on  the  horizontal  distribution  of  power  between  the  different  levels  of 
government, the strategic usage of the nationalistic rhetorics and the implication the law had 
on the inter-ethnic balance of power were added, contributing to a situation in which the 
agreement over the municipal borders was almost impossible to achieve. 
The two largest Macedonian parties, the then ruling SDSM and oppositional VMRO, did 
not succeed in finding a common position, the main conflict between them being the size of 
the municipalities (SDSM required fewer bigger units, VMRO pushing for more smaller units). 
The VMRO, a party with an already pronounced nationalistic agenda, took the side of the 
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Macedonian citizens, who would find themselves as a minority in the Albanian municipalities, 
and as there was no agreement with SDSM, they strongly campaigned against the proposed 
solution. On the Albanian side, the ruling DUI had a problem with the other Albanian parties 
that were advancing extremistic requirements and that continued to criticize the government 
for  neglecting the interest of Albanians. Both the Albanian and the Macedonian opposition 
used the nationalistic propaganda in their effort to channel the malcontent to gain support.
After  difficult  negotiations  behind  closed  doors,  the  ruling  SDSM and DUI found an 
agreement over the draft proposal. “No experts on decentralization, public administrators or 
citizens were invited to take part to the talks” (Trajkovska 2004, p. 3), and “even members of 
the SDSM presidency were excluded” (Karakamiševa 2004b, p. 3). After the first meeting, “it 
became evident  that  the  discussion  on redrawing  the  territorial  boundaries  would  remain 
behind closed doors” (Dimitrova 2004). The municipal borders proposed by the draft strongly 
reflected  the  ethnic  conception  and  political  pressures.  Thus,  for  example,  following  the 
strong pressures made by the Albanian Diaspora on Ali Ahmeti, leader of the DUI, to pursue 
either  the  federalization,  or  at  least  an  increase  of  the  Albanian  minority  share  in  the 
communities of Struga and Kičevo215, the rural communities were added to these two cities in 
order to increase the percentage of Albanians. 
The draft law agreed by the government caused a reaction almost similar to a riot. The 
domestic  NGOs  and  experts  strongly  criticized  the  prevailing  of  the  ethnical  over  the 
economic and organizational criteria. They underlined that the proposed solutions failed to 
ensure  the  functionality  and  efficiency  of  the  local  communities  and  criticized  the  un-
transparent manner in which the law was drafted. Such procedure for the adoption of the law 
was claimed to be against the OFA (requiring the inclusion of the local  authorities  in the 
process of the adoption of the Law on the Municipal Borders), and also against the European 
Charter  on  the  Local  Self-government  that,  in  the  articles  4  and  5,  clearly  required  the 
consultation  of  the  local  authorities  in  the  decision-making process  for  all  matters  which 
concern them directly, and, explicitly, in the case of changes in the local authority boundaries. 
The  law  draft  was  put  on  public  discussion,  during  which  the  malcontent  of  the 
municipalities became evident. In both Kičevo and Struga, referendum on a local level were 
organized  and  the  Macedonians  expressed  themselves  against  the  law  (the  Albanians 
boycotted the referendum), but without success in influencing the political  elite’s  decision. 
The  opposition  parties,  trying  to  use  the  local  pressures  and  malcontent  against  the 
215 See Gaber – Damjanovska e Jovevska 2004.
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government, succeeded in getting a new turn of negotiations open, but no agreement was 
found.  The oppositional  VMRO was  requiring  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo in  the 
territorial  organization,  arguing  that  a  change would bring  to the  federalization,  while  the 
Albanian parties were requiring bigger and fewer units similar to those that existed in the 
socialist Macedonia. 
After  difficult  negotiations,  the  law  was  adopted  in  August  2004,  with  a  very  narrow 
majority in the assembly (61 out of 120 votes), succeeding to attract the support of the ethnic 
Albanians. The law prescribed the creation of 81 local communities, and was criticized to be 
designed on ethnical grounds and without taking in consideration the economy, landscape, 
urban-rural characteristics. Some of the adopted solutions undermined the functionality and 
development of  such even “unnatural” municipalities established by the law from the very 
beginning, according to the opposition. 
The result of the elitist approach to the rule adoption was an overspread malcontent, in 
Struga and Kičevo even a riot requiring action by the police. In no time the citizen’s initiative 
for the referendum to abolish the law was on the table. Unfortunately, the loudest criticisms 
against the bad solutions we described above did not concern the lack of a democratic process 
and/or the failure to adopt some more efficient solution based on civic principles. Ironically, 
it  was  the  oppositional  VMRO, unsatisfied  for  being  excluded  from the  decision-making 
process,  together  with  other  nationalistic  forces  to  ethnicize  the  referendum,  using  the 
nationalistic rhetorics to criticize the  borders drawn on ethnic principles. They claimed that 
the Law on Territorial Organization pushed the country into federalization and disintegration. 
Such thesis was easily defended by reminding the Albanian threats with violence and calls for 
the Albanian right to self-determination expressed prior to the rule adoption. The final stroke 
to the national pride of the nationalists was the decision to include the periphery communities 
into  the  city of  Skopje  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  capital  fulfills  the  conditions  for 
bilingualism.  It  was  no surprise  that  more  than  60% of  the  Macedonians  found the  law 
unacceptable, and thought that the law represented a threat to the partition of Macedonia 
(believed by 70% of Macedonians), a position that, according to the public opinion polls, in 
more  than 50% of  the  cases  was  influenced  by  the  media,  the  political  parties  and  their 
leaders216.
The reaction of the Albanians to the initiative for the referendum was equally violent. The 
legislation adopted was still preferred to the status quo, and, seen the distribution of power 
216 See Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2004.
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and preferences, any better solution would be almost impossible to obtain. In such asset the 
Albanians advocated against the referendum, some even threatening “serious consequences 
on stability and peace” if the law was withdrawn.
The referendum called for November the 7th 2004 was annulled due to the low turnout. 
Such a  result  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  international  actor’s  campaign  against  the 
referendum, of the strong pressures and conditioning on “Macedonia’s  future”, and,  most 
importantly, of the historic decision of the USA, brought on November the 4 th, to recognize 
Macedonia under its constitutional name217.
Thanks to the international intervention, the referendum smoothly passed and Macedonia 
was finally starting the implementation of the decentralization process. The first step to be 
taken was scheduling the local elections that would allow the formation of the bodies of the 
local  self-government,  local  councils  and  majors.  In  the  light  of  the  coming  increase  of 
competencies and fiscal autonomy, the local elections of 2005 represented an important stake 
for all participants, which was probably one of the causes inducing the political parties to use 
any mean available, irregularities and even violence included, in order to ensure their victory. 
In the part devoted to the electoral reform, we will see how it was precisely due to the political 
parties’ behaviour and serious breach of the electoral norms that the international community, 
again, was forced to intervene.
After the establishing of the elected bodies in the municipalities, the difficult process of 
implementation  started.  Lack  of  competencies  and  resources  and  the  incapacity  of  many 
municipalities to cope with the new powers were the main obstacles to the implementation 
process. Some municipalities were not even able to ensure the collection of taxes, and some 
were on the verge of bankruptcy. The lack of institutional capacity at a local level and the 
financial problems were significantly slowing the process down, especially in the field of the 
fiscal decentralization. 
As  far  as  the  results  are  concerned,  the  research  on  the  power-sharing  mechanisms 
between the different levels  of government undertaken by Maleska, Hristova and Ananiev 
showed that  unclear  and long bureaucratic  procedures,  combined with financial  problems, 
continued to represent a source of strong central  control  over the local  government.  The 
channels  of  communication  and  problem  solution  thus  follow  the  party  lines,  the  only 
municipalities successful in communicating with the central level being those whose mayors 
were from the ruling political parties. Such “strengthening of the party-state compromises the 
217 See Dimitrova 2004, Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2004.
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very idea of the decentralization” (Maleska, Hristova and Ananiev, 2007, p. 38). The mayors 
coming from the opposition, being obstructed in their work by the central government,  are 
induced  to  criticize  the  government  for  obstructing  the  decentralization,  a  tactic  often 
combined with the nationalistic rhetorics. For example, after being excluded from the central 
government in 2006, DUI used its mayors to press the central government, bringing to the 
ethnicization  and  politicization  of  the  issue.  By  obstructing  the  decentralization  process, 
hampering the implementation of the Law on the Local Self-government, marginalizing and 
pressing Macedonians in the municipalities with DUI majority, they succeeded in creating a 
new crisis that was solved, as usual, with the “difficult question of vital national importance”, 
in closed-door negotiations. The controversial “May agreement” was reached, apparently with 
the international community’s mediation (see the section on the constitution and the section 
on the minority rights, see also Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006).
6.2.3.  THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS:  A DECENTRALIZATION FROM 
OUTSIDE
The role  of  the  international  actors  in  the  decentralization  process  in  Macedonia  was 
decisive. The link between the decentralization and the inter-ethnic relations and its centrality 
in the peace-building process brought the territorial organization to the center of the attention 
of all actors involved, both domestic and international. 
Beside  the  official  conditionality  that  linked  the  implementation  of  the  OFA  to  the 
membership and integration in the various international organizations, an important role of 
the  IAs  consisted  in  their  endless  efforts  and  engagement  in  negotiation  and  mediation 
between the  ethnic  groups  in  all  phases  of  the  rule  adoption.  Strong  financial  incentives 
(decisive seen the serious financial austerity in Macedonia), as well as political incentives were 
used  as  rewards  to  be  immediately  delivered,  this  way  increasing  the  credibility  of  the 
international actor’s actions (see Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix). Beside the consultative and 
mediatory role  of  the  EU  representatives,  in  Macedonia’s  case  we  recall  the  donor’s 
conference that,  after  it  became obvious  that  the Law on the  Local  Self-government was 
increasing the ethnic tensions making the agreement difficult, was used to push forward the 
rule adoption. We also recall the strong message the EU sent to the Macedonians prior to 
their referendum on the Law on the Municipal Borders, and, last but not least, we recall the 
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importance of USA’s recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name 3 days prior to 
the referendum218.
The pressures were combined with significant material incentives and financial support for 
the process. The EU’s financial  assistance,  but also the World Bank,  UNDP, Sida,  DfiD, 
USAID, Australia, Finland, The Netherlands and Germany financed the projects aiming to 
help the development and strengthening the municipalities in order to prepare them for the 
obligations and tasks deriving from the increased powers. The decentralization was one of the 
biggest points in the CARDS budget dedicated to Macedonia, particularly in 2002, 2003 and 
2005,  when it  absorbed  more than 20% of  the  whole  CARDS financing.  The main goal 
concerned  the  building  of  the  local  infrastructure  and  the  building  of  the  administrative 
capacity  in  the  municipalities.  Such  collocation  of  the  resources  is  quite  in  line  with  the 
statement given by the EU’s special representative Alexis Bruhns during the crisis created by 
the lack of agreement over the territorial organization of the country:
 “EU is ready to pay for local community personnel training, to teach them how to implement 
the budget, to finance some equipment for the communities, but it is necessary to know the exact 
number of communities and which shall be their territory” (Utrinski Vesnik, 25 December 2003).
The role of the international actors in the process is well illustrated in Bruhns’ statement: 
what mattered was that the Ohrid Agreement and decentralization, perceived as a guarantee 
for peace and stability, were implemented as soon as possible.  This necessity to search for 
quick  solutions  guaranteeing  the  peace  in  the  country  induced  the  international  actors  to 
legitimize the bargaining and log-rolling approach of the Macedonian elite instead of pressing 
for transparency and more inclusive discussions. The concerns of potential destabilization that 
would derive from the failure to adopt the law and, further on, from the possible blockage of 
the referendum, induced the International  Actors  to tolerate the serious breaches of both 
OFA and the European Charter on Local  Self-Governments in the procedure of the rule 
adoption. This allowed the leaders of the ruling coalition to draft one of the most important 
legislations in the process of decentralization without taking in consideration the position of 
the local authorities (as strictly prescribed by the Articles 4 and 5 of the Charter on Local Self-
Government),  the  position  of  the  civil  society  and  the  advices  of  the  domestic  and 
218 It is important however to underline that in case of referendum, unlike with the elections, the international 
community remained mainly silent on the serious breaches committed by the government in order to bring to the 
annulment of the referendum. Thus, according to Slaveski’s testimony (2004), the employees of the ministry of 
labor and social welfare were sent to visit the users of the state’s assistance (granted to the poor) to threaten them 
that in case they go out to vote, they would see their state assistance cut away (p. 34).
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international  experts  (as  it  was  required  by  the  OFA).  As  Dimitrova  reports,  the  EU 
representative in Macedonia, Sheena Thompson, stated that she was constantly in touch with 
the coalition partners and gave advice if necessary, but “it’s all in the hands of the ruling elite.” 
When asked to address the exclusive and non-transparent nature of the discussion, the EU 
representative  answered:  “these  (the  coalition  partners)  are  the  chosen representatives  on 
behalf of the citizens” (situated in Dimitrova, 2004, p. 174). 
6.2.4. THE DECENTRALIZATION: ASSESSMENT
In the previous chapters we traced the process that brought to the adoption of the most 
important documents in the field of decentralization. It was, as we saw, a process strongly 
influenced  by  the  international  actors,  EU being  the  most  important  actor  present  in  all 
negotiations between the parts engaged in the debate over the law draft.
The exit of this extremely difficult and untransparent process of decision-making, as we 
saw, was an agreement that sacrificed the municipalities’ interests to the ethnical and political 
interests. Some of the municipalities are still underdeveloped and incapable of achieving fiscal 
autonomy,  this  way  hampering  the  implementation  process,  a  direct  consequence  of  the 
prevailing of the ethnical principle over the strategic approach to the design of the municipal 
borders. Further on, as underlined by the Macedonian researchers, the functioning of the local 
municipalities is strongly influenced by the party’s relationships between the local mayors and 
the ruling government, blocking the development and the functioning of those municipalities 
where the opposition is at the power.  In the Council  of Europe’s Congress of Local and 
Regional  Authorities’  report  on  Macedonia,  we  find  underlined  that  while  the  legislative 
framework is fully in line with the European standards, the implementation is still difficult as 
the by-laws de-facto reduce the levels of autonomy guaranteed by the Law on the Local Self-
government. 
Another point of concern is the ethnicization at the local level, as both the language usage 
and, more importantly, the voting procedures are in function of the ethnic composition of the 
community. While such solutions are preferred by the nationalistic elites, the descent of the 
ethnic conflict  to the local  level  too creates a situation where the usage of the nationalist 
rhetorics  is  a  convenient  strategy  to  follow.  The  decentralization  is  easily  politicized  and 
interpreted in the ethnic key, which increases the tensions between the ethnic groups. An 
illustration  is  the complete  absence of  issues such as  “the balance  of  power between the 
central and local government” or “the accountability function of the local self-government” 
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from the  debate.  Even  in  those  cases  where  the  debate  rose  about  how large  the  local 
government’s powers shall be in the health and education sector, the discussion was guided 
mainly by ethnic concerns and divided Macedonians (proposing a more centralized model) 
and  the  Albanians  (requiring  as  large  an  autonomy  as  possible).  The  questions  of  the 
distribution of power between the different levels of governance came onto the agenda only 
recently in the implementation phases, where the central government showed the reluctance 
to share its powers with the lower units.
Such sub-optimal solutions in the field of the territorial re-organization of the Macedonian 
system of  governance  can  be  explained  by  the  sub-optimal  settling  of  the  factors  of  the 
revised EUCLIDA model influencing the decision-making process.
On the supply side, we have the international actor who, perceiving the domestic situation 
as  potentially  destabilizing,  is  pushing the domestic  elite  to search for a  solution  to what 
emerged as a key sector: decentralization. The conflictuality of the issue and potential threats 
to stability  brought to the prevailing of security concerns over the necessity to ensure the 
respect for the democratic and international standards, especially in the process of the rule 
adoption.  The  choice  of  the  instruments  for  the  rule  promotion  also  reflected  the  IA’s 
concern and preference for a quick solution of the problem: in a joint action of a series of 
international actors, all means and strategies were implied: positive and negative conditionality 
(we  can  consider  the  ad-hoc  inclusion  of  the  adoption  of  the  Law  on  the  Local  Self-
government among the conditions for the donors’ conference as a negative conditionality), 
official  pressures  on  the  country  as  well  as  unofficial  pressures  on  the  single  politicians, 
mediation  in  negotiations  and  advisory  role,  the  financial  support  and  external  guarantee 
increasing the credibility of the commitments made. 
On  the  domestic  side,  we  can  observe  how  almost  no  change  agents  committed  to 
decentralization as a mean of good democratic governance could be found among the main 
actors included in the process. The decentralization was an obligation deriving from the peace 
agreement and was mainly required by the Albanian ethnic minority, but was also supported 
from other political forces as all actors perceived the need for change. Yet, as we saw, the 
priorities  leading  the  process  were  mainly  ethnically  based.  While  some  local  authorities, 
domestic experts and NGOs tried to push forward more efficient solutions based on the civic 
and  technical  approach  to  the  question,  their  voices  were  covered  by  the  sound  of  the 
nationalistic  mobilization  around  the  issue.  Surely,  seen  the  mis-confidence  nurtured  for 
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almost ten years since the independence, seen the 2001 ethnic violence and the events in the 
neighbouring  Serbia,  and  most  importantly,  seen  the  radical  requests  of  the  Albanian 
nationalists  that  did  not  hesitate  to  threat  with  more  violence,  it  is  no  surprise  that  the 
territorial organization was mainly seen as a question of inter-ethnic relations. The opportunity 
to increase the institutional administrative capacity or to favour the participation and good 
democratic governance did not find their place in the debate over the decentralization process. 
The  political  elite,  instead  of  calming  the  ethnic  passions  and  offering  a  more  civic 
interpretation of the issue, opted for the most profitable solution: the use of the nationalistic 
rhetorics,  in  some  cases  even  including  open  threats,  in  their  short-term  calculations  on 
gaining electoral support.
Before concluding the analysis of the decentralization in Macedonia, a remark on the veto-
players shall be made. Even though the nationalistic rhetorics was more pronounced in the 
discourses of the rightists, traditionally considered more radical nationalistic parties, yet, it is 
difficult to assert to what extent such behaviour was part of the political strategy aiming to 
delegitimize  the  political  opponents,  rather  than  an  action  aiming  to  obstruct  the 
decentralization process. An example is the behaviour of DUI, a political party that while in 
the ruling coalition (2002-2006) exercised an important role in calming the tensions created by 
the  extremist  statements  by  the,  then  oppositional,  Albanian  parties.  After  the  2006 
parliamentary elections, even though it was the strongest party of the Albanians, it was not 
called into the government by the VMRO that preferred a coalition with the politically more 
compatible  PDP.  The  reaction  of  the  DUI  consisted  in  strengthening  the  nationalistic 
rhetorics.  They claimed that the Albanian rights were being neglected by the government, 
started discriminating the Macedonians in those municipalities where DUI had the majority, 
and advanced a list of requirements to be adopted “in order to improve the Albanian rights”, 
some of which unacceptable for the civil state and representing a definite step towards the 
ossification of the ethnic cleavage. At the same time, we can notice how the VMRO played 
the role of the veto player obstructing the process of decentralization only in the second phase 
of the settling of the legislative framework, when the party was at the opposition. This casts 
new light  over  the  “veto  player”-“change  agent”  concept  in  Macedonia’s  case.  Unlike  in 
Serbia, where the strong veto players obstruct the reform due to their interest in maintaining 
the status quo, in Macedonia the obstruction of the decentralization, rather than a goal, appears 
to be a mean for pursuing other political interests. The government continues to play the role 
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of the change agent, the opposition, independently from the content of the law, obstructs the 
reform. In the conclusions we will turn back to this particularity of the Macedonian political 
life, exploring the causes and implications of such strong link between the roles played by the 
actors and their preferences. 
6.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
As we saw in the sections above, the decentralization process was one of the most salient 
dimensions of the political conflict in both the studied countries and represented one of the 
most difficult  questions  to tackle.  In both cases the decentralization  (and in Serbia’s  case 
regionalization) was conceived as strictly linked with the inter-ethnic relations, rising concerns 
and fears of secession. Yet, while Macedonia was working hard on the decentralization reform 
since  2001,  Serbia  delayed  the  reform  until  the  end  of  2007,  meanwhile  solving  urgent 
problems through ad hoc solutions. The Serbian “reformist” effort of 2007, however, failed to 
face the problem of Vojvodina’s status, regulating only the less conflictive questions of local 
self-government. 
The two countries do not only differ in their devotion to the reform, but also in the quality 
of the adopted legislation. While in Macedonia’s case the legal framework does allow large 
autonomy (the obstacles are mainly identified in the implementation process), in Serbia we 
observe the reluctance to shift the power from central to local level. The decentralization was 
thus combined with the further strengthening of the central party’s leadership’s control over 
the deputies in the municipal assemblies.
The  differences  between  the  two  countries  can  be  explained  by  the  factors  of  the 
EUCLIDA model (see the Tables 5-10 in the appendix). The EU was much more credible in 
pushing the decentralization reform in Macedonia than in Serbia. Very strong conditionality 
(both the integration with EU and more immediate rewards like access to the CARDS funds) 
and the salience that the issue had for the EU (more than 20% of the total EU financial 
assistance was for decentralization) can be explained by the EU’s belief that decentralization is 
a mean for settling intra-ethnic conflict and for guaranteeing the security which appears as the 
main EU concern. This also explains the EU’s tolerance for the un-democratic procedures 
and the acceptance of sub-optimal solutions.  The most clamorous example of the lack of 
respect of the democratic procedures tolerated by the EU concerns the failure to consult the 
223
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
municipalities in the law-drafting process (obligatory under both the OFA and the CoE Carter 
on  Local  Self-.Government)  and  the  violations  of  the  procedures  and  even  large-scale 
intimidations that took place during the 2004 referendum. 
Table 1: “The decentralization in Serbia and Macedonia, most relevant factors”
Serbia Macedonia
2002 2007
IA active: CoE. EU. EU (NATO, OSCE).
IA’s  interest  in 
the field:
Democratization. Democratization. Security.
Conditionality 
with  important 
reward:
Present. Weak. Very Strong.
Did  the  IA 
tolerate  the 
undemocratic 
behavior:
- - Yes.
Domestic  Change 
Agents:
Present, strong. Present, weak. Present, strong.
Input  for  the 
change:
Domestic  and 
international.
Domestic  (constitutional 
reform).
Domestic and international.
The  compliance 
with  IA’s 
recommendations
:
Rule  adoption, 
difficult 
implementation.
Partial compliance. Good compliance.
Outcome: The norm adopted. 
Implementation 
obstructed.
The  norm  adopted,  the 
shortcomings  build  in  the 
legislative framework annul the 
effect of the change.
The  reform  implemented. 
The legislation allows for the 
further  ethnicization  of 
politics.
The importance of the International actors in pushing the reform is confirmed in Serbia, 
where we can notice the difference between the two periods (2002 and 2007), as well as in 
comparing the legislation on the local self-government and the lack of decision on the status 
of the AP. Both legal acts adopted in 2002 were strongly recommended by the international 
actors  and  made  a  condition  for  the  CoE  membership,  while  in  the  case  of  the  2007 
legislation  the  strengthening  of  the  municipalities  was  only  indirectly  mentioned  in  the 
priorities, as part of the constitutional reform. Finally, the Autonomous Provinces’ status does 
not even find its place in the Commission reports since 2005. The EU’s decision to decrease 
the  pressures  for  the  regionalization  in  Serbia  can  be  also  explained  as  a  security-guided 
decision,  as  the  unsolved  problem  of  Kosovo’s  status,  salience  and  conflictuality  of 
decentralization  as  a  dimension  and the  growing  nationalism made  regionalization  a  very 
delicate question to tackle.
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The factors on the domestic level also differed between the two countries: in Macedonia’s 
case, the presence of a strong change agent interested in pushing the changes forward (the 
Albanian ethnic minority) ensured that the international actor’s action is complemented with 
inner pressures. But while on the one hand successfully pushing forward such change, on the 
other the interests of this domestic actor influenced the debate and the interpretation of the 
issue (resulting  in  the  ethnicization  of  the process  and the  solutions  following  the  ethnic 
logic).  The importance of the domestic change agents for pushing difficult  reforms is also 
confirmed in Serbia’s case, where the adoption of the Omnibus Law on Vojvodina was mainly 
a product of the intimidatory capacity of the Hungarian minority party.
 Finally, it appears useful to recall the level of legitimacy of the rule existing. If we compare 
the laws adopted in both Serbia and Macedonia, we can notice how the most democratic in 
both procedure and its content was the Law on the Local Self-government adopted in 2002 in 
Serbia. Such result is no surprise seen the relatively positive settling of all factors we identified: 
the IA, guided by the democracy promotion interest, offered a credible, not distant in time 
reward (CoE membership), using both conditionality and socialization channels (by offering 
experts and consultants) to bring an issue onto the domestic agenda in a moment when the 
delegitimization of the status quo and the relatively mild level of conflictuality compensate for 
the weak domestic change agents. 
APPENDIX
Table 2: “EU assistance to the decentralization process in Macedonia”.
Year Amoun
t
Purpose
2001 10,5 
Small infrastructure for local self-government.
Repair-reconstruction of the local infrastructure.
Conditioned: implementation of the OFA.
2002 14 Small scale infrastructure for local self-government. Conditionality deriving from the Multi-annual indicative program 2002-2004: The help 
in development in local infrastructure will be conditioned with the adoption of the Law 
on the Local Self-government and creation of the appropriate legal framework for the 
decentralization process.
2003 9 Implementation of local infrastructure projects; Training and capacity of building local government institutions.
2004 8.5 Local infrastructure development.
2005 8.7 Support for the decentralization process (2 mil).Development of local infrastructure (6.7).
Conditioned: the decentralization reforms and a commitment on the part of 
government to allocate resources and personnel to facilitate the process.
2006 5.4 mil Support to decentralization process. Conditioned: the decentralization reforms and a commitment on the part of government to allocate resources and personnel to facilitate the process.
Source: European Agency for Reconstruction, IPE documentation 2007.
Table 3: “EU priorities in Macedonia”.
2002 Ensure smooth implementation of the decentralization process through offering the appropriate means to the central state bodies to manage the process, and 
developing the capacity of local self-government bodies to undertake the transferred responsibilities.
2003 Adopt the legislative framework which will ensure smooth implementation of the decentralization process through offering the appropriate means to the central state 
bodies to manage the process, and developing the capacity of local self-government bodies to undertake the transferred responsibilities. Partnership with citizens 
associations and a serious communication program will help the smooth implementation of the decentralization process.
2004 Implement the legislation already adopted to implement the Framework Agreement (FA). Adopt remaining legislation required by the FA, in particular adopt and 
implement the Laws on the Territorial Organization, Municipal Finance and the City of Skopje. Achieve rapid progress in the implementation of the decentralization 
process to allow proper local elections as scheduled, in particular strengthening the municipalities' capacity in financial management and management of transferred 
competencies and assets through training, consultancy and provision of equipment. In parallel, strengthen administrative capacities to supervise and facilitate the 
decentralization process, including at central level, in particular of the Ministry of Local Self-Government and of the Ministry of Finance in relation to fiscal 
decentralization as well as the line ministries in their own areas of competence. Ensure that appropriate budgetary resources are allocated in order to ensure a smooth 
transfer of competencies.
2006 Complete the necessary legislative framework to implement the decentralization process and ensuring that municipalities have the necessary means to implement their 
new competencies.
2007 Strengthen the transparency and accountability of the local administrations. In particular, strengthen internal control and audits. Establish a satisfactory standard of 
municipal tax collection throughout the country. Develop the capacity of municipalities to manage state-owned land. Ensure that the number and competence of staff 
of municipalities are sufficient
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia.
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Table 4: “EU priorities and decentralization in Serbia”.
Report 2002 Promised decentralization and reforms of provincial and local government should be implemented, as well as other constitutional revisions.
Report 2003 Promotion of effective decentralization and participation. Preparation of local government; promotion of civil society participation
(indirectly: constitutional reform).
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia.
Table 5: “EU support to municipalities and administrative decentralization in Serbia”.
2001 5 millions Municipal support program.
2003 35 millions Municipal support program, Municipal Improvement and Revival program, Municipal Infrastructure Agency support program.
2004 21.5 millions Technical assistance to main municipal related actors; Regional cooperation among municipalities.
2005 20.7 millions Municipal support programme. Conditionalities :  About  13  millions  are  conditioned  with  the  cooperation  of  the  Ministry  for  state 
administration and local self-government in the implementation of the programs.
2006 20 millions Municipal support programme Conditionalities : the cooperation of the Ministry for state administration and local self-government in the 
implementation of the programs.
2007 22 millions Municipal support programme Endorsement by all key stakeholders. Appointment of counterpart personnel by beneficiaries, Allocation 
of working space and facilities for technical assistance by beneficiaries, Arrangement by beneficiaries of 
any necessary legal procedures or permits, Participation by the beneficiaries in tender processes as per EU 
regulations,  organization,  selection  and  appointment  of  members  of  working  groups,  steering  and 
coordination committees, seminars etc. by beneficiaries, Appointing the relevant staff by the beneficiaries 
to participate in training activities etc. Availability of co-financing where required.
Source: European Agency for Reconstruction, IPE documentation for 2007.
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Table 6: “The decentralization in Macedonia, external factors” (author's elaboration).
Decentralization: Amendments 2001, The 
Law on the Local Self-government (2002), 
The Law on Local Boundaries 
(2004)
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? Yes, donors' conference. Yes, name issue.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps 
in the integration process took place? No. Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA reports? Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes. Yes
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 24,5 millions of euro, of total 102,9 EU assistance to Macedonia in 2000 - 2002.
42 millions of euro, of total 184.4 
EU assistance to Macedonia 2000 – 
2004.
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU 
assistance to the country: 23.8% 22,77%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Mean of the inter-ethnic peace. Mean of the inter-ethnic peace.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Peace keeping (security). Peace keeping (security).
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power 
by the domestic stakeholders? X Yes (referendum).
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it 
used in the law drafting? Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? X X
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to 
external criticisms?
X X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance 
with the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in 
other ways?
No (it was the compliance with OFA to 
be underlined).
No (it was the compliance with 
OFA to be underlined).
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Table 7: “The decentralization in Macedonia, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
Decentralization: Amendments 2001, The Law on the Local 
Self-government (2002). The Law on Local Boundaries (2004)
Domestic input for the change: Present (OFA and necessity to implement the constitutional amendments).
Present (OFA and necessity to implement 
the constitutional amendments).
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present and strong: Albanian minority. Present and strong: Albanian minority.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Extremely high (presence of violence). Extremely high (presence of violence).
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Intra-ethnic and inter- party. Inter-ethnic and inter-party.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes (inter-ethnic). Yes (inter-ethnic).
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience. Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Central government. Central government.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Albanian ethnic minority, local government. Albanian ethnic minority.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant 
actors?
No (presence of the supporters of the status quo among 
Macedonian majority).
No (presence of the supporters of the 
status quo among Macedonian majority).
Two or more alternative solutions present?  -  -
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of 
the central actors):  - - 
Table 8: “The decentralization in Macedonia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
Decentralization: Amendments 2001, The Law on the Local Self-
government (2002) The Law on Local Boundaries (2004)
The procedure of law drafting:
Behind the closed doors, the relevant representatives of the civil 
society, the municipalities and experts in the field not included in the 
discussion.
Behind the closed doors, the relevant representatives of the civil 
society, the municipalities and experts in the field not included in 
the discussion.
The main deficiency in the 
adopted legislation:
The introduction of the solutions that contributed to ethnicize the 
decentralization process.
The introduction of the solutions that contributed to ethnicize the 
decentralization process.
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies: Ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities.
The status (2008): Rule adopted, Rule implemented (slow and difficult implementation). Rule adopted, Rule implemented (slow and difficult implementation).
The EU comment in the 2008 
report:  -
 Decentralization, which is a basic principle of the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, has continued. However, no progress was 
made in the direct funding of the tasks decentralized to the 
municipalities.
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Table 9: “The decentralization in Serbia, external factors” (author's elaboration). 
Legislation:
Factors
Law  on  the  Local 
Self-government,  Serbia, 
2002
Law  package  on  local  self-
government, Serbia, 2007
Omnibus  Law  on 
Autonomous  Provinces 
2002
Lack  of  solution  to  the 
Vojvodina status
Was rule adoption explicitly made a 
necessary condition for the signature of an 
important international treaty, integration 
process, access to the funds?
Yes: FRY membership in 
the Council of Europe.
Only indirectly (it is not made 
explicitly subject of the EU key short 
term or short term priorities, but as a 
part of the requirement to undertake 
the constitutional reform).
Yes: FRY membership in the 
Council of Europe.
No (since the 2005 it 
even ceased to be 
mentioned in the EU 
Commission’s reports).
Did the rule adoption take place in the 
period immediately prior/after the 
important steps in the integration process 
took place?
Yes: FRY membership in 
the Council of Europe. No.
Yes: FRY membership in the 
Council of Europe. -
Was the issue part of the EU key short-
term priorities? No. No. No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term 
priorities or among the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA reports?
Yes. Not explicitly (see above). Yes. -
Was CARDS financial support to the 
process conditioned by the adoption of the 
laws?
No. No. No. No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the 
reform in general:
124.2 (the total of EU 
investment in Serbian 
decentralization 2001-
2007).
124.2 (the total of EU investment in 
Serbian decentralization 2001-2007).
124.2 (the total of EU 
investment in Serbian 
decentralization 2001-2007).
124.2 (the total of EU 
investment in Serbian 
decentralization 2001-2007).
Share of resources dedicated to promote 
reform in the sector in the whole of EU 
assistance to the country:
9.48% 9.48% 9.48% 9.48%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Part of the constitutional reform.
- Part of the constitutional 
reform.
The issue too delicate to tackle 
seen the situation in Kosovo.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention 
in the field:
Democratization. - Democratization. -
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate 
undemocratic behavior and abuse of power 
by the domestic stakeholders?
- - - -
Was consulting, advice, technical support of 
external experts made available, and was it 
used in the law drafting?
Yes. Yes. Yes. -
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Were the recommendations made by the IA 
accepted? yes partially mainly
no
Were the reports and analysis of the 
international organizations successfully used 
to delegitimize the status quo in the 
country? Were the domestic actors 
vulnerable to external criticisms?
- - -
-
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was 
the government underlining its compliance 
with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law 
in other ways?
yes yes no
-
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Table 10: “Decentralization in Serbia, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
Legislation:
Factors
Law  on  the  Local  Self-
government, Serbia, 2002
Law  package  on  local 
self-government,  Serbia, 
2007
Omnibus Law on Autonomous Provinces 
2002
Lack  of  solution  to  the 
Vojvodina status
Domestic input for the 
change:
Present (the urgent necessity 
to face the problem of the 
municipalities)
Present (the implementation 
of the Constitutional Law)
Present (urgent necessity to face the problems 
of the Vojvodina status)
-
Domestic actors pushing for 
the reform:
Present, weak (municipalities) Present, weak 
(municipalities)
Present, strong (the supporters of the 
provincial autonomy with strong influence on 
the government)
Present, weak
Level of conflictuality of the 
issue:
Mid (the ideological instance 
of the key actors is moderate)
High (the ideological 
instance of the key actors is 
polarized)
High High
Type of the conflict and main 
line of the conflict:
Between the different levels 
of government
Between the different levels 
of government
Between the different levels of government + 
intra-ethnic + intra-party
Between the different levels 
of government + intra-ethnic 
+ intra-party
Did the issue concern the 
deep divisions in society?
Yes  Yes Yes (inter-ethnic, intra-party) Yes (inter-ethnic, intra-party)
Type of the issue (salience - 
positional): salience positional - salience
The main beneficiaries of the 
status quo: central government central government central government central government
The main beneficiaries of the 
change: lower units of government lower units of government lower units of government lower units of government
Is the existing status quo 
strongly delegitimized by all 
relevant actors?
Yes No Yes No
Two or more alternative 
solutions present? no - - Yes
Political fluidity/stability (in 
terms of the perspective of 
power of the central actors)
fluid stable (-fluid) fluid -
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Table 11: “The decentralization in Serbia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
Legislation:
Factors
Law  on  the  Local  Self-
government, Serbia, 2002
Law  package  on  local  self-government, 
Serbia, 2007
Omnibus  Law  on 
Autonomous 
Provinces 2002
Lack  of  solution  to 
the Vojvodina status
The procedure of law drafting:
Behind the closed doors, 
intra-party bargaining, short 
term party leadership
Open debate, inclusion of the civil society, 
representatives of the municipalities, experts 
and other relevant actors
-
x
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:
The building of mechanisms 
that completely annul the 
effects of the decentralization 
process by strengthening the 
party central leadership 
control over the 
representatives in the local 
self-governments
- -
x
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: political parties, ruling elite Not adopted
The status (2008):
Rule adopted (though fake 
compliance with IA 
standards)
Rule adopted, rule implemented
Not adopted
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
Legislation on local self-government, 
territorial reorganization, local elections and 
the city of Belgrade was adopted in December 
2007. The changes are generally in accordance 
with the European Charter of Local Self-
Government. However, some shortcomings 
remain. A specific law regulating the transfer 
of property to municipalities, in line with the 
Constitution, has not yet been adopted
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7. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/CIVIL 
SERVICE REFORM
“At a less obvious level, successful revolutionaries also  
inherit the wiring of the old state: sometimes functionaries and 
informers, but always files, dossiers, archives, laws... Like the  
complex electrical system in any large mansion when the owner  
has fled, the state awaits the new owner’s hand at the switch to  
be very much its old brilliant self again.”
Benedict Anderson, 1991.
The civil service reform is one of the key moments in the process of democratization. As 
Linz and Stepan (1996) argued, the consolidation of democracy is impossible if there is no 
suitable state bureaucracy, usable by the new democratic government. Very often, however, 
the  administrative  apparatus  inherited  from  the  previous  regime  is  unsuitable  for  the 
democratization process, be it due to the inadequacy of the inherited administrative structure 
or procedures or to the lack of support of the bureaucrats faithful to the ongoing regime. The 
reform of the public administration in those cases becomes necessary, but at the same time it 
might be very difficult to undertake as it is a kind of reform that requires the state to reform 
itself.  This  brought  the  scholars  to  identify  in  the  state  apparatus  and  the  administrative 
capacity (and the success of its reform) an important factor of consolidation of democracy, a 
very positive factor in those cases where the administrative tradition gave the new democratic 
elite  a  professional  administrative  apparatus  on  which  to  rely  to  in  the  democratization 
process, very negative in those cases where the lack of adequate bureaucracy hampered the 
country’s  administrative  capacity  making the  implementation  of  all  other  reforms and the 
transition process difficult to undertake219. 
219 “The reformers are often bound by the very rules they seek to change, and these rules are enforced by anti-
reform incumbents privileged by the status quo. To succeed, reformers must find a way to use the rules of the 
status quo to subvert it, which involves the difficult task of inducing political actors empowered by an existing 
constitutional order to change the rules of the game” (Snyder and Mahoney, 1999). On the importance of the 
adequate bureaucracy for consolidation, see Linz and Stepan, 1996. On the administrative capacity as both a 
prerequisite for the implementation and the dimension of the consolidation see Morlino and Magen, 2004 – 
2008.
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Many  students  concentrated  in  identifying  the  factors  that  influence  the  civil  service 
reform.  The  institutional  setting,  the  type  of  inherited  bureaucracy  and  the  institutional 
legacies, the size and goal of the traditional public sector, the government’s reform capacity, 
the structure of opportunities, all were used as explicative factors in analyzing the civil service 
reform in the democratic societies220. In studying the transition towards democracy, the model 
of Meyer-Sahling is particularly interesting as it links the civil service reform with the type of 
the transition of the regime and with the alternation on power. In this model, the composition 
of  the  first  democratically  elected  governments  represents  an  explanatory  factor  that 
determines whether the administrative reform aiming towards the de-politicization of the civil 
service will take place221. 
The de-politicization and professionalization of the civil  service represented one of the 
most important steps in the dual transformation of the Central Eastern Europe222. Particularly 
in the former communist countries, where the “political loyalty was the first requirement for 
the recruitment”, and where the tradition of open partisanship prevailed, the de-politicization 
of civil service became a “central plank of the administrative reform in the region” (Goetz, 
2001, p. 1040).
However,  in  many of  these countries,  the de-politicization of  the civil  service  was not 
undertaken due to the internal transitional dynamics that failed to produce the incentive for 
the  “institutionalization  of  the  restrictions  on political  interference  into  personnel  policy” 
(Meyer-Sahling,  2004,  p.  77).  Moreover,  the  overlapping  of  the  party  building  and  state 
building process contributed to the emerging of what O’Dwyer labeled the “runaway state 
building”, consisting in the patronage politics of the ruling elite which brings to “swelling and 
politicization of the administration, hobbling its effectiveness” (O’Dwyer, 2004, p. 521). 
The politicization of the civil service negatively influences the administrative capacity. In 
the first place, by making the partisan criteria prevail over the merit-based recruitment and 
career advancement, the professionalism and effectiveness of the civil service are hampered. 
Further on, as the change of the government in these cases means the change in all managerial 
positions, the continuity in policy making is hampered, and the new elite cannot make profit 
of the experienced, know-how bureaucrats inherited from the previous government. Finally, 
the high level of the party control over the administration, particularly in the setting of the 
220 See Pierre, J. (1995), Wright, 1994, Knill 1999. 
221 See Meyer-Sahling, 2002, 2004.
222 See Barlett, 1997, cited in Mayer-Sahling, 2004, p. 71.
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large public  sector, further opens the possibility  for patronage politics,  which then further 
hampers the quality of the civil servants and their professional integrity.
The following section will be dedicated to the civil service reform in Serbia and Macedonia, 
with the particular accent on the (de-)politicization of the administration. In both countries 
the political influence over bureaucracy revealed to be very strong. In both cases the Nineties 
resulted  in  strong  incentives  for  the  patronage  politics,  runaway  state  building  and 
politicization  of  the  administration,  further  ruining  the  apparatus  inherited  from  the 
communism. As we will see, even though the administrative reform was undertaken, in both 
countries the politicization of the civil service still persists.
7.1. SERBIA: PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE POLITICIZED ADMINISTRATION
7.1.1. THE REFORM DELAYED 
One of the crucial issues in the process of democratization and in the development of the 
institutional and administrative capacity concerns the reform of the state bureaucracy. As the 
Serbian  case  taught  us,  the  democratization  without  tackling  the  administrative  reform is 
possible (yet not recommendable) only in the first phases, when the new democratic rules are 
in the phase of drafting and adoption. As soon as it comes to their implementation, the lack of 
an efficient, professional, depoliticized and functional administration turns out to be the most 
serious obstacle on the path to democratization. 
The administration system inherited from the period of Milošević’s regime was inadequate 
for the implementation of the reformist policies and very difficult to reform. Such system was 
a product of the gradual development and continuity of Serbian (Yugoslavian) administration 
since the creation of the kingdom of Serbia through all further states, the last two experiences, 
the SFR Yugoslavia  and Milošević’s regime being the most relevant for understanding the 
situation in Serbian administration at the end of 2000. 
The Serbian administrative  tradition was inspired by the continental/German model of 
bureaucracy and was following its developments until World War II and the establishment of 
the communist state. The almost 50-year long communistic regime strengthened its formalism 
and attachment  to  norms.  The  centralization  and the  hierarchy  were  combined  with  the 
rigidity and strongly pronounced legalism, but, unlike German tradition, the bureaucrats were 
not given any influence on the decision-making process. In the absence of channels for the 
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bottom-up communication, the incrementalist approach and the gradual improvement of the 
existing legislative framework was an impossible strategy to adopt. The problems were faced 
with the new legislations, contributing to the creation of a cumbersome and hyper-developed 
legislative  system.  Even  the  constitutions  were  subject  to  the  continuous  reforms  and 
changes223, whenever a political or economic crisis rose (Allcock, 2000, cited in Eriksen, 2005). 
Beside the formalism, centralization and hierarchy, another significant characteristic of the 
Serbian administration until the end of the '80s was the professionalism of the civil employees 
ensured by the security  of  tenure,  the  high revenues and a career based on seniority  and 
experience224. Politicization was present in these years as well, but the single-party system, the 
continuity  of  the  communists’  rule,  and  the  combination  of  the  party  loyalty  with  the 
professionalization and merit-based recruitment ensured the high quality of the civil servants.
The period of  Milošević’s  rule  also left  a  strong print  on the Serbian bureaucracy:  the 
professionalism was substituted by political loyalty while partisanship and nepotism became 
the only decisive criteria for recruitment and career. Low remunerations and the loss of the 
social status bureaucracy enjoyed in the previous period almost emptied the administrative 
lines from the most competent and professional staff, making it a position attractive only for 
the protégés of Milošević’s party and to those interested in job security and certainty of career 
advancement,  regardless  of  the  inadequacy  of  remuneration  at  that  particular  time.  The 
administration was at the same time oversized, and short of competent cadres. Corruption, 
which grew to enormously high levels in Milošević’s period, represented another characteristic 
of the Serbian administration that the transition was supposed to cope with225. 
These characteristics made the administrative reform in Serbia one of the most serious 
obstacles  in  the  democratization  process:  the  normativism  and  formalism  that  produces 
rigidity in functioning made the reform necessary to be undertaken as soon as possible, while 
the entrenchment and a tight net of legislations, norms and rules made the reform of civil 
service  a  complex  task.  Moreover,  the  extremely  high  level  of  politicization  of  the  civil 
servants represented another source of concern. With the regime change, the top positions in 
bureaucracy were all changed and the new staff, supportive for the reforms, was appointed. 
However,  the “voluntarism” and support for the government’s reformist  orientation these 
223 During the 55 years of communist rule, Yugoslavia saw four constitutions, in media one every 10 years 
(1946, 1953, 1963, 1974).
224 See World Bank report on Serbia and Montenegro public administration development, Report No. 28553-
YU, 2004.
225 See the section on the fight against corruption. 
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people shared was combined with the lack of practical experience (in the interview with the 
Prime Minister Đinđjić made by Eriksen, Đinđić expressed this point by stressing that he and 
his colleagues were trained in opposing, not in exercising the political power). The lack of 
experience  and  of  administrative  background  represented  one  of  the  causes  of  the  low 
administrative capacity identified as one of the key obstacles for the transition in Serbia226. 
With the excuse of the need to “clean the administration” and to “reform” the new elite, 
the practice of partisan appointments in bureaucracy went on. The politicization of the senior 
official  positions,  causing  the  changes  in  the  staff  with  every  change  of  the  minister,  is 
seriously hampering the functioning of the ministries and the continuity in the work. 
The politicization is not limited to the top senior managerial  positions only, but it  is  a 
process that tackles all the single heads of office and heads of units and sub-units all over the 
country,  both  in  the  administration  and  in  the  entire  public  sector.  Even  though  the 
managerial positions in the public sector are not officially political appointees, the political 
control over the managerial boards brings to the politicization of all these positions. 
The politicization of the entire managerial structure further results in the politicization of 
the civil service as coming from the politicization of the recruitment and career procedures. 
The politicization at the same time brings to over-crowding the administration and to the lack 
of professional staff. Even though the “systematization” measure is introduced in order to 
“control”  the  employment  in  the  civil  service,  the  politicization  and feudalization  of  the 
Serbian government limited the impact of this measure. The employment in the specific unit 
of  the  administration  is  possible  only  for  those  vacancies  that  are  prescribed  by  the 
systematization of the positions in one specific unit. The systematization plan is designed by 
the director of the unit and controlled and approved by the minister. Through the political 
appointee of both these functions, the political parties gain the control of the entire process of 
opening new vacancies in the administration. Further on, the manager of the unit having the 
final word in the employment, the entire process of recruitment is under political control of 
the party holding the specific ministry. The oversized administration made it impossible to 
establish an adequate pay system capable to attract high quality staff,  representing another 
serious  obstacle  to  the  administrative  reform.  The corruption,  in  both  its  shapes  as  state 
capture and administrative  corruption,  is  favored by the  setting  in  which the control  and 
accountability are following only the party lines.
226 See Begović, 2005.
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The third obstacle to the reform derives from the lack of political  consensus over the 
reforms and the lack of attention for the issue. As already stressed, the only issue keeping 
DOS together was its  opposition to Milošević’s  regime. Once this  goal  was achieved,  the 
conflicts over the reforms, their content, goal and timetable created a split between the two 
strongest partners: DSS and DS (that remained in DOS). Đinđić and his DS represented a 
pragmatic part of the coalition pursuing the economic reforms and giving it the precedents 
over  the  legalistic  issues.  When  it  comes  to  reforming  the  administration  (but  also  to 
approaching all other state reforms), they advocated an approach based on discontinuity. One 
of the possible solutions was to annul all legislations previously brought and to undertake a 
process of re-building of the entire legislative and constitutional framework. However, seen 
the priority they gave to the economic reforms, this option never arrived onto the agenda. 
Koštunica’s  and DSS line  advocated a  policy  of  continuity,  underlining  that  a  democratic 
transition shall not be undertaken with the methods used by the previous regime: illegality and 
violation of the rule of law. The result was that the legal framework, unharmonized, hyper-
regulated and full of controversies, was kept in place in order to be gradually changed. The 
stronger part of the coalition (DS and Đinđić) gave higher priority to other fields of reform 
(especially the economic one), tackling the administration reform only occasionally, without a 
clear strategy over the reform227.
During the period of Đinđić-Živković’s government, the steps undertaken in this field were 
sporadic  and  lacked  a  clear  vision.  The  Agency  for  the  Development  of  the  Public 
Administration and the Institute for the Administration Reform with a task to pursue the 
reform  of  the  administration  were  formed,  but  the  lack  of  coordination  and  of  a  clear 
distribution  of  competencies  resulted  in  the  deadlock  of  the  administrative  reforms.  The 
reform was left  to  those  ministries  where  the ministers  were  unwilling  to take  unpopular 
measures and tried to cope with the reform as best as they could228.
In  2002,  political  turbulence brought to the reorganization of  the  government and the 
Ministry for Public Administration and Local Government was created as a side payment to a 
small political party granting support to the unstable government. The small political weight of 
the minister and the difficulty of the task that in order to be undertaken needed the prime 
minister’s involvement to coordinate the action, undermined the efforts. The new ministry 
227 Eriksen, 2005.
228 In the interviews undertaken by Eriksen, the ministers declared that seen that the reform of administration 
is a task which benefits can be observed only a decade after, no minister was willing to be the one to fire more 
than 50 people from his ministry.
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drafted a package of legislations, including the Bill on Public Administration, the Civil Service 
Act,  the  Code  of  Conduct  for  Civil  Servants,  the  Bill  on  the  Prevention  of  Conflict  of 
Interests and increased efforts to draft the national strategy, but as the government got into a 
crisis, the Ministry decided not to initiate the procedure in the parliament that would most 
probably reject the legislation. None of these laws were ever discussed in the parliament. 
7.1.2. THE REFORMS
The change of the ruling coalition that took place in 2004 brought to power Koštunica’s 
DSS, well known for its legalistic approach according to which the reform of the state (and 
also the reform of the public administration and civil service) were the most urgent reforms to 
tackle. Such persuasion of the urgency of the public administration reform was fueled by the 
problems in the implementation of the economic and other already undertaken reforms due to 
the lack of administrative capacity. Moreover, Koštunica’s far less conflictive approach to the 
continuity in the transition made the reform of the administration easier to face, as he was 
potentially  more  successful  in  achieving  what  Roeder  (1993)  considered  the  necessary 
condition for the reform: “To succeed, the reformers must find the way to use the rules of the 
status  quo  to  subvert  it,  which  involves  the  difficult  task  of  ‘inducing  political  actors 
empowered  by  an  existing  status  quo to change it”  (Roeder,  1993,  p.  233)”  (Snyder  and 
Mahoney, 1999, p. 105). The presence in the government of a change agent devoted to the 
reform, the existence of the internal input for the reform and the reduction of the level of 
conflictuality  over the reform due to the approach the change agent adopted,  ensured the 
success of the administrative reform.
The newly elected government, convinced that the efforts of the previous cabinet were not 
acceptable, undertook the design of the administration reform from the very beginning. In 
2004  only  the  Law  on  the  Formation  of  Public  Agencies  was  adopted.  The  legislation 
regulated a practice,  already established by DOS, to create and use the agencies  as quick, 
efficient, operative bodies in response to the lack of efficient bureaucracy. The agency model, 
deriving from the Anglo-Saxon administrative tradition, was a first effort of decentralizing the 
highly centralized hierarchical structure of the ministries. About 11 agencies were formed by 
Đinđić’s government, where the governmental ones showed to be more functional than the 
private ones. 
The reformist efforts were intensified and by the end of 2004 the National Strategy for the 
Public Administration Reform and the following Action Plan prescribing the deadlines for the 
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5-year long project of the reform were adopted. The strategy underlined five principles to be 
followed:  decentralization,  depoliticization,  professionalization,  rationalization  and 
modernization of the civil service. 
The efforts to reform the civil service were specially intensified during 2005, when the Law 
on Government, Law on Public Administration, Law on Civil Servants and Training Strategy 
for Civil Servants were adopted. The Law on Civil Servants constituted two new bodies, the 
Human  Resources  Management  Center  (HRMC)  and  the  High  Civil  Servants  Council 
(HCSC), with a task to improve the employees management, ensure merit-based recruitment 
and career curriculum, create a national cadre database and undertake the training of the staff. 
The structure of the civil service was designed on a 13-level scale and the pay system was 
linked with the rank. 
The Law on Civil  Servants  provided  for a  clear  distinction  between civil  servants  and 
political employees, enlarging the group of career civil servants to the detriment of political 
appointees  in  management  positions.  In the  phases of  the  implementation  of  the  law,  all 
management positions (about 360) that were changed from political appointee to civil servants 
positions were declared vacant.  The law prescribed the procedure for the appointment on 
these positions based on the principle of professionalism and merit-based selection. The High 
Civil  Servants  Council  (the  body  appointed  by  the  government)  is  supposed  to  test  the 
candidates and produces a shortlist of a maximum of three top candidates among which one is 
selected by the minister to the nomination by the government. The lack of independence of 
the bodies included in the process of the appointment is a potential source of concern for the 
prevailing  of  the  professional  criteria  in  the  procedure,  even  though the  president  of  the 
HCSC reported only a mild political pressure over the procedure. 
The recruitment procedure for the lower ranks of the civil servants is decentralized, leaving 
it  to  the  head  of  the  institution  (agency  or  unit)  to  decide  about  the  modalities  of  the 
competition. While the law prescribed mechanisms that are quite in line with the European 
standards, including the examination, open competition and merit-based recruitment, the lack 
of  mechanisms  ensuring  the  government’s  accountability  creates  a  situation  in  which  the 
partisan-based  recruitment  is  still  possible.  The  system  based  on  “systematization”  was 
maintained, allowing party-based decisions to open new working places, while the previously 
mentioned “feudalization” of the ministries allowed full party control over the vacancies in a 
specific sector229.  Once the new working place was open, the internal or public  concurs is 
229 See the section on the political system. See also Pešić, 2006.
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open. Even though the law in principle underlines that the candidates shall be judged on the 
basis of their achievements, education, capacities or examination, it failed to ensure that such 
criteria  are  applied  by  an independent  body.  The decision  on the  procedure  of  selection 
among  candidates,  the  election  of  the  members  of  the  commission  that  will  select  the 
adequate candidates, as well as the final choice of the candidate from the list given by the 
commission, all these competencies are given to the head of the administrative body in which 
the vacancy is open. The presence of a member of the Human Resource Management Service 
as a monitoring member in the commission for examination is a weak guarantee of political 
neutrality in the procedure, as the government controls the HRMS. 
The politicization of the staff and prevailing of the partisan over the professional criteria 
persist, with the ministerial powers being limited only by the state budget prescribed for that 
particular ministry. 
The professionalism of the newly recruited staff is ensured through the obligation of each 
candidate to have served his probation period and to have passed the state examination. The 
candidates for the probation period are selected according to the same procedure described 
above. The state examination (a practice existing since the period of communism), covers the 
legal issues and basically  tests the university  knowledge of the candidates.  In the previous 
practice  the  only  training  the  servants  were  offered  during  the  probation  period  was  the 
working experience. Recently the Human Resources Management Service developed a training 
program for the cadre on the probation period230. 
The career of civil servants, as regulated in the legislation, is also made dependent on the 
evaluation of his work. Similarly to what we will see in the case of the judiciary, the evaluation 
is mainly based on the efficiency measures (articles 82-88, Zakon o Državnim Službenicima). 
According to the strategy of the reform of administration, the performance evaluation in 2011 
should start to influence the revenue through the merit-based salary incentives. 
The pay system was also reviewed, aiming to ensure more adequate revenues for the civil 
servants.  One  of  the  biggest  difficulties  in  ensuring  the  highly  professional  staff  in  the 
administration derives from the inadequate salary system, where the salaries in the private 
sector are much higher than those in the state administration. With the Law on the Salaries 
adopted in July 2006, the salary system provided for a compression ratio of 1:9. Put in practice 
in January 2007, the law caused the malcontent of the civil servants due to its disproportional 
effect on different units of administration. The malcontent escalated in the protest of the civil 
230 See SIGMA, “Serbia, Public Service and the administrative framework, assessment June 2007”.
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servants in December 2007 that brought to an increase in the salaries and promise of the 
minister that the revision of the pay system should be undertaken and that the 1:9 difference 
should  be  reduced  to  a  1:6  compression  ratio.  The  lack  of  financial  resources  is  a  main 
obstacle to the establishment of an adequate pay system that would make the civil  service 
more attractive231.
The  reform  of  the  civil  service  is  still  in  a  phase  of  implementation.  The  legislative 
framework is mainly in line with the European standards, but the implementation still shows 
the tendency to maintaining the party influence. The persistence of the practice according to 
which  the  ruling  parties  “divide  the  spheres  of  influence”  in  administration  and  public 
enterprises shows that the new legislative framework did not safeguard the public sector from 
the party influence.232 
7.1.3. EU AND THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
As Tables 7 and 8 show, the international actors were supportive for the administration 
reform, both by making it become an issue of conditionality, and by providing material and 
technical resources and assistance. Beside the European Union, the other international actors 
that acted as rule promoters were the World Bank, the Council of Europe, the United Nations 
Development Program, the OECD with its SIGMA project and the Norwegian embassy. 
The depoliticization and establishment of a professional  and efficient  bureaucracy were 
among the most often underlined requirements. Beside conditioning the EU integrations with 
the  administration  reform,  financial  assistance  was  also  made  available.  As  the  lack  of 
administrative  capacities  in  Serbia  was,  among  other,  also  caused  by  the  lack  of  material 
resources, the financial assistance made available was of crucial importance. The training of 
civil  servants  financed  and  organized  in  cooperation  with  the  European  Agency  for 
Reconstruction was one of the most important programs in the field. The technical assistance 
in law drafting was also made available, exercising a strong influence in the development of 
the national strategy for the administrative reform. Obviously, such document, once adopted, 
gained a very positive evaluation as far as its compliance with the international standards is 
concerned. 
231 See  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?dd=10&mm=12&yyyy=2007&nav_category=9, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=11&dd=29&nav_id=274353. 
232 For concrete examples of the division of the public enterprises as part of the coalitional agreement after 
the  2007  parliamentary  elections,  see  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2007&mm=10&dd=10&nav_category=11&nav_id=267157,  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2007&mm=10&dd=11&nav_category=11&nav_id=267321. 
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Even  though  the  reports  praised  the  achievements  (mainly  in  setting  the  legislative 
framework), the public administration reform remained among the key priorities of the EU 
partnership. Particularly difficult was the civil service pay system reforms and related human 
resource development measures, the first mainly due to the lack of financial resources in the 
budget,  the  second  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  in  the  process  of,  as  O’Dwyer  called  it, 
“runaway state building”, the political parties are not willing to abandon the source of the 
economic benefits for the party leaders and the main employee for what is known as “partisan 
labor market”. 
7.1.4. REFORM OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: ASSESSMENTS
As we saw, in the field of the reform of the civil service we can distinguish two periods. 
The first period, the Đinđić-Živković government, was mainly characterized by neglect for 
this area and sporadic, ad-hoc solutions for the most urgent problems. Responding to the 
necessity deriving from the regime change to adapt the old bureaucracy to the needs of the 
transition, the government changed all senior officials and all managerial staff, continuing the 
trend of the civil service’s politicization. The neglect of the prime minister’s party for this area 
of  policy,  in  a  system  where  centralization  and  hierarchy  are  coupled  with  lack  of 
communication between the ministries and with a politically weak minister of administration, 
meant that no forces necessary to pursue such complicated and painful reforms were to be 
found. Due to such situation, the lack of domestic change agents was the main cause that 
delayed the reform. 
In the second period, marked by the change of government, the actors formally committed 
to the public  administration reform came into the office.  The collocation at the center of 
Koštunica’s minority government helped to overcome the fears within bureaucracy, and to 
gain,  at  the  time,  an  already  growing  consensus  on  the  need  and  urgency  of  the  public 
administration  reform.  Moreover,  the  international  pressure  was  growing  stronger.  What 
followed were increased efforts to undertake the civil service reform, during which the rule 
adoption was intensified, while the rule implementation saw some difficulties. As we saw, the 
transparent recruitment, professionalism and accountability still are victims to the interests of 
clientele-oriented political parties, yet in a far lower measure than they used to be. The settled 
legislative framework does allow the building in time of the professional civil service, making 
the implementation of the reforms a crucial phase in the years to come. 
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7.2. MACEDONIA: ETHNICIZATION OF THE POLITICIZED ADMINISTRATION
7.2.1. THE FIRST (WRONG) STEPS
The  bureaucracy  that  Macedonia  inherited  after  its  independence  was  hierarchically 
organized, strongly centralized, rigid and inefficient (Risteska, 2006). The legalistic approach 
typical for the Prussian type of bureaucracy was strengthened by the centralization during the 
communism, bringing to the creation of bureaucrats with a tendency to interpret all legislation 
in a very restrictive grammatical way233. After the independence, the process of the “runaway 
state building”234 and the patronage politics of the ruling elite brought to the politicization and 
over-sizing of the administration and public sector, while at the same the economic crisis and 
financial  austerity  made such a large bureaucracy difficult  to maintain.  The result  was the 
lowering of the revenues, the pay-system becoming unable to attract qualified staff235. At the 
same time, the too-low remunerations to protect the clerks from corruption further hampered 
the staff’s integrity and professionalism.
As the  financial  crisis  forced the  government  to  apply  for  the  international  assistance, 
World Bank credits and IMF grants, the country got exposed to external pressures for the 
unpopular  reforms  of  cutting  the  public  spending  and  downsizing  the  administration236. 
Trying to reduce the impact of the difficult  reforms the country was facing, the Albanian 
political  elite  started  arguing  that  the  Albanian  minority  is  underrepresented  in  the 
administration237, an issue that at the same time would be used to gain new job positions to 
fulfill  by the ethnic criteria, but, even more importantly,  would ensure that in the possible 
233 See  SIGMA  report  on  Balkans  public  administration  reform,  The  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of 
Macedonia, 2004, see Risteska, 2006.
234 O’Dwayer, 2004. 
235 The ratio between the lowest and highest salaries in 2004 was only about 1:2.6, while the only supplement 
offered is 0.5% seniority increase every year, not offering any performance incentives.  Source, SIGMA report, 
2004.
236 See the IMF Staff Country Report 00/72, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, recent developments. 
See also the documents of the World Bank linked to the administrative reform in Macedonia. 
237 While the numbers do support such finding (the percentage of Albanians in the public administration – 
7% – was lower than the share in the population – 22%), the question is to what extent such distribution in the 
Nineties was a product, as the Albanian elite was arguing, of discrimination rather than a consequence of the very 
large  demographic  and  cultural  discrepancies  between  Macedonians  and  Albanians.  Thus,  the  prevailing 
traditionalistic  cultural  pattern of  the  Albanian minority  in Macedonia  meant  the high concentration of  the 
minority in the rural areas, with lower education, and with the traditional position of women excluded from the 
labour market.  In this concern we find significant the commission staff  working papers  issued by the EU’s 
commission on the developments in the Southern-Eastern Europe, where in the 1997, '98 and '99 report we find 
the  statement  that  the  representation  of  the  ethnic  minorities  in  the  administration  is  improving  and  is 
satisfactory except for the security sector. 
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structural  reforms the supporters  employed  in  the  administration  would be  spared of  the 
costs.
With the change of government in 1998, the administrative reform, delayed in the first 
seven years, arrived on the agenda. The external pressures, the financial necessity and the new 
elite  determined  to  “reform this  inefficient  residue  of  the  communistic  area”  successfully 
pushed the reform onto the table. The reform was initiated already in 1998, when a working 
group in the government was formed with the intention to draw the national strategy for the 
reform of civil service, adopted in 1999. The strategy underlined the rule of law, transparency, 
competence, stability, responsibility, predictability, equal treatment, efficiency and ethnicity as 
the principles to be pursued by the reform. Consequently (and somewhere in line with the 
IMF requirements, seen that in the year 2000 the country was applying for a new financial 
arrangement with the Fund) the Law on the Civil Servants, Law on Government and Law on 
Organization and Operation of State Administrative Bodies were adopted in 2000. The Law 
on Government shrunk the number of the ministries from 21 to 14 with the intention to re-
size the administration by, as the government in the letter of intent to the IMF underlined, 
“eliminating the surplus positions that emerged”. The same year, a Law on Civil Servants was 
adopted with the aim to regulate the status, rights, duties, responsibilities and salary system of 
the civil servants. According to the law, the selection procedure was to be based on the merit 
principle, vacancies were to be published and, after a vocational examination, the applicants 
were to be selected from the list prepared by the civil servants agency. The civil servants were 
classified  in  three  categories:  i)  executive  civil  servants,  ii)  expert  civil  servants  (for  both 
positions the university degree is required, a provision with strong distributional effects seen 
the lack of university education in minority language, and particularly the low instruction level 
of the Albanian minority), iii) the expert-administrative civil servants, with the college or high 
school degree required. The law further differentiated between 13 different positions in the 
civil service system, where the criteria for the advancements as well as the pay system were to 
be regulated on merit basis, the performance measurement being the main criteria.
However, none of these measures was more than a fake compliance covering the further 
politicization of the administration. Behind the government’s devotion to the reform was the 
desire to put the administration under the control by appointing the staff by partisan criteria. 
The  inter-ethnic  tensions  were  used  as  masks  behind  which  to  cover  the  patronage  and 
corruptive politics the government was undertaking. 
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“From the very beginning, the coalition promoted the principle of the division of the spheres 
of influence on the ethnic lines between the coalition partners.  The cadre-policy followed the 
political  and  ethnic  criteria  that  corresponded  to  the  political  and  ethnic  membership  of  the 
official  in  charge  in  the  particular  policy  area,  resulting  in  the  further  degradation  of 
professionalism.” (Nikolovska and Siljanovska-Davkova, 2001, p. 40, translated by I.M.238).
 
Thanks to the successful use of the nationalistic rhetorics and due to the homogeneous 
ethnic composition of the political parties, the distribution of the resources on the partisan 
criteria took the shape of the allocation on the ethnic key, deepening the already severe inter-
ethnic divisions239. 
The  adopted  legislative  framework  kept  the  numerous  loopholes.  The  Law  on  Civil 
Servants excluded a series of state officials from the category that is to be regulated under this 
law,  the  civil  service  positions  being  defined  as  only  those  where  the  task  is  to  perform 
professional, normative-legal, executive, or administrative-supervisory activities and to decide 
on administrative matters. Very large public sectors (of particular importance are health and 
education system, where the disproportional employment was strongly criticized), the security 
sector  (the  ministry  of  the  internal  is  the  largest  ministry,  the  number  of  police  officers 
significantly increased in the period 1998-2002), the customs and public revenue offices were 
all omitted from compliance with the law and were to be separately regulated. Moreover, the 
newly formed agencies and state bodies were also omitted, even though under the definition 
of civil service they were supposed to be regulated by the law240. The law established the Civil 
Servants’ Agency with a role to manage the recruitment and career of the civil servants. The 
agency was thought as an independent body, but this independence, according to the domestic 
authors, is hampered by the appointment procedure of the head of the agency241. According to 
the first version of the law, the head of the agency was to be appointed by and responsible to 
the government, a situation allowing great party influence over the agency. In May 2001 the 
law was amended, excluding the employees of the Central Bank and Custom administration 
from complying with the law, and changing the procedure for the appointment of the head of 
the agency that now passed to be appointed by the assembly on the governmental proposal, a 
situation that in the asset of the executive control over the assembly surely is not a mechanism 
238 A similar argument on whether the ethnic conflict was used to mask the channels of the corruption in 
government was sustained by Hislope, 2001, 2003.
239 We find an illustration of this mechanism in the case of the “restructuring” of the airport service that took 
place immediately after the formation of the government VMRO – DPA. The new manager, an ethnic Albanian, 
was assigned by DPA and as soon as he came in the office, 70 Macedonians were expelled from the job and 128 
ethnic Albanians (again supporters of the DPA) were employed.
240 See Davitkovski, 2007.
241 See Davitkovski, 2007.
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able to guarantee its independence. Thus, while the first director of the agency was discharged 
after  the  2002  elections  due  to  embezzlement,  abuse  of  power  and  irregularities  in  the 
appointments  of  civil  servants242,  the  second  director  resigned  in  2004,  explaining  his 
resignation with the political pressures and subordination of the agency to the political leaders 
as the main reason. 
Finally,  the  salary  system  prescribed  by  the  law  that  would  result  in  merit-based 
supplements,  and would significantly  improve the  position  of  the administrative  clerks by 
making the position desirable,  this  way granting the better quality  of  the service,  was not 
implemented.
Cuts  in  the  administrative  staff  were  undertaken,  but  instead  of  investing  the  created 
surplus  in  an  implementation  of  the  salary  system that  would  foster  professionalism,  the 
government decided to use the emptied positions  to introduce their  “own people”  in  the 
administration. Parallel with the downsizing, the partisan recruitment was taking place. In the 
period  1998-2002,  marked by the  difficult  reforms of  the  civil  service  and administration 
downsizing, the number of Macedonian civil servants increased from 92.000 to 128.000, all 
employed in the party lines243.
7.2.2. IMPLEMENTING THE OFA
One  of  the  most  important  consequences  of  OFA  concerned  the  Macedonian 
administration,  as  the  principle  of  the  equal  representation  was  one  of  the  most  crucial 
elements of the peace agreement. The equal representation principle meant in practice that the 
ethnic composition of the country should be reflected in all state institutions on all  levels, 
public  administration  and  enterprises  in  particular244.  The  introduction  of  the  equal 
representation as a key for peace and stability in a situation where the fiscal austerity pushes 
for cuts in the public spending and for the downsizing of the administration, can not only 
seriously hamper the professionalization of the civil  service, but may even result in the re-
allocation of the resources along ethnic lines, further increasing the ethnic tensions. 
242 The Civil Servant Agency in that period appeared to be a façade for the illicit and irregular employments 
on political and kinship basis. In the end of 2002-beginning of 2003 the director of the agency Dvojakov was 
accused of abuse of the function and irregularities in the process of the employment, which resulted in numerous 
recruitments that did not fulfill the legal criteria 
(see Utrinski, 2002-12-18, http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1048&stID=3882&pR=3  ,  Utrinski 2002-11-28, 
http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1031&stID=4498&pR=3, Utrinski, 2002-11-28, 
http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1031&stID=4499&pR=3, Utrinski, 2002-11-27, 
http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1030&stID=4393&pR=2).
243 See Gaber – Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2003, 2006.
244 See OFA, article 1.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. See relevant appendix to OFA.
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Following  the  OFA,  all  relevant  legislation  in  the  matter  was  amended  in  order  to 
incorporate the principle of the equal representation. The Code of Ethics of Civil Servants 
was also adopted in 2001. As for the implementation of the legislation and the reform, we 
already underlined how the downsizing was combined with new recruitment in the party lines. 
The change of the government in 2002 brought to a new reshuffle in the administration. 
The  newly  appointed  government  accused  the  previous  elite  of  partisan  recruitment  and 
announced the intention to downsize the administration, first of all by re-examining all the 
recent appointments, with the suspect that they were mainly irregular and partisan-guided245. 
This  brought  to  a  revision  of  the  working  contracts  and  a  series  of  annulments.  The 
politicization however continued, as the “downsizing” and “re-examination of contracts” was 
again guided by partisan interests and concerns. As Hristova (2005) underlined, the line of the 
discrimination and social marginalization in Macedonia follows the party, rather than ethnic 
lines. 
The  particular  contradiction  rose  from  the  combination  of  the  principle  of  equal 
representation and the need to downsize the civil service, both necessary and urgent steps 246. 
The result was an absurd situation in which, in 2003, the government’s decision to dismiss 
2000 people was reported side by side with the news of the opening of 600 posts in the 
administration for the members of national minorities. 
In order to allow the equal representation in the situation where the ethnic minorities were 
unable to satisfy the criteria required by the Law on the Civil  Servants (mainly due to the 
demographic composition of the ethnic Albanian community combined with the education 
policy pursued in the '90s247), the law was further amended in 2004, lowering the criteria for 
the recruitment248.  In such manner the principle of the equal representation turned to the 
245 Decision  of  the  government  of  Macedonia,  published  in  Utrinski, 2002-12-18, 
http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1048&stID=3882&pR=3.
246 The equal representation was strongly promoted by the Albanian minority threatening the use of violence 
in order to ensure the employment of their co-nationals. The financial situation was pressing the government to 
limit the spending. Finally, the external pressures and conditionality pressed the government to pursue both goals 
simultaneously.
247 The share of the Albanian minority in the whole population is 27%, while in 2004 their share in the public 
administration was about 13%. This underrepresentation coincides with the lower education rate of the minority 
population.  Thus,  while  in the primary and secondary education there are about 27% Albanian pupils,  only 
11.2% high school pupils are Albanian. The situation is even more disastrous at the university where, among 
other, also due to the lack of university education in Albanian language, the percentage of Albanian students is 
only 2.8% (Nikolovska and Siljanovska – Davkova, 2001). In order to achieve the equal representation in the 
public administration it therefore appears crucial to face the problem of the education in minority language. 
248 Thus the Article 2 of the Law on the Amendments of the Law on Civil Servants (October 2004) allows for 
the  national  minority  members  who passed  the  training  to  be  employed  without  passing  the  examinations 
required for the recruitment of Macedonian civil servants.
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ethnic key for the re-allocation of resources, which instead of bringing to the reconciliation of 
the ethnically  divided groups and the building of a professional  administration,  resulted in 
increasing the ethnic tensions and in the further ethnicization of politics. 
Besides, or better said, in a perfect match to the ethnic key, the partisan affiliation persisted 
as  a  criteria  for  re-structuring  the public  administration.  The reshuffling  of  all  managerial 
positions down to the smaller units takes place in order to reflect the electoral result, turning 
the “merit-based” recruitment envisaged by the legislation into nothing more than dead letter 
on paper. The Albanian party in the governmental coalition was using the state administration 
and the principle of equal representation to ensure the employment of its own supporters, 
while  the  Macedonian  ruling  party  supporters  were  relatively  protected  from  uncertainty 
during  the  government’s  measures  for  downsizing  the  administration249.  The  low  salaries 
(provisions of the Law on Civil Servants aiming to introduce the merit-based pay system were 
continuously postponed due to the lack of financial resources in the budget), on the other 
hand, made the public service unattractive, hampered the professionalism and independence 
of the civil  servants that in the hierarchical,  politicized system turn from “civil”  to “party 
servants”. 
7.2.3. THE NEW WAVE OF REFORMS
The politicization  and inefficiency  of  the  public  administration  were a  target  of  severe 
external criticisms, which produced growing pressures for the PA reform, particularly in the 
period the country was preparing to apply for the status of the EU candidate country. In 
2004-2005 steps were taken to improve the legislative framework by amending the code of 
ethics for civil servants in 2004 and strengthening the Civil Servants agency in 2004 and 2005, 
improving  the  existing  provision  on  recruitment  and  mobility  of  the  civil  servants.  The 
agency’s capacities were fostered to coordinate the training programs, and in October 2005 
the agency adopted a National System for the Coordination of Training of Civil Servants250. 
Particularly in 2005, as a part of the reformist steps in the aftermath of the application for the 
249 On how DUI conditioned the support to the structural reforms with the employment of the 15 DUI 
supporters in the administration, see Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2004.
250 However, as it can be seen from Table 2, the budget of the agency in this period was not following this 
“strengthening” logic, the amount destined to the agency remaining almost unchanged in absolute terms, while 
the share in state budget shrunk. In 2005 part of the resources (132.000) from the agency’s budget were allocated 
to the training as a part of the government’s priority. The structure of the resources for the administration reform 
shows  that  the  main  issues covered  by  the  reform  concerned the  social  programs  for  downsizing  the 
administration  and  security  sector  and  growing  attention on  the  equal  representation  (in  2008  the  equal 
representation became the highest spending item in the reform), while the training and improving of the financial 
management was given only sporadic attention).
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EU, the implementation of the existing legislative framework significantly improved. The first 
performance appraisal (prescribed by the legislation but never implemented) was completed, 
an action plan to set up a functional human resources management system was adopted, a new 
system of salaries  for civil  servants was introduced,  and the rules for defining disciplinary 
offenses and conducting disciplinary procedures established. The Law on Access to Public 
Information  was  enacted  in  January  and  entered  in  force  in  September,  and  in  order  to 
increase the transparency in public administration a commission was set up to monitor its 
implementation. The trend of pursuing the reform of the civil service continued in 2006 and 
2007, mainly by introducing training, strengthening the cooperation with the Ombudsman and 
increasing the transparency in functioning. Yet, many of the efforts remained only on paper: 
while  the  performance-based  assessments  were  issued,  many  of  the  reports  were  not 
submitted to the agency, while the introduction of career salary supplements stipulated in the 
civil servants law was further postponed251.
The  politicization  and  the  partisan-guided  recruitment  continued.  The  legislative 
framework, even though considered in line with the EU standards, has to be further improved 
in order to avoid dispersion and to improve coherence and consistency. The Law on Civil 
Servants remains narrow in its goal, many categories being excluded from the compliance with 
the law. This further limits the competencies of the Civil Servants Agency, excluding from its 
goals some parts of the administration that exercise the executive power and the entire non-
political public sector (see for example SIGMA report on Macedonia, 2007).  Of particular 
relevance are those periods during the electoral campaign as well as after the formation of the 
new government, both characterized with important shifts in the administration. The agency 
for the statistics brings the number of 3.298 new employments that took place in the electoral 
campaign in 2006 (ten times more than in 2005). At the same time, the change of government 
brought to large-scale dismissals and changes in the managerial bodies, from the high state 
and administrative officials, to the high, medium and even lower rank clerks. According to the 
media the “cadre cleansing” that took place counted few thousand of clerks and employees in 
the public administration and public sector (from the University deans, faculty presidents, to 
the  managers  of  the  smaller  units  in  the  health  care  institutions  and  police  department 
officials). Such practice was also the characteristic of some units of the local self government 
251 On the  recruitment  of  the  civil  servants,  analysis  of  the  existing  models,  description  of  Macedonian 
legislation and the implementation as a key condition for increasing the quality of Macedonian civil service, see 
Vitanski, 2008.
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where, due to the decentralization process that saw a great number of competencies passing to 
the local  level,  the local governments seized the opportunity to use the administration for 
ensuring  employment  for  the  followers.  This  resulted in  increasing  the  stake  in  the  2005 
municipal elections, bringing to the electoral campaign where the promises on the ethnically 
based employments in the local level administration were used to attract the votes (see the 
section on decentralization and on the elections). 
The final result is a deeply politicized administration where the administrative capacities are 
seriously hampered as professionalism is sacrificed to ethnical and party interests. The ruling 
elite has no political will to cope with the issue: the professional, technical approach to the 
reform  and  de-politicization  of  the  administration  would  cause  the  loss  of  a  significant 
resource of power, while at the same time, in a situation of high unemployment rate and large 
scale  poverty,  the  necessary  downsizing  and unpopular  measures would cause the  loss  of 
electoral support.
The costs of the administrative reform that, due to the fiscal austerity, took the shape of 
the  re-allocation  of  the  resources  along  ethnic  lines,  creates  more  pressure  to  the  ethnic 
majority parties and is contributing to increase the ethnic tensions, an issue that is further 
abused by the political elite in the mobilization of the electoral support, hampering the process 
of democratization and covering the rule of the narrow circles of the party oligarchies. 
7.2.4. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
As we already saw, the international community was strongly involved in the promotion of 
the civil service reform. The first changes in the legislative framework in 1999 were part of the 
sectoral policies promoted by the IMF252 and of the NPM reform strongly recommended by 
the World Bank253.  Finally,  the EU in its regional approach through the PHARE program 
offered  its  support  for  the  reform  of  the  civil  service  already  in  the  '90s,  particularly 
underlining the necessity for the de-politicization and the merit-based system of recruitment, 
professionalism, increase of the institutional capacity. In the EU reports prior to 2001, the 
lack  of  a  public  administration  reform  is  seen  as  a  cause  of  problems  with  the  law 
enforcement in the economic matters, while the high personnel cost in the budgetary sector 
252 Macedonia signed the first IMF arrangement in 1995, and further funding was required in 2000.
253 Since 1994 the World Bank was conditioning the financial support in the reform of the pensions and 
health care system with restraining of the state spending.
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and relatively  generous pensions and social benefits were identified as structural  problems 
hampering the financial sustainability254. 
In the periods after  the 2001 conflict,  the EU pressures were concentrated on the de-
politicization  and  creation  of  an  efficient,  professional  civil  service  through  the 
implementation of the existing legislative framework. The EU political requirements in the 
field of the implementation of the OFA insisted on the respect for the principle of equitable 
representation through the adoption and implementation of the strategic plan (EU partnership 
2004).  As  part  of  the  EU economic  issues,  the  EU required  Macedonia  to downsize  the 
number of civil servants in line with the IMF recommendations. 
The civil  service reform became one of the key issues of EU democracy promotion in 
Macedonia. Financial and technical assistance, from the EU and the member states, as well as 
from the World Bank, were made available in order to support the painful reforms (see the 
tables in the appendix).
7.2.5. THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM: ASSESSMENT
The reform of the public administration in Macedonia appears to be a kind of Pandora’s 
box, where the particularly negative setting of the factors makes the reform extremely difficult 
to undertake. The fiscal austerity and lack of resources, the ethnicization of the issue, the 
hierarchical structure of the administration, the narrow political interest in the politicization of 
the administration were, and still are, hampering the reform.
The changes introduced were mainly externally driven, increasing the importance of the 
international  actors  in  Macedonian  democratization.  Due  to  the  particularly  negative 
developments on the domestic level that turned the civil service into a key for the inter ethnic 
peace, the IA included the principle of the equal representation into the standard package of 
the administrative reform, thus indirectly accepting the prevalence of the ethnic principle over 
the civic principle in the recruitment of the civil servants. In line with Tupančeski (2005) we 
can conclude  that  it  is  impossible  to satisfy  the  two principles  at  the  same time,  and in 
Macedonia’s case the necessity to strictly comply with the principle of the equal representation 
entered in conflict with the merit-based principle officially envisaged by the legislator.
As far as the domestic actors are concerned, we can observe how the change agents and 
veto players were interchanging in the different dimensions of the reform. The initiative for 
the settling the legislative framework was coming from the newly elected anti-communist elite 
254 EU report on Macedonia, 1998.
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in 1998, but here we account for the “fake” change agents bringing to the fake compliance 
and  the  “half  undertaken”  reforms.  Similarly  to  what  happened  in  the  decentralization 
process, we can recognize in the ruling political parties (independently on their identity) the 
veto players obstructing the process of de-politicization of the civil service, which in some 
cases even resulted in the open breaking of the legislation. No change agents truly devoted to 
the administrative reform can be found in the country, except, in some moments, the civil 
servants agency that in the vertical conflict for power between the state agencies are trying to 
increase their own powers respect to the government, an effort that, however, is very limited 
in its goal. As far as the implementation of the OFA principle of the equal representation is 
concerned,  due to its  re-distributive effects it  easily  found supporters  among the minority 
political  parties  mainly  playing  a  role  of  change  agents  fostering  the  ethnically  based 
recruitment. Unfortunately, due to its importance, the issue, by becoming the core stone of 
the  peace  agreement,  degenerated to  a  principle  hampering  the  professionalization  of  the 
service as ethnicity prevailed over the merit-based civic criteria for employment. 
7.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
As we could see, both the studied countries undertook the reform of their civil service, 
aiming to its de-politicization, professionalism and increased efficiency. The results, however, 
are not fully satisfactory, both countries being strongly inclined towards the politicization of 
the civil service (a tendency registered in almost all central-eastern European countries, see 
Meyer-Sahling, 2004). Such tendency is particularly present in Macedonia, where the Law on 
the Civil Service is limited in its goal and occasionally (as it was the case with the appointment 
of the senior ranks of civil servants) is not even respected. On the other hand, Serbia, even 
though it still  shows the characteristics of a situation where the politicization and the rule 
implementation  are  not  fully  accomplished,  is  praised  by  the  international  actors  for  its 
generally high level of administrative capacity.
The  differences  in  the  “achievement”  in  the  two  countries  are  a  product  of  the  very 
different settings of factors concerning both the international and the national level. As far as 
the international actors are concerned, the EU showed to be much more active and decisive in 
promoting the reform of the civil  service in Macedonia than in Serbia.  In a very credible 
manner, the EU fostered the reform in Macedonia, combining the general conditionality of 
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 254
the  membership  with  the  more  determinative,  immediate  awards,  finally  conditioning  the 
access to the funds with the rule adoption. The importance the EU attached to the reform of 
the civil service mainly derived from the importance the issue had for the fragile inter-ethnic 
peace in Macedonia. The EU’s approach to the Macedonian civil service reform, the financial 
assistance and the conditionality, all was concentrated on the principle of equal representation, 
pushing the professionalism and merit-based recruitment in the second plan.  The security 
concern prevailed in the EU approach towards the Macedonian civil service reform, unlike 
Serbia where the public administration did not represent an issue that could trigger the rise of 
security concerns. This democratization oriented rule promotion in Serbia’s case explains the 
lower financial support, the more technical (rather than political) approach of the EU to the 
Serbian administrative reform.
Table 1: “The most salient factors and the outcome of the Civil Service reform in Serbia 
and Macedonia”.
Serbia Macedonia
2000-2003 2004- Issues 
concerning equal 
representation.
Issues  concerning 
depoliticization.
IA’s  interest  in 
the field:
Democratization. Democratization. Security. Democratization.
Conditionality: No. Weak  (no 
important reward 
offered).
Strong. Weak.
Domestic 
Change Agents:
Absent. Present. Present. Absent.
Outcome: No reform. Rule  adoption, 
partial 
implementation.
Rule adoption.
Rule 
implementation.
Rule adoption.
Lack of implementation.
On the domestic level we also find significant differences between the two countries. The 
importance the civil  service reform assumed in the inter-ethnic relationships in Macedonia 
forced the actors to adopt the approach that threatened to hamper the professionalism and 
the quality of the newly appointed civil servants. The reform is only partially undertaken: the 
part concerning the equal representation is almost fully implemented, mainly thanks to the 
importance of the issue and the strong presence of the Albanian minority. As far as the de-
politicization is concerned, Macedonia here scores only a fake compliance, both the adopted 
solutions and the implementation phase being very critical. In Serbia’s case, we notice how the 
low conflict over the issue, combined with the presence of the ruling elite interested to push 
the reform forwards since 2004, brought to a relatively smooth process of rule adoption and 
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more or less satisfactory rule implementation. Finally, since 2004, in Serbia we have a rather 
stable  political  asset,  which,  unlike  the  mechanisms  of  accountability,  appears  to  be  a 
particularly  favourable  asset  for  undertaking  the  civil  service  reform in  cases  of  strongly 
politicized administration255 (see Table 1). 
Before  concluding,  we  shall  make  a  few  observations  concerning  the  political 
stability/fluidity and the democratization process. While, as we were arguing in the previous 
chapters, too high a political stability negatively affects the ruling elite’s inclination to establish 
mechanisms  of  the  accountability,  it  appears  to  produce  a  positive  effect  on  the  de-
politicization  of  the  civil  servant.  When  analysing  the  reforms  of  the  civil  service  in  the 
Central-Eastern  Europe,  Meyer-Sahling  (2004)  linked  the  results  of  the  first  multi-party 
elections and kind of the democratic transition  to the de-politicization of the civil servants. 
According to his findings, neither the controlled transition (with the continuity of the ruling 
elite) nor the regime collapse (and the rise of a completely  new elite from the line of the 
opposition) are favourable settings for the de-politicization of the civil service. In the first case 
there is  an incentive for the maintenance of the status quo (see Macedonia 1990-1998,  or 
Serbia  under Milošević),  while  in  the  second case the  change of  the  senior  staff  with no 
reform are the exit (see Serbia 2001-2003). Only in the negotiated transition (reforma pactada) 
that brings the democratic forces to the power, or the subsequent changes of government that 
see the arrival to power of a new government whose political agenda does not differ too much 
from the previous one (partially like Serbia’s case since 2004) creates incentives for both the 
civil servants and for the government to undertake the de-politicising reforms. The relative 
stability  of  the  Serbian  political  scene  since  2004,  the  arrival  of  the  continuity-oriented, 
centralistic coalition to power, the peripheral turnover that, at the same time, brought to the 
change (at  least of  a part of)  the government,  created a dynamic between the politicians-
bureaucrats in which, according to the model of Mayer-Sheling, the de-politicization of the 
civil service is more probable. The persistence of the politicization of the Serbian civil service 
has its roots in the lack of mechanisms of the government’s accountability, in the state capture 
and  feudalization  of  the  Serbian  government  that  withdrew  most  of  the  ministries  and 
executive as well as the welfare sector agencies from the structural dynamics of the system, 
making each single ministry and part of the administration a single story to tell.
255 See Meyer-Sheling, 2004.
APPENDIX 
 Table 2: “Macedonian Agency for public servants budget”.
Year Agency for public 
servants budget
State budget Share
2002 33.274 71700273 0.046%
2003 35.068 67490170 0.052%
2004 32.444 66666000 0.049%
2005 26.660 66538469 0.040%
2006 28.492 81.749.000 0.033%
2007 28.674 79.522.497 0.036%
2008 32.660 89.397.520 0.036%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
Službeni Vesnik na Republika Makedonija.
Table 3: “The budget for the public administration reform as a 
governmental program, Macedonia”.
Year Administrati
on reform 
government
al program 
(total)
Public 
service 
reform
Training 
for the 
civil 
servants
Financial 
management 
and public 
procurement 
management
Ministry 
of 
defense 
reform
Equal 
represent
ation
2005 761.402 499.824 132 5.092 156.607 99.747
2006 643.154 395.183 - 4.642 197.571 45.758
2007 705.585 305.187 - - 267.595 107.546
2008 582.006 176.544 - - 205.462 200.000
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
Službeni Vesnik na Republika Makedonija.
Table 4: “The budget of the Agency for development of public 
administration, Serbia (since 2005 part of the ministry)”.
Institution Revenues from 
central budget
Share in the 
central budget
2002 Agency for development of 
public administration. 
4.877.037
0,002244%
2003 Agency for development of 
public administration. 
8.021.000
0,002517%
2004 Agency for development of 
public administration. 
2.588.000
0,000715%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, Službeni List Republike 
Srbije.
Table  5:  “The  budget  of  the  Human  Resource  Management 
Center, Serbia”.
Institution Revenues from 
central budget
Share in the 
central budget
2006 Human Resource 
Management Center.
46.651.000
0,008507%
2007 Human Resource 
Management Center.
87.583.000
0,013548%
2008 Human Resource 
Management Center.
103.199.000
0,016866%
Source of data: Law on State Budget, 2006, 2007, 2008, Službeni List Republike 
Srbije.
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Table 6: “EU financial assistance for the civil service reform in Macedonia”256.
Year Sum Programs Conditions
2002 €2.06 mil Equitable representation of minorities in the civil service-Category III. Implementation of OFA.
2004 € 1.83 mil Training of minority groups for civil servants (category II - translators and administrators.
2005 €2 mil Assistance to the sector for the Implementation of 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement and Training of 
minority civil servants (Category I).
The key conditionality for the project is the Government’s commitment of resources to the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. It is also crucial that the
Government secures adequate budget resources for this purpose and personnel allocated.
Totale 2000-
2006
5.86 mil euro
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006.
Table 7: “EU assistance for the civil service reform in Serbia”.
Year Sum Programs Conditions
2002 €1.5 mil Support for public administration reform. Condition from MIP:
Progress on drafting, adoption and implementation of laws concerning 
the reform of the public administration, the functioning of the 
administration in key areas such as public procurement, budgetary 
process and financial control and progress on decentralization and the 
role of local government. 
Full cooperation with the work of the Consultative Task Force and the 
future European Integration Office on relevant reforms. 
Transparent civil service recruiting mechanisms introduced and enforced. 
2003 €2mil Strengthening the Ministry of State Administration and Local Self-
government.
2004 €21 mil Further strengthening of overall administrative and financial management.
Reforms (no data available about the amount for the civil service reform 
which represented one of seven issues to be covered by these resources).
2005 €1.4mil Technical assistance for preparation and 
implementation of administrative
Reform.
Conditioned:
The success of the project largely depends on the beneficiaries’ commitment i.e. by timely 
provision of specialist staff, adequate office space and ensuring inter-ministerial cooperation during 
its implementation. These conditions will be detailed in specific Memoranda of Understanding 
prior to project launch.
Total 2000-2006 €4.9-25.9 mil
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006.
256 On the share for decentralization and assembly, see the other sections.
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Table 8: “The EU priorities and civil service reform in Macedonia”.
2002 SAA Provide the Civil Servants Agency with the means to implement civil service reform
in a perspective of integration into the EU structures and promote transparency in the
public administration and in all state bodies.
Downsizing of the Public Administration as agreed with the IMF. Modernization of the Public Administration with a view to upgrading expertise and efficiency, 
notably in the context of the implementation of the SAA with the EU.
2003 SAA Continue legislative and administrative reforms needed to facilitate the implementation of the SAA obligations when it has entered into force, in parallel with the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, and having in mind the need for equitable representation of different communities. A need for new 
employees has to be primarily met through reorganization and redeployment from other administrative bodies in line with conditionality imposed by the IFIs for 
decreasing the total number of civil servants. The reform of public administration should be boosted, including its downsizing by the elimination of non-essential 
functions.
Provide the Civil Servants Agency with the means to implement civil service reform in a perspective of future integration into the EU structures, promote 
transparency and “merit” based organization in the public administration and in all state bodies.
2004 EU 
partnershi
p
Short-term priorities: Adopt a medium term strategic plan for equitable representation of minorities, including adequate budgetary means, and ensure speedy 
implementation. Implement fully the Law on Civil Servants. Further develop the Agency for Civil Servants. Develop appropriate strategic planning and related 
allocation of resources in all Ministries and at Governmental level. Implement the Strategic Development Plan of the General Secretariat. Improve administrative 
transparency and adopt a law on public access to information. Reform the administrative procedures and administrative disputes laws in order to strengthen the 
enforcement of citizens' rights. (See also the part on the ombudsman).
2006 
accession 
partnershi
p
Short-term priorities: Implement fully the Law on Civil Servants. Depoliticize the recruitment and career advancement of civil servants and other public agents 
and introduce a merit-based career system. Improve administrative transparency. Adopt and implement a law on public access to information. Ensure the effective 
implementation of the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants. (See also the section on ombudsman).
2007 
accession 
partnershi
p
Key short-term priorities: Ensure that recruitment and career advancement of civil servants is not subject to political interference, further develop a merit-based 
career system and implement fully the Law on Civil Servants. 
Short-term priorities: Introduce a merit bases career system in order to build an accountable, efficient and professional public administration at central and local 
level. Ensure effective implementation of the code of ethics for civil servants. Strengthen administrative capacity, notably by developing the capacity for strategic 
planning and policy development as well as enhancing training, and develop a general strategy on training for civil servants. Implement effectively the measures 
adopted to ensure transparency in the administration, in particular in the decision-making process, and further promote active participation by civil society. Pursue 
implementation of the reforms of the law enforcement agencies.
2008 
accession 
partnershi
p
Key short-term priorities: Ensure that recruitment and career advancement of civil servants is not subject to political interference, further develop a merit-based 
career system and implement fully the Law on Civil Servants. 
Short-term priorities: Introduce a merit bases career system in order to build an accountable, efficient and professional public administration at central and local 
level. Ensure effective implementation of the code of ethics for civil servants. Strengthen administrative capacity, notably by developing the capacity for strategic 
planning and policy development as well as enhancing training, and develop a general strategy on training for civil servants. Implement effectively the measures 
adopted to ensure transparency in the administration, in particular in the decision-making process, and further promote active participation by civil society. Pursue 
implementation of the reforms of the law enforcement agencies. Ensure adequate administrative capacity to program and manage IPA funds effectively.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia.
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Table 9: “EU priorities and the civil service reform in Serbia”.
2002 SAA Public administration should be reformed and its size made more efficient. Steps should be taken to improve administrative capacity, at all levels of 
government.
2003 SAA Immediately upon adoption of laws, effective implementation and appropriate administrative capacity. Renewal of respect for the rule of law, damaged by the 
events of recent years. Reform of size and efficiency of public administration. Improvement in administrative capacity at all levels of government.
2004 EU 
partnership 
Short term priorities: Adopt a comprehensive strategy on public administration reform including a precise calendar of actions, in particular address civil 
service pay system reforms and related human resource development measures; establish and maintain the relevant institutions and allocate the necessary 
resources; prepare the legislation on government and civil service. 
2006 EU 
partnership
Key short term priorities: Make further sustained efforts to implement the reform of the public administration, including the civil service pay system, to 
ensure transparent recruitment, professionalism and accountability.
2007 EU 
partnership
Key short term priorities: Continue efforts to implement the reform of the public administration, including the civil service pay system, to ensure transparent 
recruitment and promotion as well as professionalism and accountability, strengthen the European integration structures, improve coordination through the 
public administration and parliament and pay particular attention to policy coordination.
2008 EU 
partnership
Key short term priorities: Continue efforts to implement the reform of the public administration, including the civil service pay system, to ensure transparent 
recruitment and promotion as well as professionalism and accountability, strengthen the European integration structures, improve coordination throughout the 
public administration and parliament and pay particular attention to policy coordination.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia.
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Table 10: “Civil service system in Serbia and Macedonia, according to the legislation in force in 2008” (author's elaboration).
Serbia Macedonia
Law on Civil Servants 
adopted in:
2005 2000 (amended: 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005).
The goal of the law: Excluded: political appointees and general service appointees. Excludes: employed in the public sector, security sector, the customs and 
public revenue offices, employed in the agencies and state bodies formed 
after the adoption of the law.
The law makes 
distinction between the 
civil servants and 
political appointees:
Yes. No.
The institution 
ensuring the 
management of the 
civil service:
Human Resources Management Center (HRMC)
High Council of Civil Servants (HCSC).
Civil Servants Agency (CSA)
General Secretariat, Ministry of Finance, human resources units in each 
institution.
The competencies of 
the body entrusted 
with the management 
of the civil service:
HRMC: 
Advertising competitions; preparing and ensuring the implementation of 
the general human resources plan for the whole state administration; co-
ordinated modernization and development of the state administration; 
participating in the drafting of respective legislation; providing opinions on 
rulebooks and staffing tables of state bodies; supporting and guiding state 
bodies concerning personnel management and internal organization; 
managing the central personnel registry of civil servants and general 
service employees; managing the internal labor market; drafting the 
training program proposal for the general civil service, organizing 
professional training; and serving as secretariat to the HCSC as well as to 
the Government Appeals Board.
HCSC: consultative role, preparation and adoption of standards for 
selection of civil servants, preparation of the code of conduct, selection 
and proposal of the three candidates short list for the election of the 
senior civil servants.
CSA: Regulates the functioning of the civil service under its jurisdiction, 
approves the inner organization and systematisation of the vacancies for 
the parts of administration under its jurisdiction; develops the policy and 
gives the advices concerning the issues of systematisation, description of 
the vacancies, selections, employment and dismissal of civil servants, 
equal representation, salaries and revenues, assessing of performance and 
disciplinary responsibility.
Decides on the misdemeanours, coordinates the activities concerning the 
training of civil servants, keeps the register of civil servants; collects and 
elaborates data on the employment of the national minority members, 
monitors and ensures the coherent implementation of the laws and 
regulations concerning the civil servants and appoints the eventual 
incoherences, promotes the efficiency and efficacy in the work of civil 
servants, gives the recommendations to the bodies excluded from the 
compliance with the Law on Civil Servants.
Principles in 
recruitment as called 
for in legislation:
Merit-based. Equal representation, equal access, equal conditions.
Recruitment: The institution publishes the vacancy announcement and appoints the 
commission, which includes one member of HRMC. The commission 
undertakes the examination of the candidates, and creates a short list from 
which the head of the unit chooses one candidate.
The CSA publishes the vacancy announcement and establishes the 
criteria for selection. The head of department with empties vacancy 
appoints the commission, which includes one member of CSA. The 
commission undertakes the examination of the candidates, and creates a 
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The law prescribes the instruction level and necessary experience for the 
different position.
short list from which the head of the unit chooses one candidate.
The law prescribes the instruction level and necessary experience for the 
different position.
Probation period for 
new recruits: 
Yes (duration prescribed by the law for different groups). Yes (duration prescribed by the law for different groups).
Examination after the 
probation period:
Necessary condition for employment. Necessary condition for employment.
Exceptions : - National minority members.
Promotion: Possible through the transfer, as well as through the internal competition. Treated as the new employment, so that the procedure is as for the 
recruitment with the public competition.
Levels of civil servants: 2 layers: senior managerial positions and executive position
senior managerial positions
executive positions: 8 types.
3 layers: executive, professional, administrative
executive: 5 types
professional: 4 types
administrative: 4 types.
Recruitment of the 
senior civil servants:
Public or internal concurs.
HCSC establishing the rules for the selection, tests the candidates and 
produces a shortlist of maximum 3 candidates to the minister of head of 
unit for appointment who then chooses to propose one to the government 
for nomination.
Public concurs obligatory.
Idem as for the recruitment.
Pay system (ratio of the 
salary between the 
lowest and highest rank 
civil servant):
1:9 1:6
Performance 
measurement:
Prescribed by the law, first reports are awaited for. Prescribed by the law, first report activity undertaken but not well 
implemented.
Performance based 
incentives:
Provided for by the law, still not implemented. Provided for by the law, still not implemented.
Training: Organized by HRMC, training program adopted in 2007. Organized by CSA, general training strategy or training program not 
adopted yet.
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Table 11: “Civil service reform in Macedonia, explanatory factors concerning the IA” (author's elaboration). 
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? Yes.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took place? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 5,86
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 2,35
Reform perceived by the IA as:
Necessary for 
the inter-
ethnic peace.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? X
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors 
vulnerable to external criticisms? X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization 
of the law in other ways?
X
Table 12: “Civil service reform in Macedonia, explanatory factors concerning the domestic level” (author's elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: OFA.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Albanian ethnic minority.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Mid.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-ethnic.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Salience.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Ruling elite, political parties, Macedonian ethnic majority.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Albanian ethnic minority.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Yes.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Yes.
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Table 13: “Civil service reform in Macedonia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: X
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: Politicization and ethnicization of the civil service.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Ruling political parties, ethnic minorities.
The status (2008):
Rule adopted and in line with international standards, partial implementation (good implementation concerning the equal 
representation, not satisfactory implementation concerning the depoliticization and professionalism. Agency for civil servants 
exists, it is functioning, yet it is corrupted as it is biased, not following the stated values.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
Some progress has been made in further implementing the Law on Civil Servants. However, there was limited progress in 
strengthening the role of the CSA, in particular in overseeing the overall recruitment process, in assessing the performance of 
civil servants and in disciplinary procedures. Full implementation of the provisions concerning performance related supplements 
has not yet been achieved. Objective and merit-based criteria are not consistently used in recruitment and promotion. There is a 
lack of transparency and accountability in recruitment decisions by individual administrative bodies and the CSA lacks 
mechanisms for assuring the legality and regularity of those decisions. Senior management positions are often filled externally 
without sufficient concern for the professional qualifications and experience, in contravention with the law on the civil service. 
An important weakness of the current framework is that it does not allow the internal promotion based on merit.
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Table 14: “Civil service reform in Serbia, explanatory variables concerning the IA” (author's elaboration).
Failure to reform (2001-2003) The reform (2004 - )
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, 
integration process, access to the funds? No. x
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process 
took place? No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? X Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes. Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 3, 5 (2002, 2003). 4, 9 (total, the 2004 excluded, see Table 6).
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 0,59% 0,44%
Reform perceived by the IA as: State capacity building. State capacity building.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? X Mainly.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the 
country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? X X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or 
was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways? X Yes.
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Table 15: “Civil service reform in Serbia, explanatory factors concerning the domestic level” (author's elaboration).
Failure to reform (2001-2003) The reform (2004 - )
Domestic input for the change: No. Yes (problem in implementation of the other reforms).
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Not present. Ruling elite.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low. Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: X X
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No. No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X  
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Civil servants, ancient regime. Ruling elite, politicized civil servants.
The main beneficiaries of the change: x Citizens, uncompromised components of the civil service.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes. Yes.
Two or more alternative solutions present? X X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid. Stable.
 
Table 16: “Civil service reform in Serbia, outcomes” (author's elaboration). 
Failure to reform (2001-2003) The reform (2004 - )
The procedure of law drafting: X X
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation:
X The possibility for politicization persisted due to the failure to establish a truly 
independent body for the recruitment and career.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Not adopted Ruling elite.
The status (2008): Not adopted Rule in line with IA standards adopted, rule implementation ongoing.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
- Overall, Serbia continues to have good capacity in the area of public 
administration. However, there was a slowdown in public administration 
reform during the reporting period. Further efforts need to be made to fully 
implement the 2005 Law on Civil Servants to improve the recruitment system 
and strengthen professionalism and accountability throughout the civil 
service. Independent and regulatory bodies performed well under difficult 
conditions. Greater determination needs to be shown by Serbian authorities 
to empower regulatory and independent bodies and to ensure that they 
operate effectively.
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8. JUDICIARY SYSTEM
“Cento delinquenti fanno meno male di un giudice cattivo” 
Francisco De Quevedo.
The role and the importance of the judiciary system in democracies has been underlined by 
several  authors  and  even  though  not  always  explicitly  included  in  the  definitions  of 
democracy, it is often recognized as its necessary condition. Thus, for Linz and Stepan (1996), 
the rule of law represents one of the five arenas of democracy, an “necessary condition for the 
political and civil society… and (together with the political and civil society it represents) the 
virtually definitional prerequisite of a consolidated democracy” (see Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 
10). Further on, “the hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported 
by a strong legal culture in civil society” is one of the requirements for the rule of law to be 
established (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 10). For Morlino, the rule of law is one of the two 
procedural dimensions of democracy and it “connotes the principle of the supremacy of law, 
and entails at least the capacity, even if limited, to make the authorities respect the laws, and to 
have  laws  that  are  not  retroactive,  and  are  available  to  the  public,  universal,  stable  and 
unambiguous” (Morlino, 2004, p. 11-12). Here again the independent judiciary is one of the 
key dimensions of the rule of law. Finally for O’Donnell, the political, civil, human rights and 
procedures of democracy are defended by the rule of law, under which all citizens are equal, 
while  the  clear,  publicly  known,  universal,  stable  and  non  retroactive  laws  are  fairly  and 
consistently applied by an independent judiciary.
The establishment of the efficient, independent judicial system is thus perceived by many 
authors  as  the  necessary  condition  for  the  rule  of  law  and  essential  precondition  for 
democracy. Further on, due to the conception which prevailed in the communist countries, 
where the judiciary was perceived as part of the executive and where no professional criteria 
were used for recruitment and career, the EU and the international actors promoting the rule 
of law in the countries of the former communist block concentrated their attention on the 
independence  of  the  judiciary  and  recruitment  and  career  criteria  as  being  key  issues  of 
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concern in their democracy promotion activities (see Piana, 2005). Such agenda, underlining 
the training, professionalism, introduction of the merit-based career criteria combined with 
the  calls  for  the  judicial  independence,  was  also in  line  with  the  register  tendency in  the 
European democracies to increase the independence of the judiciaries also in those countries 
characterized  by  a  tradition  of  civil  law  and  bureaucratic  recruitment  (see  Pederzoli  and 
Guarnieri, 1997). It is then no surprise that the reform of the judicial system found its place in 
the baggage of the norms promoted by various international actors who consider the support 
to democracy in the world the core of their activities. 
In  the  following  sections  we  will  assess  the  situation  in  the  Macedonian  and  Serbian 
judiciary  system  in  terms  of  their  independence  and  efficiency  and  we  will  describe  the 
development of the reforms in this field. In order to assess the independence of the judiciary 
we will describe the structure of the justice system, look into the procedure of the selection, 
appointment and career of the judges, examine the guarantees of the judicial independence 
built  in  the  mechanisms  of  their  recruitment  and  career,  examine  the  procedure  of  the 
administration of the court system, analyze the financing of the court system and the social 
status  of  the  judges  in  order  to  check  for  the  existence  of  the  mechanisms  of  financial 
independence of the judiciary and its staff. The judges’ social position and security of tenure, 
the training and the code of ethics, the disciplinary measures and removal procedure can also 
influence the levels of the judiciary independence and will be included in the analysis. We shall 
look  at  both  the  existing  normative  framework  and  the  procedures  prescribed  in  the 
legislations, and try to assess the implementation of the existing legislative framework. The 
main sources of the data will thus be the official documents, the law drafts and law proposals, 
the amendments proposed and the final documents adopted and put into practice, whereas 
for  analyzing  the  implementation  of  the  law  proposals,  the  legislative  framework,  the 
budgetary resources, we will use official statistics, when available, and secondary sources of 
information
As far as the efficiency of the justice system is concerned, it will be assessed by looking at 
the  official  statistics  (number  of  cases  solved,  dead  log,  number  of  cases  submitted,  the 
enforcement of the judicial decisions, number of cases solved by judge etc), and we will try to 
identify possible sources of problems by examining the working conditions, the material and 
financial resources available to the judiciary, the territorial organization of the judiciary, and 
the judicial procedures. Here again, the legislative framework and the official statistics will be 
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examined, supported by the data on the implementation revealed by the examination of the 
secondary literature and existing analysis.
As we will see, in the cases of Serbia and Macedonia both EU and CoE were engaged in 
the promotion of the judiciary reform, paying special attention to judicial independence and 
efficiency. At the same time, the judiciary appears to be one of the most difficult reforms in 
both countries and brought to rather unsatisfactory results: in Serbia we register the complete 
failure  in providing  legal  guarantees of  the judicial  independence,  while  in  Macedonia  the 
adoption of adequate legislative framework is followed by very difficult implementation.
8.1. SERBIA: REFORM WITHOUT A CHANGE
8.1.1. STRUGGLE WITH THE HERITAGE
Even though on the political agenda, since the change of the regime in 2000, the reform of 
the judicial system in Serbia, so promised and expected, remained one of the reforms without 
results257. The norms aiming to create an independent and efficient judiciary were introduced, 
but  the  changes  did  not  take  place  as  the  rules  adopted  were  either  insufficient  or  not 
implemented. 
The judicial system inherited after the change in 2000 was inefficient, corrupted, politicized 
and as such it lacked the legitimacy and trust of the citizens258. Such situation was mainly the 
product of the continuous undermining of the judiciary in the period of Milošević’s regime, 
when the nominal constitutional guarantees of independence were not realized in practice and 
the judiciary was made completely dependent on the regime. The appointment, dismissal, as 
well as the material status of the judges were in the hands of the executive, either due to the 
legislation in place (this was the case of the appointment procedure), or to the abuse of power 
(which  used to  take  the  shape of  dismissals  and political  harassment  of  the  judges).  The 
regime propelled the corruption of the judicial system by keeping the wages low, ensuring a 
situation where the political corruption and state capture were nourishing the administrative 
corruption of the judges. These two phenomena represented the basis to the judiciary’s loyalty 
to the regime, corrupted judges being unable to refuse the regime’s pressures259.
257 See Hiber, 2005. Also Dallara, 2007, 2008.
258 See Hiber, 2005.
259 See Vukovic, 2002, Begović and Mijatović, 2001.
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The reform of the judiciary was declared by the new elite to be one of the most “urgent” 
reforms and was conceived as “something we can and shall immediately undertake”260. While 
the constitutional  reform would,  among other,  also tackle  the judicial  system, the opinion 
prevailed that the reform should be conducted through changes in the legislations, and then 
the constitutional reform would just bring the constitutional guarantees to the already adopted 
and developed solutions. 261 
The reform “started” in 2001 by the changes introduced in the staff. The judges that were 
dismissed  on  political  grounds  under  the  previous  regime  were  re-appointed  and  the 
presidents of courts suspected of cooperation with the old regime were substituted by the new 
staff (while this was considered a necessary step, the changes of the presidents of courts rose 
some concerns, as in some cases it took the shape of political purges262). Another important 
initial decision was to enforce the existing legislative framework while preparing the new ones. 
The government in the meantime proceeded with drafting the laws aiming to reform the 
judicial system. The core concept of the government’s proposal was the discontinuity in the 
institution  of  judiciary,  aiming  to  use  the  reform  of  the  judiciary  to  remove  all  judges 
suspected  of  abusing  their  power  and  of  human  rights  violations  during  the  previous 
regime263. The matter was to be solved by the adoption of the Law on the Judges and Courts 
in which the organization of the judicial system was the most important part. The law was 
dismantling the existing courts and establishing new ones, a process that further required the 
re-appointment of all judges in the new courts. This way, the lustration of the judges and the 
“cleaning of the incompetent cadres of the ancient regime” was to be undertaken through the 
establishment of the new judicial system and such, ex-novo created judiciary, would be given 
full independence from the other two branches of power. All procedures for appointment, 
career and dismissal, as well as the financing of the judiciary, were regulated in this law draft in 
a manner that ensured the full independence of the judiciary and the removal of any political 
interference. 
The law draft was accepted by the government and sent to the public debate by November 
2001. Before the debate finished, another reformist draft was proposed to the assembly by the 
DSS deputies. 
260 Vojislav Koštunica, speech on the conference: “Strategija reformi” odrzanoj 15/09/2001.
261 Idem.
262 From the interview with M.S, judge of the first instance court, August 2008.
263 See Hiber, 2005.
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The law proposed by DSS underlined the policy of the continuity, especially in the judicial 
staff.  It  aimed to introduce the judicial  independence without lustration (guaranteeing  the 
security of tenure to all judges) and to increase the efficiency of the judicial system through a 
slightly modified organization of the courts. The law was adopted without passing the public 
debate. Apart from the lack of consulting the civil society, it was declared to be in line with 
the European democratic standards. 
The laws adopted in November 2001264 were a product of the compromise between the 
DOS (DS) and DSS in which the policy  of continuity  prevailed.  Such compromise was a 
product of a larger bargaining process in which the judicial reform and the Law on Work 
proposed  by  the  government  became  part  of  the  political  bargaining  in  the  unofficial 
negotiations  between  DOS  and  DSS  over  the  reconstruction  of  the  government.  The 
government and the DS showed their disapproval towards the legislation by not taking part to 
the rule adoption process: the Minister of Justice and the government’s representatives were 
not present to the session, the DS’ deputies did not participate to the discussion, while the law 
was adopted with a  large majority  due to the support  received by the opposition as  well, 
namely Milošević’s SPS. During the discussion,  the actors that refused to vote for the bill 
(SRS) argued that the law proposed by DSS was substantially the same law drafted by SPS in 
1996  but  which  was  refused  by  the  parliament.  The  DSS  deputies  admitted  that  some 
solutions were “inspired by this proposal”265. 
The most important and most positive changes introduced by the legislations in 2001 were:
The new procedures of appointment and dismissal of judges and public prosecutor were 
introduced, aiming to ensure the prevailing of professional criteria through the establishment 
of the High Judicial Council (established as a specialized independent body). The composition 
of the body was designed in a manner to give the decisional majority to the judges and their 
representatives in the council;
The material independence of the judges was pursued by the minimal wages guaranteed by 
the  law,  which  then  were  at  very  high  levels  (for  example,  the  salary  of  a  judge  of  the 
264 The Law on Judges, Law on public prosecutor, Law on the High Judicial Council, Law on organization of 
courts and the Law on the territorial organization of courts and public prosecutors offices,  published in the 
Official Gazette, 63/2001.
265 http://arhiva. glas-javnosti. co. yu/arhiva/2001/11/01/srpski/P01103118. html,
http://arhiva. glas-javnosti. co. yu/arhiva/2001/11/03/srpski/D01110205. shtml,
http://arhiva. glas-javnosti. co. yu/arhiva/srpski/arhiva-index. html.
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constitutional court was to be equal to the salary of a minister). The HCJ was given the power 
to further increase the salaries when it considered it to be appropriate;
Specialization of the courts through the installation of appellate courts and administrative 
court, as well as the changes of competencies of the High Court that was supposed to become 
the cassation court;
The legislation also tried to give other guarantees of independence and efficiency: the role 
of the court’s president in supervising (but not influencing) the work of the judges, as well as 
the  role  of  the  supervision  of  the  higher  courts  respect  to  the  lower  rank  courts  was 
clarified266. 
The lack of a real consensus over the laws adopted as a product of the inter-party trade 
became the most serious obstacle in the implementation phase. Only few months after the 
adoption of the new procedure for the judicial appointment and the formation of the High 
Judicial Council (even though with delay), the conflict burst between the judicial and executive 
(legislative) and produced those changes in the law that significantly undermined the High 
Judicial Council. The Law on Judges, Law on the High Judicial Council, Law on the Public 
Prosecutor were amended already in July 2002 (then, further amendments followed in 2003, 
2004, 2005), gradually taking away the powers of the high council and bringing them back to 
the national assembly. The most controversial change was introduced in July 2002 with the 
amendments to the Law on Judges. The changes introduced allowed the “special conditions of 
dismissal of judges”, opening the possibility for the lustration to be conducted within one 
year. In order to ensure the executive’s influence over the process, the Minister of Justice was 
given the right to propose the dismissal,  while  the assembly was given the instruments to 
avoid the High Judicial Council in the process of the judicial appointment. Considering the 
control executive and political parties keep over the Serbian parliament267, the ruling coalition 
was given the possibility to dismiss the judges it considered “politically inappropriate”. This 
“solution” was meant to prevent the old regime supporters, still present in the judiciary, to 
influence the election of the judges. The DOS and the supporters of the law perceived the 
independence of the judiciary without lustration as extremely dangerous for the reforms, and 
thus, in the name of the democratic reforms and greater good, such independence was taken 
266 On the content of the changes introduced see also Dallara, 2007, 2008.
267 As we will see in the section dedicated to the parliament, due to the Law on Elections of 2000, political 
parties’  statutes and since 2006 thanks to the article 102 of the constitution,  the mandate of the deputies is 
controlled by the political parties. Through a system of blank resignations, the political parties ensure that the 
deputies are always following the party’s line, this way subordinating the assembly to the political parties of the 
ruling majority.
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away268.  However,  this solution was raising a series  of concerns, as it  failed to ensure the 
prevailing  of  the  objective  criteria  in  the  process  of  dismissal-appointment,  opening  the 
possibility  for the lustration to become nothing  more than a political  purge and a further 
politicization of the judiciary. The lustration itself was, and still is, a source of pressures over 
the  judges  as  well  as  an  obstacle  to  their  work,  as  it  creates  a  continuous  sensation  of 
insecurity (from the interview with D.Z., judge of the first instance court in Nis). The fear of 
lustration  that,  in  the  absence  of  clear  criteria  and  seen  the  overall  politicization  of  all 
institutions, is perceived as an excuse for political purges, thus encourages the judges, fearing 
their  own  position,  to  seek  for  the  political  protection  of  the  new  masters.  “They  say 
“lustration”,  “de-politicization”,  but who will  decide? According to what criteria? It  is  not 
normal that the judges follow the parliamentary elections with fear and consider the electoral 
exit as a verdict for their future, but this is the case in Serbia” (from the interview with M.S., 
judge of the first instance court in Belgrade, August 2008).
The procedure of assessing the constitutionality of amendments introduced in July 2002 
was immediately initiated by the constitutional court, an initiative coming both from inside the 
judiciary  (the  association  of  prosecutors,  judges,  lawyers)  and  from different  NGOs.  The 
constitutional court suspended the implementation in October 2002, and decided, in February 
2003,  that  the  provisions  were  unconstitutional269.  The role  of  the  constitutional  court  in 
defending the judiciary from the attacks of the executive and legislative in this period showed 
to be crucial. The period 2002/2003 represents a period of real intra-institutional war for the 
control over the judiciary: the executive was passing the amendments and decisions one after 
the other, aiming to re-establish control over the justice, while the constitutional court went 
on declaring them unconstitutional. The effort to bring the presidents of courts and public 
prosecutors  under  a  stronger  executive  control  were  prevented  by  the  decisions  of  the 
constitutional court.
The question of the continuity-discontinuity in the judicial staff was, and still is, a most 
important obstacle in the reform of the Serbian judiciary. The number of judges is considered 
by the police makers to be too high, as well as the number of employees in the judicial system 
(about  2.500  judges  and  8.500  administration  staff  in  a  country  of  8.000.000  citizens, 
compared with 630 judges and 2.800 in Macedonia with 2.000.000 of citizens), calling for cuts 
268 Hiber, 2005.
269 Odluka ustavnog suda IU – 122/2002 od 11/02/2003, Sluzbeni glasnik RS 17/2003 I 25/03, I odluka 
ustavnog suda IU – 122/2002 od 03/10/2002.
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in  the judicial  system,  while  the  Judges’  Association  of  Serbia  underlines  that  rather than 
overcrowded, the judicial staff is not well distributed, neither adequately structured (a high 
number  of  clerks  is  paired  to  a  very  low number  of  assistants  to  judges).  The  territorial 
distribution of the courts (and consequentially  the number of judges in proportion to the 
workload  and  number  of  citizens)  was  reported  in  the  interviews  as  inadequate270 and 
identified as one of the causes of the so often complained for inefficiency due to the unequal 
distribution  of  the  workload.  The  analysis  of  the  workload  showed  that  the  growing 
inefficiency of the courts goes together with the growing efficiency of judges in terms of the 
number  of  cases  solved.  However,  if  compared  to  the  Macedonian  judges,  the  Serbian 
judiciary  does  appear  overcrowded and extremely  unequally  distributed  over  the  territory. 
Thus, the Serbian judge solves an average of 454 cases per year, with a very low efficiency if 
compared to his Macedonian colleague, solving 1137 cases per year. However, in Serbia there 
are huge differences between the courts, in some case the judges receive less than 1 case per 
month (12 per year),  whereas in bigger cities they handle more than 90 cases per month, 
showing  that  the  low  comparative  efficiency  is  mainly  the  consequence  of  an  unequal 
distribution of the workload and inadequate territorial organization.
The presence of the judges appointed by the ancient regime brings to a situation where the 
judiciary is a strong proponent of the policy of continuity. On the other hand, the lack of trust 
in judiciary (very high in Serbia: according to the public opinion surveys only 29% of Serbs 
trust the judiciary system271) legitimates the executive’s requests for lustration and control. The 
problem of the continuity/discontinuity and the executive’s  control  over the judiciary was 
particularly aggravated in 2003 when, after the assassination of the Prime Minister Đinđić, the 
state of emergency was introduced. The government used the state of emergency to put the 
opponents aside in the line of judiciary, 25 judges being unlawfully retired and replaced by 
judges  appointed  through  a  politically  driven  process.  Amendments  to  the  Law  on 
Prosecutors  were  also  made,  giving  the  Minister  of  Justice  the  power  to  nominate  the 
prosecutors. These attempts to impose control over the judiciary were all challenged in front 
of the constitutional court, making the constitutional review a defense weapon used by the 
judiciary.  But  while  the  judicial  system  is  one  of  the  important  players  defending  its 
270 See for example the report of  the Supreme court of Serbia  for  2007,  where an inadequate territorial 
network of the courts is perceived as one of the most urgent issues to tackle. Also, interview with D.Zdravkovic, 
first instance court of Nis, august 2008.
271 Data from the CPS researches of public opinion, Mihajlovic, 2005.
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independence and security of tenure of the post of the judge, the same principle also protects 
the undemocratic, illiberal, incompetent or compromised members of the system. 
What started as a conflict in the political elite between the continuity and discontinuity in 
the reforms immediately after the change of the regime, gradually turned into a conflict over 
the balance of powers between executive and judicial, where those democratic political parties 
that were at the beginning advocating the policy of “continuity and independence” gradually 
changed the preference and embraced the position “control and discontinuity”. This becomes 
evident  if  we  compare  the  level  of  independence  granted  to  the  judiciary  by  the  2001 
legislation and the level of independence envisaged in the draft constitutions proposed by the 
government in 2004, in the action plan for the reform of the judiciary adopted in 2006 and in 
the constitution adopted in 2006, in each of which the main initiative came from the party of 
the prime Minster Koštunica, DSS. There appears to be a consensus between the strongest 
political parties over the necessity to lustrate and thus re-appoint all judges, the differences 
over the criteria representing the apple of discordance. At the same time, in the judiciary there 
appears to be a diffused refusal of the politically  concentrated process of lustration as the 
judges, supporting or not the necessity to clean the judiciary, all underline that there are no 
legal bases in Serbia able to ensure the professional, merit-based process of re-appointment of 
judges and that any lustration process in the absence of professional criteria would do more 
harm than good.
8.1.2. THE REFORM WITHOUT CHANGE 
Unlike the turbulent period 2001-2004, when the legislative framework of the judiciary was 
under continuous change through amendments and constitutional court interventions, in the 
period of Koštunica’s government we count a less dynamic period where the only substantial 
change in the Law on Judges re-integrated the assessments of the constitutional court272. The 
changes introduced with the amendments in 2005 and 2006 did no longer tackle the question 
of  the  nomination  or  dismissal  of  judges  and  prosecutors,  but  concerned  the  salaries  in 
judiciary. The difficulties in the implementation of the 2001 legislation and continuous conflict 
between executive and judiciary have undermined the implementation of the articles 30-35 of 
the Law on Judges concerning the salaries of judges. Thus, in 2005, the basic salary of the 
judges in the High Court, which was supposed to be at least at the level of the ministerial 
wage, amounted to only half of it. The government tried to change the basic salary of judges 
272 On the developments of the reform of the judiciary during Koštunica, see also Dallara, 2007, 2008.
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by a governmental decision prescribing different wages for the employed in executive and in 
judiciary. The constitutional court proclaimed this decision illegal as it was against the Law on 
Judges, bringing to the amendments of the Law on Judges in 2005, through which the wages 
in  judiciary  were  equalized  with  the  wages  in  the  ordinary  administration  and  further 
diminished, while the power to propose the increase was taken away from the HCJ and made 
subject to the ministerial veto. The inadequate compensations for the employed in the court 
administration is an even more serious problem, as in some cases the wages of the clerks are 
even under 300 Euros per month, and this unsatisfactory financial status, especially for the 
administrative staff, is often a cause for the corruption of the court clerks. 
The  control  of  the  performance  and  the  concept  of  minimal  workload  were  also 
introduced,  as  well  as  the  number  of  cases  to be  solved per  month  established  for  each 
category of judges, but the salary and compensation were not linked to the performance. “It is 
said  that  the  efficiency  and  performance  criteria  should  be  taken  in  consideration  for 
promotion and further career, yet this is not the case. Whether you fulfill the norm or not it is 
all the same” (from the interview with D. Zdravković, judge of the court of first instance in 
Niš, August 2008). 
As a positive development in this period we count the adoption of the Law on Education 
of Judges in 2006. Until the adoption of this law, the judicial training was undertaken in the 
Center for the training of judges organized by the Association of Judges in cooperation with 
the Ministry  of  Justice.  The center was very active  in  providing  training,  seminars,  round 
tables, courses, gaining the approval of the international actors and the users of such service, 
but the lack of an adequate legislative framework regulating the training of the judicial staff 
was making the training center a weak, ad-hoc institution. The Law on Education of Judges 
finally  offered  a  legal  basis  for  the  functioning  of  the  training  center  and  regulated  the 
questions of the curricula for the judicial staff. According to the law on training, the education 
is both a right and duty of the judges, prosecutors, their assistants and other employees in the 
judicial system, in certain cases being mandatory by law. The High Judicial Council was also 
given the power to make the training mandatory when it considered it appropriate. Both initial 
and permanent training courses are organized, some of them made compulsory, other strongly 
recommended. The content of the education is decided by the High Judicial Council in the 
case of the training prior to assuming the office, and by the training center itself in the case of 
permanent education. The high judicial council is authorized to supervise the implementation 
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of the education programs. The education and training programs are financed by the state 
budget. The introduction of the training center was a very positive step, seen the fact that the 
legal  education  in  Serbia  is  considered  not  sufficient  to produce high quality  judges.  The 
training in the human rights standards and gradual improving of the legislation were often 
underlined in the interviews as one of  the few positive  developments in the recent years’ 
positive development.
The two most important documents adopted in 2006 were the national strategy for the 
reform of the judiciary and the new constitution of Serbia. As argued by the representatives of 
the  judiciary,  these  documents  have  actually  weakened  the  judiciary  and  hampered  its 
independence, and in many aspects represented a negative turn from the solutions adopted in 
2001. Unlike the starting period in 2001, when legislators seemed devoted to the idea of an 
independent judiciary, both the draft proposal of the constitution as well as the strategy for 
the reform of the judiciary and constitution adopted in 2006 actually opened the door to a 
stronger political influence over the judiciary. The main problem concerns the composition of 
the High Judicial Council whose 11 members are all either appointed by the simple majority in 
the  assembly  (8)  or  are  partisan by  definition  (minister  of  justice,  president  of  a  relevant 
committee in the assembly). Even though the Venice Commission’s opinion on the articles of 
the constitution concerning the judiciary was requested by the domestic elite, and the detailed 
instructions in order to ensure the judiciary independence were available, the final document 
only apparently followed the CoE recommendations, introducing structural changes to the 
system  in  a  way  to  maintain  the  political  control  over  the  judges.  In  addition  to  the 
mechanisms that do not prevent the political influence in the process of the election of judges, 
the constitutional law opted for a policy of discontinuity according to which all courts should 
be closed and then established again, meaning (according to most of the interpretations) that 
all judges shall be re-confirmed and re-appointed as well. In a situation where there are no real 
guarantees for the independence of the judges, where the re-nomination is in the hands of the 
body whose political independence is undermined and where no clear criteria for nomination 
are used, this provision raises serious concerns.
The new laws regulating the judicial system are still to be adopted. The National strategy 
for the reform of the judiciary and the action plan adopted in 2006 prescribed the necessary 
steps that shall establish an independent, efficient, transparent and accountable-for judiciary. 
However, the strategy has been criticized for its failure to provide an effective self-governing 
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structure  of  the  judiciary,  for  not  ensuring  the  independence  of  the  prosecutor  and  for 
prescribing  the  prohibition  period273.  According  to  Tomić,  member  of  the  high  judicial 
council, the constitution actually opted for and further developed the bad solutions envisaged 
in  the  national  strategy  for  the  reform  of  the  judiciary.  The  possibility  to  mend the 
shortcomings identified in the constitution through the ordinary legislation exist, but the lack 
of a constitutional guarantee to protect the judicial independence means that the events of 
2002-2003,  when  the  executive  was  struggling  for  control  over  the  judiciary  might  easily 
repeat. The law drafts prepared in the beginning of 2008 by the Ministry of Justice tried to 
face some of the shortcomings (being declared by the Venice Commission rather in line with 
the European standards, even though with some issues to be faced, especially in the Law on 
Judges). Yet it is to be seen whether the solutions proposed in the law draft to overcome the 
deficiency of the constitution will find their place in the adopted documents. Judging by the 
Serbian  record  in  respecting  the  recommendations  of  the  Venice  Commission  and 
international expertise, there is a fear that the acceptable law draft will turn into its caricature. 
The constitutional law offered a possibility for the “lustration” process as it stated that the 
old courts shall  cease to exist and new courts would be formed. The provision apparently 
opened  the  door  for  the  lustration  and  re-appointment  of  all  judges,  but  the  imprecise 
formulation (it is the courts, not the judges, to be created ex novo, while both the old and the 
new  constitution  guarantee  the  security  of  tenure  for  judges)  combined  with  the 
unconstitutionality – underlined by the exponents of the judiciary – of such provision, seen 
that the security of tenure is guaranteed by both the old and the new constitution, opened a 
conflict over its interpretation274. Further on, the criteria for re-confirming the judges are still 
not clear, leaving the possibility opened to both lustration and improving, but also for the 
further politicization and degradation of the judiciary, all depending on whether professional 
or partisan criteria would be used in the potential procedure of re-appointment. Up until mid-
2008,  the  re-appointment  was  not  undertaken,  neither  the  appellate  courts  have  been 
established. The blockage in the assembly (both due to the political situation, concentrated on 
other issues, as well as to the conflict over the judiciary reform) brought to the blockage of the 
process, resulting in a situation where no new judges are appointed,  neither those that no 
273 For the reform of the judiciary in Serbia as a case of the fake compliance, see also Dallara, 2007, 2008.
274 Omer Hadziomerović,  deputy  president  of  the Association of Judges of  Serbia,  interview for  Danas, 
13.11.2006. Also interview of the author with Zdravković D., judge of the court of the first instance in Niš, 
August 2008. For the analysis of the Article 7 of the law on Implementation of the Constitution and discussion 
on the possible interpretations and its constitutionality, see the analysis of Rakic-Vodinelić, 2007.
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longer have the right to work (on the basis of Law on Retirement or even due to criminal 
charges against them) are not dismissed. The famous lustration is still pending as a sword over 
the judiciary, reappearing every time the reform of judiciary is tackled. At the same time, the 
persistence of this status quo and delay in re-appointing the judges is “creating an extremely 
unpleasant sensation of insecurity of the judges for the future”275 and the delay is opening the 
door to unprofessional judges to seek even more intensively the political protection of the 
parties276.  The  whole  procedure  of  reappointment,  if  conducted  on the  clear,  transparent 
criteria based on the professionalism, may also be a very positive step: first of all it  could 
increase  the  quality  of  the  judicial  staff,  and it  would  also put  an end to the  continuous 
disputes between the political parties over continuity/discontinuity serving as a step to regain 
legitimacy and trust in the judicial system. Yet, the problem of the still unclear criteria for such 
step persists. The draft of the Law on Judges does not prescribe any particular procedure for 
the re-appointment of the old judges, thus giving no guarantee that the existing judges will be 
re-elected in case the article 7 of the constitutional law is applied. Further on, the article 51 
prescribes that the HCJ shall propose two candidates for each post of judge to the assembly, 
raising concerns of further politicization of the whole procedure (Venice Commission opinion 
N. 464/2007). The government gave their reassurance that the final version of the law will 
prescribe the procedure for the re-appointment as well.
The reform of the judiciary was also supposed to face the elementary material problems of 
the courts: introduction of computers in tribunals (as well as training the staff to work on the 
computers),  equipment  for  the  offices,  financial  means  for  specialists,  bad  infrastructure 
conditions, lack of material working conditions. Many of these issues have been already dealt 
with, mainly thanks to international  donations.  However,  the critical  material situation still 
persists, as it is well depicted in the annual work reports of the High Court. 
8.1.3. THE RESULTS OF THE REFORM
As already mentioned above, the reform of the judicial system is one of the fields in which 
the continuous legislative  changes produced almost no effects  in  terms of  establishing  an 
independent judiciary system. 
As far as the efficiency is concerned, there is a significant percentage of unsolved cases that 
do not actually seem to decrease (on the contrary, they seemed to increase if compared to 
275 From the interview with the Zdravković D., August 2008.
276 From the interview with Miodrag Majič, president of the Belgrade court of first instance, published in 
Danas, 13.11.2006.
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their number in 2002). However, if we consider the fact that the number of cases submitted to 
the court was also increasing, and if we consider the number of cases solved per year, then it 
can be seen that there was some progress in efficiency of the employed, even though it is 
obvious that the system is not capable to cope with the increasing number of cases. 
Corruption is another significant issue when it comes to the judiciary. According to the 
survey on the corruption in judiciary conducted in 2004 (Begović et al.), about 85% of the 
people working in the judiciary (judges, prosecutors, representatives before courts and staff) 
believe that there is corruption in the judicial system (21% believes that the corruption is very 
widespread, 64% that there is a certain level of corruption). According to the results of the 
research,  the  main channel  of  corruption  goes  through the  executive  and legislative  (thus 
institutional corruption/state capture) where the judges trade their decision in exchange for a 
better position, promotions or some material advantage (about 23% of respondents claimed 
that the channel of corruption are via representatives of executive and legislative branches, 
while about 75% of respondents testified that the corruption in the judiciary is influenced by 
the  dependence  of  judicial  on  the  executive).  The  specialized  staff  (judges,  lawyers, 
prosecutors) is considered to be the main link in the chain of corruption: more than 50% of 
the  interviewed  members  of  the  judiciary  considered  these  figures  responsible  for  the 
corruption in judiciary. The administrative staff is also rather exposed to corruption, often due 
to their inadequate material status277. 
Consequently,  the  citizen’s  opinion  on  the  judicial  system  remained  rather  negative. 
According to the CeSiD surveys, only 32% of citizens trusts judges, while more than a half 
(58%) does not trust the judiciary. Even though very low, this result places the judiciary above 
other two branches of government (legislative 27:65, executive 30:62) as well as above the 
political parties and politicians, which are the two least trusted institutions.278 The level of trust 
seems to be higher than in 2000 (when only 23% of citizens declared to trust the judicial 
system), but the same is true for the level of mistrust (in 2000 45% of citizens declared that 
they do not have any confidence in the judicial system). Media and politicians are also a source 
of low trust in judiciary, contributing with their sometimes irresponsible statements to the 
delegitimization of the system: “Searching for sensations, media are often reporting cases of 
bad practice, not paying attention to our everyday work when people are honestly doing their 
277 All data are taken from Begović et all, 2004.
278 Mihailović, 2005.
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jobs. Similarly, politicians are also irresponsible in their statements concerning judiciary. You 
can often hear them criticizing the court decisions, or giving statements that leave ordinary 
people with the sensation that the politicians are really controlling the judiciary, even when it 
is not the case. How can you pretend citizens to trust the system then?” (from the interview 
with M.S.).
As far as the role of the judiciary in promoting and protecting human rights is concerned, 
due to its lack of independence, to the shortcomings in the legislative framework (the anti 
discrimination legislation is not up to the European standards) and due to the lack of adequate 
understanding  of  the  human  rights  protection,  the  most  socially  marginalized  groups 
(especially the LGBT population, the sex workers and the drug addicts) are often subject to 
discrimination  by the  judiciary  system.  Even when they  decide  to  seek justice  before  the 
courts,  the  victims  of  the  homophobia-based  violence  are  considered  responsible  of 
provocations: “As the discrimination based on the sexual orientation is not recognized in the 
legislation,  if  you try to bring  the case in front of the courts,  even if  it  is  about physical 
violence, the answer you get is something like ‘you should not have been intimate with your 
partner in public’, or ‘you should have not publicly proclaimed your sexual orientation in the 
first place’. Obviously, there are also judges who are more understanding towards the issue, 
but given the slow efficiency of the judiciary, long procedure, and lack of adequate legislative 
frameworks, the capacity of the judiciary to protect the basic human rights of the marginalized 
groups is  low” (from the interview with Ajdarević J.,  human rights  activist,  Lambda,  Niš, 
2008). 
The reform of the judicial system in Serbia is still pending. In the period immediately after 
the change of regime some positive steps were taken (the laws adopted, even though without 
possibility  for public  discussion and without proper involvement of the non-governmental 
actors,  were  assessed  as  a  very  positive  step).  However,  the  changes  introduced  in  the 
legislation in 2002 and 2003, the conflict over the power that took place and the consequent 
uncertainty of the legislative framework has seriously undermined the positive achievements 
from 2001. The implementation of the laws introduced was also difficult, the main reasons 
being both the political interference as well as the lack of financial resources. The documents 
adopted  in  2006  do  not  represent  an  adequate  framework  for  the  development  of  an 
independent  judicial  system The  lack  of  clear  constitutional  guarantees  and  constitutional 
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solutions opening the door to political interference are significant problems, especially in the 
light of the reluctance of the Serbian ruling elite to give away their control over the judiciary.
8.1.4. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY 
The reform of the judicial system was immediately perceived as one of the priorities of the 
international actors engaged in helping Serbia’s newly established democracy to consolidate, 
both due to the importance of the independent judicial system for the democratization and to 
the Serbian judiciary’s very difficult situation. The pressures for the reform of the judiciary 
were exercised both by the EU and by the Council of Europe, both providing the material 
resources  and  making  technical  assistance  available  (please  see  the  tables  5,  8,  10  in  the 
appendix). As we can see from Table 5, the reform of the judicial system was subject to the 
priorities underlined in the commission’s reports in 2002-2003, and found its place among 
both short terms and key short terms priorities in the EU partnerships 2004, 2006, 2007279. All 
priorities underlined the importance of the establishment of an independent judiciary and of 
avoiding political interference, individuating the main problems in ensuring the independence 
of judiciary in the appointment criteria and procedures and in the lack of an independent 
budget.  In  the  conclusions  of  the  EU Council  of  ministers  on the  Western Balkans,  the 
reform of the judiciary and security sector reform were often underlined as the most urgent 
issues to tackle. Judging by the tone of the commission reports, the pressures of the EU to 
pursue the reform of the judiciary was growing in line with the developments in the Serbian 
judicial system: the appraisal for the steps undertaken at the first year of transition, with the 
growing severity of the tone, while the priorities became more numerous and more precise. 
However, the conditionality effect in pursuing the judiciary reform was inconsistent due to the 
EU’s overall approach to Serbia that was mainly security-guided and concentrated on other 
political issues280. As it was underlined in the Multi-annual indicative program for Serbia and 
Montenegro 2004-2006 (but this is still the case due to the Kosovo issue):
“The first  MIP (Multi-annual  Initiative  Program) 2002-2004 has striven to support  the 
progress  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  in  the  above-mentioned  difficult  political  and  socio-
economic scene (political conflict, destiny of the state union, problem of Kosovo and Southern Serbia, I.M.) 
which has, to a certain extent, hampered the efficiency and results of the CARDS assistance to 
support reforms and progress in the SAP”.
279 On the EU promotion of the judiciary reform in Serbia see also Baracani, 2005. 
280 On the “vagueness” of the EU in approaching the reform of the judiciary in Serbia and on the lack of 
credibility in promoting the reform, see Dallara, 2007, 2008.
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While the reform of the judiciary was identified as one of the key reforms in Serbia, due to 
the lack of domestic consensus over Serbia’s foreign policy, the political concerns of the EU/
Serbia relations prevailed, pushing the domestic reforms behind. Until now, the conditionality 
linked to the judicial reform has not been given strong accent. In the action plan of Serbia for 
accessing the EU in the field concerning “ensuring the independence of the judiciary”, the 
adoption of the constitution is considered as a step ensuring the judicial  independence as, 
according to the Serbian authorities, the HJC is an independent institution.
Beside  the  conditionality,  the  efforts  to  promote  the  judicial  reform and improve  the 
situation in the judiciary also included technical as well as financial assistance, as it can be seen 
in Tables 8 and 10. Justice and home affairs programs received about €80.5 millions from 
2000  to  2006281,  about  €34,8mil  of  which  were  channeled  to  the  judiciary  (including  the 
prosecutor’s  office).  The  financial  assistance  aimed  primarily  to  improve  the  working 
conditions  (especially  with  the  introduction  of  the  IT  equipment),  the  training  (thus,  the 
Judicial training center was realized and until 2006, when the legislation provided the state 
financing, also financed from funds collected by different donors), education and socialization 
through the organization of conferences, round tables, seminars. Thus, as far as the action of 
the international actor is concerned, we can notice that EU used conditionality in combination 
with socialization,  in  order to promote  the reform of the  judiciary.  The credibility  of  the 
conditionality was hampered by the overall EU approach to Serbia, whereas the socialization, 
given the diffusion of judiciary independence as a norm in the western democracies, and given 
the continuous EU practice of monitoring, praising, criticizing and suggesting, round tables 
organized  and  technical  assistance  offered  to  Serbia,  can  be  judged  credible.  The  less 
conflictual  issues  that  were  tackled  by  the  EU  financial  assistance  (training,  equipment) 
registered,  as  we  saw,  positive  developments.  The  program’s  specific  conditions  did  not 
include the establishment of an independent  judiciary but concentrated on practical  issues 
concerning the implementation of the programs (see table at the end of the chapter). 
The success of the strategy, as we saw, was almost insignificant, particularly in the field of 
the judicial independence, but the ruling elite at least showed a tendency to fake compliance, 
testifying  a  certain  level  of  importance  it  associates  to  the  international  recognition.  We 
described the behaviour of the Serbian decision makers towards the Venice Commission’s 
assessment on the constitutional draft. The international experts’ assistance was requested in a 
form that followed the social influence pattern, the recommendations were even accepted, and 
281 Data: European Agency for reconstruction. Quarterly report to the EU Parliament, January-March 2008.
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the engagement of the IA in the procedure of the law drafting was widely publicized, testifying 
the tendency of the decision makers to seek for the international legitimization of its work. 
One  of  the  main  points  during  the  government’s  campaign  for  the  referendum  on  the 
constitution was exactly the fact that the articles concerning the judiciary were considering the 
Venice  Commission’s  recommendations.  However,  the  fact  that  the  respect  of  the 
international standards and the search for recognition was only an instrumental, strategic step, 
is testified by the shortcomings, inconsistencies, loopholes introduced in the legislation and by 
the hampered-with implementation. The potential costs deriving from the introduction of the 
new rules were avoided as the new norms were either not implemented, or changed. The CoE 
report on Serbia 2006 clearly depicts the situation: “It was regrettable that comments provided 
by the Council of Europe experts have either not been properly taken into account (as in the 
case of the criminal code) or have not been requested at all”. 
8.1.5. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE (LACK OF) CHANGE: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
We saw that  the  judicial  reform in  Serbia  is  actually  still  pending,  the  lack  of  judicial 
independence being the most important issue to tackle. We also saw that in the reform of the 
judiciary we can actually individuate few cycles when the trend of the events was following 
similar directions:
In 2001 we had positive, almost promising developments: the unconstitutional decision on 
the dismissal of judges brought by the previous regime were annulled, the respect for law was 
established  as  a  principle  to  follow  and  the  drafting  of  new  legislations  in  the  newly 
established Council for the reform of judiciary initiated. These positive efforts were partially 
obscured by the political conflict, but however, the laws adopted were positively assessed. 
In 2002 and 2003, soon after the law adoption, the whole process took another direction. 
The new legislation was not properly implemented, and it was amended in a way that clearly 
undermined the judicial independence. The executive showed strong reluctance to hand the 
control over the judiciary, defended by the constitutional court and its rulings. 
In the period 2004/2005 we witness a less turbulent situation: the laws were amended in 
order to re-integrate the rulings of the constitutional court, but the political interference in the 
appointment  remained.  The  lack  of  financial  independence  of  the  judicial  system in  that 
period became an issue of concern: the salaries in judiciary were radically diminished by the 
amendments to the Law on Judges. The lack of any change in that period is also evident from 
the lack of changes in the judiciary’s budget. 
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Finally, in 2006, in agreement with the EU priorities, the national strategy for the reform of 
the judiciary and the action plan on the implementation of the strategy, the new constitution 
and a series of laws282 were adopted.  The budget for 2007 showed a significant increase in 
comparison with the previous years (see table 1 in Appendix). As the legislative framework 
regulating the judicial system is supposed to be changed, and the reform to be implemented, it 
is still too soon to assess the developments in the field. However, both the National Strategy 
as well as the constitution adopted are not well promising when it comes to the independence 
of the judiciary. 
The lack of independence of the judiciary is caused by the executive’s strong interest in 
maintaining  control  over  the judges:  as  we saw,  the channels  of  corruption in  the justice 
system seems to go from the representatives of the executive and legislative to some judges 
that, being dependent both in terms of their career as well as financially, are keen to exchange 
sentences for the security of their post or for material benefits. The lustration process seems 
necessary, both if the ruling elite is to be finally deprived of the excuse for the control over the 
judges, if the trust in the system is to be restored, as well as if the judiciary is to be cleaned of 
the incompetent or corrupted members. But it is difficult at present to imagine the lustration 
process  not  driven  by  the  interest  of  political  parties  and  based  on  clear,  transparent, 
professional criteria. Who shall be given such competency? The legislative is controlled by the 
executive that has a strong interest in maintaining its control on judiciary, while the process of 
lustration is obviously feared by members of the judiciary. 
What we witnessed in 2006 can be judged as a step, but a very partial one. The pressure of 
the international actor was growing, domestic change agents (mainly associations of judicial 
professionals, Law University and specialists and different NGOs, media and public opinion) 
were pressing for the change, but at the same time the veto players in executive as well as in 
the  part  of  judiciary  were  able  to  block  the  reforms.  The  result  is,  once  again,  a  partial 
compliance,  or  better  say,  a  reform  strategy  that  can  be  welcomed  for  the  many  good 
solutions it offers, but according to which the political parties are still able to maintain their 
control  (for  the  resume of  the  situation  in  Serbian  judiciary,  please  see  the  tables  in  the 
appendix). 
282 Law on the Witness Protection in the Criminal Proceedings, Law on the Amendments of the Law on 
Courts, Law on the Amendments of the Law on Judges, Law on Amendments of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
Decision on the National Judicial Reform Strategy, Criminal Procedure Code, Law on Training of Judges and 
Public Prosecutors.
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8.2. MACEDONIA: REFORM WITHOUT IMPLEMENTATION
8.2.1. THE FIRST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF JUDICIARY
Similarly to Serbia, the reform of the judiciary was one of the most difficult reforms in 
Macedonia. The situation in the judicial sector well represented the whole spectrum of the 
problems the new democracies are faced with: the financial  austerity,  the lack of material, 
technical and human resources, the backlog of the cases, slow and inadequate procedures, the 
lack of independence and the politicization, corruption and clientelism were among the most 
often underlined inefficiencies of the Macedonian justice system. During the discussion on the 
judicial reform, the president of the NGO Transparentnost – Makedonija (Transparency – 
Macedonia) Zoran Jacev advanced the thesis of a “judicial oligarchy”, according to which the 
judges are entering the political and economic deals with the political and business elite. At the 
same time, due to the lack of political will,  resistance from within the judiciary and lack of 
material resources, the reforms have been delayed until the strong external pressure did not 
succeed in bringing the issue onto the agenda.
After proclaiming its independence, Macedonia proceeded with the state and institution 
building process, judiciary included. The 1991 constitution, 1992 Law on the Republic Judicial 
Council and Law on Public Prosecutor and the 1995 Law on Courts represented the legal 
framework under which the Macedonian judiciary was functioning until the recent reforms. 
The unbearable situation in the Macedonian judiciary we depicted in the previous paragraph 
has been mainly blamed on the inadequate solutions embedded in these documents.
The 1991  constitution  gave  the  basis  for  the  establishment  of  an  independent  judicial 
system as a third branch of power. The judicial  independence and political neutrality have 
been underlined as a principle upon which the judiciary shall be based (article 98), and the 
constitution offered some basic guarantees to the judge’s position in order to subtract them 
from  the  political  pressures  (like  the  unlimited  mandate  and  the  security  of  position). 
However, at the same time the judicial bodies designed by the constitution and the procedure 
for the election of judges failed to grant practical application of such principle. Thus, similarly 
to what we saw in Serbia,  the constitution (and consequentially  the Law on the Republic 
Judicial Council)  made the procedure of appointment as well as of career advancement of 
judges strongly dependent on the legislative body. The assembly elects the seven members of 
the judicial council which are responsible for proposing the judges for appointment to the 
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assembly, according to criteria that are not well specified. The assembly’s influence over the 
members  of  the  RJC  have  been  underlined  and  criticized  in  different  reports  of  the 
international  actors,  where  the  main  criticism  concerned  the  politicization  of  the  RJC 
members that give their  loyalty  to the party that have elected them to the council283.  The 
exclusive powers of the RCJ and the assembly in the nomination and dismissal of judges in 
the situation where the official code of ethics is lacking and no clear criteria for assessing the 
judge’s performance are settled, were used to exercise pressure over the judges284. The lack of 
discipline and the cases of corruption were covered and not investigated, in exchange for the 
sentences favored by the political elite. 
Another shortcoming in the system designed by the legislative framework settled in the 
first years of transition concerned the complete lack of financial independence of the judiciary. 
Thus  the  Ministry  of  Justice  (MoJ)  designs  the  budget  for  the  judiciary,  and submits  the 
amount to the ministry of finance who then has the power to change the amount requested 
before the bill goes to the legislature. This way the judiciary is left with almost no possibility to 
influence the amount and distribution of the resources it receives. As the transfer of resources 
is not direct, passing through the ministry of justice, a further source of influence is given to 
the MoJ, which can obstruct the transfers to the courts. The control both over the amount to 
be assigned to the judiciary and over the resources to be transferred to the courts gave the 
ministry of justice the possibility  to pressure any single court in the country. An effort to 
increase the judiciary revenues was made in 1997, when the government agreed to return to 
the courts half of the collected revenues from court fees, auctions and confiscated objects, but 
this decision has never been enforced. 
The fiscal austerity of Macedonian courts and the persistent under-funding of the judiciary 
resulted in a situation in which the courts reported €1.4 millions285 of accumulated debts for 
electricity,  water  supply  and  basic  spending,  putting  the  presidents  of  the  courts  under 
continuous management pressure in order to ensure the minimal functioning of the courts. 
The financial austerity made them vulnerable to financial pressures, both from the ministry of 
justice and from any other source of material gain. A good illustration of the pitiful financial 
situation of the courts, and of its implications, is the case of the court president who admitted 
283 See for example the ABA-CEELI report on the situation in the judiciary in Macedonia, 2002, where 
nepotism and political favoritism were underlined as the most serious problems at the RJC.
284 The RCJ was supposed to exercise control over the judges’ work and, when necessary, to proceed with 
disciplinary measures. However, as the criteria for assessing the judges’ work were unclear, the possibility for the 
abuses of this power opened.
285 EU report 2006.
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trying to influence the decision of a judge in his court, in a case involving a municipal officer 
who had the authority to approve the building allow a planned court building expansion286. 
A similar situation is found if we pay attention to the salaries of the judges, which remained 
rather low if compared to the salaries of other officers as well as with the judges’ salaries in 
other Balkan states (according to Utrinski, the highest salary in the judiciary for the president 
of the high court in 2006 was about 900 Euro, compared with 1.700 in Serbia and 3.500 in 
Bosnia for the same function). The salaries were almost blocked since 1996, until the adoption 
of the Law on Salaries,  and remained more or less the same even after the law, so widely 
publicized and praised, actually failed to bring any substantial change in the material status of 
the judges. The low salaries for the judges are not only a potential cause for corruption in the 
judiciary, but also are an obstacle for ensuring the quality of the judges, as the salaries are 
much lower than in the private practice, and as such are not able to attract the most skilled 
lawyers. Even worse is the financial situation of clerks and administrative staff, whose salaries 
are even far from being sufficient to ensure their impartiality and good quality of their work. 
Of no surprise  then that  some important channels  of  corruption are passing through the 
administration and that one of the most criticized features concerned the procedure of the 
case  assignment  were  bribing  the  court  administration  is  used  to  influence  the  case 
assignment287.
The organization of the courts is based upon the 1995 Law on Courts, which dismantled 
the system of courts inherited from the previous regime and designed the judiciary as a single, 
monolithic pyramid. The distinction between the criminal court, specialized courts and the 
misdemeanor courts has been abolished. The courts of first instance (27 of them) are thus 
dealing  with all  cases,  both administrative  and criminal,  without  the  specialization  for the 
particular branches of law. There are also three courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. The 
constitutional  court,  according  to  the  constitution,  is  not  part  of  the  judiciary.  Such 
organization of the justice system was, according to the domestic authors, based on the belief 
that this way the splitting, overlapping and mixing of competences would be avoided and an 
efficient  organization would be created. The decision makers supposed that a single court 
system without  specialization  would ensure  the organization  and functional  possibility  for 
rationalization  of  the  inherited  potentials  of  the  courts,  while  the  concentration  of 
competences  in  the  courts  of  first  instance  was  seen  as  a  mark  of  the  quality  and 
286 See ABA – CEELi assessment of the judiciary in Macedonia, 2002.
287 See the ABA-CEELI report on the judiciary in Macedonia, 2002.
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rationalization of resources (see Janevski and Zoroska – Kamilovska, 2005). However, only a 
decade later, the same model was blamed of inefficiency and blocking the court’s work. An 
inadequate  organization  of  courts  created  a  situation  in  which  some  courts  were 
overburdened,  with  resources  (technical,  material,  human)  insufficient  to  cope  with  the 
number of cases under their jurisdiction, whereas in smaller courts the number of cases was 
far below their capacities. The lack of distinction between civil, administrative and criminal 
cases actually created a situation where the courts are overburdened with a large amount of 
execution and “misdemeanors” cases blocking the work of the courts288. Beside the inadequate 
organization of courts, other identified causes of backlog were the complicated procedures 
and the deficiencies in the system of summons delivery. 
In the period immediately after the 2001 violence, the reform of the judiciary, even though 
often mentioned, was not undertaken in a comprehensive, strategic manner. Some changes 
were introduced, most importantly through the constitutional reform that followed the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement (OFA) and through the 2003 amendments to the Law on the Republic 
Judicial  Council  and the Law on Courts in order to allow the OFA implementation.  The 
composition of the judicial council was changed in order to ensure the veto power to the 
members of the ethnic Albanians by prescribing the Badinter majority289 for the election of the 
3 members of RJC290. The same principle of qualified majority was introduced in the Article 
109 of the constitution for the appointment of the justices of the Constitutional Court and the 
Law on Courts  was amended in  order to ensure the  equal  representation  of  the  national 
minorities in the judiciary291. 
Another important step in this period is the adoption of the Law on the Budget of the 
Courts, following the initiative of the Macedonian Judges Association (MJA). Even though the 
288 Thus, of the 730700 cases that were still pending in March 2005, 71% were execution and misdemeanor 
cases.
289 The “Badinter majority” is a label used in Macedonia to refer to the particular mechanism introduced as a 
part  of the 2001 Peace Agreement (Ohrid Framework Agreement,  OFA).  It  consists  in the double majority 
where, beside the absolute or 2/3 majority,  the majority of the votes belonging to the deputies declaring to 
belong to ethnic minorities shall be obtained for the decision to be adopted. Its usage, as prescribed by the OFA, 
is rather large, and due to the imprecise formulations of the OFA it is still subject to different interpretations and 
a key in the political conflict between the Macedonian majority and ethnic Albanians. It is one of the crucial 
points of the OFA and the key for understanding the developments in almost all dimensions covered by this 
study. Please see the sections on the assembly and minority rights. 
290 The XIV amendment to the constitution and the law on RJC.
291 Equal representation in all state agencies is another core principle of OFA requiring that the state bodies 
reflect the ethnic composition of the country. This provision was thought and included in OFA as an instrument 
for  the  protection of  the  minorities’  rights,  as  it  pushes  for  positive  discrimination and might  increase  the 
minorities’ loyalty to the state. However, in the case of Macedonia, it was interpreted in a too strict manner, often 
resulting in sacrificing professionalism for ethnicity. Please see also the part on the civil service reform, police 
and security sector reforms. 
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law draft prepared and advocated by the MJA aimed to abolish the above mentioned financial 
dependence of the judiciary, the document was modified in the assembly so to preserve the 
executive’s influence over the judicial budget through the veto power given to the Minister of 
Justice.  The  legislation  constituted  the  new  body,  the  Judiciary  Budget  Council,  with 
competence to design the budget of the judiciary and the allocation of the resources. Even 
though the veto powers the executive maintained do not allow the full financial independence 
of judiciary, the presidents of courts and the judiciary as a whole are given more possibilities 
to influence their own financial resources. 
8.2.2. THE REFORM
The reform of the judiciary was finally initiated in 2004 with the adoption of the strategy 
for the judicial system reform. The impetus for the reform mainly derived from the external 
pressures that can be traced back to the reports issued by different international organizations 
engaged  in  democracy  promotion  and monitoring.  The  reports  of  the  EU,  World  Bank, 
Council of Europe, and NATO all identified the lack of the reform of the judiciary as the 
main obstacle to the full democratization in the country292 and these criticisms echoed in the 
domestic opinion and media, creating an internal push for the reform. The judiciary reform 
was  one  of  the  most  important  recommendations  the  EU  commission  continuously 
underlined, and the domestic stakeholders were avoiding the question for as long as possible. 
After years of neglecting the question, in 2004, the year of the Macedonian application for the 
membership to the EU, the judiciary reform had to be urgently faced in the hope of a positive 
answer from Brussels. The strategy for judicial reform adopted in November 2004 envisaged a 
number of changes to the legal framework aiming to enhance the efficiency and quality of the 
judicial system. The training, appointment and the career advancement procedures were to be 
brought in line with the international standards by the introduction of structural changes in 
the composition, selection and spectrum of competences of the Judicial Council and by the 
introduction  of  the  state-financed  academy  for  training  the  judiciary  staff.  The  courts 
organization and the procedures were also to be changed in order to increase the efficiency of 
administration of justice. The envisaged reform was supposed to tackle two most important 
questions: the independence (politicization) and the efficiency of the judiciary. 
292 EU SAA 2003/2004 reports, World Bank report on the Judiciary system in countries in transition, NATO 
recommendations for membership. See also Gaber – Damjanoska and Jovevska, 2004.
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The reform began with the constitutional reform, a solution that made some fears about 
the real intention of the decision makers to reform emerge, due to the possibility (in some 
moments threatening to become reality) that the reform could be blocked by the political 
appetites  of  smaller  political  parties  holding  the  veto  power  in  the  constitutional  reform. 
Fortunately, the political leaders finally succeeded in reaching the agreement that the reform 
shall concern only the judiciary, leaving all other issues aside (see Gaber – Damjanovska and 
Jovevska, 2005). The debate in this period saw the key political actors mainly interested in the 
procedures of appointment and composition of the Judicial Council, whereas the members of 
the judiciary were trying to avoid the probing term proposed. They opposed to the passage of 
the  authority  of  misdemeanors  to  administrative  organs,  underlined  the  necessity  for 
improving  their  financial  situation  and  required  the  2/3  majority  for  the  election  of  the 
prosecutor and appointment of judges by arguing that the simple majority represents a source 
of the party’s influence.
The difficult  negotiations resulted in the political  parties finally  achieving the necessary 
agreement and passing the necessary constitutional amendments in December 2005. A 2/3 
majority was agreed for laws on the judiciary and the public prosecution, while the election of 
the members of the council of judges and council of prosecutors required simple Badinter 
majority (meaning the veto power to the minorities, but not necessarily the political consensus 
of all parties in the election of judges).
The reform thus went on in 2006, when it overlapped with the ongoing electoral campaign, 
meaning that the changes in the judiciary were to be pursued and used as part of the electoral 
campaign. In practical terms, this meant the speeding up of the reforms in order for the bills 
to be passed before June. The new Law on Courts, Law on Judicial Council and Law on the 
Academy for Training of Judges were adopted. The hasty procedure, particularly in the last 
phase, caused the malcontent of the judiciary as the reform was mainly drafted by the Ministry 
of  Justice  and influenced by the  political  parties  instead of  incorporating  the  suggestions, 
requests and needs of the judiciary.
The legislative framework put in place is considered to be in line with the international 
standards. As far as the organization of courts is concerned, the most important novelties 
concerned the establishment of the fourth court of appeal, administrative court and special 
court departments in five basic  courts to deal with cases of organized crime. The Judicial 
Council was also reformed in order to increase its independence. Out of fifteen members of 
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JC, only five were to be elected by a procedure that implies the influence of the legislative, 
eight are elected by the judges and the remaining two are the president of the Supreme Court 
and the Minister of Justices.
The Law on the Academy for the Training of Judges was also adopted, finally allowing 
appropriate initial and continuous training of the staff (until that moment the training was 
organized  by  the  Macedonian  association  of  Judges  through  the  Centre  for  Continuing 
Education of Judges). The academy is supposed to allow the merit-based recruitment and to 
increase the quality of the judiciary as the Judicial Council can propose the candidates for the 
judge only from the list of the candidates provided by the academy. The academy’s bodies are 
designed so to ensure their independence from other branches of power. 
The changes were also introduced in the Law on Litigation Procedures, while the adoption 
of  the  new  Law  on  Administrative  Disputes,  the  Law  on  Mediation,  the  Law  on 
Misdemeanour and the Law of Enforcement aimed to increase the efficiency of the system. 
The reforms continued in 2007, when the new Law on the Public Prosecutor was adopted, 
after  a  delay  that  raised  criticisms  from  the  opposition  parties  and  accusations  that  the 
government  is  not  willing  to  give  away  its  control  over  the  prosecutor  office  (Gaber  – 
Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2007). The substantial differences between the government and 
opposition  over  the  question  of  the  duration  of  the  mandate  and,  more  importantly,  the 
continuity/discontinuity with the existing prosecution system, blocked the reform for almost a 
year293.  Finally  the  law  was  adopted  in  December  2007,  the  opposition  and  prosecutors 
succeeding  in  ensuring  the  unlimited  mandate  for  the  office  whose  appointment  was 
subtracted by the assembly and given to the independent body of the Prosecutors’ Council. 
The government succeeded to maintain the control over the Public Prosecutor of Macedonia, 
to be re-appointed by the assembly for the mandate of six years. The Law on Salary of Judges 
was also adopted in 2007 in order to introduce the system of salaries of judges able to protect 
the judges from pressures and influences, strengthening their independence and impartiality. 
According to the legislation, the salary is based on the impartial criteria including the type of 
court and the type of cases the judge is handling, his position, the duration of tenure, the 
knowledge and specializations as well as the results achieved (art. 4 Law on Salary of Judges). 
The salaries are calculated on the basis of the average salary in the country for the previous 
year, which is then multiplied by a coefficient which varies from 2.8 to 3.7. However, while 
293 The key question, beside the limited mandate proposed by ruling VMRO, was the conflict over whether all 
prosecutors shall be re-elected, or the already appointed prosecutors shall automatically keep their mandate.
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the law was claimed to solve the problem of the inadequate financial treatment of the judges, 
the  financial  status  of  the  judges  remained  substantially  unchanged  as  the  calculation  of 
salaries remained the same, with the same coefficients settled by the previous legislation (Law 
on Salary of the Deputies and other Elected and Appointed Officials  11/91, 38/91, 23/97, 
37/2005, 84/2005). As it was the case with all other laws in the field, the Law on Salary of 
Judges  was drafted by  the  ministry  of  justice,  without  consulting  the judiciary  and it  was 
strongly criticized by the members of the judiciary for maintaining the existing status quo 
where  the  salaries  do  not  reflect  the  responsibility  of  the  judges  and are  far  from being 
stimulative (Utrinski, 2007).
With the adoption of the Law on Public Prosecutor Office and Law on Council of Public 
Prosecutors in December 2007, the legislative framework necessary to settle the judiciary as an 
independent branch of power was put in place. However, on the side of the implementation 
of  the adopted reformist  laws,  the  situation was far  from changed.  According  to the  EU 
commission reports, the deficiencies persisted (particularly the party influence, and political 
pressures) while the implementation was hampered and delayed respect to the government’s 
strategy.
8.2.3. HAMPERED IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of the reforms was seriously delayed by the failure of the assembly to 
appoint 5 members to the Judicial Council,  which made it very difficult to obtain the 2/3 
majority necessary for the decision making in the Council. The delay was mainly caused by the 
decision of the major Albanian party DUI to block the assembly’s work as a reaction for being 
called to enter the government composed of VMRO and the smaller Albanian party DPA. 
The  institutional  crisis  was  further  aggravated  by  the  cohabitation  between  the  president 
coming from the opposition  SDSM and the hostile  majority  in  the  assembly,  making the 
appointment of the 2 members on presidential  proposal  difficult  to ensure. The failure to 
appoint  the members of the council caused a delay in appointing the judges of the newly 
founded courts (administrative court and fourth Court of Appeal in Gostivar) as well as in 
starting  the  work  of  the  Academy  for  the  training  of  judges.  The  delays  were  finally 
surmounted in the second half of 2007, after DUI re-entered the assembly. The compromise 
was finally found and the 4 members of the council were appointed, making the work of the 
council easier, particularly in the domain of the appointment of judges.
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According to the media  and the statements of  domestic  experts,  the politicization  and 
pressures are still present, only now combined with nepotism and personal links as criteria for 
appointing the judges294.  The appointment of 46 judges in the courts of first instance and 
courts of appeal undertaken in February 2008 was strongly criticized in public, as the newly 
appointed judges were connected with family links with the high state officers and members 
of the government. The impartiality in the appointment of the judges in the administrative and 
in the newly formed court of appeal are also questionable, as some of the judges elected lack 
the  minimal  professional  requirements  and  have  never  before  exercised  a  similar  duty 
(Duvljak, February, 2008, Utrinski). The exponents of the judiciary identified the main cause 
of such situation in the creation of a too-powerful Judicial Council without the establishment 
of  any  mechanisms  for  inner  control.  In  an  interview  for  Utrinski,  the  president  of  the 
Supreme Court and member of the Council argued that the new Law on the Judicial Council 
created “a monster that is threatening to destroy the whole judicial system”. He underlined 
that the presidents of courts often initiate the procedure for removal against those candidates 
elected by the Council due to their incapability to exercise their function and failure of the 
council to appointing the candidates through professional criteria (from Duvljak, 2008). The 
lack of accountability  mechanisms brings to three paradoxical situations where the highest 
judicial body is actually breaking the law. An illustration of such practice was the decision of 
the Council to reconfirm and prolong the mandate of its president Iseni, thus breaking the 
Law on Retirements, according to which Iseni was supposed to retire and a new president of 
the council was to be elected. While the council was given, and started to exercise, the right to 
investigate the cases of abuse of power, inefficiency and unprofessionalism and to undertake 
disciplinary  measures  against  judges,  the  Helsinki  committee  accused the  council  of  using 
double standards. They pointed out that the council refused to investigate the work of the 
judges for the irregularities appointed by citizens, which, according to the Helsinki committee, 
shows the council’s tendency to protect the corrupted judges and to take disciplinary actions 
selectively. As the Venice Commission commentators have underlined in their opinion on the 
draft of the constitutional amendments concerning the judiciary in Macedonia, the Judicial 
Council is designed as a closed body where no mechanism of control other than internal are 
envisaged. It was also given too large powers, too large immunity for its members, too much 
influence and non-external control,  making the council  a kind of “super – body” (see for 
294 Interview with Jovanovski, Taseva, Hristova.
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example the comments of Suchocka to the draft of the constitutional amendments, 2005, and 
the comments of Mazak to the same amendments, 2005). As we saw, the solution adopted did 
not  follow  the  concerns  expressed  by  the  Venice  Commission  which  resulted  in  the 
establishment  of  a  “super-body” that  answers only  to itself.  According  to some domestic 
authors, this solution, that established the judicial council as a “super-institution”, might bring 
to a situation where the centre of the corruption and (political) influence over the judiciary is 
moved from the government to the judicial council (Laboviќ, 2006, 361 – 362). As Anderson 
and Grey  underlined,  “the  most  pressing  issue  in  many  transition  countries  is  to  ensure 
judicial accountability,  given newfound independence” (Anderson and Grey, 2007, p. 333), 
and in the case of Macedonia the failure to ensure the mechanisms of accountability of the 
council can prove to be some serious shortcomings hampering the reform of the judiciary. In 
order  to  change  the  legislative  framework  and establish  the  accountability  of  the  judicial 
council, the very large consensus of the political parties would be needed (as the procedure 
prescribes the qualitative majority), and as we saw, this is rather difficult to achieve in the case 
of Macedonia. Furthermore, it would surely cause the resistance of the judicial council that 
could use its influence over the judiciary to oppose the change. Last but not least, the line 
between accountability  and control  is  thin and the change would surely raise the problem 
(both among experts in designing the reform, among the politicians and in public opinion) of 
defining the mechanisms that could ensure accountability without hampering independence.
The financial independence of the judiciary is still hampered. We saw how the salary of the 
judges remained unchanged even though the Law on Salary was adopted claiming to ensure 
adequate compensation for the activity of judges. The ministry of justice kept control on the 
budget of the judiciary through the veto power of the minister in the council for the budget of 
judiciary. The ruling majority maintained the possibility to veto the appointment of judges by 
designing a procedure that requires the 2/3 majority in the council,  which – in a situation 
where 5 out of 15 members are appointed by the assembly and 1 member is the minister of 
justice – actually makes it impossible for the representatives of the judiciary to over-vote the 
members appointed by the legislative. The presence of the minister of justice in the Judicial 
Council,  in  the  Academy  for  training  management  board  and  in  the  Council  of  public 
prosecutors as their full member has also been pointed out by the domestic actors as a source 
of  influence,  even  though only  in  the  Council  for  the  Judiciary  Budget  such influence  is 
realistically exercised, through the veto power. As shown in Tab.1, only a slight growth in the 
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budget of the judiciary was registered in 2004, leaving the judiciary’s share in budget more or 
less stable on about 1.6 – 1.7%. Moreover, the judiciary is almost completely financed by the 
main central budget, having only about 5% of the incomes deriving from their own resources. 
All these issues represent the points testifying the persistence of the often criticized political 
control over the judiciary. “Unlike the case of Serbia, in Macedonia we do have a nominally 
independent  judiciary.  Yet,  the  outcome  is  the  same,  only  the  way  differs.  The  nominal 
independency  is  hampered  by  the  political  control  through  the  minister’s  control  of  the 
budget and through the veto-powers and unofficial pressure he exercises” (from the interview 
with Jovanovski, director of the office of the Information Office of the Council of Europe in 
Skopje, August 2008). The most recent developments – when the mayor of Struga, member of 
the oppositional SDSM, was arrested for corruption and then, before the trial, amnestied by 
his party fellow who had the position of the president – show the lack of political will and 
maturity which are necessary for establishing the rule of law. By accusing the government for 
politically orchestrated arrests, the President of the Republic granted the amnesty to the man 
whose guilt was still  to be proved, in order to save him from what he is sure would be a 
politically biased trial.
8.2.4. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The reform of the judiciary in Macedonia is a process initiated by the country’s intention to 
apply for the EU membership. The role of the international actor in pushing the issue onto 
the agenda, by offering legal, technical and material support, appeared thus decisive. 
As we saw, after the establishment of the judiciary system in the first half of the Nineties, 
the  changes  in  the  legislative  framework  were  sporadic,  small  changes  being  introduced 
through the amendments of the existing legislation in order to ad-hoc face the most striking 
problems. The politicization, the lack of professional standards in the appointment and career 
development  and  inefficiency  remained  endemic  features  of  the  Macedonian  judiciary, 
identified  by  the  World  Bank  as  the  most  serious  obstacle  to  democratization  and 
continuously  criticized  by  the  different  international  actors  in  their  reports  on  the 
developments in the country. The European Union, since the first SAA reports, included the 
improvement of the functioning of the judiciary and its de-politicization as urgent steps to be 
taken. The pressure became more articulated with the EU partnership, where among the short 
term priorities we can find the call to prepare a comprehensive reform of the judiciary, with 
particular  accent  put  on  the  mechanisms  to  ensure  political  independence  of  judges  and 
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prosecutors and the establishment of the merit-based criteria for the career. A set of actions 
necessary to simplify the court procedures was also required, as well as the strengthening of 
the institutional capacity of training the judicial staff.
The  2006  access  partnership  priorities  underlined  the  necessity  to  settle  the  legislative 
framework (amendments of the constitution and the adoption of the necessary legislations 
regulating the system of selection, career for judges and prosecutors and strengthening of the 
training system), and called for the implementation of the strategy and action plan on the 
judicial reform adopted. The accent was also put on the necessity to reduce the cumulated 
backlog. The successful settling of the legislative framework is reflected in the 2007 and 2008 
commissionary reports and access partnerships. In these documents the priorities concerning 
the  judiciary  call  for  the  implementation  of  the  adopted  legislation,  requiring  that  the 
government establish a sustained track record on the implementation of judiciary reforms, and 
strengthen the independence and overall capacity of the judicial system (see Tab.6). 
The EU also gave a substantial financial support to the reform through the PHARE and 
CARDS programs (€11.2mil for the judicial system, see Tab.2), while the USA organizations 
financed the training of judges and judicial staff. 
8.2.5. ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM
The reform of the  judiciary  in Macedonia  proved to be one of  those cases where the 
international actor’s action has been crucial for pushing the issue onto the agenda. After a 
long period of stagnation and delay in the reform295, the decisive action of the international 
actors brought the issue onto the agenda. The time factor seems to matter, as the negative 
assessments  and  criticisms  towards  the  judiciary  came in  a  period  when  the  Macedonian 
government was planning to apply for the candidate status. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 
(2004)  underlined,  the  size  of  the  reward,  the  time  perspective  and  the  speed  of  reward 
(immediate  or late?)  significantly  influence the probability  of  the compliance  to the norm 
promoted. The application for the candidate status (beginning of 2005) and the desire to start 
with the negotiations,  especially  when combined with the strong social  pressure exercised 
through the criticisms of the judiciary, pushed the reforms forward.
295 The lack of comprehensive reform we registered can be explained in line with Anderson and Grey as a 
consequence of an agenda “overbooked” with more important political and economic issues a transition country 
faces in the first years after transition. According to the two, judiciary reforms are pushed successfully onto the 
agenda only with the increase of the demand for the judicial service that comes with the economic liberalization.
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On the domestic level, the lack of strong institutional change agents among the ruling elite 
appears at least partially compensated by the favourable political moment. Indeed, the election 
scheduled for mid-2006 created a situation in which the EU integration and the successful 
reform of the judiciary were the cards to be played by the government in the coming elections. 
But this situation, while contributed to make rule adoption easier (even under the difficult 
condition of reaching the large consensus, so difficult in Macedonia), at the same time made 
reform hastily, not allowing for more detailed evaluations and analysis. We can question in 
which measure the registered failure to ensure the judicial council accountability is a product 
of  the  “hasty”  solutions  that,  rather  than with  the  problem solving,  is  a  combination  of 
international pressures and electoral campaign. 
As far as the rule implementation is concerned,  here again we account for continuous 
strong external pressures. The refusal of Brussels to open the negotiations with Macedonia 
settled the new goal to achieve, and the full implementation of the judicial reform is one of 
the  conditions  Macedonia  shall  satisfy  in  order  to  see  its  candidate  status  reach  full 
significance. The delay and difficult implementation can be explained by the rather negative 
conditions  on  the  domestic  level,  the  continuous  financial  pressures  combined  with  the 
instable political  situation and continuous conflict  between the ethnic and political  parties 
hampering  the  process.  However,  even  though  slowly  and  with  serious  problems,  the 
legislative  framework was finally  settled in  the 2007 and the efforts to implement it  have 
begun.
8.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
In the previous paragraphs we saw the developments of the judiciary system in our two 
cases, Serbia and Macedonia. The problems the two countries faced were rather similar, what 
with  politicization,  corruption,  inefficiency  and bad financial  situation  being  the  common 
problems of  the  two.  The most  serious  challenge  in  both  cases  was  the  executive’s  (and 
parties’)  control  over the judiciary,  established through the lack of financial  independence, 
through politicization of the Judicial Council and through the role given to the parliamentary 
majority in appointing the judges, and the consequent politicization of the judicial system. The 
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political  influence  is  identified  in  both  countries  as  an  element  of  the  state  capture 
mechanism296 and linked to the corruption in the judiciary297. 
Even though the problems in the functioning of the judiciary in the two cases studied were 
rather  similar,  the  differences  in  their  reformist  paths  and  in  the  current  situation  are 
important. While in Serbia we register a failure to establish an independent judicial system and 
blockage of the judiciary reform, in Macedonia the rule adoption phase is completed. The 
Macedonian  legislative  framework  regulating  the  functioning  of  the  judiciary  undergone 
significant changes in the last four years and was judged by the international experts to be 
mainly  in  line  with  the  European  standards,  implementation  now  representing  the  most 
difficult challenge to face. 
Table 1: “Judiciary reform in Serbia and Macedonia, summary of most important factors 
and outcome”.
SERBIA MACEDONIA
2001 2006-
Main input for the 
change
Domestic Domestic External
Conditionality with 
important reward
- Absent Strong, present
Presence of the ChA Present Present Irrelevant
Presence of Veto Players Present Present Irrelevant
Conflictuality High High Mid
Stability/fluidity of the 
political environment
Fluid Stable Fluid
Outcome Rule adopted
Never implemented
Rule adopted not in line 
with international 
standards
Implementation pending
Rule in line with 
international standards 
adopted
Implementation ongoing, 
slow
How can we account for the differences in the outcome in the two countries? As we can 
see in table 1 (for the more detailed tables see the appendix), the first difference seems to be 
on the  supply  side.  The action of  the  international  actors  aiming to promote  the judicial 
reform appears to be much more credible in the case of Macedonia. Starting in 2004, the 
European Union made rather clear to the Macedonian government that the reform of the 
judiciary  is  a  necessary  condition  for  granting  the  candidate  status  and  opening  the 
negotiations.
The fact that the reward (candidate status) was rather near also increased the credibility and 
efficiency of the conditionality exercised. The credibility of the international actor was also 
296 For Macedonia see Labovik, 2006, for Serbia see Pešić, 2006.
297 For Macedonia see Labovik, 2005 and 2006, for Serbia Begović, 2005.
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strengthened by the fact that access to the CARDS funds was conditioned by the persistence 
in the reform (see Tab.7 and 10). The vulnerability of the Macedonian political elite to the 
external influence298 and criticism, as well as the strong preference of the whole society for 
European integration, pushed successfully for the compliance in the field, inducing the policy 
makers to overcome the difficulties and change their calculations of costs and benefits. The 
success  to  amend the  constitution  is  one of  the  clearest  examples  of  how the  European 
agenda can induce the Macedonian policy makers to put their disputes aside and narrow the 
party interests: in a country where the whole political agenda consists in the integration into 
the international institutions, no political actor can bear the cost of being the party-breaker. 
The political fluidity and uncertainty about the exit of the future electoral competition, as well 
as  the  large consensus required for the  reform – which made including  the  opposition  a 
necessary condition, represented positive factors for establishing an independent judiciary. In 
the case of Serbia all these factors were absent: the conditionality exercised by including the 
judiciary reform among the key questions to be faced was not credible, due to the political 
relations between Serbia and EU that made the security concerns (state union destiny, Kosovo 
status,  southern  Serbia  and  the  rise  of  the  nationalistic  forces)  prevail  over  the  goal  of 
democracy promotion. Further on, the high conflictuality on the issue that tackled one of the 
most salient dimensions of the political conflict in Serbia (the problem of facing the past and 
continuity/discontinuity dilemma with the previous regime) and hampered the mechanisms of 
the electoral accountability  that produced only a peripheral turnover299,  made the domestic 
asset for establishing the mechanisms of horizontal accountability rather unfavourable300. 
Before  closing  this  chapter,  we  would  like  to  add  a  final  observation  concerning  the 
process of the rule implementation. Both the short history of the Serbian “will-be reform” in 
2001 and the Macedonian case share the characteristic of the rule adoption achieved through 
the change of the costs and benefits balance. In the case of the Serbian effort to reform the 
judiciary we recognize such asset in the bargaining process, conflictual and caractherized by 
the parties’ short term stratgies, that brought to the adoption of the Law on Court, Law on 
High Judicial Council and Law on Judges in 2001. The dissatisfaction and the disapproval of 
298 The vulnerability of the Macedonian political elite to the external influence (EU and NATO in particular) 
is one of the most important characteristics of the Macedonian politics that we will meet in other fields as well. 
Very often the international actors have pushed the issues onto the agenda, exercised significant pressures over 
the domestic stake holders or played the mediator role. It was reported by the domestic analysts as the key factor 
in  understanding  the  domestic  developments,  as  well  as  the  main  instrument  the  domestic  politicians  use 
(interviews with Hristova and Taseva, august 2008).
299 On the concept of peripheral turnover see Sartori, 1972.
300 On the links between horizontal and electoral accountability see Morlino, 2006.
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the key stake holders for the law301 resulted in a failure to implement the law. In the case of 
Macedonia,  we  assisted  to  a  rule  adoption  that  was  mainly  guided  by  strong,  credible 
international conditionality. As we underlined in the theoretic part of this work, the reforms 
pursued by counting on the logic of the convenience without changing the actors’ preferences 
results in what we labelled “controversial” compliance. In such asset the actors do not change 
their beliefs or preferences but only the calculation of the costs and benefits. As a result, the 
compliance  with the norm (if  achieved)  is  again subject  to the further costs  and benefits 
calculations,  instead of  being guided by the rule internalization (which can,  however,  take 
place after some time). The controversy of such compliance lays in the persistence of the 
original preferences that can re-emerge, as soon as the structure of costs and benefits change. 
This was the case of Serbia in 2002, and might become the potential source hampering the 
rule  implementation  in  Macedonia  (we  already  saw  some  difficulties  in  the  rule 
implementation). In line with Morlino and Magen’s hypothesis, we can argue that an evident 
lack of rule internalization is one of the main causes for the difficulties Macedonia meets in 
implementing the judicial reform. In such asset, the influence of the external actor remains the 
key for pushing the process forward, ensuring that the costs and benefits calculations of the 
key actors grant the implementation of the newly adopted rules.
301 The members of the government were not present in the assembly during the voting.
APPENDIX
Table 1: “Budget of the Judiciary, Serbia”. 
(in thousands of dinars).
Year Budget judiciary, resources from 
the state budget
Budget judiciary (all 
resources)
State budget Share of judiciary in the 
state budget
Share of state finances in the 
judiciary’s total finances
2002 3793374 4893374 217379629 1.745% 77.5%
2003 7056778 9099112 318691919 2.214% 77.5%
2004 7151705 9660522 362045252 1.975% 74%
2005 7733697 10849669 429764926 1.799% 71.3%
2006 10533775 13568436 548405821 1.921% 77.6%
2007 16214213 20933154 646466666 2.508% 77.5%
2008 18092827 22586724 611866850 2.95% 80.10%
(Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Sluzbeni List Reublike Srbije).
Table 2: “Budget of the judiciary, Macedonia”. 
(in thousands of denars).
(Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Sluzbeni Vesnik na Republika Makedonija).
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Year Budget judiciary, resources from 
the state budget)
Budget judiciary (all 
resources with rebalance)
State budget Share of judiciary in the 
state budget
Share of state finances in the 
judiciary’s total finances
2002 901.394 - 71.700.273 1.257% -
2003 1.012.532 - 67.490.170 1.500% -
2004 1.150.641 1.219.365 66.666.000 1.726% 94.36%
2005 1.171.457 1.235175 66.538.469 1.760% 94.84%
2006 1.291.673 1.292.061 81.749.000 1.458% 94.96%
2007 1.283.176 1.347.376 79.522.497 1.614% 95.24%
2008 1.518.736 1.595.688 89.397.520 1.699% 95.18%
Table 3: “The efficiency of Serbian courts, statistics of the cases submitted and solved”.
Year Number of cases in 
procedure
Number of cases submitted in 
the year
Number of solved cases Percentage of solved cases Solved cases/new cases 
(percentage)
2002 1.551.789 1.096.323 1.099.972 70.9 % 100.33%
2003 1.626.794 1.174.977 1.118.798 68.7 % 95.22%
2004 1.704.616 1.559.566 1.098.063 64.4 % 70.41%
2005 1.923.550 1.270.441 1.257.991 65.3 % 99.02%
2006 2.309.704 1.610.659 1.611.215 69.7 % 100.03%
2007 2.251.081 1.579.522 1.552.505 68.97% 98.29%
(source: the Serbian High Court annual reports 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007).
Table 4: “The efficiency of Macedonian courts, statistics of the cases submitted and solved”.
Year Number of cases in 
procedure
Number of cases submitted in the 
year
Number of solved cases Percentage of solved 
cases
Solved cases/new cases 
(percentage)
2000 1053505 589506 538751 51.14% 91.39%
2001 1062475 547334 520284 48.97% 95.06%
2002 1049219 507027 616155 58.72% 121.52%
2003 1193383 760319 689226 57.75% 90.65%
2004 1391853 887226 716608 51.49% 80.77%
2005 1664429 988720 816869 49.09% 82.62%
2006 1724981 875855 870127 50.44% 99.35%
2007 1967009 956686 794140 40.37% 83.00%
(source: The data for the period 200-2005 are from “Explanation following the proposal of the Law on Courts in Macedonian assembly, April 2006”, available at 
www.sobranie.mk/uploads/dokumenti/Obrazlozenie,%20sudovi%2011.4.2006.doc, For 2006 and 2007 the data are from the Annual report on the functioning of judiciary, 
issued by The Macedonian High Court 2006, 2007).
303
Table 5: “EU priorities in the field of the judiciary reform in Serbia” .
2002 SAA 
report 
priorities
Reform of the judiciary and prosecutorial systems should continue, with particular attention to independence, criteria for appointments, training, procedures, and 
reduced opportunities for political interference. Budgetary provisions for the new system of judges’ salaries should be introduced rapidly. Steps should be taken to 
improve the enforcement of the court judgments. Action should be taken on corrupt elements within the state system.
2003 SAA 
report 
priorities
Continue the reform of the judicial and prosecutorial systems, with particular attention to independence, criteria for appointments, increased specialized staffing 
of courts, training, procedure, reduced opportunities for political interference, budgetary provisions, enforcement of court judgments. Implementation of the 
Federal Criminal Code and transfer of military courts to civilian.
2004 EU 
partnership 
Short term priorities: modernize and increase efficiency and independence of the court system, in particular its commercial courts; ensure the functional 
independence of war crime prosecutors. Prepare for the setting-up of administrative and appellate jurisdictions. 
2006 EU 
partnership
Key short-term priorities: pursue with determination the reform of the judiciary to guarantee its independence, professionalism and efficiency, in particular 
review the system of recruitment and career to be based on technical and professional criteria, avoiding political influence, and secure permanent tenure of judicial 
posts.
Short term priorities: Adopt and implement legislation on mandatory initial and continuous training for judges, prosecutors and court support staff, and 
strengthen the training centers, start rationalizing the court system and modernize proceedings, in particular in the field of commercial law. Strengthen the 
autonomy of the prosecution system, particularly the offices of the prosecutors for organized crime. Strengthen the office of the prosecutor for war crimes. 
Establish administrative and appellate courts.
2007 EU 
partnership
Key priorities: Improve the functioning of the judiciary, guarantee its independence, professionalism and ensure that the career development and recruitment of 
judges and prosecutors are based on technical and professional criteria and free of political influence.
Short-term priorities: Ensure the full independence of the courts and prosecution system and strengthen the office of the prosecutor for war crimes
Implement the action plan on the judicial reform strategy. Adopt and implement legislation on mandatory initial and continuous training for judges, prosecutors 
and court support staff, and strengthen the training centers. Rationalize the court system, modernize proceedings, introduce an effective court management 
system and establish administrative and appellate courts. Create an IT network for prosecutors at all levels, ensure enforcement of court decisions and further 
strengthen the capacity to try war crimes domestically in full compliance with international obligations to the ICTY. Strengthen the office of the prosecutor for 
war crimes. 
2008 EU 
partnership 
with Serbia
Key short-term priorities: Improve the functioning of the judiciary, guarantee its independence, accountability, professionalism and efficiency and ensure that 
the career development and recruitment of judges and prosecutors are based on technical and professional criteria and free from political influence. Ensure 
proper functioning of the Constitutional Court. 
Short-term priorities: Ensure the full independence of the courts and prosecution system. Strengthen the office of the prosecutor for war crimes. Implement the 
action plan on the judicial reform strategy. Adopt and implement legislation on mandatory initial and continuous training for judges, prosecutors and court 
support staff and strengthen the training centers. Rationalize the court system, modernize proceedings, introduce an effective court management system and 
establish administrative and appellate courts. Create an IT network for prosecutors at all levels, ensure enforcement of court decisions and further strengthen the 
capacity to try war crimes domestically in full compliance with international obligations to the ICTY. 
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, my elaboration.
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Table 6: “EU priorities in the field of the judiciary reform in Macedonia”.
2002 SAA 
report 
priorities
Improve the functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, in line with international standards. Strengthen training of judges and prosecutors on EU legislation. Limit 
politicization of the judicial system as a part of a strategy of development and reform and introduce objective professional standards for appointment and career 
development.
2003 SAA 
report 
priorities
Improve the functioning and efficiency of law enforcement agencies and of the judiciary, in line with international standards. Strengthen training of judges and 
prosecutors on EU legislation. Limit politicization of the judicial system as a part of reforms aimed at developing judicial capacity and ensure that objective 
professional standards for appointment and career development are fully complied with.
2004 EU 
partnership 
Strengthen the judicial system - Prepare a comprehensive reform of the Judiciary. Review the current system of selection, appointment and promotion of judges 
and prosecutors with a view to ensuring political independence, irrevocability of judges and career development based upon merit. 
Prepare necessary constitutional and legislative amendments to guarantee the independence of the body in charge of their selection and career development. 
Simplify court procedures. Improve the enforcement of the courts' decisions. Introduce alternative dispute resolution mechanisms including arbitration and 
mediation in criminal matters. Ensure the appropriate enforcement of property rights and court rulings in the area of civil law. Strengthen the institutional 
capacity to train judges and prosecutors and prepare the setting up of a national school for magistrates. Provide for adequate initial and vocational training 
schemes.
2006 EU 
access 
partnership
Key short-term priorities: Adopt the constitutional amendments needed to implement the reform of the judicial system, in line with the recommendations of 
the Venice Commission. Subsequently adopt and implement the measures needed to strengthen the independence of judges (notably by reforming the judicial 
council and their system of selection), strengthen the training system for judges and prosecutors, improve the caseload management, and reduce the backlog.
Short-term priorities: Ensure a timely implementation of the strategy and action plan on judicial reform with a view to strengthening its independence, 
improving the efficiency of the courts, and strengthening the overall capacity of the judicial system.
Improve the execution of civil cases, and put in place an effective delivery and summons system. 
2007 
Access 
partnership
Key short-term priorities: Establish a sustained track record on implementation of judiciary reforms and strengthen the independence and overall capacity of 
the judicial system. Complete the reform of the prosecution and finalize the appointment of the Judicial Council.
Short-term priorities: Further develop initial and continuous training in the academy for judges and prosecutors.
Complete the setting-up of the new court structures and allocate appropriate resources to ensure that they are fully operational and enhance their efficiency. 
Ensure proper and full execution of court rulings.
2008 
Access 
partnership 
2008
Key short-term priorities: Establish a sustained track record on implementation of judiciary reforms and strengthen the independence and overall capacity of 
the judicial system. Implement the reform of the prosecution and finalize the appointment of the Judicial Council.
Short-term priorities: Further develop initial and continuous training in the academy for judges and prosecutors.
Complete the setting-up of the new court structures and allocate appropriate resources to ensure that they are fully operational and enhance their efficiency. 
Ensure proper and full execution of court rulings.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, my elaboration.
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Table 7: “EU financial support for the judiciary in Macedonia”.
Year Sum Programs 
2000 (phare) €2mil Development of the administrative and processing capacity of the courts and prosecutors.
2001 €1.4mil Technical assistance to carry out an assessment of the enforcement system.
Professional selection and training of the judiciary.
Equipment supply to public prosecutors Office.
2002 / /
2003 €2.54mil Development of the administrative and processing capacity of the courts and prosecutors.
2004 €1.5mil Professional selection and training of judges.
2005 €1.5mil Support to 
Public 
Prosecutor’s 
office.
Conditioned:
There needs to be a continued clear signal from the Government that the new Laws on Criminal Procedures and Public 
Prosecution will be fully implemented as an integral part of its own Judicial Reform Strategy. If this commitment is not 
forthcoming, the project as designed cannot proceed. Furthermore, the Government needs to formally adopt the Judicial Reform 
Strategy, which again is a key conditionality for the project to proceed.302
2006 €2.25mil Reform of the 
judiciary system.
Conditioned:
It is essential that political will and momentum be maintained for the Judicial Reform process. Without full support to this strategic 
direction, specific tactical interventions will yield insufficient sustainable benefit.303 
2007 €1.1 mil (IPE) Support to
Judicial Reform.
Conditions: general conditions for the program implementation. The Ministry of Justice will carry on the judicial reform process 
and will make sure that all the framework conditions, including the Strategy for Information-communication technology (SICT) 
and the Integrated Court Management System (ICMS) for the setting up and effective functioning of the Administrative Court are 
fulfilled. The implementation of the reform should lead to the legal and institutional changes that are going to regulate the tasks and 
jurisdiction of the Administrative Court, to define the basic provisions on the structure and the internal organization of the 
Administrative Court. 
Total 2000-2006 10.79 mil eur
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
302 Source: Project Fiche 3.2.1.1 to action program 2005 for the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, European Agency for Reconstruction.
303 Source: Sector Fiche 1.1. to action program 2006 for the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, European Agency for Reconstruction.
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Table 8: “EU financial support for the judiciary in Serbia”.
Year Sum Goal of the programs. Conditions.
2002 3.5 millions IT support to Judiciary.
2003\
13 millions304
Training for prosecution office and expert support for the ministry of justice with the aim to define the reform strategy, introduce alternative conflict 
resolution mechanisms.
2004
12.5
Twinning project to engage the capacity of the ministry of justice; Support the Judicial training center; Help introduce the alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms; IT training and Legal Data Base project.
2005
3.8 Supply of IT equipment for the ministry of Justice.Fight against economic crime in the republic of Serbia by strengthening Judicial and police capacities to tackle economic crime.
2006
2 mil
Support to the 
commission of the high 
judicial council.
Conditioned: Funding of all proposed programmers is conditional upon the signing of an Implementation
Agreement with the main project partners clearly outlining roles and responsibilities. Each of the project partners will be 
required to implement the necessary institutional arrangements ensuring a smooth implementation of the proposed projects. 
Outstanding issues, particularly support to the computerization of the court system under the 2004 program, should be 
addressed before program support begins.
2007
5 millions
Improvement of the 
efficiency and 
transparency of the 
judiciary system
Standardized system for 
judiciary education and 
training.
Conditioned: (The general conditionality envisaged in order to guarantee the implementation of the programs). The Ministry 
of Justice will ensure that its order that SENA case management software must be used in all courts of general jurisdiction 
that have fulfilled the technical requirements for its implementation is duly implemented. The Ministry of Justice will ensure 
that all stakeholders and beneficiaries of the project are in favour of normative, organizational and changes in the 
management of the courts and recommendations to the judiciary for improving the everyday practice of the judicial system 
and reducing the number of unsolved cases. 
Total 2002-2006 39.8 mil eur (of which €13mil shared with law enforcement agencies).
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
304 To be shared with law enforcement agencies
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Table 9: “The comparison between the Macedonian and Serbian judicial system” (author's elaboration).
Mak Ser
Court system administrated by: HCJ. HCJ.
The majority of the members of HCJ are elected by: The judiciary. Simple majority in the national assembly.
Appointment, dismissal etc of judges by: HCJ. First appointment assembly on HCJ proposal 
Re-appointment HCJ.
Security of tenure? Yes. Yes.
Probation period? No. Yes.
Judicial Budget decided by: Court Budget Council (minister of justice keeping veto 
power). 
Minister of justice.
The Judiciary share in state budget1: 1.57% (average 2002 – 2008). 2.16% (average 2002 – 2008).
Percentage of the judiciary budget deriving from own 
resources1:
5% (average 2004-2008). 23.5% (average 2002-2008).
Salaries: Calculated on the basis of the average salary. Calculated on the basis of the salaries in 
administration.
Number of judges:1 630 2418
Number of staff (not including judges)2: 2793 18171
Percentage of cases solved2 : 51.31 (average 2002-2007) 68.33 (average 2002-2007)
Number of cases in procedure2 : 1391853 1704616
Number of cases solved per year2 : 716608 1098063
Number of cases per judge2 : 2209 645
Number of cases solved per judge2 : 1137 454
EU assistance to judiciary: €11.19mil (2000-2006) €25.8mil (plus 13 to share with other 
enforcement agencies) (2002 – 2006).
Legislative framework concerning judiciary considered in line 
with European standards?
Yes. No.
Rule adoption of the EU promoted norms: Mainly concluded. Still pending.
Implementation of the EU promoted norms: Still pending. -
The most serious concern remaining: Lack of accountability of HCJ. Executive control – partisan influence on the 
judiciary.
1Data from European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, European judicial system, edition 2006.
2Data for Macedonia based on the Reports of the Constitutional Court of Macedonia, data for Serbia based on the Reports of the Constitutional Court of Serbia.
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Table 10: “The explanatory factors for the judicial reform in Macedonia 2004 -, international level” (author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration process, 
access to the funds?
Yes.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took place? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 10.79 millions of euro, of 307.9 total EU assistance to Macedonia for 2001-2007 (1).
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 3.5%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Part of the necessary reforms in transition to democracy.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? -
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
Yes (2).
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
Yes (3).
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Table 11: “The explanatory factors for the judicial reform in Macedonia 2004 -, domestic level” (author's elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: Weak.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: -
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Mid.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Government vs opposition, between different branches of government.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes.
Two or more alternative solutions present? No.
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid.
Table 12: “Judicial reform in Macedonia 2004 -, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: Open, discussion.
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:
Failure to ensure the mechanism of the accountability.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Members of the HJC.
The status (2008): Rule adopted, implementation pending.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Good progress in implementing the strategy on judicial reform. However, further strengthening of the judiciary is required as regards its independence, efficiency, human resources and budgetary framework. Moderately advanced.
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Table 13: “Explanatory factors for the judicial reform in Serbia (2001; 2002-2003, 2006-), international level” (author's elaboration).
Serbia 1
Set laws on Judiciary, 2001.
Serbia 2
Amendments  on 
Judiciary 2002-2003.
Serbia 3
Constitution 
2006.
Was  rule  adoption  explicitly  made  a  necessary  condition  for  the  signature  of  an  important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds?
- No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the 
integration process took place?
No. No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the 
SAA reports?
Yes  (issues  need  attention  in 
following 12 months).
Yes  (issues  need 
attention in following 
12 months.
Yes. 
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general:
39.8 millions of euro, 2001-2007, of 
1290,7 total EU assistance to Serbia 
in that period (1).
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the 
country:
3.08 %
Reform perceived by the IA as: Part  of  the  necessary  reforms  in transition to democracy.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the 
domestic stakeholders?
-
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the 
law drafting?
Yes. Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Yes. No. Only partially.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize 
the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
-
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the 
international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
- Yes.
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Table 14: “Explanatory factors for the judicial reform in Serbia (2001; 2002-2003, 2006-), domestic level” (author's elaboration).
Serbia 1
Set laws on Judiciary, 2001.
Serbia 2
Amendments on Judiciary 2002-2003.
Serbia 3
Constitution 2006.
Domestic input for the change: Urgent  necessity  for  the  reform  of judiciary (1).
Public  delegitimization of  the  judiciary, 
constitutional reform, constitutional law.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present  (judiciary,  civil  society,  political actors).
Present (judiciary, civil society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High (continuity-dicontinuity). High (continuity-dicontinuity). High (continuity-dicontinuity).
Type of the conflict and main line of the 
conflict:
Between the old and new elite, within the 
new elite.
Between the old and new elite, within the 
new  elite,  between  different  branches  of 
government.
Between  different  branches  of 
government.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions 
in society?
Yes (continuity-discotinuity, new-old elite).  Yes  (continuity-discotinuity,  new-old 
elite).
Yes (intra party conflict).
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Positional. X X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Supporters  of  the  ancient  regime, corrupted parts in the judiciary.
X Ruling  elite,  corrupted  parts  in  the 
judiciary.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens. X Citizens, judiciary.
Is  the  existing  status  quo  strongly 
delegitimized by all relevant actors?
Yes.
Two  or  more  alternative  solutions 
present?
Yes (presence of two completely different 
approaches to the way the reform shell be 
undertaken: continuity-discontinuity).
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the 
perspective  of  power  of  the  central 
actors)
Fluid. Fluid (conflictual, period of stagnation and 
turbulencies).
Stable.
(1) See for example Koštunica’s speech on the conference: “Strategija reformi”, 15/09/2001. 
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Table 15: “The judicial reform in Serbia (2001; 2002-2003, 2006-), outcomes” (author's elaboration).
Serbia 1.
Set laws on Judiciary, 2001.
Serbia 2.
Amendments on Judiciary 2002-2003.
Serbia 3.
Constitution 2006.
The procedure of law drafting:
Within the party that proposed the law, no 
public debate, the civil society, 
representatives of the judiciary, experts 
and other relevant actors not included (1).
Within ministry, no public debate, the civil 
society, representatives of the judiciary, 
experts and other relevant actors not 
included.
Behind the closed door in intra-party 
bargaining, no public debate, the civil 
society, representatives of the judiciary, 
experts and other relevant actors not 
included.
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:
In line with international standards. Completely undermining the judiciary 
independence established by the 2001 law.
Parties’ control over the HCJ (2).
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies:
Government (political parties of the ruling 
coalition)
Government (political parties of the 
ruling coalition).
The status (2008): Rule adopted.No implementation.
Rule adopted and implemented, some 
parts though reversed by the CC.
Rule adopted.
Implementation pending.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
Overall, there has been little progress 
with the judicial reform process. The 
legislative framework to implement 
judicial reform, as provided for by the 
new Constitution, is still not in place. 
Considerable efforts still need to be 
made by Serbia to ensure the 
independence, accountability and 
efficiency of the judicial system.
(1) The public debate was undertaken on the draft law proposed by the ministry, not on the law that at the end entered the parliament, proposed by DSS, see the section on the 
judiciary above.
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9. FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND 
ORGANIZED CRIME
“But if you do not have the Tao yourself, what use of you 
spending your time in vain efforts to bring corrupt politicians  
into the right path?”
Confucius.
Corruption as a phenomenon is said to be as old as the state, well-known and mentioned in 
the penal codes of various ancient civilizations, from the Jews, Chinese and Aztecs to the 
Greeks and Romans305. Representing the “deviation from the formal duties of a public role” 
(Nye, 1997, in Kahn, 2004, p. 3), the intentional violation of the principle of impartiality for 
personal gains306, and the abuse of public resources for personal gain (definition used by the 
World  Bank),  corruption,  in  all  its  variants  (in  the  shape  of  bribery,  extortion,  cronyism, 
nepotism, patronage, graft, embezzlement) and in whatever dimension and scope (from petty, 
administrative corruption to the great political corruption and state capture), directly violates 
the  principles  and values  upon which  democracy  resides.  “As Pizzorno notes,  corruption 
tends  to  act  upon  those  conditions  of  political  activity  without  which  democracy  is  not 
democracy at all: the principle of transparency… equality of the political rights, equal access to 
the state… (It)  undermines the political  control  exercised by the citizens…(and) produces 
inequality of access to the benefits of state actions” (Della Porta and Vannucci, p. 9, 1999). 
The negative impact the corruption has on the political, economic and social development was 
widely examined in literature and the fight against corruption became one of the hallmarks of 
many international actors engaged in the democracy promotion307.
305 See Khan, 2004.
306 Tanzi, 1995, in Begović and Mijatović, 2001.
307 However, we should underline that corruption was not so condemned in the politological literature during 
the  Sixties  as  it  is  nowadays.  Hislope  stresses:  “Finally,  we  really  do not  possess  definitive  information  on 
whether corruption is good or bad for transitional polities. In the 1960s, when modernization, nation-building 
and development  were central  topics  of investigation in  the  study  of  post-colonial  states,  political  scientists 
generally felt corruption was not such a harmful thing.” (Hislope, 2003, pp. 4-5), illustrating the point by the 
works of Huntington (Political Order in Changing Societies), Bayley, (The Effects of Corruption in a Developing 
Nation), and Nye (Corruption and Political Development). Le Billon, 2003, also criticizes the position according 
to which corruption brings only harm: “Such a view of corruption lacks historical and cultural contextualization, 
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Political corruption, also known as “state capture”, a situation when individuals or groups 
(economic, political, criminal or else) use corruption to capture the state and all its aspects, 
gaining  influence  over  the  decision-making  process,  over  the  government,  parliament, 
judiciary  and  administration,  is  of  particular  importance  for  our  two  cases308.  Unlike  the 
administrative  corruption,  where  the  existing  laws  are  distorted  in  the  phases  of 
implementation, the state capture concerns the decision-making process. Here again we have 
the distortion of the very principles of democracy as the decision power is de-facto taken away 
from the citizens and the citizen’s preferences are far from being all given equal consideration. 
The corruption thus corrupts the established (or at least constitutionally/legally  envisaged) 
democratic mechanisms of allocation of values, bringing to the re-distribution of the power 
and resources.
Seen the implications  the corruption  has on the  distribution  of  resources in  a  specific 
society, some politological studies approached the phenomenon from the point of view of the 
realpolitik,  coming to the conclusions  that,  under specific  circumstances,  some corruptive 
practices may be crucial factors for the maintenance of the political regime and even for the 
peace, stability  and survival  of the state.  For example,  according to Morlino (1998,  2005), 
clientelism and patronage politics represent one of the anchors of democracy, allowing the 
maintenance and a certain level of consolidation of democracy in those assets with limited or 
low legitimization of the democratic regime. Similarly, Hislope, inspired by Gramsci’s thought 
about  corruption/fraud  as  a  strategy  residing  between consent  and  force,  identifies  three 
mechanisms ensuring the inter-ethnic peace: consensus, control and exchange (corruption), 
arguing  that  corruption  is  a  key  for  understanding  not  only  the  inter-ethnic  conflict  in 
Macedonia, but also the peace and stability the country experienced during the Nineties. A 
similar argument is found in Le Billon, 2003, who argues that corruption can not only “fuel 
the war”, but might “buy the peace” as well. According to Le Billon, the effects (positive or 
negative)  of  the  corruption  depend  on  the  type  of  corruption  (the  author  theorizes  the 
typology based on the “level of stakes of exchange” and the “number of suppliers dispensing 
corruptive benefits”), and under specific circumstances it can become the only instrument of 
peace and stability. “In divided societies, a distribution of the spoils of office among different 
as the widely diverging experiences of relations between corruption, development and politics demonstrate in the 
recent history of Asian, African and Latin American countries (Johnston, 1986; Szeftel, 2000)… More broadly, 
corruption  is  endogenous to  many political  structures  in  which it  serves  key  hierarchical  functions,  thereby 
contributing to the political order (Cohen et al., 1981; Charap and Harm, 1999)” (Le Billon, 2003, pp. 413-313).
308 On state capture see Omelyanchuk, 2001.
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and possibly  antagonistic  groups and regions can help to stabilize a country’s politics  and 
economy.  The  tacit  institutionalization  of  corruption  within  the  hierarchy  of  the  state 
apparatus – for example by means of below-subsistence civil service wages or the purchase of 
decision-making positions – is a powerful mean for a ruling group to retain the allegiance of 
its  individual  members  and  organizations,  by  providing  both  an  inescapable  economic 
incentive  (access  to  rents/bribes)  and  a  disciplinary  threat  (dismissal  for  corruption)”  (le 
Billon, 2003, p. 416). From this point of view, rather than corruption, it is the change in the 
pattern of corruption that can lead to conflict and even to violence.
In the following section we will examine the levels of corruption and organized crime in 
the  two  studied  countries,  trying  to  trace  the  factors  favouring  the  development  of  the 
corruption,  the  registered  mechanisms  and  channels  of  state  capture,  describe  the  steps 
undertaken by the governments to fight back (or promote) the corruption and examine the 
factors that eventually  brought to the adoption and implementation of the anti-corruption 
legislation. As many of the mechanisms fostering corruption were explored in the sections 
concerning judiciary, administrative capacity and police reform, here we will concentrate on 
other  dimensions  of  the  fight  against  corruption:  the  anti-corruption  legislation,  the 
mechanisms of  public  finances  control,  the financing  of  the  political  parties  in  particular. 
Being strictly linked with the exercise of power and power-holders, corruption represents one 
of the most difficult issues to tackle, as it assumes that the ruling elite limits its own power and 
submits itself to control and accountability. When widespread, corruption becomes an issue 
uniting  the  rulers  against  the ruled,  turning  the anti-corruption  legislation  into a  symbolic 
policy, aimed for the “publicization” (to be spent in media campaign) and doomed from the 
beginning  to  be  obstructed  in  the  implementation  phase.  Finally,  many  of  the  factors 
favouring corruption are at the same time its consequences, this way creating a vicious circle 
which is very difficult  to exit.  As we will  see, the two countries at study performed rather 
purely when it comes to fighting the corruption back, combining the intensive rule adoption 
with the complete lack of implementation and fake compliance. 
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9.1. SERBIA
9.1.1. HERITAGE FROM THE NINETIES
In the aftermath of the 5th October 2000,  the corruption represented one of the most 
serious  problems  Serbia  was  facing309.  During  the  Nineties  the  corruption  penetrated  all 
structures of the society and reached such high levels that many Serbian citizens considered 
some of the subtypes of the corruptive behaviour (particularly nepotism, cronyism and all 
those practices that do not directly involve cash-payment) as a normal, daily practice, almost 
an obligation of the well-educated person310. For many, corruption was the way to survive311, 
and for  some it  was  the  way  to  gain  power.  On the  top  of  the  centralized  structure  of 
corruption in Serbia was its authoritarian leader312, Slobodan Milošević, awarded the 5th place 
on the Transparency International’s list of the top ten most self-enriching leaders in the recent 
years313. 
There are no available data in the corruption perception index for Yugoslavia for 2000 or 
2001, but the index of 2.3 in 2003, after almost three years of fight against corruption and 
after the adoption of a series of laws in the field, very well testifies the levels of corruption 
towards the end of Milošević’s regime. According to the public opinion surveys conducted in 
the summer 2000, 80% of citizens believed that all state and public institutions are corrupted 
(Mihajlović et al. 2000).
As far as the organized crime is concerned, according to the Transcrime report, there are 
more than 50 organized crime groups active in Serbia and Montenegro, horizontally organized 
with 3 to 10 members, composed of both nationals and non-nationals coming from Bosnia 
and Croatia. They operate both inside the country and internationally, of particular importance 
being the activity in the neighbouring countries: Turkey, Austria, Germany and Italy. Seen its 
geographic position, Serbia represents one of the most important transit countries for drugs, 
weapons and human trafficking  (Savona and Curtol,  2004).  The very large security  sector 
309 See Begović and Mijatović, 2001. Also Baracani, 2005.
310 According to the public opinion research undertaken by Mihajlović in summer 2000, more than 70% of 
the citizens would offer a bribe in exchange for a service, more than 60% of citizens considered bribing the only 
way to ensure that one enjoys his own rights, more than 50% considered cronyism and nepotism acceptable, and 
more than 60% believed that Serbia is doomed to corruption (See Mihajlović at al., 2000).
311 During the Nineties the economic crisis and inflation brought the salaries to such a low level that most of 
the citizens (particularly those in the public sector) were near to starvation. 
312 Begović and Mijatović 2001 distinguish between centralized and decentralized corruption, arguing that in 
Serbia’s case the corruption was centralized.
313 "Plundering  politicians  and  bribing  multinationals  undermine  economic  development,  says  TI". 
Transparency International (2004).
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developed during the Nineties, the involvement of Serbia in the Balkan conflicts and the high 
levels of corruption created an extremely favourable environment for the organized crime. 
The assassination of the Prime Minister by a member of the special security unit, who was also 
proved to be the head of one of the biggest criminal groupings in the country, illustrates the 
salience  of  the  problem  (for  the  links  between  Serbian  security  forces,  war  crimes  and 
organized crime see also the chapter on the security forces).
The causes of the development of corruption in Serbia, according to Begović and Mijatović 
(2001), can be classified in three macro factors: economic, political and juridical. 
The economic  system between the  end of  the  80s  and the  beginning  of  the  '90s  was 
recognized as one of the most important causes for corruption in Serbia. The large public 
sector, the delayed economic reforms, the state intervention in the field of economy, the very 
large and complicated system of regulations and procedures, the mix of state,  society and 
private property, poverty and economic crisis the country experienced, represented the fertile 
ground for the development of corruption. The Balkan wars were used as an excuse to pass to 
the “war economy”, that represented the further strengthening of the involvement of the state 
in the economy and allowed to postpone the economic reforms. Finally, the UN economic 
sanctions turned the smuggling into state business and the smugglers into national heroes. 
The political reasons that brought to the overspread of corruption are to be found in the 
lack of democratic institutions, the authoritarian regime of one man, control of the regime 
over the finances, strong security forces under the command of the regime, the narrow elite’s 
control over the state-owned corporations, the control over the legislative and executive, the 
recruitment policy based on the political “acceptability” and obedience314. Similarly, the war in 
the Balkans and the involvement of the Serbian military, police and security forces in the war 
in the former Yugoslavia, together with the creation of the paramilitary forces, represented an 
extremely favourable setting for the development of the organized crime (see the chapter on 
the security forces). 
According  to  some authors,  the  corruption  in  Milošević’s  period  was  conducted  from 
above  and  was  propelled  from  the  centre.  The  strong  hierarchy  and  the  loyalty-based 
recruitment system that requested blind obedience from the lower officials was completed by 
the possibility given to the officials to be involved in the corruption without consequences. 
The small salaries were there to ensure the involvement of the bureaucrats in the corruption 
chains that would guarantee their loyalty to the regime. Begović (et al.) underlined that the 
314 See Begović and Mijatović, 2001.
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corruption in Serbia was both centralized (in relation to the private interest), and decentralized 
(in  relation  to the citizens).  It  was both  administrative  and political,  and it  penetrated all 
aspects of society: not only the ruling institutions and administration, but also the judiciary, 
police, security forces, the health and education, the social assistance.
The  final  set  of  causes  identified  by  Begović  and  Mijatović  concerns  the  legal  and 
constitutional framework: the existence of numerous norms on one side, with significant legal 
“shortcuts”  on the  other,  the  horizontal  as  well  as  vertical  lack  of  harmonization  of  the 
legislations, the lack of control and responsiveness mechanisms, the institutions with unclear 
division of competencies and too large liberties left to the bureaucrats in the process of law 
interpretation  and enforcement  were  a  good basis  for  the  “nothing  is  easy,  everything  is 
possible” state. 
The corruption during Milošević’s regime penetrated all segments of state and society, and, 
we should add, the “democratic opposition” was not immune to this disease. The previous 
ruling experience of the parties composing DOS should also be included among Milošević’s 
regime legacies, that contributed to the new ruling elite’s incapacity to decisively strike back on 
corruption.  On the  local  elections  in  1996  the  “democratic  opposition”,  as  it  was  called, 
gained the majority in several cities.  After a few months of long protests,  the regime was 
forced to accept the electoral results and the opposition parties came to power in all the large 
cities in Serbia.  This resulted in a constellation of powers in which the “democratic” local 
governments  developed  democracy  within  an  authoritarian  regime.  As  Dahl  already 
underlined, it is difficult to imagine democracy developed within a non-democratic unit, and 
Serbia in the '90s clearly showed it. As some annalists underlined, the local democratic elite 
behaved in the precisely identical manner as the regime: corruption and clientelism became 
their hallmark as well (see Vuković, 2002). This resulted in a situation where the lower-rank 
party officials got involved in very serious cases of corruption, and, moreover, developed a 
strong financial and security interest in not facing the issue. Even when the party leadership 
was determined to give a  definitive  strike to corruption,  the pressures coming from both 
outside and inside the political parties represented a difficult obstacle to any change in the 
existing practices.
9.1.2. CORRUPTED AGAINST CORRUPTION
Immediately after the regime change, the development of the legislative framework aiming 
to fight corruption began. The fight against corruption was one of the most important issues 
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on the new elite’s political platform, and at the same time one of the most salient issues on the 
public agenda. In January 2001, the corruption was perceived to be the most serious social 
problem together with poverty, political instability and criminality315, so activities to face the 
issue were undertaken already in 2001. The legislative framework put in place in order to fight 
the corruption was composed of a series of laws classically understood as systemic measures 
for fighting  and preventing  corruption.  However,  as  we will  see,  in  all  cases  the  adopted 
legislations suffered from serious shortcomings. 
The first steps were undertaken in October 2001, when Đinđić’s government formed the 
Council for the Fight Against Corruption. The body was formed within the government and 
was supposed to have an advisory role. The first composition of the council,  appointed in 
December 2001, clearly showed the political will of the decision maker to face the issue: the 
members were chosen from the lines of eminent professionals and scientists known to the 
public as non-partisan members of the intellectual elite316. However, only 6 months later, came 
the first resignations: the president of the council Beljanski resigned “as he did not share the 
government’s understanding of the fight against corruption”.  As the government failed to 
nominate new members to the council, it decided to change the number of members from 15 
to 11, but the council failed to elect its president and remained blocked until the beginning of 
2003. 
In this first period after the regime change, in the field of the fight against corruption we 
also account for the introduction of corruption as a criminal offence through the amendments 
to  the  criminal  code  adopted  in  February  2002317 and  the  first  Serbian  Law  on  Public 
Procurement.  Even though the  legislator  was rather  successful  in  designing  the  legislative 
framework, defining the crime of corruption and prescribing severe measures against it, in the 
last years numerous cases of highest-level corruption that involved the political leaders were 
only  discussed  in  the  media  but  never  investigated  or  prosecuted.  Similar  difficulties  in 
compliance  are  registered  in  the  case  of  the  Law  on  Public  Procurement.  Prepared  in 
cooperation with the international experts, it was assessed as mainly in line with the European 
Standards. The law prescribed the establishment of the Agency for the Public Procurement, 
under  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  and the  Commission  for  the  Protection  of  the  Rights  of 
Suppliers. The Agency for Public Procurement was formed in 2004, when the law started with 
315 See, Begović B. and Mijatović D., 2001.
316 On establishment of the Council for the Fight against Corruption and its role, see also Dallara, 2008.
317 http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2002/02/26/srpski/D02022505.html. 
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the  implementation.  Even  though  its  implementation  brought  to  an  increase  in  the 
transparency of the public procurements318, some shortcomings in the legislative framework 
and difficult implementation are registered in this field as well. The legislation covered only 
the processes of opening the tender, collecting offers and contracting, leaving the procedure 
of planning the procurement as well as the control of the contract’s realization to the still un-
functioning State Audit Institution. Further on, the submission of the agency to the Ministry 
of Finance opens the door to the political influence that represented a serious problem in the 
functioning  of  the  agency319.  In  2005  the  government  brought  the  decision  to declare  all 
procurements  in  the  police  as  confidential,  omitting  a  very  large  police  sector  from  the 
compliance with the law. The implementation of the law is also seriously hampered due to the 
inadequate size of the agency that is too small to face the workload320. 
While  in  the  period  immediately  after  the  regime  change  some  positive  steps  were 
undertaken, the deep political crisis that culminated in the assassination of the Prime Minister 
in March 2003 brought to the surface a series of scandals connecting the ruling elite to the 
organized crime. As the assassination of the Prime Minister induced the government to make 
the council functional, the missing members were finally nominated. The council continued to 
exercise strong pressure on the government, by issuing the analysis and reports on some of 
the  biggest  corruption  scandals  in  2003.  In  one  of  the  reports,  the  council  even  openly 
accused DOS government for the lack of political will to fight the corruption321. 
In summer 2003, in an effort to increase their legitimacy, the parties agreed and adopted 
the Law on the Financing of Political Parties. The law, however, even though it was adopted 
with a very large consensus in the assembly and it enjoyed the support of the CoE and EU, 
represented a series of shortcomings that further threatened to undermine its implementation. 
Among the most serious loopholes we find the unclear division of competencies between the 
bodies that are supposed to control the parties’ financing, the lack of an independent body 
that  would  monitor  the  compliance,  the  discretional  powers  of  the  president  of  the 
parliamentary commission who is the only one that can press charges for the violation of the 
law. The adoption of the Law on the Financing of Political Parties represents an illustration of 
a law aimed to be publicized instead of implemented. It was adopted by the political parties 
seeking for legitimization, and the shortcomings in the law clearly testify that it was never 
318 See Barać, 2006, also Begović, Jovanović and Paunović, 2007.
319 See Barać, 2006.
320 See Begović, Jovanović and Paunović, 2007.
321 On the relations between the Council and the Government, see Baracani, 2005.
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supposed to be properly implemented. It was supposed to enter into force only in 2004 (after 
the parliamentary elections), but its implementation, as stressed by the Council for the Fight 
Against Corruption, CeSID and Trasparentnost, as well as according to the domestic analysts, 
is completely lacking. No party was ever accused of the infringement of the law, even though 
the reports on the financing of the 2007 parliamentary elections did not contain the names of 
donors322.
The parliamentary elections in December 2003 brought to power Koštunica who, turning 
the  public  attention  to  questions  like  corruption  and  organized  crime,  promised  decisive 
measures in  the field.  In the first  hundered days of  government,  the Law on Conflict  of 
Interests was drafted and adopted. However, the process of rule adoption and the content of 
the legislation showed that such actions were part of a strategy aiming to the image-making 
and that the laws adopted were only symbolic in the nature. 
The Law on the Conflict of Interest was proposed already in 1994 by DS as a response to 
Milošević’s abuse of power, but it felt forgotten until the 2000 change of regime. The process 
of drafting the new Law on Preventing the Conflict of Interest was initiated in 2002 by the 
Council  for  the  Fight  Against  Corruption  and by several  NGOs.  After  the  parliamentary 
elections of December 2003, Koštunica, in line with his electoral promise, underlined the fight 
against the corruption and the adoption of the Law on the Conflict of Interests as one of the 
government’s priorities. The law was in fact adopted very soon after the formation of the new 
cabinet (April 2004), but without the public debate and according to a simplified procedure 
used in the urgent cases, which seriously undermined the possibility to remove the several 
shortcomings in the legislation. Neither the documentation prepared by the Council, nor its 
recommendations were taken in consideration. Some of the individuated shortcomings were 
so serious they undermined the law’s function: the law excluded the entire judiciary and local 
self government, both considered to be the main sources of corruption, from compliance. It 
also allowed (even though it limited) the participation of the parliamentarians to the manager 
boards of the public companies. The law limited access to the information about the assets of 
the public officials (in order to protect their privacy), making it almost impossible for those 
citizens who might have information about the public officials' property to know if the official 
has or hasn’t declared it. The entire design of the Council is considered unsatisfactory, as a 
body of only 12 persons, without the necessary infrastructures and resources, is supposed to 
322 See Stojiljković Z., Milosavljević M., Simić M., Vuković S., (2005), CeSID, 2005, Komentari na zakon o 
finansiranju političkih stranaka i predlozi za unapređenje zakonske regulative, Interview with Barać, 2008.
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control the declared assets of more than 13.000 officials (Transparency Report 2006). These 
shortcomings in both the content and the implementation of the rule adopted clearly show 
the symbolic nature of the legislation: it was drafted and adopted in a manner to “satisfy” the 
external and the internal requirements for the rule adoption, without the intention to allow its 
implementation.
Such façade approach of the government to the question of the fight against corruption 
soon brought the government and the Council into a new conflict. In December 2004 the 
Council  published  the  report  on  the  affair  with  the  National  Savings  Bank,  accusing  the 
Minister of Finance of corruption. As a reaction, the government cut the relations with the 
Council.  The  Council  continued  with  its  activities,  making  the  proposals,  issuing  reports, 
revealing cases of corruption and making its recommendations to the government, but, as 
reported by  the council,  all  its  initiatives  were ignored323.  The budget of  the  Council  well 
illustrates  Koštunica’s  government’s  concern  for  this  institution:  the  council’s  portion  in 
budget during 2004-2007 never passed 0.0028%, one third of the budget share it had in 2003 
(see the Table 8 in the appendix).
The conflict that bursted between the government and the Council for the Fight Against 
Corruption,  together with external and internal pressures to take serious steps in the fight 
against  corruption,  brought  Koštunica’s  fragile  minority  government  in  a  position  where 
actions to fight back the corruption, at least formally, shall be undertaken. Thus, the National 
Strategy for the  Fight  Against  Corruption  was  finally  designed in  2004,  and,  with serious 
delays,  adopted  in  2005,  after  almost  3  years  of  repeated  and  underlined  need  for  that 
document. The National Strategy was drafted in cooperation with the European experts as 
well as domestic NGOs, and it obtained a rather good evaluation, while the Action Plan is 
adopted in the government during the electoral campaign on the 28th December 2006. The 
government also announced that it adopted and sent to the assembly the long-awaited for Law 
on the  Special  Anti-Corruption  Body,  but  then,  almost  silently,  the  law went  out  of  the 
procedure and returned to the government in order to be re-designed. As the Transparency 
2006  report  on  Serbia  says,  “given  the  international  community’s  interest  in  Serbia’s 
institutional evolution, legislation is often introduced more to comply with external pressure 
than to meet domestic needs. The implementation of laws adopted under these conditions is 
323 See the Council’s report for 2006.
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often weak. This applies equally to the Information Law and much of the anti-corruption 
legislation adopted in recent years”324.
The Law on the State Audit Institution was also adopted in 2005. Seen the complete lack 
of control over the public spending (the last report on the budget spending was submitted in 
2002), the establishment of an independent state audit was of crucial importance in preventing 
the abuse of the state resources. However, this legislation, as all anti-corruption documents 
adopted in this period,  represented nothing  more than a fake compliance  of the publicity 
seeking ruling elite. As underlined in the analysis of the Commission for the Prevention of 
Corruption, the institution of State Audit was given so large competencies and obligations that 
the  very  functioning  of  the institution  and its  capacity  to monitor  the  public  spending is 
questioned.  Further  on,  the  independence  of  the  institution  is  undermined  due  to  the 
procedures that put both the appointment and the dissolution of the Council in the hands of 
the parliamentary majority.  The Council of the State Audit Institution was supposed to be 
appointed before May 2006,  yet  this  deadline was not respected and the body was finally 
formed  in  September  2007,  when  the  ruling  majority  appointed  the  candidates.  The 
independence  of  the  institution  was  undermined  already  prior  to  the  appointment  of  its 
members,  as  the  candidates  were  “divided”  between  the  ruling  political  parties  (each 
nominating  a  certain  number  of  candidates),  while  the  opposition  strongly  criticized  such 
solutions, questioning not only the political neutrality of the candidates, but in some cases also 
their personal integrity as well as the fulfillment of the conditions for the appointment325. One 
year  after  the  appointment  of  the  council,  the  state  auditors  are  still  lacking  the  basic 
conditions  for  their  work  (they  are  not  even  assigned  an  office,  not  to  speak  about  the 
elementary infrastructures).
The failure to implement the existing legislative framework resulted in very negative reports 
on  the  levels  of  corruption  in  Serbia  in  2007  and  2008.  The  ranking  of  Serbia  on  the 
corruption  index  worsened,  while  due  to  the  failure  to  comply  with  the  GRECO 
recommendation Serbia  risked to be declared as a “non cooperative” country,  putting the 
country’s membership in CoE at risk  326. The government proceeded with drafting a set of 
anti-corruption  laws  that  were  submitted  to  the  assembly  in  September  2008  (still  in 
procedure). While the international  experts positively  assessed the law drafts, the domestic 
324 Transparency, 2006 report..
325 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=09&dd=18&nav_id=264059. 
326http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?  
yyyy=2007&mm=10&dd=15&nav_category=11&nav_id=267800.
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experts in the fight against corruption are very suspicious about both the legislation’s content 
and the government’s devotion to the issue. As Barać, president of the Council for the Fight 
Against Corruption, underlined, Serbia already has the set of laws to fight against corruption, 
so the main problem is not the lack of legislative framework, rather the lack of political will to 
strengthen  and  implement  the  existing  legislative  framework.  According  to  the  domestic 
experts,  the  rule  adoption  is  just  one  in  a  series  of  fake  compliance  steps.  Instead  of 
strengthening the existing bodies, the Law on the Agency for the Fight Against Corruption is 
actually dismantling the existing institutions, some of which, like the Council for the Fight 
Against Corruption or the Commission for the Protection of the Concurrency of the Market, 
proved  capable  to  go  against  the  ruling  oligarchs.  The  continuous  undermining  of  the 
institutions, the obstruction of the consolidation of the existing institutions, the high levels of 
legal uncertainty, all these are phenomenon the domestic experts recognized as the tactic for 
the corrupted ruling elite to avoid the fight against corruption327. 
9.1.3. THE DOMAINS AND CAUSES OF THE CORRUPTION IN SERBIA
After the change of Milošević’s regime, the fight against corruption was among the top 
priorities of the newly formed democratic government. However, the negotiated nature of the 
transition and persistence of the old cadres, many of which not only loyal to the previous 
regime,  but  also involved  in  corruption  and crime cases,  limited  the  capacity  of  the  new 
government to cope with the problem. The lustration process never took place and, except for 
Milošević  and  the  very  narrow  circle  of  his  supporters  and  family,  the  members  of  the 
previous  elite  were  not  prosecuted  for  the  abuse  of  power  and  crimes  committed.  Even 
though the anti-corruption council  prepared well-testified charges against the heads of the 
previous regime, the procedure was blocked in the office of the public prosecutor and the 
Prime  Minister  Živković  justified  the  delay  of  the  process  due  to  the  “sensitivity  of  the 
issue”328. 
The negotiated nature of the transition also meant the lack of political strength to face the 
problem of the Serbian business elite. The Serbian economic elite was born during a period of 
international  isolation,  under  an  authoritarian  regime  and  in  a  war-shaken  society  where 
corruption, grey economy and organized crime were tightly linked to the central authorities329. 
327 The interview with Verica Barać. See also the statement of Goati for B92, September the 23rd, 2008.
328 Barać and Zlatić, 2004.
329 For the links between the political, economic elite and organized crime in Serbia and Croatia, see Rotta, 
2003. On the link between nationalism, organized crime and corruption and on the influence the international 
isolation has on the development of such links, see Kemp, 2003. On the links between the Serbian elite (political 
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After the regime change, the economic elite succeeded in legitimizing itself and established 
strong  ties  with  the  new political  circles,  ties  which,  in  lack  of  transparent  and  efficient 
political  institutions,  took the shape of nepotistic/corruptive  links330.  The financing of the 
political parties and the link between the business elite and politicians are the basis of the state 
capture  that  took  place  in  Serbia  and  a  key  for  understanding  the  Serbian  difficulties  in 
successfully fighting back the corruption331. 
To these factors we should add the particularities of the Serbian political and party system 
that finally contributed to the state capture we register in Serbia. In the section on the form of 
government we explored the impact of the polarized pluralism type of party system on the 
electoral  accountability  of the central actors of the system. The ruling elite,  free from the 
electoral responsibility and enjoying high certainty over future competitions, is by no means 
motivated to strengthen the inter-institutional accountability or to limit its own power. The 
lack of judiciary independence, the politicization of the state administration and the parties’ 
control  over  the  mandates  (see  the  relevant  chapters)  represent  the  mechanisms  that 
concentrate the judicial,  executive and legislative power in the hands of a narrow political 
leadership. Such complete, unlimited control over the state opens the possibility for the party 
leaders to pursue their personal  interests and those of their business partners without any 
checks from below. The list of unpunished and unprocessed cases of large-scale corruption, 
involving  top politicians,  that,  together with the well-prepared proofs and documents,  the 
Council  for  the  Fight  Against  Corruption  submitted  to  the  government  and  the  public 
prosecutor, testifies on the levels of the impunity enjoyed by Serbian oligarchs332.
Finally, a very large public sector inherited from the previous regime and the privatization 
that was opened only after the change of the regime offered a very high stake in the game 
both for the political elite controlling the state resources, and for the economic elite seeking to 
and  economic)  and  the  organized  crime  during  the  ‘90s  see  the  report  of  the  Southeast  European  Legal 
Development Initiative, “Anti corruption in South-eastern Europe: first steps and policies”, on the difficulties 
and  costs  of  the  integration  with  the  EU rising  from the  existence  of  the  economic  elite  linked  with  the 
nationalist pattern governments see Vachudova, 2003. See also the section on the economic issues.
330 For the paradoxical legitimization of the illegal profit through the law on extra profit with retroactive 
effects, as well as on how the law implementation brought to the establishing of the ties between the economic 
and political elite, see Mijatović, 2005, Bisić, 2005, Prokopijević, 2002. 
331 See Pešić, 2006.
332 One of the most famous examples is the one concerning the minister of finances, Dinkić, was discovered 
and publicly accused of being involved in the corruption scandal on the National Saving Bank by the Council for 
the fight against corruption, but no legal consequences followed (except that the government cut the relations 
with  the  council  as  described  above).  Similarly,  his  colleague,  Ilić,  minister  of  capital  investments  in  both 
Koštunica's governments,  was involved in the corruption scandal concerning the Serbian Railways company, 
again without any consequences. 
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increase its  own capital.  The Law on Privatization was adopted soon after  the change of 
government.  Beside  inadequacy  of  the  adopted model  of  the  privatization333,  the law also 
centralized the process, strengthening the state’s control. The lack of clear, transparent criteria 
in  deciding  the  winner  of  the  auction/tender  brought  to  the  predomination  of  the 
bureaucratic  arbitration  in  the  process  and  opened  the  door  to  corruption.  The  law was 
amended  in  May  2005,  yet  not  in  order  to  incorporate  the  recommendations  of  the 
international  actors and Council  for the Fight Against Corruption,  but in order to further 
increase  the  discretional  powers  of  the  Agency,  contributing  to  the  further  lack  of 
transparency in the process of privatization (see Barać, 2006, p. 23).
9.1.4. EU AND FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION IN SERBIA
The  process  of  the  EU  democracy  promotion  in  Serbia  included  the  fight  against 
corruption  as  one  of  the  areas  of  intervention.  Both  conditionality  and  socialization 
mechanisms were used. As we can see in Table 2, the fight against corruption was considered 
an issue needing particular attention in each of the EU documents, both in the SAA reports 
(in the paragraph on the areas needing attention) and in the European partnership. Moreover, 
some measures such as: de-politicization of public administration and judiciary independence, 
reform of the police, reform of the recruitment system in all sectors, even though indirectly, 
also  included  measures  that,  if  well  designed  and  implemented,  would  help  fight  back 
corruption. However, as these areas are already examined in other paragraphs, we decided to 
deal only with the recommendations and rule promotions of those norms that are included in 
the EU documents under the label “fight against corruption”.
We can observe how, passing from the SAA reports to the EU partnership, the shape of 
conditionality  changed.  It  became more  concrete,  with  the  prescription  on  the  pieces  of 
legislation to be adopted, which surely strengthened the credibility of the conditionality on the 
matter.  However,  we  shall  underline  that  even  though corruption  is  considered  a  serious 
problem in Serbia,  only in 2007 it  was included among the key short-term priorities.  The 
credibility of such step is, however, undermined, as it is the case with all other areas of EU 
intervention in Serbia, seen that more urgent issues, such as the ICTY, Kosovo and the rising 
of the security issues, are undermining the credibility  of the EU democracy promotion in 
Serbia. 
333 See Janković, 2006, Prokopijevic 2002. See the section on economic issues.
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As for the participation to international  forums and socialization channels of influence, 
Serbia became a part of GRECO (Council  of Europe’s initiative, Group of States Against 
Corruption)  in  2003,  and  the  international  experts  (CoE,  Transparency  international,  EU 
office)  were all  very  active  in  designing  the legislations,  especially  in  drafting  the national 
strategy for the fight against corruption. The participation to GRECO opened the door to 
another  source  of  conditionality  and  influence334.  The  2005  GRECO  evaluation  report 
brought about 25 recommendations considering the adoption and the implementation of the 
laws and by-laws. The third-round evaluation that started in January 2007 revealed the lack of 
compliance of Serbia with GRECO recommendations and, according to the statement of the 
president of GRECO, Drago Kos, this lack of compliance seriously compromised Serbia’s 
position in CoE. In the statement given on 15/10/2007,  Kos made explicit  that the non-
compliance  with  the  GRECO  recommendations  is  one  of  the  criteria  used  by  EU  in 
evaluating the political developments in the country. He made clear that if the Law on Anti-
corruption Agencies and the action plan are not adopted, Serbia might be declared as a “non 
cooperative”  country,  a  status  that  brings  in  first  instance  the  obligation  of  three-month 
reporting, and – in cases of further lack of compliance – the loss of membership in CoE335. 
The  fight  against  corruption  was  also  included  among  the  objectives  of  the  CARDS 
program in the area of good governance and institution building (directly mentioned in 2004 
with 64 millions of euro). 
The EU and CoE also served as an incentive for Serbia  to get involved in a series of 
conventions in the field of fight against corruption,  such as the European Convention on 
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the proceeds and Crime and UN Convention 
for the Fight Against Corruption. 
9.1.5. THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: ASSESSMENT
Even though the Serbian ruling elite is announcing a more decisive fight against corruption 
and the adoption of a set of laws, we might observe that the legislative framework for fighting 
against corruption in Serbia is already in force and that rather than the lack of legal means, the 
real  problem  is  the  weakness  of  these  laws  and  the  failure  to  implement  them.  In  the 
development of the instruments to fight against the corruption in Serbia we can distinguish 
334 On the importance and limits of the Council  of Europe in promoting the fight against  corruption in 
Serbia, see Dallara, 2008.
335 http://www.b92net/info/vesti/indexphp?
yyyy=2007&mm=10&dd=15&nav_category=11&nav_id=267800. 
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three moments in the development of the legislative framework. The first period goes from 
January 2001 (when the newly elected DOS government, with Đinđić as Prime Minister, took 
the power) until the mid-2002 when the first resignations in the Council for the Fight Against 
Corruption took place. A series of positive conditions are registered in this period:
• Existence of change agents in the lines of government and strong popular support for 
the actions against corruption;
• The new ruling elite and the instability of the future electoral competitions;
• Lack of links between the new political elite and the business sector;
• The issue being brought to the agenda thanks to the elite’s formal devotion to the issue 
and its inclusion into the core of the political program of the newly elected coalition;
• Finally, the ruling elite was new, and being so, prosecuting and fighting back corruption 
was a decision hitting the old elite involved in the corruption cases, it was tackling the 
old  links  established between the politics  business and eventually  underground,  and 
being so the case, it coincided with the goals of the new, emerging ruling elite. 
At the same time, however, a series of negative aspects were also influencing the situation:
• The “negotiated” transition and the conflict  between DSS and DS ensured that the 
policy of continuity prevails;
• The lack  (and  impossibility  to  undertake)  the  process  of  lustration.  All  aspects  of 
government: judicial,  security system, administration, health and education system in 
particular  were  completely  penetrated  by  the  personnel  involved  in  the  corruption 
chains, representing a strong veto player blocking the change.
In the first period we only had a couple of provisions adopted: a change in the penal code 
to include corruption, the Law on Public Procurement and formation of the Council.  The 
behaviour of the decision-maker at the time (declaring assets on voluntary bases, creation of a 
strong and influential council) all point to a direction of the existence of the political will and 
presence of change agents devoted to the issue in the ruling class. The political instability in 
the situation of the new ruling elite could be a positive incentive if it was not for the fact that 
DOS  was  not  a  completely  “new”  elite  (the  parties  were  already  at  power  in  the  local 
governments,  with  already  developed  corruption  channels).  The  strong  veto  players  were 
operating: on the one hand the elite of the ancient regime fearing persecution, on the other 
the “new potential (ab)users”, but, even more importantly, all Serbian “tycoons” and “donors” 
331
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
who for years were sustaining the regime, and ready to invest in the new democratic order in 
exchange for the influence in the decision-making. The international pressure existed, both in 
the shape of conditionality  and through the socialization channels,  but corruption was not 
among the most salient issues of the IA promotion package. 
The second period is characterized by the turbulent inner politics when the crisis within 
DOS between DSS and DS was consuming all the political energy, together with the issues of 
Yugoslavian state destiny and negotiations with Montenegro.  Moreover,  being the conflict 
between old-new, continuity-discontinuity, radical reform or incremental change the cause of 
the DSS-DS split, it is no surprise that an issue getting to the core of the future distribution of 
power could not be faced in a period of governmental  instability.  This  crisis  exploded in 
March  2003  with  the  assassination  of  the  prime  minister  Đinđić,  when  the  government 
proclaimed the state of emergency, on one hand undertaking a series of drastic measures in 
the  fight  against  both the  organized crime and corruption,  but  on the  other  opening the 
Pandora's  box  of  partisan-motivated  accusations336.  In  such  situation  the  government,  in 
search of legitimacy, re-established the council and adopted the crucial piece of legislation: the 
Law on Financing of Political Parties. Unfortunately, seen the behaviour of the parties, the 
rule adoption was possible  only  because of the consciousness that the rule would not be 
implemented. Such conclusion is grounded on the fact that the law itself contained elements 
that  would impair  its  implementation.  Thus,  the  maximum amount  that  can be spent for 
financing the electoral campaign is far above the real cost of electoral campaigns. The political 
parties have two choices: either to lose the elections, or to infringe the law. On the other 
hand, the body authorized to monitor the financing of the electoral campaign is actually a 
politicized  body  (republican  electoral  commission)  composed  of  members  elected  by  the 
parties. 
The third period, 2004-2007, was characterized by the rule adoption and, at the same time, 
the lack of political will and absence of truly devoted change agents, who would bring to the 
implementation of the rules, among the decision makers. The number of the veto players on 
the other hand increased (while in the first transition years there were elements not included in 
the process of  political  corruption,  the predominance of  one block  at  the  power and the 
establishment of the polarized pluralism party system brought to the involvement of the “no 
336 Let us just remember that during the electoral campaign DSS underlined that they know and have proof of 
the  political  background  of  Đinđić’s  murder  only  to  admit,  few  months  later,  when  called  to  open  the 
investigation, that the announcements was part of the electoral campaign. 
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longer  new  elite”  in  the  corruption  circles).  But  as  both  the  public  opinion  and  the 
international  community increased the pressure (we saw how the EU passed from general 
recommendations to more specific requests that precise rules or documents are adopted), the 
government’s  need for  legitimacy brought  to formal  compliance  and rule  adoption.  What 
made the rule adoption feasible was the “symbolic” nature of the adopted legislation, never 
meant to be implemented. In a situation when the veto-players in search of legitimization 
behave as fake change agents, the “symbolic” rules are easily adopted.
9.2. MACEDONIA
9.2.1. HERITAGE FROM THE NINETIES
The  corruption  in  Macedonia  is  believed  to  be  one  of  the  most  serious  problems 
hampering the democratization process. According to the public opinion surveys, in 2002 the 
83% of citizens believed corruption to be the most urgent problem a new government should 
solve (Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2002), while, according to the 2000 opinion polls, 
more than 81% of the citizens believed that all or most of the state officials are corrupted (this 
figure is taken from Labovik 2005). The country’s positioning on the “corruption perception” 
scale is also clearly illustrating the point, the country occupying the 103rd place in 2005. In the 
report of the International Crisis Group for 2002, the level of corruption in Macedonia was 
estimated to bring an annual cost of about 200 million dollars, inducing the ICG to accuse the 
Macedonian donors that, instead of democracy, they were actually financing the corruption 
(Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska,  2002).  It  was mainly  due to this  ICG report  that  the 
attention of the IA and domestic civic society shifted to the problem, both actors starting to 
perceive corruption as one of the most serious issues hampering the rule of law in the country 
and the greatest obstacle to the much needed FDI.
As far as organized crime is concerned, according to the Transcrime report, there are about 
10 organized criminal groups operating in Macedonia, organized hierarchically and made up of 
both  nationals  and  non-nationals.  Their  activity  is  transnational,  with  particularly  well-
developed connections with the Albanian and Serbian organized crime groups. They are active 
in the Balkan area and Eastern Europe area (in particular Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Turkey), 
as  well  as  in  the EU member states  (Austria,  Germany,  Greece,  Italy,  Romania,  Bulgaria, 
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Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Hungary)337.  The  main  activities  these  groups  are  engaged  in  are  drug 
trafficking (Macedonia is a transit point of the Asian heroin and South American cocaine for 
the market of the western Europe, the Albanian mafia originated in Kosovo and Macedonia 
holding the big share of the drug markets in Austria, Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Poland  and  Belgium  and  almost  the  entire  Swiss  market),  trafficking  of  human  beings 
(Macedonia being both the transition and the origin country for trafficking of women for 
prostitution purposes), and smuggling of the stolen vehicles (see  “The contribution of data 
exchange  systems  to  the  fight  against  organized  crime  in  the  SEE countries  final  report 
2004”). Other activities, such as smuggling of migrants, tobacco, cigarettes and goods, as well 
as money laundering, are also rising concerns.
In order to understand the causes for corruption and organized crime in Macedonia, to the 
factors usually underlined in the studies of the post-communist transition, the particularities 
deriving from the Balkan ethnic wars should be added. In Macedonia’s case (similarly as we 
underlined  for  Serbia),  the  already  favourable  ground for  the  development  of  corruption 
(deriving  from  the  drawbacks  of  the  communist  system,  non-existent  or  low-developed 
democratic norms and values, inefficient and underdeveloped economy and non-transparent 
decision-making  processes),  was  combined  with  the  proliferation  of  the  organized  crime 
(especially of smuggling, trafficking and illegal trade)  in the whole Balkan region due to the 
ethnic war and the international community embargo to the FR Yugoslavia338.
The analysis of corruption and organized crime in Macedonia can not omit the important 
impact  the  ethnic  tensions  and  the  2001  conflict  in  Macedonia  had.  According  to  many 
authors, the ethnic violence that took place in 2001 was tightly linked to the “state capture 
mixed with the administrative corruption” identified by Kempt (Kempt, 2003). However, the 
causal  link between the organized crime and inter-ethnic  conflict  is  blurry,  as the conflict 
creates a situation when the corruption and organized crime can flourish, while at the same 
time the conflict can be a product of the political corruption and organized crime interests339. As 
Kempt would argue: 
“Conflict  creates  an  environment  where  corruption  and  organized  criminal  activity  can 
prosper,  to the  extent  that  they become impediments  to  conflict  resolution and post-conflict 
337 See Savona and Curtol, 2004.
338 In an effort to ensure the international recognition, Macedonia made enormous economic sacrifices by 
respecting the UN embargo on Macedonia’s main trade partner, Serbia. The effects of this embargo were further 
aggravated by the unilateral embargo imposed by Greece on Macedonia due to the name issue.
339 See Hislope, 2001, 2003. A similar mechanism of the link between political corruption and war (here 
interstate war) can be found in Snyder, Myths of Empire. 
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rehabilitation.  Perpetrators  are sometimes parasites of the conflict;  in other cases  a  symbiotic 
relationship develops between political and criminal elements. It will be noted that in some cases 
conflicts that are labelled 'inter-ethnic' have little to do with ethnic or national-cultural issues and 
more to do with defending narrow economic interests.” (Kempt, 2003, p. 49).
In his realistic analysis of the inter-ethnic conflicts, Kempt reminds us of a very obvious 
fact often forgotten in the value-guided analysis: the very nature and bursting of the ethnic 
conflict is a ground where, for the logic of matters, the leaders of the secessionist (anti-state) 
group are strongly propelled to use the channels of the organized crime. First off, the ethnic 
conflict means arming, and in order to find the weapon supply the leaders of the secessionist 
ethnic group often have no other choice than the channels of the organized crime (after all, 
any arming would be against the law, and therefore criminal). Often this link goes further, in 
order to ensure financing as well. Finally, the support to the ethnic paramilitary groups given 
by profit-seeking criminal groups is also common. In fighting back the secessionists, the state 
and the majority group might also be forced to develop the links with the criminal groupings 
(see Kempt, 2003). 
At the same time, the organized crime can use the inter-ethnic conflict and provoke the 
violence  to  cover  up  for  their  own  activities  (we  will  see  an  example  in  the  chapters 
concerning the reform of police in Macedonia). The ethnic tensions are at the same time the 
mask the organized crime can use to hide its activity, and the goal in the name of which the 
ethnic leaders might decide to get in touch with the organized crime groups. According to 
some  analysts,  the  2001  inter-ethnic  conflict  in  Macedonia  is  strongly  linked  with  the 
organized crime. The state capture and extremely high levels of corruption of the VMRO-
DPA government in the period 1998-2001 brought the Macedonian state to the conflict.340
The link between the corruption and inter-ethnic relation is, however, not necessarily one 
directional,  and  not  necessarily  does  the  corruption  produce  or  nourish  the  inter-ethnic 
conflict. In some cases, it can also be a mean of peace. In the theoretical model of the inter-
ethnic peace, Hislope perceives the “exchange” (the informal, spontaneous self-interest guided 
exchange between the political  actors) as one of the three mechanisms of the inter-ethnic 
peace, and identifies in corruption and patronage politics the link that allowed Macedonia’s 
first peaceful decade of independence. In the period until 1998, the Albanian minority party 
PDP was part of the ruling coalition, playing a cooperative, democratic game, in exchange for 
the participation to the government and access, together with the Macedonian ruling parties, 
340 See International crisis group, “Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags the Country Down,” 
n.133, (August 14, 2002). See also Hislope, 2003.
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to  the  “profits  that  accrued  from  the  vast  network  of  sanctions-busting  operations  that 
mushroomed during the  international  embargo against  Yugoslavia  (1992-  1996)”  (Hislope, 
2003, p. 7). Such “coalition of convenience” survived “despite severe economic dislocation, 
estranged ethnic relations in society, and repeated regional crises (e.g., the Bosnian war, unrest 
in Kosovo, Albania’s meltdown in 1997) that threatened to spill-over into Macedonia” (idem, 
p. 8).
The linkage of the corruption and organized crime with the ethnic divisions, peace and 
stability brings the issue to the core of the understanding of the Macedonian transition. It also 
calls for particular attention when seeking the solution to the problem. We already underlined 
how the ethnicization of politics is continuously used in order to decrease the transparency of 
the decision-making process and to allow the parties to maximize their personal benefits (see 
the chapter on IAC).  The tendency to maximization of the Albanian party’s requirements 
described  in  the  previous  chapters  is  continuously  questioning  the  fragile  inter-ethnic 
consensus Macedonia resides upon. The corruption in the '90s appeared to be the key of 
Macedonian  stability  and a  mean of  the  inter-ethnic  peace.  In  2001,  it  was  the  fuse  that 
brought Macedonia to explode. How diffused is corruption in nowadays Macedonia? And, 
even more importantly, what is its role?
In the following section we will concentrate on corruption and state capture in Macedonia, 
trying to assess the levels of corruption, its causes and the measures undertaken to prevent it, 
to turn then to the problem of the organized crime.
9.2.2. MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS OF CORRUPTION IN MACEDONIA
In Macedonia’s case, literature identified the presence of two “types” of corruption. First 
of all, there is a presence of what is labelled in literature as “state capture”, a situation “related 
to the operation of certain individuals, groups, companies which by corruption influence the 
adoption of certain laws, decisions, court verdicts, erroneous management of bank funds and 
similar with the purpose of acquiring personal or benefit for the party” (Labovik, 2005, p. 72). 
Hristova’s  analysis  (2005)  brought  some clear  examples  of  how the  state  institutions  and 
resources are literally captured by the political elite. Further on, we can also register the spread 
what is known as “administrative corruption”, referring to the classical variant of bribery and 
corruption of the public officials and officers341.
341 On the presence of these two types of corruption in Macedonia see Sistem za nacionalni integritet, Izveštaj 
za Republika Makedonija, 2002, also Labovik, 2005, pp. 275 on. On the distinction between the administrative 
corruption and state capture, see Labovik, 2005, p. 71.
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 Similarly  to  what  happened  in  Serbia,  here  again  the  economic  dimensions  and  in 
particular the large public sector inherited from the communism, the delay in the economic 
reforms342 and the difficult financial situation during the '90s when Macedonian economy was 
hit  by  the  double  embargo,  represented  the  basis  that  brought  to  the  development  of 
corruption  and  organized  crime.  The  UN  embargo  to  Serbia  and  Greece’s  embargo  on 
Macedonia de-facto cut Macedonia’s weak economy out from its main sources of trade. The 
difficult economic situation favoured smuggling, which brought to connections between the 
ruling political elite and the organized crime groups (Kempt 2003, Hislope, 2002, 2004). In the 
study of corruption in Macedonia, Labovik (2005) identified the economic sphere as the most 
subject to corruption, mainly due to the economic transition after the communism, where the 
existence of the large public sector and state-owned property represented a pool abused by the 
political elite. The process of privatization and the public procurement were identified as the 
key points of corruption, while the political control over the Agency for privatization, the 
non-transparent  procedure  of  privatization,  the  “political  protection”  mechanisms  of  the 
racket343,  the  non  transparent  procedures  of  public  procurement344 and  the  process  of 
assigning the licence for the non-taxed import were identified as its main mechanisms (see 
Labovik, 2005, p. 277-280).
Another factor that favoured the development of the corruption and state capture in the 
'90s is the weakness of the state and lack of mechanisms of accountability that would limit the 
political power, block the rent-seeking behaviour of the ruling elite and protect the system 
from the  penetration  of  the  private  interest.  The  politicization  of  the  administration  and 
judiciary was both a cause and consequence of the persistent weakness of the Macedonian 
state. As we could see in the section on the judiciary and civil service reform, the incapacity of 
Macedonia to undertake reforms bringing to the depoliticization of the state institutions was 
mainly caused by the particularities of Macedonian transition. The parallel process of the state- 
and party system building favoured the patronage politics and the “runaway state building” 
process. Labovik identifies the third sphere penetrated by corruption in the administration and 
judiciary,  where the  lack of  merit-based recruitment,  politicization of  the civil  service  and 
342 See Vachudova on how the delay in economic reforms influenced the establishment of what she labelled 
“nationalistic pattern of government”, which she considers particularly favourable for the rent-seeking behaviour 
of political leaders.
343 The political racket represents the situation when the political parties at power are offering “protection 
from the financial police and control” and “more favourable business environment” in exchange for financial 
support..
344 See below.
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judiciary and the lack of transparency are considered the main causes allowing the corruption 
in these areas. Taseva, in the interview undertaken during summer 2008, underlined that in 
Macedonia the legislative framework appears fully in line with the international standards, but 
behind the apparently independent judiciary, the apparently functional agency for fight against 
corruption, the state audit and a series of other institutions lies the strong political interference 
of  the corrupted political  parties.  The politicization  of  all  state institutions  brings,  in  first 
instance, to the state capture and political corruption, and then, indirectly, to the spreading of 
the  administrative  corruption  and  lower-levels  bribery,  which  usually  follow  the  political 
corruption (the political influence is usually combined with the political protection from the 
accountability mechanisms)345. The economic crisis and the low salaries of the administration 
and  judiciary  staff  induced  the  already  compromised,  politicized  staff  with  harmed 
professional integrity to seek side-payments, allowing the spread of bribery and administrative 
corruption. 
The political parties are the actor common to all spheres identified by Labovik (2005) as 
key-areas  of  corruption  in  Macedonia.  We  underlined  that  the  privatization  and  public 
procurement, due to the large public sector, represented the cores of the corruption. But we 
should  remind  that  this  is  possible  only  due  to  the  links  with  the  political  parties:  the 
privatization agency, the financial police and the public sector and firms are all controlled by 
the ruling party appointees, which means that only through the parties or party members the 
favours can be offered. Further on, through the control of the appointments and through the 
politicization  of  the  judiciary  and  civil  service,  the  political  control  is  used  to  open  the 
channels of (political, but also other kinds of) influence that goes from the political elite to the 
bureaucrats and judges. This way the political elite can ensure the adoption of a favourable 
court decision or a favour in the administration, to use it for the party or narrow personal 
interests, or even to exchange it with other actors. Finally, the un-transparent process of rule 
adoption and weak civil society, in combination with the abuse of the nationalistic sentiments 
and the nationalistic rhetorics, made the legislative process a subject completely controlled by 
the unaccountable for, irresponsible ruling political elite. 
The  strong  powers  enjoyed  by  the  narrow political  leadership  bring  to  the  focus  the 
problem of the financing of the political parties, a key point through which the corruption and 
corruptive practices penetrated the political sphere. The un-transparent financing of political 
345 On political corruption and its link with judiciary and administration in Macedonia see Labovik, 2005, p. 
287.
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parties in the Nineties was combined with the provision according to which the political party 
could also drive  resources from its  own business,  which  resulted in  most of  the political 
parties being also the economic subjects. The political party at power used the state resources 
to ensure a preferential treatment for its own firms. In 2000, after the first change in power 
threatened the established equilibrium, such provision was abolished by a constitutional court 
sentence. However, the political parties hampered the implementation of the CC’s sentence by 
passing the property and shares to their own members, who became shareholders in various 
companies and banks346. The lack of control over the parties’ financing persisted even after the 
adoption of the new Law on Financing of Political Parties. As one Member of the Parliament 
stressed, when a party functionary brings the money, he is praised by everyone and no one, 
not  even  the  party  leader,  asks  where  the  money  comes  from347.  Even  though  the  new 
legislation establishes the obligation to declare the received funds and to submit the annual 
financial report to the Ministry of Finances, to the Agency for Public Revenues, to the Central 
Register and to the State Audit, however the real control over the spending and donations is 
hampered by the political control over each of these agencies. The analysis of Treneska (2004) 
revealed that the sources of the illegal finances in the electoral campaigns are many, going 
from “cash” financing and cash payments, to malversations with the accounts, and use of the 
illegal sources: foreign donations348, donations from public companies (where the managers, 
political  appointees,  use their  position to transfer  the company resources to their  political 
party),  and  even  donations  from  the  organized  crime,  drug-  and  weapon  smuggling, 
prostitution and illegal gambling (Traneska, 2004). 
The link between politics and the organized crime is of crucial importance in this case, 
especially seen that the inter-ethnic conflict represented one of the causes/consequences of 
the spreading of the organized crime in Macedonia. The high level of corruption and state 
capture, the weak state and lack of  an independent,  professional  judiciary represented the 
channels the organized crime used to avoid justice  (see  Buscaglia and Jan van Dijk, 2003). 
During  the  1999  NATO intervention  in  Kosovo  and the  2001  violence,  the  paramilitary 
groupings, both Albanian and Macedonian, strengthened their links with the organized crime. 
The ONA (Albanian paramilitary grouping active in Macedonia) developed its logistic links 
with the Kosovo’s UCK and Albanian mafia active in Kosovo, while the paramilitary unit 
346 See Labovik, 2005. See also Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, 2002.
347 Ramadani, 2004.
348 The Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, 2002, underlines that, in several cases, international 
transfers of money onto the accounts of the ruling political parties during the electoral campaign were registered.
339
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
Lavovi was created within the Macedonian ministry of interior, including the individuals from 
the underground (see Stojarova, 2007). In the aftermath of the Ohrid Agreement, due to the 
enormous pressures from the Albanian parties, and thanks to pressures from the “security-
seeking” international community, the Law on Amnesty was adopted granting the amnesty to 
all  criminal  acts  connected  with  the  conflict,  and perpetrated  by  members  of  ONA.  The 
reintegration of the ONA fighters into political life, the persistence of the Lions until 2003 
when the unit was demobilized while about half of them was regularly enrolled into police and 
security forces, the lack of lustration process, all contributed to open the channels from the 
organized  crime  to  politics,  making  the  successful  fight  against  the  organized  crime  and 
corruption difficult to undertake. 
9.2.3. CORRUPTED AGAINST CORRUPTION
The development of the legislation for the fight against corruption in Macedonia followed 
the lines of an externally induced change. The determination to fight back corruption was 
rather weak in the first ten years since independence. The creation of the institution of the 
State Audit (1997) and the introduction of the Law on the Public Procurement (1998) were 
required by the World Bank and IMF in line with the administrative reform pushed by these 
two actors.  However,  both legislations  showed serious  shortcomings  and mainly  failed to 
bring to the expected results349. Thanks to the inadequate legislative framework and the built-
in loopholes, the public procurement remained one of the most serious sources of corruption, 
while the functioning of the State Audit Office was seriously undermined due to the failure to 
ensure its independence (as the body is nominated by the government and then appointed by 
the majority in the assembly) and due to the lack of powers. Thus, even in those cases when 
the Audit General revealed the abuses of the state budget350, no investigation or prosecution 
of the case were undertaken until  the change of government. In January 2002, due to the 
pressures from the World Bank and IMF, the amendments of the Law on Public Procurement 
were introduced in order to increase the transparency in the process. However, the legislator 
failed again to bring the issue in line with the international standards. In March 2002 the Law 
against Money Laundering entered into force, prescribing the establishment of the Directorate 
for Prevention of Money Laundering within the Ministry of Finance, but the measure did not 
349 See Labovik, 2005.
350 One of the most striking examples is the Audit Office’s report on the abuse of the health insurance fund,  
when several thousands of Euros were transferred to the ruling party’s account. 
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bring  to  significant  changes,  as  the  inadequate  definition  of  “money  laundering”  and the 
continuous obstruction in the functioning of the Directorate impaired any significant change.
More serious steps in facing the issue of corruption followed in 2002,  after the severe 
criticisms of the ICG brought the problem onto the agenda. The strong ICG criticisms in 
March 2002, only a day prior to the much awaited-for donors’ conference, brought corruption 
to  the  core  of  all  international  organizations  active  in  the  country.  The  corruption  and 
organized crime came immediately onto the public and political agenda. 
Immediately after the ICG criticisms, the Law on Fight against Corruption was adopted 
(April  2002).  The implementation  of  the  legislation  was  delayed  for  six  months  after  the 
adoption, a decision that de-facto amnestied the cases of corruption that took place during the 
previous  periods.  The  law  established  the  anti-corruption  commission,  composed  of  7 
members appointed  and elected by the  assembly  with a  wide scope of  responsibilities  as: 
corruption  prevention  among the  authorities,  conducting  the  measures for  preventing  the 
conflict of interest, the rule initiative and consultative role in the matters linked to the fight 
against corruption and initiative of the process of investigation and prosecution in the cases of 
corruption. The law on the commission was criticized by the domestic authors for the delay in 
its implementation351, for the failure to establish the Commission as a really independent body, 
and for the provision according to which the undeclared profits become de-facto legalized 
through taxation. Further on, giving such wide competences to the commission resulted in a 
situation where the spheres of authorities  overlapped,  particularly with those agencies that 
were originally supposed to undertake the investigative measures (Ministry of Inner Affairs, 
Financial Police, the Agency for Public Revenues), a solution that only contributed to a hyper-
regulation that results in non-action (see Labovik, 2005). 
The  Law  on  Fight  Against  Corruption  also  faced,  for  the  first  time  in  Macedonian 
legislation, the question of the conflict of interests (the whole section IV is dedicated to the 
issue),  but  according  to  the  domestic  experts,  especially  seen  the  unclear  provisions 
concerning the implementation, the conflict of interests should be separately regulated.
As  the  corruption  got  to  the  centre  of  the  public  attention,  the  newly  elected  SSDM 
government  made  the  fight  against  corruption  one  of  the  key  points  in  its  policy.  The 
Commission was formed by November 2002, and it began its work with exercising pressure 
on the newly elected parliament and on the government members to declare their assets and 
351 See Utrinski, 17. April 2002, Labovik, 2005, Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, 2002.
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started the drafting of the State Programme for the Prevention and Repression of Corruption, 
adopted by the government in June 2003. 
The investigation of the abuse of power in the previous period also took place, while the 
commission  started  40  judicial  procedures  against  the  officials  who  failed  to  report  their 
assets. Some of the high officials of the previous government were accused of corruption and 
abuse of power, while a series of scandals shook the opposition, who began to accuse the 
government  of  political  purging.  However,  the  research  undertaken  by  the  Transparency 
International  in  Macedonia showed that  many of  the  initiated  cases  were  blocked  by the 
prosecutor’s  office,  testifying  the  high  importance  of  the  independence  of  the  public 
prosecutor’s office for the establishment of the rule of law. Further on, as Labovik underlines, 
the  investigation  on  the  corruption  cases  covered  only  the  period  of  the  VMRO-DPA 
government, 1998-2002, leaving aside the period prior to 1998 when the SDSM was in power. 
Similarly,  when,  after  the  adoption  of  the  Law on  the  Financing  of  Political  Parties,  the 
political parties’ finances were examined for the first time in 14 years of multipartyism, the 
ruling parties’ accounts appeared clean, while irregularities were identified in the accounts of 
the oppositional  parties” (Labovik,  2005,  p. 282).  The strong political  control  over all  the 
institutions that are supposed to keep the government accountable for (from the judiciary to 
the  Commission  for  the  fight  against  corruption,  Agency  for  Public  Revenues,  Central 
Treasury  and  State  Audit  Office)  withdraws  the  government  from the  responsibility  and 
makes the anti-corruption legislation applicable only to the opposition. 
In line with its electoral promise and international pressures, the government started with 
the intensive rule adoption. Following the GRECO recommendations, the amendments to the 
criminal code and to the constitution were also adopted in 2003, in order to allow the usage of 
the modern investigative procedures. The Law on Budget and Law on Public Procurement 
were also amended, creating more transparent and easier mechanisms of control by merging 
separate budget users’ accounts into a single account within the Treasury, which allows the 
proper supervision and control over the ministries’ expenditure commitments and payments. 
In the Ministry of Finance the Internal Audit Office was established, while in the Ministry of 
Interior the Special Unit for Investigating the Corruption in Police was established.
In 2004 the Law on Control of Precursors came into effect, bringing the Macedonian law 
into compliance with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and European Union standards. 
Amendments of the criminal code were adopted in order to meet the UN recommendations 
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and particularly to strengthen the country’s fight in the trafficking of human beings. In the 
same period, the commission for the fight against corruption proposed the amendments in 
the Law on the Fight Against Corruption, according to which the assets should be declared 
also at the end of term and the obligation to submit an assets declaration was extended to civil 
servants in the state administration as well. The commission status was also modified, now 
being  established  as  a  unit  where  the  commissionaires  are  exercising  this  role  as  a  main 
profession (not as a side activity). It was also given its own budget (that amounted to about 
0.012% of  the  budget,  to  be  increased  to  0.022%  since  2006).  The  new Law on  Public 
Procurement, this time more in line with the EU standards, was also adopted, but the serious 
problems in the implementation remained. 
The constitutional amendments in 2005 finally lifted the government members’ immunity, 
allowing the investigations of the corruption cases among high officials, while amendments to 
the public procurement legislation adopted in December 2005 allowed a more transparent 
functioning  of  the  public  procurement  system (see  EU 2006  report).  2005  also  saw  the 
adoption of the Law on the Witness Protection and Law on the Protection of Personal data, 
both considered necessary pieces of legislation in the fight against the organized crime. In the 
beginning of 2006 the Law on Free Access to Information was finally adopted (see the section 
on the human, political and civil rights). In line with the new government’s commitment to 
continue fighting back the corruption, the Law on the Conflict of Interests (2006) was finally 
adopted, the Law on the Fight against Corruption was amended to stop the political parties 
from collecting and spending funds from anonymous sources and the State Programme for 
the Prevention and Suppression of Corruption was adopted in December 2006. The judicial 
system reform saw the establishment of the special court departments in five basic courts to 
deal  with  the  issues  of  the  organized  crime.  The  national  action  plan  to  fight  human 
trafficking was adopted and a Coordination Centre for Fighting Human Trafficking and Illegal 
Migration was opened in April 2006.
The main criticism however remains the same, continuously underlined in the EU reports, 
but also identified by the domestic authors as well: the lack of a comprehensive approach for 
fighting back the corruption. In this light, the complicated legislative framework, numerous 
agencies  and  institutions  to  deal  with  the  issue,  all  represent  a  serious  obstacle  to  the 
implementation  and  monitoring.  The  Commission  for  the  Fight  Against  Corruption  was 
criticized for its passivity and incapacity to oppose to the governmental requests (see Gaber-
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Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2007),  as well as for the politicization and conflict of interest 
(Čangova  for  Utrinski,  2007).  The  scandals  that  shook  both  the  government  and  the 
commission  in  2007  made the  commission’s  failure  to  act  against  the  high  state  officials 
evident352. The strengthening of the legislative framework and police actions against the cases 
of the administrative corruption are combined with the open violation of the law by the ruling 
political parties. The scandalous privatization of the power-plant Negotino is just one of the 
examples of such lack of any rule of law. 
The continuous efforts and legislative intervention, the setting of the rules, strategies, and 
institutions  in  order  to  fight  back  the  organized  crime  brought  to  only  partial  results  in 
Macedonia. The EU reports underlined that, even though the basic legislation is largely in 
place, and the implementing legislation is mainly adopted, the organized crime and corruption 
persist to be an issue of serious concern. The conviction rate for human trafficking-related 
crimes such as human trafficking, slavery and mediation in prostitution, remained as low as in 
the previous years. 
The international pressures brought to an intensive legislative activity that slowly brought 
to the adoption of what is traditionally considered the core-stone legislation for fighting back 
corruption.  However,  the  legislative  framework  is  applied  only  in  cases  of  low-level, 
administrative  corruption  and  against  the  political  opponents,  and  even  there,  the 
publicization and politicization of the process prevails353. The state-capture mechanisms we 
described in the first part of this section showed much bigger resistance. As Slavevski (2004), 
Naumov (2004), Ramadani (2004) underlined, the adopted rules and actions taken appears to 
be only another video in the government’s media campaign and as such, they are not more 
than  cosmetic  changes  incapable  to  produce  effects.  In  a  report  of  Transparentost  nulta 
korupcija published in 2007, the politicization of the public sector, the political interference in 
economy, the financing of political parties, the shortcomings in the procedures for controlling 
the public procurement, the weakness in the functioning of the anti-corruption mechanisms 
352 Thus, while starting the procedures against the civil servants that failed to submit the property leaf, the 
commission failed to require the asset declaration from the chief of the secret service and prime minister’s cousin 
Mijalkov. The media and civil  sector exposed the case in public,  but the commission did not undertake the 
measures prescribed by law (for the “Mijalkov case”, Utrinski, 2007, see also Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 
2007).
353 In the interview undertaken during summer 2008, Taseva underlined how the fight against corruption in 
Macedonia is nothing more than a mere fiction, manipulation of the public opinion in order to hide the high-
profile cases of corruption. The cases are always publicly initiated, covered with strong media campaign. Yet, 
most of the started cases are not prosecuted.
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and the weakness of the institutions are still in the list of the identified causes of corruption, 
even after five years of rule adoption aiming to cope with these problems.
9.2.4. EU AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION 
As with some other dimensions as well, here again the international actors were crucial for 
pushing the problem of the corruption onto the agenda. In the interview with Taseva, the 
former president of the Commission for the Fight Against Corruption and current leader of 
Transparency in Macedonia, underlined that the entire process of the fight against corruption 
in  Macedonia  is  an  externally  driven  process  where  nothing  is  done  unless  required  and 
supported from the IA. It is no surprise then that the fight against corruption in Macedonia 
began  only  after  2002,  when  the  issue  was  identified  by  EU,  USA,  World  Bank  as  a 
phenomenon hampering the rule of law in Macedonia. Since 2003,  when the fight against 
corruption entered among the EU priorities in Macedonia, the pressure grew in time, to arrive 
to include the monitoring  of  the implementation of  anti-corruption legislation  among the 
2007  key  short-term  priorities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  fight  against  organized  crime 
represented a subject of constant pressures, being present from the first reports, gaining in 
time on the specificity of the norms promoted (see the table 3). The support to the issue was 
provided through the CARDS funds, by targeting directly the issue, as well as through the 
support of the reform of the judiciary and police.
Pressing  for  a  more  consistent  fight  against  corruption,  the  EU  also  required  the 
compliance with the recommendations issued by GRECO. The GRECO recommendations to 
Macedonia targeted a series of issues, requiring the adoption of the anti-corruption legislation, 
strengthening the agencies settled to fight back the corruption, increasing the accountability 
and transparency in the state institutions. In its third evaluation report, the GRECO stressed 
that Macedonia met almost all priorities, except those concerning the government officials’ 
immunity  and  government’s  control  over  the  prosecutor’s  office.  However,  we  should 
underline that, seen the methodology of monitoring implied by GRECO (interviews with the 
state authorities),  some of the requirements are considered implemented mainly due to the 
nominative existence of the rules in question, where no attention was paid on the de-facto 
implementation on the grounds. 
Beside the EU, other international actors were also included in promoting the policies to 
fight back the corruption. We already underlined how the window of opportunity was opened 
by the International Crisis Group report issued in 2002 and the call to the donors “not to 
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finance the corruption” in Macedonia (Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska 2002). The World 
Bank and IMF were also particularly active in promoting the reforms aiming to strengthen the 
public procurement and introduce the efficient management of the public resources. 
9.2.5. THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME: ASSESSMENT
Similarly to the judicial system reform, the fight against corruption in Macedonia appears to 
be an externally driven reform. The issue was raised by the international NGO (International 
Crisis Group) and consequently arrived on the agenda of the International Actor that, prior to 
that moment, appeared concentrated on more security-driven issues (implementation of OFA) 
and more tolerant to the corruption scandals. 
The  report  of  the  ICG  pushed  the  issue  not  only  to  the  domestic,  but  also  on  the 
international agenda, bringing to the increase of the IA’s attention to the matter (the fight 
against corruption is included among the EU’s SAA priorities only in 2003, after the ICG’s 
criticisms). At the domestic level, the weakness of the civil society (active in monitoring and 
criticizing the government but excluded from the policy-making process, see the section on 
civic society) and the lack of independent institutions capable to monitor, control and make 
the government accountable for, brought to the lack of strong change agents to support the 
norm from within.
The strong international criticism threatening the government’s legitimacy in the electorate, 
forced the political elite to undertake immediate actions, successfully pushing the issue onto 
the  domestic  agenda.  The  response  was  the  almost  immediate  rule  adoption,  and  the 
introduction  of  a  series  of  measures  for  preventing  corruption.  This  is  one  of  the  few 
examples where the social influence channel of action was successfully used to foster the rule 
adoption. In this case the social influence exercised by the international actors took the shape 
of  “reinforcement  by  punishment  with  the  use  of  social  incentives”  (the  criticisms 
undermining the government’s legitimacy). The social incentives, unlike what Schimmelfennig, 
Engert and Knobel (2003) argued, appear efficient in promoting the adoption of the anti-
corruption legislation in Macedonia. It is possible to hypothesize that the efficiency of the 
social incentives as a mean of rule promotion differs as we pass from reward to “punishment” 
(de-legitimization or, more generally, criticizing). It is important to underline that the use of 
social incentives in this case does not bring the logic of appropriateness to prevail, rather it 
makes the costs and benefits deriving from the social incentives enter the calculation in a 
behaviour that remains guided by a logic of consequentiality. 
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It becomes clear that, when responding positively to the social incentives, the actors do not 
change their preferences when we observe the  content  and implementation of the legislative 
framework put in place. On the level of rule implementation, the personal interests of the 
decision makers and the great benefits to be derived from the corruption channels resulted in 
seriously  obstructed  rule  implementation,  a  finding  quite  in  line  with  the  “controversial 
compliance”  that  we  hypothesized  to  be  the  outcome  of  the  “social  influence”.  This  is 
particularly clear for the period between the ICG report and EU 2003 inclusion of the anti-
corruption measures among the issues requiring immediate action: the government’s response 
on the ICG report arrived within one month in the shape of the adoption of the legislation 
with delayed implementation. 
While a series of efforts is registered, the result of these efforts is incomplete. As no strong 
institutional change agents capable to further support the reform from within was found, the 
final  result  is  fake  compliance.  The  persistence  of  the  international  pressures  since  2003, 
however, contributed to keep the anti-corruption policies on the agenda. Corruption is fought 
at the lower levels and in those cases involving the political opponents, while the government, 
at  least  until  in  office,  is  trying  to  escape  the  responsibility.  Consequently,  the  highest 
resistance was found in those fields that concern the political corruption and state capture: the 
government showed to be reluctant in handing the control over to the judiciary, prosecutor 
office (achieved only in 2007, see the part on the judiciary), and to the bodies designed to fight 
the  corruption,  trying  by  all  means  to  withdraw  from  the  external  control.  The  double 
standards in approaching the issue are well illustrated by the practice that all  governments 
elected after 2002 adopted the fight against corruption as their official priority, but at the same 
time failed to ensure that, at least in the lines of the government, the corruption scandals are 
avoided. 
9.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
Bearing the difficult heritage of the Nineties, both Macedonia and Serbia were and still are 
facing the serious problem of corruption and organized crime. The causes that brought to the 
spreading of corruption in the two countries are similar: the economic crisis, the international 
embargo, the large public sector and state interventionism in the economy, the delay in the 
economic reforms, the war that shook the Balkans and the spread of the nationalism all being 
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factors that favoured the development of corruption in the two countries. Both countries also 
represented a series of similar mechanisms: the state capture is present in both cases, where on 
the one hand the politicization of the state institution strengthens the position of the narrow 
party leadership, while on the other the financing of the political parties and the links between 
the party leadership and the economic elite allowed the business elite’s access to the decision-
making process. 
Some differences are yet worth to mention. On the side of the causes, in Serbia’s case the 
ten-year long Milošević’s regime, characterized by systemic, centralized corruption, played an 
important role in the overall  degradation of the institutions and society.  But this,  while  it 
contributed  to  the  penetration  of  corruption  to  all  segments  of  society,  it  also  created a 
specific positive impact for the fight against corruption once the regime was overthrown, as 
the change of the regime provoked a temporary shock in the existing corruptive mechanisms. 
The only case of a relatively serious fight against corruption and the truly dedicated decision 
makers are registered in Serbia immediately after the October 2000, when the fight against 
corruption, for the new elite, had the meaning of fight against the old ruling elite. However, 
this favourable context did not last too long. Very soon the creation of the links between the 
political and economic elite made the incentives of the new elite to face the issue decrease. 
Moreover, the polarization of the political system, the centrifugal party competition and the 
establishment of the peripheral turnover made the system rather stable. The ruling elite, stable 
on its position, was not motivated to introduce the mechanisms of accountability. 
Another important difference between the two countries concerns the role of corruption. In 
Macedonia’s case, corruption played an important role in maintaining the peace in the country 
during the '90s, and, it is possible to argue, this might still be the case. Some practices linked 
with  corruption  still  appear  closely  linked  with  the  inter-ethnic  relations.  Very  often, 
nationalism  is  used  to  cover  the  dislocation  and  untransparency  of  the  decision-making 
process, covering the deal-making behind closed doors. In the chapter on the police reform 
we will see how nationalism was often used to cover the members of the Albanian organized 
crime gangs, while in the part on the administrative capacity we underlined how the principle 
of  the  equal  representation  directly  hampered the  merit-based recruitment  in  the  lines  of 
bureaucracy. Seen what was at stake (position in the office allowing access to the resources 
deriving from corruption), the strategy used by the Albanian ethnic parties, both in their intra-
group struggle for power (nationalism) and in bargaining with their Macedonian counter-parts, 
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we might wonder what might happen if the corruptive mechanisms keeping the Macedonian 
and Albanian elite together broke.
When we turn to the process of the fight against corruption,  we register a much more 
salient role of the IA in Macedonia’s case than in Serbia. As we saw, the successful use of the 
social influence strategy in Macedonia brought the issue onto the agenda, contributing to calm 
the  deficiency  deriving  from the  weak  civil  sector  in  the  country  and the  lack  of  strong 
domestic change agents. In a few years time, in both countries the legislative framework for 
the fight against corruption was in place. However, as we underlined in the introduction to 
this chapter, the particularity of the issue is such that the relatively smooth rule adoption is 
followed by difficult and obstructed implementation, registered as the final outcome in both 
countries  studied.  As  already  mentioned  above,  the  only  successful  case  of  fight  against 
corruption was registered in Serbia immediately after the change of the regime, when the new 
ruling elite  played the role of an important change agent, testifying the importance of the 
political will for a successful change.
Table 1: “The fight against corruption in Serbia and Macedonia, comparative assessment”.
SERBIA MACEDONIA
2001-2002 2003-
IA Conditionality: Absent. Present weak. Present weak.
IA Social influence: Irrelevant. Present. Present.
IA Social learning: Present. Present. Present.
Domestic ChA: Government, civil society. Civil society. Civil society.
Type of the issue: Salience. Salience. Salience.
Main line of the 
conflict:
Ancient regime vs. New 
elite.
Rulers vs. Ruled. Rulers vs. Ruled.
Main beneficiaries of 
the status quo:
Old ruling elite. Ruling elite. Ruling elite.
Main beneficiaries of 
the change:
New ruling elite, citizens. Citizens. Citizens.
Stability/fluidity of 
political environment:
Fluid. stable. Fluid.
Outcome: Rule adoption.Intention to comply.
Rule adoption.
Fake compliance.
Rule adoption.
Fake compliance.
 
APPENDIX
Table 1: “EU priorities and the fight against organized crime in Serbia”.
2003 Elaboration and implementation of an Action Plan against organized crime, particularly the trafficking of human beings. Finalization and implementation of National 
Strategies against drug trafficking.
2004 Short-term priorities: Strengthen inter-agency cooperation within the Republic and formalize inter-Republican cooperation. Develop the capacity to seize assets. 
Strengthen criminal intelligence. Start implementing the specific action oriented measures that were agreed at the JHA ministerial meeting in November 2003. Take 
the necessary steps to prepare for the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with Europol. Increase capacity to fight against drug trafficking and develop a national 
drugs strategy in line with the EU Drugs Strategy and Action Plan on Drugs. Strengthen fight against trafficking of human beings, including by providing adequate 
assistance and protection to the victims. 
2006 Short-term priorities: Adopt the legislation and develop the capacity to seize assets. Strengthen criminal intelligence. Adopt legislation on the protection of personal 
data and take the necessary steps to prepare for the conclusion of a cooperation agreement with Europol. Strengthen the fight against the trafficking of human beings, 
including the provision of adequate assistance and protection of victims.
2007 Short-term priorities: Adopt outstanding legislation, develop the capacity to seize assets, implement a national strategy against organised crime and strengthen 
criminal intelligence. Continue the fight against trafficking of human beings, including implementation of the strategy for prevention of trafficking and provision of 
adequate assistance and protection to victims.-Increase the efficiency of international cooperation and implementation of the relevant international conventions on 
terrorism.-Improve cooperation and the exchange of information between all branches of the security services and with other states and prevent financing and 
preparation of acts of terrorism. 
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia.
Table 2: “EU priorities and the fight against corruption in Serbia”.
2002 Action should be taken against corrupt elements in the system.
2003 Firm action against corrupt elements in the system. 
2004 Short-term priorities: Prepare a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in line with Council of Europe standards and adopt Law on Conflict of Interests. 
2006 Short-term priorities: Fully implement the laws on conflict of interests. Adopt and implement a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy and subsequently detailed 
Action Plans, notably through establishing a competent body for implementation.
2007 Key priorities: Set up the fight against corruption at all levels and develop a comprehensive public system of financial control to increase transparency and 
accountability in use of public finances.
Short-term priorities: Implement the action plan on the anti-corruption strategy and establish an independent and effective anti corruption agency. Ratify 
international conventions against corruption. Further clarify and enforce regulations related to prevention of conflict of interests, in line with international standards. 
Develop and implement a transparent system of declaration of assets of public officials.
2008 Key priorities: Set up the fight against corruption at all levels and develop a comprehensive public system of financial control to increase transparency and 
accountability in use of public finances.
Short-term priorities: Implement the action plan on the anti-corruption strategy and establish an independent and effective anti corruption agency. Ratify 
international conventions against corruption. Further clarify and enforce regulations related to prevention of conflict of interests, in line with international standards. 
Develop and implement a transparent system of declaration of assets of public officials.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia.
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Table 3: “EU priorities and the fight against organized crime in Macedonia”.
2002 Strengthen the fight against organised crime; including by strengthening co-operation between different law enforcement bodies. Introduce legislation on the 
protection of personal data and set up the independent Agency charged with its enforcement.
2003 Strengthen the fight against organised crime, including by establishing comprehensive plans to prevent and fight against organised crime and corruption, taking 
decisive actions to demonstrate that crime does not pay, strengthening co-operation between different law enforcement bodies, developing crime intelligence and 
reliable statistical data, increasing administration capacity. Address the obstacles that forbid the use of any kind of special investigative techniques. Establish and 
ensure proper implementation of a national Plan against Drugs. Introduce legislation on the protection of personal data and set up an independent Agency charged 
with its enforcement.
2004 Short-term priorities: Pursue the conclusion of agreements with neighbouring countries, including on cross border cooperation as regards the fight against organised 
crime, trafficking and smuggling, judicial cooperation, border management, environment and energy, and ensure their effective implementation. Promote cooperation 
with Interpol and other international law enforcement organization, in particular through improved consultation of their databases. Implement the action oriented 
measures that were adopted by the Government and presented at the EU-western Balkans JHA ministerial meeting of 28 November 2003. Complete the ratification 
of the 2002 UN Convention on Organised Crime and its related protocols on small arms, trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, and ensure 
implementation. Enhance coordination between law-enforcement bodies involved in fighting organised crime. Enhance intelligence and risk analysis and set up a 
central criminal intelligence unit, working in cooperation with all law enforcement agencies. Adopt the legislative changes needed to allow the use of special 
investigative means. Develop witness protection programmes. Increase capacity to fight against drug trafficking. Develop a national drugs strategy in line with the EU 
Drugs Strategy and Action Plan on Drugs. Clarify the respective roles of the Directorate against Money Laundering (DML) and of the Financial Police and upgrade 
the DML to the level of a financial intelligence unit in line with EU standards. Take the necessary steps to prepare for the conclusion of an agreement with Europol. 
Increase international cooperation and implement relevant international conventions on terrorism. Improve cooperation and exchange of information between police 
and intelligence services within the State and with other States. Prevent the financing and preparation of acts of terrorism.
2006 Short-term priorities: Conclude and implement agreements with neighbouring countries, notably on free trade, cross-border cooperation, fight against organised 
crime, trafficking and smuggling, judicial cooperation, border management, environment, transport and energy. Pursue the implementation of the set of action-
oriented measures for the fight against organised crime. Create an integrated intelligence system for inter-agency use in the fight against organised crime, including 
trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs. Develop a national strategy on drugs in line with the EU Drugs Strategy for 2005 to 2012 and well-structured unit 
specialised in undercover policing and ensure training on intelligence-led policing. Ensure adequate resources for witness protection. Strengthen the capacity to 
investigate computer crimes.
2007 Short-term priorities: Foster cooperation with neighbouring countries and ensure effective implementation, notably on cross border cooperation, the fight against 
organised crime, trafficking and smuggling, judicial cooperation, border management, readmission and the environment. Further intensify the fight against organised 
crime, notably by making better use of special investigative measures and by promptly issuing and following up international arrest warrants (including for computer 
crime, with a special focus on child pornography), and create an integrated intelligence system for inter-agency use in the fight against organised crime, including 
trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs. Strengthen efforts to implement the national action plan to combat human trafficking and the capacity to investigate 
computer crime.
2008 Short-term priorities: Foster cooperation with neighbouring countries and ensure effective implementation, notably on cross border cooperation, the fight against 
organised crime, trafficking and smuggling, judicial cooperation, border management, readmission and the environment. Further intensify the fight against organised 
crime, notably by making better use of special investigative measures and by promptly issuing and following up international arrest warrants (including for computer 
crime, with a special focus on child pornography), and create an integrated intelligence system for inter-agency use in the fight against organised crime, including 
trafficking in human beings, arms and drugs. Strengthen efforts to implement the national action plan to combat human trafficking and the capacity to investigate 
computer crime.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia.
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Table 4: “EU priorities and the fight against corruption in Macedonia”. 
2003 2Step up the fight against corruption by adopting and implementing a comprehensive strategy, in line with international and European standards and practices 
(including the setting up of appropriate bodies to prevent, investigate and prosecute corruption, increased transparency and objectivity in various procedures 
performed by the executive bodies, clarity in financing of political parties, full implementation of public procurement legislation).
2004 Short-term priorities: Implement the strategy for the fight against corruption. Increase institutional capacity to investigate and prosecute corruption. Improve 
coordination and ensure cooperation between the law enforcement agencies and the State Commission on the Prevention of Corruption. Improve exchange of 
intelligence on corruption related cases between the services in charge of identifying, investigating and prosecuting established cases. Strengthen and implement the 
rules applying to officials' declaration of assets, conflict of interest, transparency in public procurement and internal and external control of the administration. Adopt 
appropriate legislation on financing of political parties.
2006 Short-term priorities: Fully implement the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Improve transparency in public decisions and in 
the management of state assets (including state owned land, concessions and public procurement). Implement the recommendations made by the State Commission 
for the Prevention of Corruption and further improve coordination and cooperation between the law enforcement agencies. Review the discretionary rights of certain 
public officials and adopt clear rules relating to conflict of interest. Ensure the implementation of the legislation adopted on the financing of political parties and on 
control over the assets of officials and impose effective sanctions in case of infringements. Identify the extent of the corruption phenomenon in key areas of public 
life in order that effective preventive and detection measures can be put in place. Enhance the capacity of police investigators and prosecutors to deal with corruption 
cases. Ensure adequate coordination between the State Commission for the Prevention of Corruption and the State Prosecutor.
2007 Key short-term priority: Establish a sustained track record on implementation of anti-corruption legislation.
Short-term priorities: Ensure an adequate follow-up to the recommendations made by the State Commission Against Corruption and the State Audit Office. 
Implement fully the recommendations made by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Strengthen the administrative capacity needed to implement the 
rules adopted on the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns. Impose effective sanctions in case of infringements. Follow up the reviews carried out of 
discretionary rights of certain public officials. Ensure full implementation of the law on public access to information.
2008 Key short-term priority: Establish a sustained track record on implementation of anti-corruption legislation.
Short-term priorities: Ensure an adequate follow-up to the recommendations made by the State Commission Against Corruption and the State Audit Office. 
Implement fully the recommendations made by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Strengthen the administrative capacity needed to implement the 
rules adopted on the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns. Impose effective sanctions in case of infringements. Follow up the reviews carried out of 
discretionary rights of certain public officials. Ensure full implementation of the law on public access to information. Further strengthen cooperation among 
institutions.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia.
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Table 5: “EU assistance to the fight against corruption and organized crime in Serbia” (for the resources fostering the police and judiciary 
reform, see the section on judiciary and on security).
2002 € 7 millions Assistance to public finance reforms (€7 million).
2003 € 16 millions Assistance to public finance reforms (€16 million).
2005 € 8 millions (6.5 + 
1.5) 
Capacity Building and strengthening of 
the Organised Crime Directorate Fight 
against economic crime in the Republic 
of Serbia (€1.5 millions).
The OCD must have legally based checks and balances, with regard to special investigative 
measures, that allow a proper balance between the police/OCD’s need to investigate organised 
crime activities and simultaneously protect the privacy of citizens not under justified 
investigation.
2006 € 3.5. millions 
(1.5+2)
Supreme Audit Institution (€1.5 million)
+
Technical assistance to the Commission 
for the Protection of Competition (€2
millions).
Prior to the drafting of the Twinning Fiche for the State Audit Support an Implementation 
agreement will be signed with Parliament to ensure the provision of appropriate resources to 
run the State Audit office and absorb institutional support. This will include the appointment of 
a senior Parliamentarian counterpart to work with EAR and the successful Twinner. An 
implementation agreement will be signed between EAR and the Tax administration/Ministry of 
Finance guaranteeing the readiness of installation premises and related actions for the printing 
facility before any procurement actions are carried out. An implementation agreement will be 
signed between the European Commission and the Ministry of International and Economic 
Relations detailing responsibilities for the introduction of DIS structures and the 
programming/management, implementation of IPA.
2007 2 millions Support to the public procurement office. Existing legislation does not match completely the adequate criteria requested for 
implementation of the project. Public Procurement Office, Commission for Protection of 
Tenderers’ Rights and Public procurement system Group of the Ministry of Finance do not 
dispose with enough number of employees, which jeopardizes the project implementation. The 
project will not be supported unless all these preconditions for its implementation are fulfilled. 
Therefore, the Government needs to continue providing full support to the Public 
Procurement Office and its activities, empower it by giving it more responsibilities and more 
staff.
Total 36.5 millions
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
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Table 6: “EU assistance to the fight against corruption and organized crime in Macedonia” (for the resources fostering the police and judiciary 
reform, see the section on judiciary and on security).
2002 €  1  million  (0.7  + 
0.3)
Combating money laundering, phase 1.
Capacity building for combating drugs-related criminal activity.
2003 €3.5 millions (1 + 1 
+ 1.5)
Equipment supply to the Directorate for Money Laundering Prevention.
Technical assistance in the fight against drugs.
Establishment of a Public Procurement Bureau.
2004 € 1 million Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Finance for development of internal audit.
2005 € 2 millions (1.5 + 
0.5)
Combating  money  laundering 
(phase II).
Strengthening  capacity  to 
combat  organised  crime  and 
terrorism-Equipment  supply  to 
Police Special Tasks Unit.
National authorities must respond adequately to the advisory input of the preceding technical 
assistance project in support of the Directorate for Money Laundering Prevention. There must 
be a quantifiable progress in the amount of secondary legislation and procedures adopted. 
Reporting systems and procedures, to be implemented under the related CARDS 2003 project, 
must be installed and training completed.
It is imperative that there is a continued political will on the part of the national authorities to 
support implementation of the Police Reform strategy and that the Government allocates 
sufficient resources for this purpose.
2006 € 1.2 millions Public  internal  financial 
control.
Full commitment by the beneficiary country authorities at all phases of preparing for 
decentralised management and establishment of the main principles of the chapter 32 public 
internal financial control. 
Total 
2001-2007
8.7 millions
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
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Table 7: “Macedonian Anti-Corruption Commission budget share”. 
(in thousands of denars)
Year Budget for 
commission
State budget Share 
2004 8.440 66.666.000 0.0127%
2005 15.235 66.538.469 0.0228%
2006 13.223 81.749.000 0.0127%
2007 18.739 79.522.497 0.0236%
2008 20.485 89.397.520 0.0229%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Sluzbeni Vsnik na Republika Makedonija.
Table 8: “The budget of Serbian Council for the Fight Against Corruption”.
Year Budget Council for the Fight Against 
Corruption budget in dinars
Council for the Fight Against 
Corruption budget share
2002 217.379.629.540 -
2003 318.691.919.000 30.000.000 0. 0094%
2004 362.045.252.000 9.850.000 0. 0027%
2005 429.764.926.000 12.460.000 0. 0028%
2006 548.405.821.000 15.847.000 0. 0028%
2007 646.466.666.100 13.733.000 0. 0021%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Sluzbeni List Republike Srbije.
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Figure 1: “The widespread of the corruption in Serbia”.
How widespread is corruption among the following groups?
-100 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40
NGOs
University professors
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State admnistration
Local government
Judges
Inspections
Ministers
Customs officers
MPs
Medical doctors
Politicians/political parties
a lot a little
Source Pešić, 2006, p. 28.
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Table 9: “Anti-corruption measures in Serbia and Macedonia according to the legislation in force” (author’s elaboration).
Special institutions formed to fight the corruption
Serbia Macedonia
Agency: 2001 Council for the Fight Against Corruption. 2002 Anti-corruption commission.
2004 law amended, financing from budget.
Functions: Consultative, advise, law proposal, monitoring of implementation. Corruption prevention among the authorities, conducting the measures for 
preventing conflict of interest, rule initiative and consultative role in the 
matters linked to the fight against corruption, initiative of the process of 
investigation and prosecution in the cases of corruption.
Budget (in media): 0.00398% of the state budget. 0.01894%
Role effectively 
exercised:
Strong change agent. State institution.
Relation with 
government:
Strongly conflictive. Controlled by government. 
Introduction of the corruption as a criminal offence
Serbia Macedonia
Year: 2002.
Status: Implemented only for the low rank cases of corruption.
Law on Conflict of Interest
Seria Macedonia
Adopted: 2004. 2002 (part of the law on the fight against corruption).
2007 law adopted.
Shortcomings: Omitted from compliance judiciary, local officials. Allowed the MPs the 
participation in the managerial boards of public companies. Limited access 
to the information about the assets of public officials. Complicated 
procedure for election of the council for prevention of the conflict of 
interest, too limited size of the council and lack of financial resources.
2002: Unclear provisions, necessity to introduce the more clear, 
comprehensive legislative framework by regulating separately the matter. The 
anti-corruption commission was supposed to implement the law, which only 
further contributed to overburden the functioning of the commission. 
Implementation: Very difficult. Partial, selective.
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Law on financing political parties
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2003. 2004, amended 2006.
Shortcomings: Unclear division of competencies between the bodies designed to 
implement the law (Parliamentary committee and RIK). Inadequate 
financial resources. Unclear procedures.
The bodies monitoring compliance are under the strong political influence.
Implementation: Almost absent. Selective implementation, the politicization in the implementation (only the 
opposition’s finances are controlled).
National strategy for the fight against corruption
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2005. 2003.
Law on the Stat Audit Institution
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2005. 1997.
Shortcomings: Lack of independency, too large competencies. Lack of independence. 
Implementation: Only recently. Body formed only in 2007, still lacking basic infrastructure. Difficult (obstruction in functioning).
Law on public procurement
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2002. 1998 amended 2002, 2003, 2005.
Shortcomings: Lack of political independence, not covering all phases of the process, 
since 2005 police excluded compliance. 
Implementation: Delay in settling the relevant institutions, the size of personnel inadequate 
to come with the workload.
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Table 10: “Factors favouring corruption in Serbia and Macedonia”.
Factors favouring corruption Macedonia Serbia
Large public sector. Present. Present.
Weakness or absence of the parties promoting the 
economic transition.
Present. Present.
Delay of the economic reforms. Partially present. Present.
State intervention in the economy (state regulations). Partially present (since 1995 Macedonia 
enters the arrangements with IMF and 
WB, which promotes the reforms).
Present.
Overlapping between the political and economic elite. Present. Present.
International embargo. Present. Present.
War. Present. Present.
Nationalism. Present. Present.
Inter-ethnic conflict threatening country’s security. Present. Partially present (while Serbia was involved in almost all inter-ethnic 
conflicts in Balkans, the territorial concentration of the Albanians in 
Kosovo and their relative weakness resulted in a situation where the 
conflict threatened only the peripheral parts of Serbia, never the central 
part or entire country as it was the case in Macedonia).
“Exchange” as the instrument of the inter-ethnic peace. Present. No.
Authoritarian regime during the 90ties. No. Present.
Party system building coinciding with state building. Present. Partially present (differently from Macedonia, Serbia had already existed 
as the independent state to represent the basis for the nation and state 
building process).
lack of rule of law, weak state, lack of accountability 
mechanisms.
Present. Present.
Strong security forces under the command of the 
regime.
No. Present.
Overburdened, complicated, un-transparent, un-
harmonized legislative framework and procedures 
giving large space to the bureaucrat’s arbitrary.
Present. Present.
Hampered electoral accountability. No. Partially present (the type of party system producing the peripheral 
turnover exercise limitative effect on the electoral accountability).
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Table 11: “Mechanisms of corruption in Serbia and Macedonia”.
Mechanisms of corruption Macedonia Serbia
Politicization of the judiciary: Present (shortcomings of implementation of the norms). Present (shortcomings in the legislative framework).
Politicization of the administration: Present (shortcomings in the legislative framework). Present (shortcomings in the legislative framework).
Party control over the deputies: Present weak (inner parties relations). Present strong (constitutionally guaranteed).
Un-transparent decision-making process due to: Use of nationalistic rhetorics. lack of mechanisms of accountability, feudalization of 
government.
Log-rolling exchanges: Inter-ethnic. Inter-party .
Un-transparent financing of political parties: Present (lack of implementation of the norms). Present (shortcomings in the legislative framework).
Conflict of interest: Present (lack of implementation of the norms). Present (shortcomings in the legislative framework).
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Table 12: “Settling the fight-against corruption and organized crime legislation in Serbia (2001 - 2002; 2004-), factors on the international level”.
Law on fight against corruption, inclusion 
of corruption as a criminal defense, law on 
public procurement (2001-2002).
Law on Conflict of Interest, Law on 
State Audit, National strategy (2004- ).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds?
No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in 
the integration process took place? No.
No.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? - Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in 
the SAA reports?
- Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No. Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 7 million (2001-2002). 36.5 million (2001 - 2007).
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to 
the country:
1,27% of the total EU assistance to Serbia 
for 2000-2002.
2,82% of the total EU assistance to 
Serbia for 2000-2007.
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary for the rule of law and good 
governance.
Necessary for the rule of law and good 
governance.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the 
domestic stakeholders?
X X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in 
the law drafting?
Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Yes. Partial.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external 
criticisms?
No. No.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the 
international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
No. No.
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Table 13: “Explanatory factors for settling the fight-against corruption and organized crime legislation in Serbia (2001 - 2002; 2004-), domestic 
level”.
Law on fight against corruption, inclusion of 
corruption as a criminal defense, law on public 
procurement (2001-2002)
Law on Conflict of Interest, Law on 
State Audit, National strategy (2004 
- ).
Domestic input for the change: Present, strong criticism of the public opinion. Present.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Public opinion, civil society, government, council. Public opinion, civil society, council.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Apparently low (salience issue), yet, strong 
opposition of the interested.
Apparently low (salience issue), yet, 
strong interest of the ruling elite.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Old vs. new elite. Rulers vs. ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? X X
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience. Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo:
Ruling elite (in a measure in which it succeed using 
corruption for own enrichment), old elite (in a 
measure in which succeed escaping the 
punishment).
Ruling elite, political parties.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens. Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes, apparently (yet, the beneficiaries of the status 
quo.
Two or more alternative solutions present? No. No.
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid. stable.
Table 14: “Settling the fight-against corruption and organized crime legislation in Serbia (2001 - 2002; 2004-), outcomes”.
Law on fight against corruption, inclusion 
of corruption as a criminal defense, law on 
public procurement (2001-2002).
Law on Conflict of Interest, Law on State Audit, National strategy (2004 - )
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:
Legislative framework is generally good, 
lack of implementation.
Loopholes, shortcomings in the legislation annulling its effects, lack of implementation.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Ruling elite, political parties. Ruling elite, political parties.
The status (2008): Fake compliance. Fake compliance.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Overall, corruption continues to be widespread and to pose a serious problem in Serbia. 
Despite greater public awareness of the issue and newly adopted legislation, major 
problems remain. These include the lack of sufficiently independent and efficient 
oversight bodies in core areas such as party financing, conflict of interest, public 
procurement and privatization.
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Table 15: “Explanatory factors for settling the fight-against corruption and organized crime legislation in Macedonia, international level”.
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration process, 
access to the funds?
X
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took place? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 8,7
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 2.83% of the total EU assistance to Macedonia 
for the period 2000-2007.
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary for the rule of law and good 
governance.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Partially.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
Yes.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
No.
Table 16: “Explanatory factors for settling the fight-against corruption and organized crime legislation in Macedonia, domestic level”.
Domestic input for the change: X
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Civil sector, weak.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Apparently low (salience issue), yet, strong interest of the ruling 
elite.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Rulers vs. ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? X
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite, political parties.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes, apparently (yet, the beneficiaries of the status quo.
Two or more alternative solutions present? No.
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid.
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Table 17: “Settling the fight-against corruption and organized crime legislation in Macedonia, outcomes”.
The procedure of law drafting: -
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: Legislative framework is generally good, lack of implementation.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Ruling elite, political parties.
The status (2008): Fake compliance.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Some further progress has been made in implementing anti-corruption policy. The legal and institutional framework has been 
strengthened and some further results have been achieved in implementation. However, corruption remains a particularly serious 
problem. Further steps are necessary, in particular as regards implementing provisions on financing of political parties and 
election campaigns. The country partially meets its priorities in this area.
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10. FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA
“Eccezion fatta per pochi solitari eroi, chi teme di dire  
quello che pensa, finisce per non pensare quel che non può dire”
(Sartori, 1993, p. 69).
The freedom of the media is one of the fundamental prerogatives of democracy. In the 
very  definition  of  democracy,  the  independence  of  the  media  and  alternative  sources  of 
information are considered a necessary key element for the citizens to be allowed to exercise 
their  other  political  rights.  Without  the  freedom  of  expression,  the  political  pluralism  is 
limited, citizens cannot express their preferences and influence the choice of policy, nor can 
they exercise any control over the government through criticism. At the same time, the lack of 
alternative sources of information limits the citizens’  capacity to make their preferences as 
they are not able to make an informed decision, thus limiting their electoral rights. It also 
makes it  difficult  for them to exercise control  over the ruling  elite,  as  they lack impartial 
information about the government’s actions.354 
The information and the control over the information are considered by the students of 
power relations as one of the resources of power. Thus, Laswell and Kaplan (1950) include 
information (knowledge) as one of the values giving basis to the power, while Stoppino (2001) 
includes knowledge and beliefs as one of the four domains upon which the power can be 
exercised.  Persuasion  and  manipulation  of  the  information  are  considered  by  Stoppino 
particular  manners  of  exercising  power  through the  influence  of  the  subject’s  beliefs  and 
knowledge. Being an important resource, the control over the information (and the freedom 
of the media, expression, right to alternative sources of information or lack thereof, which are 
linked to such control) represents the core of the struggle for power, both among different 
elites  trying  to  acquire  and  control  the  information,  and,  during  the  process  of 
democratization,  between  the  ruling  elite  and  citizens/group/political  actors  pushing  for 
democracy. Allowing and developing the freedom of expression and alternative sources of 
354 On the freedom of speech and freedom of information as a part of the minimal set of political institutions 
necessary for modern representative democratic government to exist see Dahl, 1999.
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information is a process in which the citizens acquire a significant portion of power over the 
ruling elite, and as such represents the core of the democratization process355.
Being the core of the power relations, the divulgation of the freedom of expression and 
development of the freedom of media represent one of the most difficult changes to push 
ahead. When (as it happened to be in Macedonia and Serbia in the fall of communistic regime) 
the influence and limitation of the freedom of speech is combined with the state ownership of 
the all existing media, the process is particularly difficult as the ruling elite possesses several 
means to maintain the control over the media. 
In  the  following  paragraphs  we  will  analyze  the  process  of  developing  the  legislative 
framework for the protection of the media freedom in the two countries, paying particular 
attention to the legislation concerning the broadcasting, the public information, the access to 
the information, decriminalization of slander and undue political  and economical influence 
over the media. As we will see, in both Serbia and Macedonia the development of the media 
freedom met some difficulties, first of all in the implementation of the rules, resulting in a 
paradox where  the  rather  standardized  legislative  frameworks  are  combined  with  the  low 
performance in this dimension.
10.1. SERBIA
10.1.1. MEDIA AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The liberalization and pluralism of the media were established in Serbia for the first time in 
the beginning of the '90s, when the constitution granted the freedom of speech, the right to 
publish newspapers, the right to the plurality of sources of information (art 46) and the right 
to the private property and private business (this way allowing the organization of non-state 
owned firms and media enterprises). Very soon several newspapers, radio and, slowly, private 
TV stations were born. However, such “plurality” on the paper was seriously undermined in 
practice. The ruling SPS inherited the control over the state owned media (with an already 
well-developed infrastructure), completely monopolizing the biggest channels of information. 
Furthermore, through intimidations, regulations and financial means the private media were 
355 The  acceptance  of  the  political  pluralism  is  considered  one  of  the  fundamental  steps  towards 
democratization. For Dahl this is one of the two steps bringing to the development of democracy (the other 
being universal suffrage), while for Rokkan it is the first of the four thresholds of democracy. The freedom to 
contestation and political pluralism are strictly linked to the freedom of expression.
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kept under control. As the opposition to the regime grew, the pressure over the independent 
media  and  limitations  of  the  freedom of  speech  grew  as  well,  resulting,  in  1998,  in  the 
adoption of the draconic Law on Public Information, establishing the means to intimidate and 
punish  the  media  criticizing  the  regime356.  In  order  to  protect  the  citizens  from  the 
“manipulation”, the disinformation was criminated, this way allowing the regime to arbitrary 
close  any  media  that  expressed  criticisms  against  the  regime  (usually  classified  as 
“disinformation”,  and “untruths”)357.  The censorship was introduced and the fines for the 
non-compliance with the law are set to unreasonable amounts for the journalists’ and editors’ 
low revenues.
After the regime change, the situation significantly improved as the 1998 Law on Public 
Information was put out of force. However, even though significantly better if compared to 
the last years of Milošević’s regime, both the media independence and professionalism are still 
causing  serious  concern,  the  intimidation,  pressure,  corruption,  control,  conditionality, 
coercion, all being used by the politicians in order to influence the media. The reports of  the 
Belgrade center for human rights, the Helsinki committee, OSCE, Media center, ANEM (a 
network of  independent media whose role was crucial in the Milošević era), the journalists 
association, all continue to underline the pressures the media are exposed to, and the lack of  
ethics in the work of  many, some even nationally widespread, media358. While the politicians 
are using all possible channels of  influence (the control of  the financing and ownership of  the 
media  but  also  open  threats,  physical  assaults  and  violence)359,  the  journalists  are  often 
violating human rights and the basic professional ethics (from the occasional engagements in 
political parties and corruption, to the publication of made-up scandals, use of PR materials 
and speeches of hate, in some cases even Nazi propaganda and call  for violence)360.  Such 
356 See also Dallara, 2008.
357 See Matić 2002.
358 The most recent report issued on the subject is the Country Report as part of the Media Sustainibility 
index, 2008. 
359 In the pool undertaken by Strategic Marketing Research for the association of the independent media 
NUNS, in 2007 more than 40% of the Serbian journalists considered their job dangerous in terms of fearing for 
their own lives.  About 80% of the journalists  believed that journalism in Serbia is  strongly politicized,  95% 
believed that the media are under control (censorship),  37% of which believed that the censorship is largely 
widespread, 44% believed that it is widespread, while 14% believed that it is only used occasionally and on 
specific topics). According to the journalists, censorship is mainly undertaken by the politicians (70%) or tycoons 
(59% of responses), and is mainly directed to cover for the economic/financial malversations of the politicians 
(78%) or tycoons (68%). For examples of political influence over the journalists see Spaić, 2005.
360 Thus in the same research undertaken by ANEM, 64% of the interviewed journalists agreed with the 
statement that “many journalists in Serbia are used to putting their profession to the service of the political 
parties”, while 45% believed that “Many journalists in Serbia are linked with the organized crime and protect the 
organized  crime  interests  in  their  reporting”  (only  22%  did  not  agree  with  this  statement).  In  the  Media 
Sustainibility Index the professionalism is the indicator on which Serbia got the lowest score. 
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situation  is  strongly  favored  by  the  difficult  financial  situation  of  the  journalists  and  the 
insecurity of their position. The analysis of Serbia’s scoring in the Media Sustainability Index 
and  Freedom House  clearly  shows  that  the  professional  journalism  is  the  weakest  point 
(Serbia’s lowest score on the MSI is for the professional journalism, 1.91, which significantly 
pushes  the  total  score  down to  2.21)  and that  the  main cause  for  this  problem is  to  be 
searched in the political environment (according to the Freedom House data for 2007, the 
Press  in  Serbia  is  considered  partially  free,  the  most  critical  dimension  being  “political 
environment”, which makes the score rocket up to 45 points).
The adequate legislative framework is a first step in the process of establishing free media 
and penalizing the political pressures. As we will see, the legislative framework in place, not 
unlike other fields we analyzed, shows some serious shortcomings and, most importantly, is 
not properly implemented. The violations of the freedom of speech and the attacks on the 
journalists  perceived as “not enough patriotic  in their  reporting on Kosovo issues” in the 
second half of 2007, supported by some members of the government, are the final exhalation 
of what was the more general direction in the last years361. 
10.1.2. CHANGES INTRODUCED
Even though one of the first steps undertaken after the change of regime was to abolish 
the 1998 law, the situation after the “democratic revolution” was far from being democratic in 
substance. The media previously controlled by Milošević's regime, after their “liberation” (in 
the state owned media, “liberation” meaning a change in the managerial staff, while in the 
private media, “liberation” meaning a change in the political orientation of the media owner) 
continued their uncritical, partisan reporting, this time favoring the new ruling elite. Starting 
from the position that considered anyone against the new democratic government and any 
critics towards the reforms actually the product of the ancient-regime supporters,  the new 
Đinđić's government maintained the control over the media by establishing the government’s 
information  bureau,  which  became  an  instrument  of  control,  and,  when  necessary,  even 
intimidation of the media362.  Very soon the new ruling elite started to enjoy the privileges 
deriving from the control over the media, which seriously influenced their calculation of costs 
and balances when approaching the media legislation.
361 The deterioration of the situation in 2007 is well  depicted in Serbia’s score in the Reporters Without 
Borders index, where there is a significant drop in the ranking from 2006 to 2007.
362 See Cvijanović, 2002.
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It is easily understandable that such situation brought to the adoption of rules only partially 
complying  with the international  standards,  to  delays and shortcomings in  the process of 
implementation  and  to  the  lack  of  effective  changes  on  the  grounds.  Three  pieces  of 
legislation are important to understand the (lack of) development of the free media in Serbia: 
the Law on the Broadcasting, the Law on Public Information and the Law on Free Access to 
Information. 
The Law on the Broadcasting was adopted in 2002, after strong pressures coming both 
from  internal  change  agents  (media,  civil  sector)  and  from  the  international  actors.  The 
drafting  process was undertaken in cooperation with the international  actors  and national 
NGOs, with long public debate, in search for a broad support and legitimization of the law. 
However, once drafted, the document was amended by the government at the last moment 
and  adopted  including  the  changes  (some  of  which  crucial  for  the  functioning  of  the 
broadcasting council) introduced without consulting any other members of the civil society. 
Due to these changes, the Broadcast council, a body designed to “bring order in the Serbian 
ether”, passed from being prevalently influenced by the civil  sector to being mainly under 
political control (the number of members decreased from 15 to 9, four of which are proposed 
by the state, four from different bodies of the civil society, while one was to be appointed by 
the 8 elected members and shall be resident in Kosovo)363. 
The  Law  on  Public  Information,  adopted  in  March  2003,  followed  similar  patterns. 
Drafted in collaboration with a series of international and domestic experts and other relevant 
actors, the law was submitted to the public discussion. Yet, as it got to the assembly during the 
period of the state of emergency when the freedom of speech was limited, the government 
used its MPs to re-introduce into the legislation some solutions previously strongly criticized 
by the non-governmental actors. The document adopted included also nine completely new 
articles regulating the sensitive issue of the limitation of right to information. The introduction 
of such solution, especially due to the manner in which these articles were included, caused 
some  concerns  in  the  media  on  possible  censorship.  The  amendments  also  placed  more 
restrictions on the protection of information sources than the earlier drafts discussed in public 
did, and included a series of detailed provisions, some of which obviously superfluous and too 
difficult to implement, which from the very beginning undermined the validity of the act and 
363 See the report of the representatives of the Serbian media submitted to the Council of Europe Secretariat 
delegation, May 2003, available on the Internet: http://www.b92.net/english/special/rds/media.php.
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the compliance with the law364.  The Law on the Free Access to Public  Information,  even 
though prepared together with the Law on Public Information, did not enter the procedure 
and was adopted only one year later.
The implementation of the laws was also delayed, representing, according to the analysts, a 
clear sign of the lack of political will to give away the control of the media. Thus, the members 
of the Council of Broadcasting Agency were appointed only in 2003, and even then, the three 
members  nominated  by  the  political  institutions  were  nominated  with  no respect  for  the 
procedures.  This  brought  to  the  dismissal  of  two  “regularly”  elected  members,  lack  of 
approval of the agency’s statute (necessary for the work of the agency), blockage of the work. 
The situation was “solved” only in the 2004 when the newly elected government adopted the 
amendments  bringing  the  council  under  strict  assembly’s  control,  amendments  strongly 
contested both by the domestic association of the journalists and by the international actors. 
Even  though  the  law  was  amended  already  in  summer  2004,  the  “new”  members  were 
appointed only in February 2005, three years after the law adoption and five years after the 
transition initiated. The failure to implement the Broadcasting Act delayed the procedure of 
introduction and allocation of the licenses, hampering the quality of the media sector.
The 2004 amendments and particularly the possibility given to the assembly to discharge 
Broadcasting council’s members by a simple majority (seen the control the political parties 
exercise over their MPs) put the Broadcasting agency under the executive’s control. Due to 
the disputes between the media associations  and the government over the candidates,  the 
appointment of the members of council was delayed, to bring to the creation of a body very 
similar in composition to the one from 2003. The council started with the work, most of 
which  concerned  the  privatization  of  the  state  owned  media,  allocation  of  licenses  for 
broadcasting (in order to bring order to the ether overcrowded by the existence of numerous 
private channels, both national and local, formed in the last years). 
Seen the composition of the council, its potential politicization and executive’s control, the 
examples of the failures to respect the norms, shortcomings in the procedure, abuse of power, 
and, in the case of some TV station (like BK), the clear partisanship use of the agency against 
the political opponents, it is no surprise that the process of the allocation of frequencies is 
judged not transparent and politically biased.
364 See the report of the representatives of the Serbian media submitted to the Council of Europe Secretariat 
delegation, May 2003, available on the Internet: http://www.b92.net/english/special/rds/media.php.
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The executive’s  control  over the institution supposed to implement  the Law on Radio 
Diffusion  and to  protect  the  professionalism,  ethics  and  independence  of  media,  actually 
meant that none of these goals is reached. The agency did not succeed in punishing the hate 
speech and slander, which worked their way even into the most read daily newspapers. The 
government managed to keep the ownership of the actions in the majority of state media, 
through the privatization process in which the state companies were buying the media, while 
the new constitution, by granting any one without exclusion the right to possess the media gives 
the basis for the re-establishment of the state ownership of the channels of communication. 
The Law on the Broadcast was further amended in summer 2006, showing clear signs of a 
further worsening of the situation. The amendments were adopted as an answer to the public 
condemnation of the Agency’s behavior in the process of closing the BK television, a step 
clearly  dictated  by  the  government  and  the  Prime Minister  Koštunica,  threatened by  BK 
owner’s political ambitions365. The amendments increased the agency’s powers, incorporating 
all actions the agency undertook in the process against BK, the exclusive right to decide to 
shut the emitter down and the use of the police forces in order to enforce decisions being 
among the new document’s most controversial  issues. The content of the law, the lack of 
consultation of the civil society and the process of amending were all strongly criticized by the 
international and domestic actors, president Tadić refusing to promulgate the law by decree. 
However,  the  government  pushed  back  the  accusations  deriving  from  the  domestic  and 
international  actors,  refused  the  CoE  and  OSCE  recommendations,  and  made  its 
counterattack on the “external forces protecting the material interests of the western ‘media 
magnate’ and trying to control the media in Serbia by mixing up with the questions concerning 
the Serbian ether”. They accused OSCE to be partial and to represent the interests of the 
RTL,  which  was  refused the  frequency,  and in  October  the  law was  again passed in  the 
assembly, a condition sufficient for overruling the presidential veto. 
The delay in the implementation of the Law on Broadcasting delayed the transformation of 
the RTS (Radio Television of Serbia) into a public service until spring 2006, which allowed the 
government to continue exercising the political control over this media. When the process 
finally took place, the domestic NGOs and journalists’ associations expressed their concerns 
365 The  BK  did  actually  violate  the  provisions  on  reporting  during  the  elections,  yet,  the  selective 
implementation of the law and the abuse of powers by the Council provoked the rection of both domestic as 
well as international actors. Thus, while BK was closed, the Council decided not to close the pirate broadcasters 
until the end of the parliamentary elections, even though one of the five national broadcasters that obtained the 
licence lamented the problems in transmitting due to the interference with its frequency caused by the pirate 
stations. See Helsinki report on Serbia, 2006.
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about the process seen the persistent politicization of RTS and the governmental influence on 
it.  According to the Law on Broadcasting,  RTS was supposed to be transformed into the 
Public Broadcasting Service. The transformed public broadcaster was to be coordinated by the 
Managerial  Board  (whose  members  are  appointed  by  the  Agency)  and  by  the  Director 
(appointed  by  the  Managerial  Board).  The  failure  to  ensure  the  transparency  of  the 
appointment of the members to the Managerial  Board gave way to criticisms by the civil 
society and media, especially  the association of the journalists.  Further on, the Managerial 
Board tailored the Statute of RTS, excluding the university degree from the conditions for 
being appointed as General Director in order to allow the assignment of such position to the 
politically  controversial  figure  of  Alexandar  Tijanić  (minister  of  information  in  Milosević 
government, very close to Koštunica’s DSS and political  appointee on the position of the 
Director of RTS since 2004)366. 
Another important piece of legislation was the Law on Free  Access to Information. The 
law was adopted only in November 2004, and is generally in line with the European standards, 
apart  from  some  shortcomings  leaving  space  to  ambiguous  interpretation  and  difficult 
implementation  (see  below).  The  implementation  itself  was  slow,  the  Office  of  the 
commissioner for public information becoming operational only in June 2005. The appointed 
commissioner was a politician from SDP, a small political party that caused the dissolution of 
the assembly  in 2003 by withdrawing its  support  to DOS government due to the  several 
scandals in which the government was involved. The election of the politician to such position 
was criticized by the domestic  NGO, yet,  after three years,  the commissioner’s  work was 
praised by both domestic and international  actors.  In July 2007 Šabić was given a second 
mandate for the same function, decision welcomed this time by the civil society. 
In the 2005 another important step in setting up the legislative framework for independent 
media was made, when the amendments of the criminal code finally substituted the prison 
sentence  with  the  fee  sentence  for  slander/libel.  However,  parallel  to  these  positive 
developments in 2005, the assaults on the journalists, the political pressures over the media, in 
some  cases  even  the  open  threats  coming  from  high-level  politicians  and  government 
members were also taking place. Such trend persisted in 2006 and in 2007, when the attacks 
on journalists, particularly on those working for B92, were intensified, while the prosecution 
for  such  crimes  was  unsatisfactory,  rarely  bringing  to  the  arrest  and  trial  of  the  people 
involved in such attacks. 
366 See Helsinki Report on Serbia, 2006.
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The sad situation in media is confirmed by the Media center survey conducted in June 
2007: 81% of the journalists claimed that journalism in Serbia is politicized, 95% that there is a 
political control/censorship of information in the media, especially as far as the information 
about financial abuses by politicians and financial giants is concerned. Only 2% believe that 
there is a large number of independent journalists. In the open interviews with the journalists 
undertaken in 2005, we discover how the political oppression is direct, politicians (without 
difference  between  “democratic”  and  “undemocratic”  political  elite)  consider  journalists 
nothing  more  than  their  own  PR  agents,  calling  and  dictating  the  news  on  request, 
withdrawing given statements, controlling not only the substance of the news, but also the 
heading, subtitles and the formatting issues on the news concerning them. Such influence and 
control over the media is aggravated by the inclination of one part of journalists to seek for 
political  protection  and the  presence,  in  some cases,  of  corrupted editors,  journalists  and 
members of the editorial boards. In many cases the control over the media is ensured through 
the ownership, either by the state, or by the parties, or by the financial and economic elite367. 
The situation in the media appears to go towards some improvements in 2008. As the 
police failed to protect the journalists,  beaten up by the protesters (and one journalist  was 
beaten up by the police themselves368) during the protests against the arrestment of Mladić in 
summer 2008,  the media  organized  a  boycott,  refusing  to report  from the protest  during 
which  the  incidents  occurred,  and  exercised  strong  pressures  over  the  government  and 
minister of interior, trying to promote measures for greater protection of the journalists. The 
sentence of the court in Zaječar,  according to which the violence over the journalists was 
punished  with  6-month  detention,  only  further  increased  the  journalist’s  dissatisfaction369. 
Seen  that  the  minister  of  interior  was  the  high  official  during  Milošević’s  regime370,  the 
criticisms strongly threatened his legitimacy and the image of the “new, reformed SPS” the 
party was trying to build in order to make itself acceptable to the EU and “pro-democratic” 
forces. After the pressures from the civil society and the journalist’s association, the Ministry 
of Interior reacted in order to identify the people involved in the violence. The government 
promised that the law should be amended in order to ensure that the journalists are treated as 
367 See Media Center Beograd, research project “Ethics in media-did anything change?”, 2005.
368See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=30&nav_id=310763,
 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=24&nav_category=64.
369See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=31&nav_id=310988,
 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=25&nav_id=310155. 
370 Ivica Dačić, the Minister of Interior since 2008, was a spokesman of Milošević’s party SPS during the '90s, 
and the vice president of SPS since 2000. 
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officers on duty, and in order to give much harder punishments to those who perform acts of 
violence against the journalists. The association of the journalists prepared the draft proposal 
for  the  amendment  of  the  Law  on  Public  Information  in  October  2008.  Should  the 
government  keep  its  promise  and  adopt  the  proposed  amendments,  the  security  of  the 
journalists would significantly improve. 
The amendments on the Law on Access to Public Information is also looked forward to by 
the  commissioner  public  information  who  still  complains  the  unacceptable  limitations  in 
legislation  that  are  hampering  his  work  and  limiting  the  citizens’  right  to  access  the 
information.  Among the inadequacies in the legislative framework representing the biggest 
obstacle in the work of this institution, we find the lack of mechanisms for monitoring the 
compliance and the failure to ensure the implementation of the commissionaire’s decisions 
and  recommendations.  Even  though,  in  two  years  of  functioning,  the  commissionaire 
submitted  more  than  1500  complaints  against  the  institutions  and  officials  who failed  to 
comply with the law, in only 39 cases the decision was brought, among which in only 6 cases 
the  misdemeanors  were  condemned  to  pay  the  fee.  Another  limitation  comes  from  the 
unharmonized legislative framework allowing limited access to information, when, according 
to the commissionaire’s report, very often the access to the information was limited in order 
to cover for cases of corruption, abuse of power, violations of the law and similar371. The lack 
of a Law on the State Secret, Law on the Protection of Personal Data and the lack of other 
relevant norms is hampering the implementation of the Law on Access to Public Information, 
as the lack of clear criteria is commonly used to limit access to the information. The working 
space is also considered inadequate towards the staff and the workload, but even though the 
commissionaire  required  the  solution  of  this  problem,  the  government  ignored  its 
requirements  for  three  years,  to  provide  for  a  positive  response  only  in  spring  2008,  yet 
further delaying the implementation of the decision. According to the conclusions from the 
reunion of  the  Ombudsman,  Commissionaire  for the access  to the  information,  Supreme 
State Audit, Director of the office for public procurement, such difficulties in the elementary 
infrastructure  appears  to  be  “common  to  all  independent  institutions  with  particular 
competencies concerning the protection of citizens’ rights and fight against corruption”372.
As far as the ownership of the media and plurality of sources of information is concerned, 
the  situation  is  biased.  Even  though  there  appears  to  be  a  plurality  of  the  sources  of 
371 See the informator on the functioning of the office of commissionaire for public information, pp. 117-118.
372 See the report on the work of Ombudsman, Službeni Glasnik Srbije, April 2008, pp. 30.
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information (several radio and television broadcasters and print media, as well as unrestricted 
access to internet), the domestic experts express concerns: “It looks at first glance as if Serbia 
had a pluralistic media scene. But the editorial positions in electronic and printed media, in 
most cases, do not approach the fundamental issues seriously, so they often are nothing but a 
flat-out transmission of political positions, positions of the tycoons, or other strong lobbies. 
The public interest is often losing the battle against the media campaigns by different political 
and interest groups” (Gaće, director of the association of journalists in Serbia, Panel on the 
Media Freedom of Serbia organized by IREX as a part of the “Media sustainability index” 
project, 2008). The media ownership is also a sector rising serious concerns. Even though the 
register  for  the  media  owners  exists  and  all  media  are  obliged  to  submit  the  ownership 
structure,  the  domestic  experts  underlined  that  the  coordinated  attacks  the  media  launch 
against a specific political party or leader rise doubts on the truthfulness of the declared owner 
structures. 
As far as the news agencies are concerned, there are three news agencies, two private and 
one public (Tanjug). The state-owned agency is considered politically biased as it is strongly 
dependent on the government’s financial support and strongly favours the news originating 
from the state. In such light the obligation of the public media to use Tanjug as a source of 
information is further hampering the independence of the public media. 
 
10.1.3. THE IA’S ROLE IN THE REFORM
As the table shows, the media freedom is one of the issues on which the EU started to 
promote the norm from its very first reports. The issue was subject to continuous pressures 
and conditionality, yet it had not achieved the status of the key short-term priorities in the last 
period373. As far as the financial assistance is concerned, it should be underlined that the media 
sector is the one that received the financial assistance of the EU already during Milošević’s 
regime, when the international actors offered their support to the local and oppositional media 
in a strategy of, as Vachudova would label it, “differential empowerment”.
The EU’s pressures for the media independence and right on information promotion were 
combined with the same pressures deriving from the CoE and OSCE, in some cases joint 
statements and recommendations being issued. CoE, as well as OSCE, were very active in the 
process of advocating and offering technical support (particularly in designing the Laws on 
Broadcasting 2002, on Public Information 2003 and on free access to information in 2004). 
373 See Baracani, 2005.
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The CoE offered their  opinion on different  draft  proposals,  and organized meetings  and 
consultations with the government and the ministry of culture. Yet, in the first two cases, the 
final versions of the text either failed to include some of the recommendations made (the Law 
on Broadcast), or were amended introducing limitations to the levels of liberty promoted by 
the  international  actors  (the  case  of  the  Law  on  Public  Information).  The  amendments 
introduced to the Law on Broadcast  were strongly  criticized  by all  actors  included in  the 
process (EU; CoE; OSCE), whose reports and public statements continue to underline the 
problem and to call  for a proper implementation of the existing laws (yet,  as we saw, no 
success was achieved in case of the Law on Broadcasting). 
In the field of the freedom of expression and freedom of the media,  the international 
influence in terms of legitimacy seems significant, testifying the importance and legitimacy of 
the European heritage in protecting political, civil and human rights. In some cases the rule 
adoption  was  explicitly  due  to  the  desire  to  comply  (at  least  on  the  paper)  with  the  IA 
standards:  the  consultation with the IA and the use of  their  expertise  in the  law drafting 
process, the call through media for the “compliance with the European standards”, in the case 
of the Law on Broadcast the underlining of the devotion to the European principles  and 
norms. This search for external (and in particular, European) acknowledgment as part of the 
legitimacy  and  confirmation  of  the  government’s  democratic  potential  indicates  the 
possibilities  of  the  use  of  the  social  influence  for  the  promotion  of  the  media  freedom. 
However,  even though the IA issued some reports  criticizing  the  situation in  the Serbian 
media, the low media visibility did not allow them to play a catalyst influence in pushing the 
change forward.
10.1.4. ASSESSMENT
While in the field of the media freedom we registered the development of the legislative 
framework, at the same time we saw that the improvements (significant in the first years of 
the  regime  change)  are  still  rather  slow.  The  legislation  is  only  partially  in  line  with  the 
international standards, while the implementation faces more serious obstacles. The difficult 
financial situation of both media and journalists is another source of concern as it makes the 
media vulnerable to the influence of the economic elite.
The  international  actors  were  rather  active  in  promoting  the  settling  of  the  legislative 
framework in the field of media freedom. The coordinated action of EU, CoE and OSCE 
included  conditioning,  advocating,  technical  support,  monitoring  and  criticizing.  On  the 
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domestic side we register the consciousness of citizens about the existence of media control, 
the call for independent media coming from the journalists’ association, some domestic NGO 
and civil society. However, the lack of governmental change agents and the strong interest of 
the domestic elite in maintaining the control and politicization of the media obstructed the 
reforms and brought to a mere fake compliance. We can notice the “nominal” devotion to the 
freedom of  the  press  in  all  political  parties’  programs,  and  the  general  principle  is  often 
revoked in the electoral campaign. Yet, the importance of the media’s influence on the public 
opinion makes the control over the media one of the means of the struggle for power any 
politician tries to use. In the asset with weak democratic institutions such incentive turns to a 
de-facto politicization of the media and difficulties in the implementation of the legislative 
framework. Such low ethics, combined with corruption, difficult financial situation and crisis 
of professionalism, induce some journalists and media to get “side jobs” and search for the 
sponsorship of the political or economic elite. 
Finally, it appears that in Serbia there is still a lack of understanding what the role of media 
should  actually  be,  even  among  the  editors  of  the  most  common  newspapers.  Seen  the 
radicalization of the political temperature and the growing nationalism, the questions of self-
censorship and the role of the media become salient, the borderline between the impartial and 
professional reporting and the creation and maintenance of consensus becoming an important 
question. In Serbia there is still some bias between the necessity for impartial information and 
the  media’s  political,  “educational”  function  (prone  to  supporting  the  communist  regime 
during the communist regime, to supporting “patriotism” and defending the “Serbian nation” 
in  Milošević’s  period,  to  supporting  “democracy  and  change”  connotation  in  the  DOS 
period).  This  ambiguity  can  be  identified  also  on  the  supply  side,  on  the  side  of  the 
international  actors  who often request media to be used in order to sensitize  the Serbian 
public  opinion on issues  such as  ICTY, war crimes and Kosovo,  changing  the  prevailing 
negative opinion on the tribunal and contributing to the arrestment of the indictees. Such 
pressures on the Serbian ruling elite to guarantee a particular type of reporting in the media is 
actually advocating a politicized media under executive control, and a role of media as a creator  
of the public opinion. The question, on both the supply and the domestic side, therefore is: 
does the limitation of the media freedom, when used for serving “democratic  goals” as a 
higher good, justify the violation of the basic democratic values? In Serbia, due to its very long 
history of authoritarian regimes, the most common approach, both on the political elite and 
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among  the  journalists  and citizens  is  that  “higher  good”,  be  it  “defense  of  the  state”  or 
“democratization”,  justifies  the limitation of  the freedom of expression.  The requests and 
criticisms coming from the IA concerning not only the system, but in some cases also the 
content of the media reporting, are not helpful in changing the current approach to the media. 
10.2. MACEDONIA
10.2.1. THE MEDIA AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION SINCE 1990 
The  independence  and  the  fall  of  the  communist  rule  in  Macedonia  represented  the 
beginning  of  the  development  of  a  free  media  sector.  The  constitution  adopted  in  1991 
included  the  freedoms  of  expression,  of  information,  of  receiving  and  accessing  to 
information as fundamental freedoms and rights of the citizens (article 10), while the Law on 
the Essential system of Public Information, introduced in 1990, made a radical turnaround 
concerning  the  possibilities  for  establishing  printed  media.  The  end  of  the  unipartism 
represented  the  moment  of  the  liberalization  of  the  media,  a  series  of  new  sources  of 
information immediately spreading out.
In the first  years  of  the  transition,  due to the lack of  legislation  regulating  the matter, 
several  electronic  media  outlets  were  established,  bringing  to  what  is  labeled  in  domestic 
literature  as  “a  chaotic  and  uncontrolled  explosion  of  media”.  The  variety  of  the  offer, 
especially  in  television  and radio  channels,  was  combined  with  the  complete  lack  of  any 
criteria for registering the media, of professional, technical and financial standards, which, as a 
consequence, brought to a low quality of the content and lack of professionality of the media 
scene. Until the adoption of the first legislation aiming to regulate the existing chaos, more 
than 250 private broadcasters with “undefined status, without clear concept and physiognomy, 
without elementary technical and technological conditions for work, with freely chosen and 
illegally used broadcast frequencies” appeared374. As far as the printed media are concerned, 
the situation was exactly the opposite, with more pluralism and competition in printed media 
being established only in 1996 with the emergence of the first private newspaper “Dnevnik”, 
to explode in the pluralism of the printed media only after the 1999.
After the first six years, during which the state only sporadically undertook “moratorium” 
measures or shut down a few broadcasters (officially in order to bring some order in the ether, 
374 See Šopar and Jovanova, 2000.
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but, due to the dubious and undefined criteria for such actions, the actual political background 
of  such  decision  cannot  be  sorted out),  the  state  made its  first  steps  aiming to set  up a 
normative framework. The issue was regulated only in 1997-1998 (also due to the obligations 
deriving from the membership in the Council of Europe), when the Law on the Broadcasting 
Activity (1997), the Law on Telecommunications (1998), the Law on Concessions (1998) and 
the Law on the Establishment of the Public Enterprise Macedonian Radio Television (1998) 
were adopted. The adopted legislation calls for the principles of the freedom of information, 
of  receiving  and  accessing  to  information  and  of  establishing  institutions  for  public 
information as  guaranteed by the Macedonian Constitution  (art  16)  and by the European 
Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
The settled legislative  framework introduced the necessary material,  financial,  technical, 
programming  and  staffing  criteria  for  obtaining  the  concession  for  broadcasting,  and  it 
regulated the way both public and private sector are financed. It introduced some order in the 
field (to the extent to which it was implemented) and normatively constituted the public and 
private sector, formally establishing pluralism for broadcasters375. Among the other norms, it is 
important to underline that the law established the principle of balance in the informative 
function  of  the  broadcasters,  calling  them to  be  open  to  free  competition  and  impartial 
information on various political ideas, and to treat political subjects in their programs in an 
appropriate and impartial manner. It forbids the political parties (or their leaders) to own the 
media.
The most significant provisions of the legislative framework established at the end of the 
nineties  concerned  the  establishment  of  the  Broadcasting  Council,  a  body  supposed  to 
“represent the citizens’  interests”, made of nine members appointed and dismissed by the 
assembly (a solution that easily shifted the citizens’ representative to the representative of the 
ruling majority’s interest). The council was given the power to propose decisions concerning 
the allocation of the frequencies and of the resources from the broadcasting subscription fee 
intended for projects of public interest, but the legislator reserved the final decision to the 
government, significantly weakening the council and increasing the government’s influence.
The Law on the  Establishment  of  the  Public  Enterprise  Macedonian  Radio Television 
(MRTV), adopted in 1998, regulated the structure of the MRTV, further strengthening the 
political  control,  as the centralized organizational  structure turned the politically  appointed 
management board and general director of the MRTV into central figures on which all other 
375 See Šopar and Jovanova, 2000.
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functionaries are dependent. As far as the local public broadcasters are concerned, the power 
to appoint the key figures in these media was given to the municipal councils, making them 
dependent on the local governments. 
The financing of the media, as regulated by the legislation, represented another source of 
concern. The public media, MRTV, was thought to be financed by the fee paid by citizens on 
a monthly basis, and to “integrate” the revenues with funds from the commercials and from 
marketing services, from the sale of own programs, sponsorships and donations, as well as 
from resources provided by the state for special programs. The idea behind it was to make 
MRTV  independent  by  ensuring  that  its  financial  resources  are  independent  from  the 
government. However, seen the incapacity to ensure the payments of the fee (only about 50% 
of fees is paid by the citizens who often refuse to pay, particularly seen their biased view of 
MRTV as strongly politicized), MRTV turned to commercials which are allowed to take up to 
7% per broadcasted hour (unlike the private media, where they are allowed to take up to 20% 
per broadcasted hour). Allowing MRTV to broadcast commercials put the private media in a 
even more difficult position, as MRTV, seen its monopolistic and favored position on the 
market, pushed the prices of the marketing services down, bringing the private media (for 
which marketing, beside donations, was almost the only source of finances) to an extremely 
difficult position. This step further pushed the private media into a financial crisis and forced 
them to trade their own independency, becoming subject to the political and economic elite’s 
pressures. 
The law also decreed that 10% of the collected fees shall be used for financing the private 
media’s  “public  interest  projects”,  but  as  the  allocation  of  these  resources  is  upon  the 
government  (the  broadcasting  council  only  has  the  power  to  suggest,  which  is  often not 
respected by  the  government),  this  only  represents  another  source  of  the  private  media’s 
dependence on the political power (see Šopar, 2005). 
Further on, the lack of legislation guaranteeing editors and journalists the protection of the 
workers’ unions and the lack of collective contracts puts owners and financiers of the media in 
the position to exercise undue pressures over the journalists fearing for their jobs. The non-
professionalism, subjectivism and submissiveness to pressure or self-censorship are a direct 
product  of  a  system in  which  the  de-jure  guaranteed freedom of  information  is  de-facto 
hampered  by  the  fierce  competition  where  only  those  who  are  capable  to  ensure  the 
protection of the economic and political centers of power can survive376. The politically biased 
376 See Šopar, 2000, 2005.
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media,  both  state-owned (incline  to  the  ruling  elite)  and  private  (often  controlled  by  the 
different political parties), are the most criticized feature, and the ruling elite appears not too 
prone to change377. 
Other issues of serious concern in the media legislative framework established in the '90s 
were the lack of adequate training for the journalists, the criminalization of slander (for which 
the criminal code prescribed imprisonment for several months) and the lack of a Law on 
Access to Public  Information.  All three issues represented a serious obstacle in the media 
system  development.  The  lack  of  training  of  the  journalists,  particularly  when  classical 
education is not able to satisfy the needs of the too-pluralized market requests, brought to a 
significant decrease in the staff’s quality (both journalists and other professions). The lack of a 
comprehensive government’s policy on media resulted in the failure to develop a strategy for 
the  education  of  the  journalists.  The classical  university  education  (criticized  upon as  too 
theoretic) is combined with the “alternative” education378, but both are functioning without an 
insight on the real needs of the journalists379. 
In the aftermath of the 2001 armed conflict, the situation in the Macedonian media sector 
was characterized by strong political and economic influence over all the major sources of 
information,  lack  of  professionalism,  quality  criteria  and  confusion  in  the  overcrowded 
Macedonian ether. Another salient problem was the ethnic division reflected not only in the 
de-facto  existence  of  two  parallel  media  systems,  but  on  the  existence  of  what  can  be 
considered two parallel truths, two distinct value systems and two different weltanschauung 
reflecting  two  distant  realities380.  The  Helsinki  committee  report  on  the  situation  in  the 
Macedonian media in 2001 strongly criticized all journalists, broadcasters and newspapers for 
the war propaganda and lack of professional  reporting.  The spread of the ethnic tensions 
through the media, both in Macedonian and Albanian language often was, and still is, the core 
of the criticisms in the reports of international actors involved in rule promotion.
377 On the  politicization of  media  see  Andrevski  2003,  as  well  as  Šopar  and Jovanova  2000,  European 
commission report 2002. For an analysis on the political affiliation of the particular media according to the 
content analysis of the broadcasted programs, see Andrevski, 2002
378 The independent schools of journalism were organized for the first time in 2002, when the Macedonian 
institute  for  media  organized a training for  all  professions  and profiles,  example  later  followed by  different 
NGOs, INGOs, IGOs.
379 See Šopar, 2005.
380 See Šopar, 2004.
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10.2.2. THE CHANGES
As  the  role  of  media  in  the  2001  conflict  was  criticized  by  different  national  and 
international actors (like, for example, the Helsinki Committee), and as the core of the 2001 
ethnic conflict also tackled the issues of education and culture of the national minorities, in 
the  conclusive  part  of  the  agreement  the  contractual  parties  invited  “the  international 
community, including OSCE, to increase its assistance for projects in the area of the media in 
order  to  further  strengthen  radio,  TV and  print  media,  including  Albanian  language  and 
multiethnic  media”.  The  parties  also  invited  “the  international  community  to  increase 
professional  media training  programs for members of communities  not in  the majority  in 
Macedonia” (Annex C to OFA, article 6.1).  In august 2002,  the OSCE mission to Skopje 
settled the Media Development Unit (MDU). The organization was active in organizing the 
training,  advocating  and  offering  technical  assistance  in  the  drafting  of  new  pieces  of 
legislation, and particularly in assisting the creation of the local media in the language of the 
minorities.
The governmental change in 2002 also brought to a series of changes in the media sphere 
(beside the usual changes in the staff of the public-owned MRTV). The largest state owned 
print  media  enterprise,  Nova  Makedonija,  literally  collapsed.  After  a  series  of  financial 
difficulties,  it  was privatized during the electoral  campaign in an attempt of at time ruling 
VMRO to  gain  points  by  solving  the  urgent  problem of  one  of  the  oldest  Macedonians 
companies.  However,  the  newly  elected  government,  after  assessing  the  procedure  of 
privatization, declared it unlawful and annulled the contract with the Slovenian buyer, which 
caused further financial agony and the almost ruination of what was the monopolistic giant in 
the field of the printed media until 1996.
In  the  same  period,  2002-2003,  the  German  company  WAZ  bought  the  three  most 
influential  printed media,  “Utrinski  vesnik”,  “Dnevnik”  and “Vest”,  that  merged into one 
company in mid-2003. This brought 54% of the newspapers’ market under the control of a 
single  owner,  WAZ,  a  dominant  position  according  to  the  Law  against  Restriction  of 
Competition (which considers it a monopoly when the control reaches 50% of the market or 
more),  but  it  was  still  considered  a  situation  of  “healthy  competition”  and  “absence  of 
monopoly”  according  to  the  assessment  of  the  Anti-monopoly  administration381.  The 
domestic authors showed great concern over the re-establishment of the monopoly in the 
printed media, comparing the situation with that of 1996 when monopoly was exercised by 
381 See Šopar 2005, Andrevski 2002.
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the state-owned Nova Makedonija. They also underlined that the presence of foreign capital in 
the  field  of  the  media  would  only  further  facilitate  the  government  in  maintaining  the 
influence over the media, as the “government (under the motto that it must control the influx 
of foreign capital in the media), through special governmental commissions, has the last word 
and insists  on  investors  that  are  not  too  liberal,  i.e.  whose political  stance  would not  be 
significantly different from the stance of the state”382.
The  positive  developments  in  this  period  were  the  reconstruction  of  MRTV,  the 
introduction of the second channel with programs for the national minorities and cuts within 
the staff. The debate over the legislative framework initiated, mainly under the pressures from 
the civil society, the media sector and international actors (the most prominent to mention are 
OSCE, CoE and EU).  The great  expectations  of  the actors  (particularly  state and private 
broadcasters) made the debate over the Broadcasting law particularly vivid. While the private 
media were expecting the new government to fulfill the electoral promises (decrease of the 
fees  for  using  broadcasting  frequencies  by  90%,  revision  of  the  right  to  advertising  and 
propaganda  via  MRTV,  legal  regulation  of  the  journalists’  labor  rights,  provisions  of 
transparency in expenditure of funds belonging to public enterprises etc383), the MRTV was 
hoping to solve its financial problems through access to state budget. 
The new Law on Broadcasting Activity was finally adopted in November 2005. The change 
of the appointment procedures of the members of Council as well as of the managerial board 
of the MRTV contributed to more independence from the governmental influence over these 
bodies. The law was drafted in cooperation with OSCE, the Council of Europe and EU and 
incorporated the recommendations of these bodies, thus contributing for the law to achieve a 
positive assessment from the international actors. 
However,  the  practice  of  politicization  in  the  appointment  of  the  heads  in  MRTV 
persisted. The government kept on appointing the general director, switching the appointee 
with every shift of government, and even introducing the ad-personam drafted amendments 
to the law in February 2007, in order to allow the appointment of the general director that, at 
the time, did not have the Macedonian citizenship. Arguing that the foreign expertise would 
help MRTV out of its  crisis,  the former OSCE member Janez Sajović from Slovenia  was 
appointed as general director, while the political appointee was given the position of second 
general  director  (the  two-headed  executive  was  established  by  the  changes  introduced  in 
382 See Šopar, 2004.
383 See the electoral commitments of SDSM in Andrevski 2002.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 384
February  2007)  in  order  to  exercise  control  over  Sajović384.  As  the  constitutional  court 
annulled the provision allowing foreigners to be appointed as one of two members of the 
executive body, the government decided to grant Sajović the Macedonian citizenship for his 
personal contribution to the Republic of Macedonia. 
The  failure  to  ensure  the  mechanisms  for  financing  the  media  is  the  most  serious 
shortcoming  of  the  Law  on  Broadcasting,  criticized  both  by  the  international  experts 
immediately  after  the  law  adoption,  and  by  the  employees  three  years  after  the  law 
implementation. Some of the unpopular solutions we mentioned above persisted (the right of 
MRTv to broadcast commercials), even though the matter was regulated in a more precise 
manner.  Some  new solutions  adopted  also  caused  concerns  like,  for  example,  the  direct 
collection of the tax for broadcasting that was previously collected via the electricity bill and 
was still rather low (only 50% of the taxes used to be collected, see OSCE report 2005). This 
resulted in further concerns rising on the capacity of MRTV to collect the tax, concerns that 
were proved founded in practice. As it was stressed in the interviews with the journalists of 
MRTV, the financial problems are more serious than ever, bringing the national broadcaster 
almost  to  the  point  of  bankruptcy,  allowed  by  the  changes  introduced  in  the  Law  on 
Broadcasting in august 2008. The lack of political will, the interests of the political leadership 
from  the  funds  potentially  deriving  from  granting  the  new  frequency  to  the  national 
broadcaster and the lack of interests from the managerial board of MRTV were identified as 
the main causes of the failure to reform MRTV385.
In 2006 another positive step was made with the adoption, after several years and several 
unsuccessful efforts, of the Law on Free Access to Information. Such delay in the adoption of 
the Law on Access to Information was identified by Šopar to be caused by the government’s 
intention to: 
• limit  the  access  to  information  and  maintain  the  discretionary  power  over  which 
information could be made public, and 
• use the opportunity  of the adoption of the Law on Media that would regulate the 
matter to introduce more strict control over the journalists. 
Thus,  after  the  country’s  entrance  in  the  Council  of  Europe  and the  adoption  of  the 
European Strategy on Human Rights that made precise requirements in the field of media 
384 Interview with Manevski, media assistant in OSCE spill-over monitor mission to Skopje, august 2008. 
Manevski specified that Sajović entered an arrangement with Macedonian government on his own behalf and 
that OSCE did not take any role in this decision.
385 From the interview with Manevski, OSCE media assistant, august 2008.
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freedom, the international pressure to adopt the Law on Media and Law on Free Access to 
Information resulted in a series of draft proposals coming from the government, each of them 
criticized by domestic and international public as far from being democratic (see Šopar, 2001). 
After the media and civil society pressures for the adoption of the law in 2003, the draft was 
finally  prepared,  but  it  remained  blocked  in  the  government  after  its  first  reading  in  the 
parliament.  It  was  finally  adopted  only  in  February  2006,  but,  as  reported  by  the  EU 
commission, the implementation is still difficult as many institutions are still not prepared or 
are unwilling to facilitate access to the information held. The weak administrative capacity of 
the commission for the protection of the right to free access to public information is further 
hampering the implementation of the law386.
In 2006 the custodial sentencing for defamation was also eliminated, but the question of 
defamation is still not in line with the European standards. Seen the number of the journalists 
prosecuted  for  libel,  defamation,  disinformation  and  similar  (according  to  the  Helsinki 
committee  report  2006  there  is  no  single  redaction  that  is  not  having  journalists  under 
prosecution),  and  seen  the  existence  of  cases  where  a  politically  biased  judiciary  brought 
sentences against the journalists who published a correct information, the problems of liberty, 
independency,  freedom  of  expression,  professionalism  became  strictly  linked  with  the 
problem of the judicial independence and the rule of law.
Even  though  the  legislative  framework  for  ensuring  the  freedom  of  expression  and 
information in Macedonia significantly improved in the period 2005-2006, and even though 
the Broadcasting council initiated its work adopting a series of necessary documents for the 
law implementation, the pressures over the media, the political influence, the lack of respect 
for  the  law  during  the  electoral  campaign  as  well  as  the  recent  effort,  advanced  by  the 
government, to use the EU recommendations to adjust the law in order to get rid of the 
broadcasting  council  and  put  it  under  the  ministry’s  control,  represent  issues  of  serious 
concern for the future of the media in Macedonia. The IGOs and international monitoring 
organizations active in the field therefore rank Macedonia rather low in the respect for the 
freedom of expression. Freedom House thus continues to consider the country partially free 
in  terms  of  media  freedom,  while  in  the  Media  Sustainability  Index  the  country  is  not 
performing well  either.  The main problem,  as  reported by  Kambranov,  editor  of  the  TV 
channel 5, lies in the fact that the freedom of expression, while guaranteed by the law, is not 
respected by the judges. The values of freedom of speech and expression are not entrenched 
386 See Commission Report on Macedonia, 2007.
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in the society, but they are considered as an exception, rather than a general right (see the MSI 
report on Macedonia). While the jail sentence is no longer prescribed for libel, it remains a 
criminal offence, and the charges against the journalists continue growing. The sentences are 
usually  economic,  but the amount of the penalties,  together with the costs  of  the judicial 
process, is so high that it represents a very serious problem for the journalists. The Broadcast 
council, even though the procedure for its appointment was made less politically biased (the 
members  are  appointed  by  the  parliament  upon the  proposal  from different  independent 
bodies and parts of the civil society), is under strong government’s pressure, in some cases 
resulting even in biased decisions. Even this partial dependence on the assembly was enough 
to open the door to the political pressures. The failure to ensure the financial autonomy of 
MRTV placed  the  public  broadcaster’s  dependency  on  the  government,  while  the  fierce 
competition on the commercial  market,  the  only  financial  resource for the private  media, 
resulted in a drop of the prices and increase of the media’s vulnerability to the economic elite. 
10.2.3. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND THE MEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN MACEDONIA
Since  its  adherence  to  the  Council  of  Europe,  Macedonia  has  become  subject  to  the 
external promotion of the freedom of expression. The recommendations of the Council of 
Europe aimed to the protection of the independence in the broadcasting and printed media, 
editorial freedom, even-handed tax treatment, free availability of newsprint and equal access to 
broadcasting,  printing  facilities  and  to  distribution  outlets.  In  more  concrete  terms,  the 
requirements of the CoE for media freedom in Macedonia concerned the adoption of the Law 
on the Public Media (never adopted); the restriction of the influence on the media by the 
government and the parliament, and the guarantee of the independence and transparency of 
the Broadcasting Council; the dismantling of the near-monopoly in advertising of the Nova 
Makedonia agency387. 
Since the 2001 conflict and the signature of OFA, the OSCE mission was established, with 
the Media Development Unit particularly organized in order to foster the development of the 
media in Macedonia. The mission was active in organizing the training (particularly for the 
journalists belonging to the national minorities), in advocating and promoting the legislative 
changes and in monitoring the developments in the field. 
387 See Council of Europe, “Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia”.
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The EU also included freedom of expression and media sector development among the 
priorities, both as a part of the political criteria and of the sectoral policy in the field of the 
“information society and media”. Similarly to other fields, the recommendations became more 
concrete, gaining in determinacy, with the adoption of the European Partnership that listed 
more precise priorities. While in the first period (2002-2003) the core concern was to ensure 
the compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, in the partnerships we find 
the requirements to improve the broadcasting legislation, introduce the independency of the 
media regulatory bodies, review the legislation on defamation, tackle the issue of the financing 
and financial independence of the media – or lack thereof (for more details see table 1).
10.2.4. ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM
The pattern of the media system development is quite in line with the patterns in other 
similar  issues  where  the  difficult  process  of  the  ruling  elite  and  political  parties 
democratization is involved. The political influence established over both public and private 
media (even though through different mechanisms and with different patterns) proved rather 
difficult to dismantle. The political parties and the ruling elite,  together with the economic 
actors and the corrupted, unprofessional  members of the profession,  represented the veto 
players obstructing the strengthening of the media freedoms in Macedonia. We can therefore 
register  a  series  of  efforts  to  obstruct  the  change,  and  even  to  reverse  the  positive 
developments made, in order to re-establish the political control over the media.
On  the  supply  side,  we  shall  first  account  for  the  obligations  deriving  from  the 
membership in the Council of Europe that brought to the first normative changes in 1997 
(above  all,  adoption  of  the  Law  on  Broadcasting),  that,  however,  were  far  from  being 
sufficient.  In  the  period  after  the  OFA, the  international  pressures  (even though not  too 
strong, seen the existence of “more salient” issues occupying especially the EU’s attention) 
were constantly exercised through the usual instruments (monitoring of compliance and the 
EU partnership recommendations). To the recommendations and calls for compliance coming 
from the Council of Europe, the comparatively more determinant pressure of the EU was 
added, both “joining” strengths with the CoE and pushing for the respect of the Convention 
on Human Rights, as well as adding the institutional requirements. In combination with the 
strong  pressures  coming  from  the  civil  society,  the  media  and  general  public,  and  in 
combination with the intention to apply for the candidate status, the increased international 
pressures resulted in the positive legislative changes in the sector in the end 2005-first half of 
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2006. As the media and the informative sector represent part of the acquis as well, the EU 
pressure in the field in the recent years is mainly part of the integration process rather than 
subject  to  the  EU  promotion  of  the  political  changes.  Thus,  in  the  recent  European 
Partnership, recommendations tackling the media freedom are treated as part of the sectoral 
policies and not as part of the political requirements.
The result was, as with many other dimensions we analyzed, an active legislative activity 
and only a partial change. 
10.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The building up of the legislative framework supporting the media freedom in both Serbia 
and Macedonia faced a series of difficulties mainly coming from the lack of will of the political 
and economic elite to loosen their control over the media sector. The nominal devotion to the 
freedom of speech and the right to information,  built  in the constitutions  adopted at  the 
beginning of the nineties in the two countries, was not filled with substance. However, as it 
emerges from our analysis  above (see the appendix  for the summary),  the difficulties  and 
developments followed slightly different patterns in the two countries.
In  the  case  of  Macedonia,  the  difficulties  derived  from  an  unfavorable  economic 
environment, which brought to a situation in which all media outlets are forced to seek their 
resources from the political and economic circles. One of the causes for such situation should 
be looked for in the government’s policy towards the media that allowed unfair competition 
by letting the state-owned MRTV to dictate the prices of advertisement, thus hampering the 
competition  on  the  market  and  putting  the  private  media  in  an  unsustainable  financial 
situation.  The only  private  media  that  survived  such sharp  competition  hampered by  the 
favored  position  of  the  state-owned  media  were  those  that  found  alternative  financial 
resources mainly coming from the political and business cycles.
In  Serbia,  the  control  over  the  state-owned  media  was  combined  with  the  legislation 
allowing censorship and harassment of the opposition (the Law on Public Information from 
1998 had a  strong  role  in  this  process).  After  the  overthrow of  the  regime in  2000,  the 
situation significantly improved as the 1998 legislation was pushed out of force. Yet, lifting up 
the mechanisms of harassment was only a first necessary step, the settling of the legislative 
framework for the protection of the media freedoms representing a much more difficult task. 
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While the regime change represented a favorable factor for pursuing the media freedoms, as 
the status quo was strongly  delegitimized by all  relevant actors,  at the same time the high 
temperature of the events brought to the situation where, again, the plurality of the opinion 
was not tolerated. Criticizing the “new democratic government” was an act perceived as a 
praise to the ancient regime and as such was condemned and demonized. The journalists and 
editors acted consequentially, self-censorship being diffused particularly in those media that 
were previously controlled by the Milošević elite. The lack of tolerance and the tendency to 
limit the freedom of expression in the name of a “higher, national  interest” still  persist in 
Serbia.  Be  it  the  “communistic  ideal”,  the  “Serbian  nation”  or  “democracy”,  there  is  a 
tendency to be less tolerant towards those opinions that are not in line with the national goals 
prevalent at the moment. The violations of human rights during the 2003 state of emergency, 
not  unlike  the  episodes  of  violence  against  journalists  and  the  social  actors  advocating 
unpopular  issues,  particularly  intensified  in  the  last  years  of  the  polarization  of  Serbian 
political life, are a clear illustration of the law’s interiorization of the freedom of expression 
among some parts of the population. Obviously the ruling elite, favored, and at the same time 
contributing with its rhetorics to the maintenance of such asset, was not particularly eager to 
loosen the inherited mechanisms of media control whose benefits it now enjoyed.
In both cases the development of the legislative framework followed a similar pattern in 
which the actions of the international actor were crucial for supporting the present, active, but 
relatively week change agents (the media associations, the civil sector) in their struggle against 
the ruling elite. The strategies, however, as well as the intensity of the commitment of the 
international  actor,  appear  different.  In  the  case  of  Serbia  the  conditionality  (relatively 
credible, seen the overall low credibility of the EU action in Serbia) was combined with the 
financial support conditioned with the rule adoption (the promotion of the media freedom in 
Serbia amounts to about 1.5% of the EU CARDS program destined to Serbia in the period 
2000-2006). The media is one of the few sectors to which EU’s financial assistance was made 
available  even  during  the  Milošević  period,  which  is  clearly  in  line  with  Vachudova’s 
observations  concerning  the  usage  of  differential  empowerment  as  a  strategy of  the rules 
promotion. In the assets with the authoritarian undemocratic regimes, but also, in those assets 
where the government is not inclined to listen to the international actor, the civil and media 
sector are paid more attention to, as they are perceived as potential change agents and partners 
of the IA’s. The existence of the conflict over the European orientation of the country and 
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the presence of the actor questioning the legitimacy of the EU (like the SRS and DSS who 
gradually passed from a pro-EU to an against-EU position) contributed to increase the EU’s 
attention on the issues concerning the media in Serbia (we can follow the rise of the concern 
for the EU’s image in the section “perception of the EU” published in the reports in 2002, 
2003, 2004). The (lack of) EU financial assistance to the media sector in Macedonia, seen the 
widespread support for the EU integrations in this country, is also an argument going in line 
with  the  above.  As  Sašo  Klekovski,  the  coordinator  of  one  of  the  leading  NGOs  in 
Macedonia, expressed: “the EU’s attention for the civil and political rights (and in particular 
for the civil and media sector) fluctuates in function of the vulnerability of the government in 
office to the EU influence. They usually remember that civil sector exits only when they can 
not  obtain  what  they  want  from the  government.  And  seen  the  servile  behavior  of  the 
Macedonian political elite, the civil sector here lost importance.388” 
The low EU financial support to the media sector in Macedonia is also to be explained by 
the predominance of issues concerning the security dimension and inter-ethnic relations. The 
EU thus concentrated on other issues, leaving the promotion of the media freedom to the 
other actors (in particular to the Council of Europe and OSCE) to whom it offered support. 
The OSCE mission to Skopje formed the Media Development Unit in 2002, which offered 
significant  assistance  to  the  process  of  building  the  legislative  framework.  However,  the 
existence of such unit should not be seen as the cause of the lack of EU-coordinated support, 
as  in  other  fields  where  OSCE  also  organized  particular  units  for  managing  the  rule 
promotion (OSCE’s Police Development Unit, OSCE’s Administration Reform Unit etc), the 
EU  nevertheless  developed  its  own  agenda,  also  getting  directly  involved  in  the  rule 
promotion.
Last  but  not  least,  many  of  the  difficulties  faced  in  the  process  come  from  the 
particularities linked to the question of media freedom in general. The ownership structure, 
even when properly  declared,  is  not  easy to control  and at  the same time it  significantly 
influences the editorial policy. As stressed by a Serbian journalist in an interview undertaken 
by  the  author:  the  problem  of  the  media  freedom  is  far  more  than  only  the  legislative 
framework. For example, how can you know whether the TV station belongs to the politician 
or not? How do you know whether the declared owner is the real owner and what are his 
personal links? No law can control these things… There is and there always will be, in Serbia 
as well as in Italy, France, USA, the temptation to control and, if possible, to manipulate the 
388 From the interview with Klekovski S, summer 2008, Skopje.
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information.  The law,  obviously,  can help.  But  after  all,  it  is  on  the  journalist  to  choose 
between comfort and truth.”
APPENDIX
Table 1: “Situation of the media freedom in Macedonia and Serbia 
according to the Media Sustainability Index, 2007”.
Serbia Media Sustainability Index Macedonia
2.21 Free speech: 2.10
1.91 Professional journalism: 2.27
2.48 Plurality of news sources: 2.42
2.87 Business management: 2.11
2.50 Supporting institutions: 2.50
2.39 Total score 2.28
Source: Media Sustainability Index., author’s elaboration.
Table 2: “Situation of the media freedom in Macedonia and Serbia 
in 2007 according to the Freedom House”.
Serbia Press Freedom (by Freedom 
House)
Maceron
13 Legal environment: 11
17 Political environment: 18
9 Economic environment: 16
45 Total score: 45
Partially free Status: Partially free
Source: Freedom House: Freedom of the press, author’s elaboration.
Table 3: “EU priorities and media sector reform in Macedonia”.
2002 SAA report Strengthen the legal and constitutional guarantees on freedom of expression in line with the European Convention on Human Rights
2003 SAA report Strengthen the legal and constitutional guarantees on freedom of expression in line with the European Convention on Human Rights. Support the 
development of the media sector in line with the European standards. 
2004 European 
Partnership
Short term priorities: Promote freedom of expression and media - Review the legal framework for broadcasting to prevent political interference. Take 
concrete steps to ensure the independence of media regulatory bodies. Review the legislation on defamation to reflect European standards and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.
2006 Accession 
partnership
Short term priorities: Implement the new law on broadcasting to guarantee the independence of broadcasters and the quality of the service they provide. 
Ensure that media legislation is in line with the recommendations formulated in May 2005 by the joint expertise of the Council of Europe and the 
Commission. Ensure that the legislation on defamation reflects the European standards. Strengthen the independence and administrative capacity of the 
Council for Electronic Media. 
2007 Accession 
partnership
Short term priorities: Strengthen the independence and administrative capacity of the regulatory authorities for electronic communications and media. 
Ensure a stable and sustainable source of funding for the public service broadcaster and the Broadcasting Council.
2008 Accession 
partnership
Short term priorities: Strengthen the independence and administrative capacity of the regulatory authorities for electronic communications and media. 
Ensure a stable and sustainable source of funding for the public service broadcaster and the Broadcasting Council.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 4: “EU financial assistance to the media sector in Macedonia”.
2001 0.18 millions Media 
support
Source: European Agency for reconstruction.
Table 5: “EU priorities and media sector reform in Serbia”.
2002 SAA report Outstanding issues – democratic or technical – concerning the media should be completely resolved by mid-2002.
2003 SAA report No further delay in putting conditions into place for the full implementation of freedom of expression. Support the development of the media sector in 
line with the European standards. 
2004 European 
Partnership
Short-term priorities: Decriminalize slander. Enforce media legislation, in particular broadcasting law, by assuring political independence of the 
Audiovisual Council. Adopt law on free access to information, in line with the Council of Europe standards.
2006 European 
Partnership
Short-term priorities: Enforce media legislation. Ensure effective independence of the Broadcasting Council, as well as fair and transparent allocation of 
broadcasting frequencies for media operations. Ensure the full and timely transformation of the state-owned broadcasting media into public service 
broadcasters; complete the transformation of Radio Television of Serbia into a public service broadcaster in line with the European standards. Fully 
implement the law on free access to information. 
2007 European 
Partnership
Short-term priorities: Improve the functioning of the broadcasting council in line with the international standards, ensure fair and transparent allocation 
of regional and local broadcasting frequencies to media operators. Fully implement the Law on free access to information and strengthen the office of the 
Commissioner for Free access to information to ensure the enforcement of decisions/recommendations. Start approximation to the acquis on the 
audiovisual sector and improve transparency and accountability, particularly of the Republican Broadcasting Agency. Sign and ratify the European 
Convention on Transfrontier Television.
2008 European 
Partnership
Short-term priorities: Improve the functioning of the broadcasting council in line with the international standards, ensure fair and transparent allocation 
of regional and local broadcasting frequencies to media operators. Fully implement the Law on free access to information and strengthen the office of the 
Commissioner for Free access to information to ensure the enforcement of decisions/recommendations. Start approximation to the acquis on the 
audiovisual sector and improve transparency and accountability, particularly of the Republican Broadcasting Agency. Sign and ratify the European 
Convention on Transfrontier Television.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 6: “EU financial assistance to the media sector in Serbia”.
Source: European Agency for Reconstruction, annual programs, 2007 IPE documents.
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200
0
1 million Support to the independent media outlets.
200
1
2 millions Support for the transition process of local independent media outlets and  for the restructuring of Radio Television Serbia.
200
2
1 million Support to the establishment of the Serbian Broadcasting Council (300.000).
Support to the transformation of RTS into a Public Broadcasting Service (700.000).
200
3
6 millions Transformation of RTS into an independent and financially sustainable broadcasting service.
Support and strengthening of the independent media (in particular Media centre and B92).
200
4
3 millions Support to RTS.
Postgraduate specialized media studies.
Media fund.
200
5
2.5  millions 
(2.35 + 0.15)
Media  fund  (improving  the 
quality of the production) 
Enforcement  of  the  Media 
Legislation-  EU/CoE  Joint 
Initiative.
The  government  has  to  implement  and enforce  media  legislation in  line  with EU standards,  e.g.  the 
Broadcasting Law, in particular the re-election of the Broadcasting Council and the launching of the tender 
for issuing licenses to national, regional and local electronic media; distribution of broadcasting frequencies 
and the establishment of the Telecommunication Agency necessary for issuing of licenses. 
200
6
2 millions Support  to  the  Yugoslavian 
film archive.
The resources of the archive should be readily available for all the parties who are interested in the former
Yugoslavia. To that end, an agreed plan of promotion/marketing will be formulated between the Agency, 
the Ministry of Culture and Media and the Archive management prior to the provision of Support. An 
Implementation Agreement will be signed between the Agency and the Ministry of Culture and Media to 
ensure the Archive premises will be in good order and ready for the installation of the equipment.
Table 7: “Legislation regulating the media sphere and media freedom in Serbia and Macedonia” (based on the legislation in force, author's elaboration).
Freedom of speech, Freedom of media, Right on information 
Serbia Macedonia
Constitutional guarantees: Art 46: freedom of expression., Limitation in cases of hate speech, 
call for violent change of the constitutional order, call for violation of 
the territorial integrity, war propaganda; 
Art 50: freedom of the press, Limitation in cases of hate speech, call 
for violent change of the constitutional order, call for violation of the 
territorial integrity, war propaganda; Art 51: right to information. No 
limitations prescribed.
Art  16:  freedom  of  expression,  freedom  of  public 
information and creation of informational institutions.
Right  to  free  access,  reception  and  transmission  of 
information.
Censorship is forbidden.
No limitations prescribed.
Legislative guarantees: The constitutionally  guaranteed rights are further  introduced in all 
relevant legislation on media.
The constitutionally guaranteed rights are further introduced 
in all relevant legislation on media.
Law on Broadcasting
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2002, amended 2004, 2006. 1997, 
2005 amended 2008.
Considered  in  line  with  EU 
standards:
No, due to the procedure of appointment of the members to the 
Broadcasting council.
Yes.
Main problems: Delayed  implementation.  Strengthening  of  the  political  influence 
over the Broadcasting council, lack of transparency in the functioning 
of the council, selective implementation of the laws.
Not  properly  implemented  in  those  parts  concerning 
independence of MRTV;
Not  offering  any  solution  to  the  financial  problems  the 
media, both state and private, are facing.
Law on Public Information
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2003.
Considered  in  line  with  EU 
standards:
Mainly.
Main problems: Provisions allowing censorship, possibility for the state to own news-
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agencies  (and,  linked with this,  the pressure  on public  media to use 
state-owned agencies which, due to the state funds, enjoy the benefits 
of unequal competition).
Law on Access to Public Information
Serbia Macedonia
Adopted: 2004. 2006.
Considered  in  line  with  EU 
standards:
Yes. Yes.
Main problems: Difficult  and  delayed  implementation  (the  institution  experienced 
serious obstacles and lacks the basic infrastructure)
Limitation in functioning
Lack of implementation mechanisms.
Difficulties in implementation as still many state institutions 
refuse or  are not capable to release  the information they are 
holding. Moreover, the commission for the protection of the 
right to free access to information is considered weak and with 
low administrative capacity to ensure the rule implementation.
Custody-sentence for slander/libel
Abolished: 2005. 2006.
Problems: Still many journalists under accusation, too high fees (see MSI 
report 2008).
Violence over the journalists
The issue rises concerns: Yes (see MSI report 2008, Helsinki report 2006). Re-emerging (cases of violence recently re-appeared, see MSI 
report).
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Table 8: “The explanatory factors for the development of the media freedom in Macedonia, international level” (author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration process, 
access to the funds? No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took place? Yes (CoE membership).
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 0.18.
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country:
0.07%.
Reform perceived by the IA as:
Part of the necessary reforms in 
transition to democracy.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were 
the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking 
the external legitimization of the law in other ways? X
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Table 9: “The explanatory factors for the development of media freedom in Serbia 2001-2003 and Serbia 2003-2007, international level” (author's 
elaboration).
Serbia 2000-2003. Serbia 2004-2007.
Was the rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds?
No.
No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in 
the integration process took place? Yes (CoE membership). - 
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention 
in the SAA reports?
- Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes. Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 4 millions. 17.05
Share of the resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the total of EU 
assistance to the country:
0.51% 1.3%
Reform perceived by the IA as:
Part of the necessary reforms in transition to 
democracy.
Part of the necessary reforms in 
transition to democracy.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by 
the domestic stakeholders?
X X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used 
in the law drafting?
Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Partially (some have been intentionally omitted).
Partially (some have been 
intentionally omitted).
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external 
criticisms?
X X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with 
the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other 
ways?
Yes. Yes.
398
Table 10: “The explanatory factors for the development of media freedom in Macedonia, domestic level” (author's elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: Weak.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present but weak (media associations, civil society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Rulers vs. Ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors): Fluid.
Table 11: “The explanatory factors for the development of media freedom in Serbia 2001-2003 and Serbia 2003-2007, domestic level” (author's 
elaboration).
Serbia 2000-2003. Serbia 2004-2007.
Domestic input for the change: Present (sensitivity on the issue particularly developed due to the media control during the regime.
Weak.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present (media associations, civil society, "new democratic elite").
Preset but weak (media associations, civil 
society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low. Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict:: Rules vs. Ruled. Rulers vs. Ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No. No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience. Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite. Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens. Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant 
actors?
Yes. X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of 
the central actors)?
Fluid. Stable.
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Table 12: “The development of media freedom in Macedonia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: -
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation:
Inadequacy of the mechanisms for media financing, persisting politicization, failure to properly implement the existing 
legislation.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Ruling elite.
The status (2008): Legislative framework settled, slow implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
With regard to freedom of expression including freedom and pluralism of the media, the legal framework continues to meet most 
international standards. However, poor implementation leads to weaknesses in practice. The economic and financial 
autonomy of the public service broadcaster and the regulatory body has still not been ensured. Most of the broadcast 
media are related to political or business interests, which affect their content. Ownership of the leading print media 
remains highly concentrated. The media continue to be subject to significant political interference. 
Table 13: “The development of media freedom in Serbia 2001-2003 and Serbia 2004-2007, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
Serbia 2000-2003. Serbia 2004-2007.
The procedure of law drafting:
The main deficiency in the 
adopted legislation:
Politicization still present, lack of implementation, 
lack of some essential pieces of legislation (law on 
access to public information).
Lack of implementation, some mechanisms of politicization still persisting, lack of 
side legislation.
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies:
Ruling elite. Ruling elite.
The status (2008): - Legislative framework needing some adjustment, slow implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 
report:
The Constitution contains guarantees for freedom of expression which are generally 
protected. However, the conditions for freedom of expression in Serbia were 
affected. The cases of violence, hate speech, maltreatment of the journalists, threats 
to journalists from the local officials and business elite. The law on media 
concentration and new legislation on advertising have not yet been adopted. 
Legislation on local self-government, adopted in December 2007, contains provisions 
in contradiction with the laws on broadcasting and public information and is 
undermining the privatization of municipally owned media. Allocation of regional 
frequencies has been completed, but the process lacked transparency in a number of 
cases.
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11. CIVIL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT
“One of the most widespread myths on civil society is on its  
benign nature and democratic potential”
Vankovska, 2002.
Born in its current definition with the Scottish Enlightenment and the German Idealism389, 
the concept of the civil society and the development of the civil sector increasingly gained the 
attention of the scholars of democratization, who saw in it a source from which opposition to 
the  authoritarian  regime  can  flourish390.  For  Linz  it  became  one  of  the  variables  in 
distinguishing  between  different  types  of  political  regimes  (we  can  thus  recall  Linz’s 
distinction between the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that differ also at a level of the 
regime’s penetration into the space of civil  society), while,  for Linz and Stepan, a free and 
active civil society is a precondition for the democratization process391. The functions that the 
civil  society  plays  in  democracy are  well  represented in  the  work of  Hadenius  and Uggla 
(1999) who distinguish between its pluralist and educational functions. 
The pluralist function of the civil society “concerns the distribution of power in society and in 
political life. By combining and joining together, people obtain power resources. By organized 
collective  action,  groups  can easier  hold  their  own and  protect  their  interests  vis-à-vis  other 
groups  in  society  and  vis-à-vis  the  origins  of  the  state.  An  advanced  civil  society  –  one 
characterized by a multiplicity of well-developed popular associations – forms a bulwark against 
despotic tendencies in political life and serves as well as a defence against oppression” (Hadenius 
and Uggla, 1999, p. 1622).
To this we can compare Gellner’s definition of the civil society as:
“a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, 
nonetheless, entered and left freely, rather than imposed by birth or sustained by awesome ritual.” 
(Gellner, 1994).
389 Bernhard, 1993.
390 According to Gellner, the recent growing popularity of the concept is to be explained by the end of the 
Marxism and the importance that the civil society played in the end of the communistic regimes of Eastern 
Europe. See Plattner, 1995.
391 See Linz and Stepan, 1996.
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Or the conception,  according to Foley  and Edwards – present in  the work of  Kuron, 
Michnik (et al.) – where “special emphasis is put on civil society as a sphere of action that is 
independent  of  the  state  and  that  is  capable  –  precisely  for  this  reason  –  of  energizing 
resistance to a tyrannical regime” (Foley and Edwards, 1996, p. 39) 
The educational function of the civil society consists in its socialization function and in the 
learning  and  experience  the  individual  derives  from  the  participation  to  the  citizens’ 
associations and groups392. 
The development of the civil society is therefore tightly linked to the fundamental rights 
and freedoms (the  right  to association  which makes it  possible;  the  right  to participation 
which is exercised, among other ways, also through participation to the citizens’ associations), 
with the mechanisms of the citizens’ influence on the decision-making process (here we recall 
the  role  that  the  interest  groups  and all  other  forms of  associations  play  in  fostering  the 
communication between the citizens and the government, both in terms of expressing the 
citizens’  preferences  and in  offering  the  government its  knowledge  and experience  in  the 
specific area of interest) and with the mechanisms for keeping the government accountable 
(see above).
In this chapter we will concentrate on the development of civil society in Macedonia and 
Serbia. We will pay attention to the environment in which the civil society is operating and 
particularly  to the financial  issues that  appear to be  a crucial  point  for understanding the 
features of the organizations. We will also face the problem of the inner potentials and values 
of the civil society. The civil society is by no mean necessarily civic or democratic, tolerant or 
transparent. As Vankovska stressed, in the countries of transition it can also have its “dark 
side”, “very malign forms and elements (such as various criminal gangs, mafia groups often 
associated with state structures, private security actors etc)” (Vankovska, 2002, p. 5). Not to 
go any further, we might question on the democratic and civic potentials of associations such 
as “Blood and honour”,  “National machine”, “Movement for the protection of the ICTY 
indictees” and similar, active in Serbia with a membership mainly on a voluntary basis. If the 
associations, unions, neighbourhood committees, interest groups, philanthropic enterprises of 
all sorts and all other forms of citizens’ voluntary associations and NGOs are not democratic 
392 Foley and Edwards, 1996, identifies the origins of this conception of the civil society functions in the work 
of the eighteenth-century "Scottish moralists," including Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, and Francis Hutcheson 
and  in  Tocqueville’s  “Democracy  in  America”,  whose “approach  puts  special  emphasis  on  the  ability  of 
associational life in general and the habits of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of 
citizens in a democratic polity.” 
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within, if they are united around non-democratic values, then, rather than support democracy, 
they might be a threat to it. Finally, we will also face the issue of the impact civil society can 
have on politics. Here we mainly refer to the role of civil society in influencing the policy, to 
its inclusion in the decision-making process and to its role in keeping the state accountable. 
Beside the resources we used in the other sections as well,  such as legislations,  programs, 
official governmental documents, media, we will also use the CIVICUS reports on the NGO 
development  for  Serbia  and  Macedonia.  The  extensiveness  of  this  index  (covering  4 
dimensions of the civil society, 25 sub-dimensions with several indicators for each of the sub-
dimensions) and the standardized questionnaires make the results comparable, while the use 
of the domestic experts allows the particularities of each state to emerge in the reports.
11.1. SERBIA
11.1.1. FREE TO ASSOCIATE ACCORDING TO 1982 LAW
The development of the Serbian civil  society can be traced back to XVIII-XIX century 
when the first Serbian NGOs are dating from. The first Serbian Law on the Freedom of 
Association was adopted in 1881. The spreading of liberalism in XIX century’s Serbia also 
brought to the development of the non-governmental organizations,  even though most of 
them had a short breath, ceasing their activity or being forbidden by the authorities393.
With the establishment of the communistic mono-party regime, the pluralism in all sectors 
was  limited  and  the  civil  sector  was  put  under  political  control.  While  the  period  of 
communism was associated with the party organizing civil  society and association (we can 
thus recall a number of “citizens” associations, all being actually organized, penetrated and 
controlled  by  the  communist  party  by  overlapping  of  membership  and  leadership),  in 
Milošević’s  era,  NGOs were  suppressed,  treated as  a  “national  enemy”  and delegitimized 
through the regime’s media campaign, while at the same time their existence was spent abroad 
as a proof of the democratic character of the Serbian regime. The law basis of the civil sector 
were the Law on Associations at the level of the republic, adopted in 1982, and the federal 
Law on Citizens’  Associations and Political  Parties from 1990.  The legislation ensured the 
political  influence  through  administrative  and  police  control  over  the  registration,  and 
forbidding the self-financing of the NGO, as well as any financing from abroad. A law forbid 
393 See Milivojević, 2006.
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“treason”, in a formulation that made any criticism towards the government be considered an 
action against the state. This allowed for maltreatment and police harassment of the NGOs’ 
activists.
The activism of the NGOs also changed during the Nineties, the most popular being the 
anti-war  associations  and  those  concerned  with  Human  Rights  issues.  Even  though 
suppressed,  civil  society  played  an  important  role  during  the  Nineties  and  during  the 
overthrow of Milošević’s regime, serving as a basis for the aggregation of the discontent. The 
citizens, disappointed with the political parties of the opposition and their incapacity to unite 
and face the regime, gave their support to civil movements and associations. In this light, a 
crucial  role  in  the  change  of  the  regime was  played  by  OTPOR,  CeSID,  G17 plus,  and 
ANEM. 
11.1.2. THE (LACK OF) CHANGES
Unlike what was registered in other fields, the development and strength of the civil sector 
started to fade away with the change of the regime. The research on the participation of the 
citizens shows that the support to the civil sector and the participation also decreased. The 
political parties suppressed the civil society hampering all the merits for the transition, thus 
marginalizing  the  civil  sector  which  now,  after  the  regime  changed,  had  a  hard  time  re-
identifying  itself394.  In  the  first  two years  after  the  change  of  the  regime,  the  process  of 
democratization saw a large involvement of the civil sector in the decision-making process. As 
we could see in the sections following the development in the other areas of policy included in 
this analysis, in the first two years after the change of government the law drafting saw the 
involvement  of  the  civil  sector,  domestic  experts,  think-thank  agencies,  professional 
associations and other relevant NGOs being consulted during the legislative process (yet, in 
many cases, the adopted rules were amended in a much less democratic  and participatory 
atmosphere). As time passed, the consultation of the civil actors was less and less used, even 
on questions of their competence, to result, as we could see in the other sections, excluding 
the NGO from the legislative process whenever possible from 2003, and particularly since 
2004, up to today395. 
Immediately after the establishment of the new government, the Law on the Associations 
was drafted and adopted by the government already in 2001, but, due to the political struggle 
394 See Pavlović, 2005. 
395 Similar pattern was registered also in other researches. See Milivojević 2006.
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within  DOS and  the  obstruction  of  the  reforms  that  followed,  it  was  not  adopted.  The 
question of financing the civil sector and NGOs was also urgent to be faced, but here again 
the government failed to introduce mechanisms to ease the difficult financial situation many 
NGOs are facing. The taxation policy is considered one of the most discouraging parts of the 
legislation, as NGOs and associations are taxed as if they were business companies, while at 
the same time they are not allowed to make profit. No incentives for  donors are provided, 
while VAT was calculated even on foreign aid until the 2005 governmental decision. 
Under the pressures coming from the EU and CoE, Koštunica’s government designed a 
new law draft in 2006, which again did not enter the assembly’s agenda. The external and 
domestic NGO pressures were judged very important for including the “freedom of political 
party, union and any other form of association, as well as the right to stay out of any association” in 
the 2006 constitution. During Koštunica’s government, however, the development of the civil 
society slowed down. Not only were they mainly excluded from the decision-making process even 
though  the  government  was  nominally  devoted  to  fostering  the  social  dialogue,  but  the 
delegitimization of some NGOs also took place. The approach used in Milošević’s period, when 
the regime-hostile NGOs were accused to work against the domestic interest, re-emerged, and 
became particularly visible with the re-emerging of the nationalistic rhetorics. Some NGOs 
like  the  Helsinki  Committee,  the Belgrade centre for human rights,  Women in black,  the 
Humanitarian Law Centre were subject  to  violence  and even officially  condemned by the 
political  elite  for  their  critics  to  the  government  and  particularly  for  their  requests  for 
prosecution of human rights violations and ethnic violence acts committed during the '90s. 
Further on, as Hanke wrote (2004),  in Serbia,  rather than social dialogue, we have a social 
monologue  where  the  parties  engaged  in  the  process  are  not  used  to  listening  to  their 
counterpart.
After  the government changed,  in 2007,  the new government proceeded to draft  the new 
document, which entered the assembly procedure on October 2007.  While, as we saw, the law 
drafting was incredibly slow (the law is still pending, after seven years), on the other hand we 
can notice how the drafting process always saw the large participation of the NGOs, both 
international  as well  as domestic,  and consultancy with OSCE, CoE and EU experts.  The 
ruling  elite,  in  presenting  the  law  drafted  in  2007,  underlined  the  compliance  with  the 
European  standards  and  the  importance  of  the  legislative  framework,  both  for  the 
democratisation process and for the compliance with the EU priorities396. The law remained 
396 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=07&dd=21&nav_id=256282. 
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on the assembly’s agenda, but the instable period of the second half of 2007 obstructed its 
adoption. Again, with the change of government, the new proposal was drafted again and 
entered the procedures in July 2008. 
The  civil  sector  in  Serbia  is  still  considered  underdeveloped.  Among  the  difficulties  and 
shortcomings it is facing, we can list the decrease in the citizens’ participation, lack of adequate 
legislative framework, lack of democratic practice with the NGOs and prevalence of the leadership 
(usually one man controlling the entire organization in an almost authoritarian manner), lack of 
financial  resources,  dependence  on  external  donors,  lack  of  transparency  on  the  way  NGOs 
function, especially, lack of transparency on the finances, lack of citizens’ trust in the NGOs397. The 
state’s financial support to the NGOs is growing, but the financial means from the state budget are 
not distributed in a transparent manner and are usually assigned to organizations formed before the 
'90s (Milivojević, 2006).
Of particular importance are the lack of democratic practices within the civil sector associations 
and the prevalence of the leadership. This way, not only is the participation hampered, but also the 
low institutionalization of the organization threatens their stability. “One man’s associations” or 
“family businesses” are dying for the will of one man. The lack of financial resources and the 
prevalence  of  external  donations  move the  lines  of  accountability  and the  NGOs “donation-
seeking”, without specialization in precise domains of action, implementing the programs imposed 
by the external donors’ agenda (not always in line with the domestic necessity), accountable to the 
donor rather than to the citizens. Lacking the spirit of voluntarism and the value basis, the work in 
such NGOs is perceived as an employment. The external dependency and accountability on the 
other hand brings to the obscured transparency of the finances. Finally, the lack of civil basis for the 
functioning of one part of the NGOs actually opens the doors to corruption, as the rent-seeking 
behaviour penetrates the civil sector as well. According to the research World Association for the 
Citizens’  Participation,  73%  of  the  civil  sector’s  representatives  believed  that  corruption  and 
corporativism are widespread among the NGOs398. It is obvious that in such assets both the citizens’
 trust and the citizens’ participation to the civil sector are rather low, while the non-governmental 
organizations become much more successful in preaching than in applying democracy399. 
397 See Milivojević, 2006.
398 Milivojević, 2006, pp. 115.
399 This point is well illustrated in Serbian scores in the CIVICUS index: while in the dimension “actions to 
promote democracy” Serbian NGOs are scoring 2 points on a points scale from 1 to 3,  when it comes to 
“democratic practices within the NGOs” the score is only 1.
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11.1.3. THE EU AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SERBIAN CIVIL SOCIETY 
As  far  as  the  role  of  the  international  community  in  the  promotion  of  the  right  to 
association and NGOs position, the CoE, OSCE and EU pressures appear to be decisive. As 
the table shows, the pressures to build up a favourable environment for the development of 
the civil society were already present since the very first report of the EU, and the same is true 
for the CoE. Consultancy, advocacy and technical assistance in law making were offered and 
financial assistance, conditioned with the rule adoption, was made available as well. During the 
public debate over the law proposals,  the government tended to underline the compliance 
with the international norms and the incorporation of the European standards into the law 
proposal.  The pressure was also made in requesting the involvement of the civil  sector in 
drafting the legislations, both through explicit requests and through criticisms of the policy 
making process whenever the public debate was avoided.
11.1.4. ASSESSMENT 
The development of the legislative framework, aimed to guarantee the right to association 
and civil society development in Serbia, is still lacking. Obviously, the situation is much more 
favourable than it was in the previous periods, as the civil society is active, allowed, and at 
least tolerated. An exception are those associations calling for the protection of human rights 
that are active in criticizing the government and calling for the cooperation with ICTY, as the 
unpopularity of the issue among the citizens gives the government a chance to discredit and 
even attack or threaten those organizations without being punished by voters. On the other 
hand, organizations such as, for example, CeSID (Centre for free elections and democracy), 
that are active in the fields concerning democracy but not tackling the sensitive nationalistic 
issues, are much stronger and successful in exercising important pressures over the ruling elite. 
However, while the freedom to association is not obstructed, the development of the civil 
sector is not supported either. The legislative framework is still the one inherited from Tito 
and  Milošević,  the  law  drafted  since  2001,  always  in  a  very  open  procedure  with  the 
involvement of all relevant actors, yet the rule adoption is still lacking. Reluctant to open the 
policy making process to the influence of the present think-tanks and NGOs, yet conscious of 
the necessity for the participation and inclusion of the civil society in the democratic process, 
the ruling elite opted for the fake compliance in this field as well. Thus, while in the initial 
phases the civil society was consulted, round tables on the law drafts were often organized and 
apparently the NGOs and think-tanks relevant for the particular areas of policy involved, in 
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the final stage of the process the elite always managed either to avoid the public debate, or to 
amend the legislation at the last minute. 
11.2. MACEDONIA
11.2.1. THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NGO SECTOR 
The freedom of association in Macedonia is guaranteed by the article 20 of the constitution 
adopted immediately after the independence. To the already existing associations of citizens, 
inherited from the previous regime, a series of newly formed non-governmental organizations, 
which number reached 3.300 units by 1998, were added (source: UNDP 1999). The “old” 
organizations thus co-existed with the “new, independent ones”, the differences between the 
two being  both in  membership  and type of  activity:  the  organizations  inherited  from the 
previous regime were mainly religious,  sports, cultural associations,  with large membership 
and own property. The new ones were relatively smaller,  more active in the advocacy, and 
often externally supported. As the independence and the transition attracted a series of foreign 
donors and international non-governmental organizations in the country, together with new 
resources, new themes arrived as well. 
In 1998, the Law on Citizen Associations and Foundations was finally adopted, in order to 
adjust the legislative framework to the new democratic asset (until 1998 the civil sector was 
regulated by the Law on Social organizations and Citizen Associations from 1983). The delay 
in the adoption of the law was mainly a consequence of the necessity, in the first years after 
independence,  to  concentrate  on  the  nation  and  state-building  process,  the  ruling  elite’s 
agenda being mainly busy with questions concerning the international recognition and high 
politics. The drafting procedure was initiated in 1995, mainly driven by the domestic pressures 
where international actors such as the Council of Europe and the European Union played a 
role of democratic example for the domestic NGOs400, while the membership in CoE created 
an external incentive for the rule adoption. The adopted law prescribed a rather simple and 
fast procedure for the registration of the civil society organizations, where five adult citizens 
can register an NGO in the court (rather than within police as envisaged by the previous 
legislation)401. The NGOs are not allowed to be politically active or to use their own property 
400 Interview with Klekovski, august 2008.
401 See Michieli and Mesarič, 2007.
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for fulfilling the goals of political  parties (art3).  The associations and foundations that are 
advocating or acting against the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia, that are 
spreading national, racial, religious hate and intolerance and those that are calling to armed 
violence, are forbidden. 
While  allowing  for  the  simple  registration  of  the  associations  and  allowing  their 
independent  and free  functioning,  the financial  treatment  of  NGOs failed to support  the 
development of the civil society402. Thus, no tax incentives for donors were allowed, neither 
were  tax  benefits  for  CSOs envisaged in  the  legislation.  While  the  support  to  the  public 
institutions financed from the state budget or to the Red Cross was encouraged, with these 
donations  being  subtracted  from  the  tax  base,  there  were  no  other  tax  benefits  for 
philanthropy. There was no possibility neither for citizens nor for enterprises to dedicate part 
of the tax paid to the state to a certain NGO. Such solution was mainly in line with what 
appears  to be  the  standard approach of  the  Macedonian  elite  to  the  question  of  human, 
political  and citizens’  rights:  “as far the question does not tackle the budget,  everything is 
possible. But when it comes to the distribution of the resources, then the process is blocked 
and no change can be introduced”403.
As far as the state support from the central budget to the NGOs is concerned, since 2002 
the state prescribed a certain amount of  budget to the support  of the civil  society.  Some 
ministries also allocate part of the budget for supporting the relevant CSOs in their fields (like 
the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning, or the Agency of Youth and Sports). The 
problem  with  these  allocations  of  state  funds  is  that  they  are  allocated  through  non-
transparent procedures and according to unclear criteria404.
The difficult financial situation of the civil society associations only further strengthened 
the characteristic of the NGOs already established in the previous period: strong dependency 
on external donations. 
This  strong  dependence  on external  support  significantly  shaped  the  Macedonian  civil 
society.  Combined with the very low diffusion of volunteerism in the society405 (the social 
solidarity and civic engagement, spread and pressed by the state during the communism, left 
room for a new concept of extreme individualism),  this  donor dependency resulted in an 
402 According to Klekovski, finances are the most serious problem of the Macedonian civil society. See also 
the USAID NGO sustainability index according to which Macedonia’s worst score is the financial viability. 
403 Interview with Klekovski, Skopje, august 2008.
404 See Nuredinoska and Gaber-Damjanovska, 2005.
405 See Klekovski, 2007.
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“enterprise-,  pragmatic  approach” of  citizens  and  NGO “volunteers”  to  the  civil  society. 
Thus, the opinion that the NGOs are a source of employment, which became the biggest 
motivation to get  involved  in  certain activities  of  the organization,  prevails.  The program 
activities are thus undertaken only as far as they are sponsored, and are usually suspended 
once the funds are no longer available406. Obviously, there is a difference between different 
NGOs, where those that are based on values already existing in the society (here we still refer 
to those values that were inherited from the period of the communism) succeed in surviving 
as they are more successful in attracting volunteers, while those that were mainly externally 
driven  are  disappearing  as  funds  and  donations  are  vanishing.  As  it  emerges  from  the 
interviews  with  the  representatives  of  the  civil  sector,  the  future  of  the  Macedonian  civil 
society is in the membership and volunteer-based NGOs, feminist, religious, ethnic groups 
organizations being the most rooted in society and thus most easily adaptable to the lack of 
external support.
The  donor-dependency  also  shifted  the  accountability  of  the  NGOs:  instead  of  being 
accountable to citizens and own members, they became accountable to donors. In drafting the 
programs of actions, the prevailing principle becomes the one that satisfies the criteria to be 
granted access to funds, this way meeting the priorities of the sponsors, and not those of the 
society. This results in further disappointment of the citizens towards the NGOs that, instead 
of pursuing the satisfaction of the local necessities, are following the donors’ agenda, often 
drafted without a thorough understanding of the local needs. At the same time, it nurtured the 
pragmatist approach of the NGOs407. 
The lack of democratic practices within the organizations, the low level of transparency, a 
strong,  sometimes almost authoritarian leadership,  no change in the organization’s  leading 
structure, and the consequent lack of division between leadership and management are among 
the most serious weaknesses of the Macedonian civil sector. According to the research of the 
civil society development in Macedonia undertaken by MCIC, the limited application of the 
organization’s statutes and acts, the problems of the conflict of interests, the separation of the 
non-executive and executive functions, favoritism and lack of supervision of the work are also 
among the problems often identified in the functioning NGOs. This brings to the conclusion 
406 See Bytyqi F. and Buldioski G., 2005.
407 On  the  sponsor-oriented  accountability,  see  Sazdovska  S.  and  Zajazi  K.,  2005,  on  the  international 
sponsors influence over the Macedonian civil society’s agenda, see Freedom House report 2006. On the NGOs 
following the donor’s agenda and neglecting their own declared program, see USAID, NGO sustainability index, 
report for Macedonia, 2007.
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that the Macedonian NGOs are far better in promoting and advocating than in practicing 
democracy  internally408.  These  functioning  shortcomings  are  contributing  to  the  de-
legitimization  of  the  civil  society  actors,  further  diminishing  the  civil  sector’s  capacity  to 
influence the decision makers and to keep them accountable for. In more recent times, the 
transparency of the financial resources of the NGOs was accepted and the practice to make 
their  own financial  reports  available  on-line  was also established,  but  the  problem of the 
democratic  deficit  still  persist.  The  un-democratic,  strong,  almost  authoritarian 
leadership/personal  ownership  persist  as  the  most  serious  shortcoming  that,  beside  the 
question of the democratic potentials of the undemocratic NGOs, also causes fears for the 
survival  of  these  un-institutionalized  organization  still  dependent  on  their  (more  or  less) 
charismatic leaders409.
When it comes to the influence on the decision-making process, a very negative trend in 
the previous period gradually started inverting since 2003 when, in order to meet the requests 
from the EU priorities, the government and the assembly decided some measures to involve 
citizens’ associations in the decision-making process. The office was opened in the assembly 
to foster the communication between the NGOs and the MPs, and the decision to open the 
department for the cooperation between the Government and Civil Society Organization was 
adopted in 2004410. The importance of such decision (implemented and put in place only since 
2007,  when  the  Strategy  for  the  Development  of  the  Civil  Society  was  adopted411)  was 
enormous,  as  the  process  of  the  EU  integrations  and  necessity  to  adopt  the  necessary 
legislation shifted the decision-making process from the assembly to the government, thus 
making the law drafting in the government the key (and the only) phase where it is possible to 
influence the content of the adopted rules412.
Pushed by international pressures, the dialogue between the government and the NGOs 
appears to gradually grow in the last four years. As far as the influence over the decision-
making  process  is  concerned,  while  the  civil  sector  organizations  are  rather  active  in 
influencing  the  policy,  their  success  is  limited.  It  reaches  its  maximum in  the  process  of 
drafting the national strategies and the legislation in the field of human rights, in the social 
policies targeting some specific groups such as women, disabled, Roma, pensioners, while it is 
408 See Sazdovska and Zajazi, 2005.
409 Interview with Klekovski, Skopje, august 2008.
410 See Michieli and Mesarič, 2007.
411 See Michieli and Mesarič, 2007.
412 Interview with Klekovski, Skopje, august 2008.
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far more limited and even absent when it comes to state budget, finances or the issues linked 
with the accountability of the state institutions. Similarly, the capacity to keep the government 
accountable  for  is  also  limited,  with  better  results  showed  in  holding  the  bureaucracy 
accountable for discriminatory acts when delivering public services and violations of human 
rights, and having almost no impact of the activities aiming to hold the state accountable for, 
particularly when corruption is concerned413.
Finally,  in 2006/2007,  the legislative  framework regulating  the civil  society  was further 
improved in the government’s effort to meet the EU requirements. The Law on Sponsorship 
and  Donations  was  adopted  (April  2006),  allowing  tax  incentives  for  donations  and 
sponsorship by a local or foreign legal or physical entity. The Civil Society Unit within the 
government was established and the strategy for cooperation with civil  society,  drafted in 
cooperation with the international actors and domestic NGOs, was adopted in June 2006 with 
an  aim to  pursue  the  strengthening  of  the  civil  society  and  their  inclusion  in  the  policy 
development  process  and  in  legislative  drafting.  The  Law  on  Citizens  Association  and 
Foundations was amended in 2007, creating a central registry for the citizens’ associations. 
The  amendments  introduced  also  aimed  to  “democratize”  the  NGOs  by  introducing 
mechanisms ensuring  the  transparency  in  functioning  and prevent  the  conflict  of  interest 
situations within the NGOs. 
 The law implementation remains however difficult, while the criteria for the allocation of 
funds from the state budget to NGOs still remain un-transparent. The implementation of the 
Law on Donations and Sponsorships was blocked until the law regulating taxation was not 
amended. While the mechanisms fostering the financial transparency appear finally accepted 
by the NGOs, the leadership concentrated management and the problems of the nepotism, 
cronyism and protectionism linked with the authoritarian, personalistic NGOs persisted. The 
creation  of  the  Central  Register  also  showed  some  difficulties,  as  the  very  short  time 
scheduled  rose  concerns  over  the  possibility  for  the  procedures  to  be  respected  and the 
revision  of  the  existing  statutes  really  undertaken.  The legislation  also allowed the  Public 
Prosecutor or any other interested individual to initiate a court procedure to dissolve an NGO 
unable to fulfill its statutory provisions, a solution criticized by the domestic actors as they 
perceived it as a potential treat to the NGOs’ autonomy.414 
413 See Gerasimovska – Kitanovska and Klekovski, 2005.
414 See the USAID, NGO sustainability index, Macedonia, 2007.
413
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
Finally, as far as the activism and inclusion of the NGOs in the decision-making process is 
concerned, it depends on the type of the issues. The façade changes (incorporating some very 
liberal  provisions as well)  are rather easy to push forward, yet the problems arise when it 
comes to the issues with financial consequences, to the state budget or the distribution of 
power. In these areas, the inclusion of the civil society and its capacity to influence the process 
is rather low415.
11.2.2. INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY 
Seen Macedonia’s civil society’s financial dependency on external donors and sponsors, the 
importance of the international actors in the development of the civil sector in Macedonia is 
unquestionable. In this section we will only briefly observe the role of the European Union 
and Council of Europe.
Not  unlike  other  questions  concerning  human  rights,  the  first  Law  on  the  Citizens’ 
Associations and Foundations appears to coincide in time with Macedonia’s membership in 
the Council of Europe and adherence to the European Charter of Human Rights. Following 
the EU priorities concerning the civil  society, the government started to undertake actions 
aiming to promote and foster the dialogue with civil society. Parallel to the conditionality of 
the partnership, other means of influence were used as well: a series of programs were put in 
place  pushing  the  government  for  the  further  cooperation,  education  and training  of  the 
governmental  staff,  advocacy  and  assistance  in  law  drafting  were  made  available  (on  the 
activities see the EAR annual reports to EU commission). Financial assistance was also used 
through the CARDS programs. However, in the interviews with the representatives of the 
civil  sector, it emerged that the civil  sector appears to be the last of the EU’s priorities in 
Macedonia, being mostly remembered only in those moments when the government and the 
state were in a crisis, in situations of the regime’s emergency, or in those moments when the 
politicians undertake the course and step behind positions unfavored and undesired by the 
EU416.
11.2.3. DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY: ASSESSMENT
Similarly  to all  other areas concerning the human rights,  in this field we identified two 
distinct moments: the first, immediately after the Macedonian ratification of the European 
415 From the interview with Klekovski, august 2008.
416 Interview  with  Klekovski,  Skopje,  august  2008.  On  the  impact  of  the  EU on  the  human  rights  in 
Macedonia and on the civil society, see Novakova, 2007.
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convention on human rights, that brought to the first settling of the legislative framework 
regulating the NGOs, and the second, whose traces can be found already in 2003, when the 
first effort to foster the dialogue between the government and the civil society was undertaken 
but finally brought to positive developments only in 2006-2007, when a series of positive steps 
in  settling  the  legislative  framework  took  place.  Here  again  we  have  external  pressures 
combined  with  active  domestic  change agents  (the  domestic  NGOs)  resulting  in  positive 
developments and government’s efforts to meet the requirements of the external actors, at 
least in those fields, like human rights and protection of specific social groups, and in those 
phases of the policy making (like the development of national strategies) where the costs of 
such compliance for the ruling elite are lower. However, the nepotism, the lack of democratic 
practices  within  the civil  sector,  the suspect  politicization and monopolization of the main 
NGOs rise concerns over the potential preferential access to the decision-making process only 
for those parts of the civil society that are supportive for the ruling elite. 
11.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The strengthening of the civil society in Serbia and Macedonia followed a similar pattern, 
resulting in a series of features (deficiencies) in the field common to both countries. With 
differences in degree, in both countries we registered:
1. International donors as the prevalent source of finances;
2. Consequential shift of the accountability from towards the citizens to towards external 
donors;
3. Consequential  shift  of  attention  from the  domestic  needs,  association’s  values  and 
programs  to  the  external  donor’s  agenda  which  is  not  necessarily  in  line  with  the 
situation on the ground;
4. This necessity for rent-seeking rather than value-seeking behavior further contributes 
to  the  concept  of  NGOs  as  business,  sometimes  “family  business”  (“family 
association” in which the director and the members of the board are all members of 
one  family),  and  the  concept  of  the  engagement  in  the  NGOs  as  a  form  of 
employment.
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5. The consequential change of the relationships  within  the NGO. The establishment of 
the  employer-employee  relationship  between  the  managerial  part  and  the  activists 
further  hampers  the  already  weakened  democracy  within  the  organizations.  The 
prevalence of the charismatic founders of the association and the strength of a leader 
able  to  ensure  the  financial  resources  also  contributes  to  the  almost  authoritarian 
dynamics within the associations;
6. Beside the lack of democratic practices, this also results in the low institutionalization 
of the associations whose capacity to survive their leader are questionable;
7. The transparency of the finances and the internal process is also hampered, resulting in 
the decrease of the citizens’ respect for the work of the NGOs;
8. It is no surprise then that corruption is often believed to be spread in the civil sector as 
well, further hampering their participation.
This finding in the characteristics of the associations of civil society in the two countries 
induces us to ponder on the democratic capacity of those parts of the civil society dependent 
on  external  incentives.  While  independent  from the  state  and  government,  the  externally 
financed NGOs still do not necessarily articulate or express the citizen’s preferences, do not 
allow the citizen’s participation, do not serve the role they are supposed to serve in allowing 
the bottom-up communication and participation. This being the case, to what extent can the 
externally created civil society foster democracy? Similarly, we can contemplate the role that 
the international donors are playing. By financing the implementation of their own agenda’s 
rather than allowing the bottom-up inputs, by adopting “one size fits all” templates of the 
promoted norms rather than analysing the local necessities, by searching for “servants” who 
would implement  their  programs rather  than looking  for  “partners”,  are  the  international 
donors strengthening, or rather weakening the civil society in the transitional countries? 
As far as the impact of the civil society is concerned, here again we find common patterns, 
in both cases the NGOs being much more successful in influencing the decision-making in 
the fields of fight against poverty and human rights protection, rather than in influencing the 
state budget or exercising control over the state or business sector.
As far as the differences between the two countries are concerned, Macedonia has a far 
better developed legislative framework which regulates the participation of the civil society, 
but at the same time this “consciousness” of the legislator appears combined with the lower 
potentials of the Macedonian civil sector. In Tab.2 we brought the results for the CIVICUS’ 
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civil society index for the two countries. While Macedonia generally scores better than Serbia, 
we can notice that in few sub-dimensions Serbia’s civil society is performing better, Serbia’s 
backwardness on other dimensions increases the importance of this shift in pattern. While the 
better performance on the sub-dimension “basic freedoms and rights” is no longer relevant 
(the indicator was using the Freedom House index on the media freedoms from 2004, on 
which Serbia had a score as a free country, deteriorating in the media freedoms afterwards), 
other two sub-dimensions are telling an interesting story of the role and potentials of civil 
society in the two countries. Thus, Serbia’s better performance in the dimensions “depth of 
citizens’ participation” (1.3 : 0.7) is mainly a product of the much higher inclination of the 
Serbs  to  volunteer  in  the  associations.  Similarly,  the  difference on the  dimension “socio-
cultural context” (1.7 : 0.7) is a product of the much more diffuse civic consciousness among 
the citizens of Serbia. We should also consider the fact that the participation index in Serbia is 
lower in 2004, but Serbia experienced a much stronger mobilization of the citizens during the 
'90s. The importance of the social movements and civil sector in overthrowing Milošević’s 
authoritarian regime testifies the capacities of the Serbian civil society. At the same time, the 
experience  and  participation  during  the  regime  of  Milošević  might  also  explain  the 
comparatively  higher civic  consciousness and the higher inclination to volunteering of the 
Serbian citizens. 
As far as the development of the legislative framework strengthening the civil sector in two 
countries is concerned, the difference in the results achieved in the two countries, rather than 
to the particularities of the sector, appears to be linked to the general characteristics of the 
anchoring  process  in  two  countries:  the  generally  higher  leverage  of  Macedonia  to 
international  pressure  and  the  steps  in  the  integration  process  (ratification  of  the  CoE 
conventions, candidacy to the EU) opened the window of the opportunity through which the 
salience issues of the rather low level of conflictuality were easily pushed on the agenda. The 
opposition of the ruling elite, which is the main beneficiary of the situation of the weak civil 
sector, was significantly diminished due to the general weaknesses of the Macedonian civil 
sector and to the superficiality of the change. The difficult implementation and limitation of 
the civil society in its impact on the more salient issues are the result of an externally induced 
change.
APPENDIX
Table  1:  “USAID,  NGO sustainability  index,  2007.  Results  for 
dimensions, for Serbia and Macedonia”.
Macedonia Dimension Serbia
3.6 NGO  Sustainability 
(total):
4.5
3.0 Legal Environment: 4.7
3.7 Organizational 
Capacity:
4.3
4.5 Financial Viability: 5.5
3.0 Advocacy: 4.0
3.9 Service Provision: 4.5
3.2 Infrastructure: 3.7
3.8 Public Image: 4.8
 (The scale used is a 1 to 7 points scale, 1-3 Consolidation, 3-5 
Mid-Transition, 5-7 Early Transition).
Table  2:  “CIVICUS,  Civil  society  index,  per  dimensions,  for 
Serbia and Macedonia”.
Macedonia Dimension (sub-dimensions) Serbia
1.5 Structur:e 1.3
0.7 Breadth of Citizens Participation: 1.0
1.4 Depth of Citizens Participation: 1.3
1.7 Diversity of Civil Society Participants: 1.3
1.8 Level of Organization: 1.4
2 Inter-relations : 1.5
1.7 Resources : 1.3
1.4 Environment: 1.5
1.2 Political Context: 1.3
1.3 Basic Freedoms and Rights: 2.0
2.0 Socio-economic Context: 2.0
0.7 Socio-cultural Context : 1.7
2.0 Legal environment : 1.5
1.7 State-Civil Society Relations: 1.3
1.0 Private Sector-Civil Society Relations: 1.0
2.1 Values: 1.6
2 (2+2) Democracy (inner democracy + democracy 
promotion):
1.5 (1+2)
1.3 Transparency: 1.0
2 Tolerance: 2.0
3 Non-Violence: 2.0
2.3 Gender equity: 1.7
2 Poverty Eradication: 1.0
2 Environmental Sustainability: 2.0
1.8 Impact: 1.5
1.7 (2+2+1) Influencing Public Policy (social policy influence + 
human rights influence + budget influence):
1.0 
(2+1+0)
0.5 Holding State and Private Corporations Accountable 
for:
1.5
1.5 Responding to Social Interests: 1.5
2.3 Empowering Citizens: 1.7
2 Meeting Societal Needs: 01.07.00
Source: For Macedonia: Klekovski (eds) 2005. For Serbia, Milivojević 2006. In 
red, the dimensions on which Serbia scores better than Macedonia.
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Table 3: “EU assistance to the civil sector development in Serbia”.
2002 3 millions Training programme.
Supplying basic office equipment for selected NGOs.
Organizing joint workshops and seminars for NGOs and local administrations.
Provision of grants (up to € 50,000) for selected NGO/local administration projects.
2003 1 million Inclusion in poverty reduction strategy process.
2004 4 millions Development of legal & financial framework for the civil society sector.
Promoting the role of civil society in environmental protection.
Capacity building for local partnership projects.
Monitoring of grants.
2005 2 millions Support to Civil Society Advisory Committee
Support to the Parliamentary Committee for 
Poverty Alleviation.
Support to SIF monitoring units.
Support to Social Innovation Fund (SIF).
Government needs to adopt the law on free associations and the law on legal status of foreign 
NGOs as well as the provision of tax incentives for NGO donations.
2006 4.5 Support to Social Innovation Fund.
Support to Civil Society.
Gender Mainstreaming.
The government continues to support the role of NGO’s in the transformation of Serbian 
society and in fighting poverty. An Implementation Agreement is signed with the Ministry of 
Labour Employment and Social policy detailing how gender mainstreaming will be integrated 
into government policy and sustained after the project is complete.
2007 2 Strengthen cooperation between the 
professional organizations in Serbia and the 
EU.
Civil society organizations need to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate both amongst 
themselves and civil society organizations in the EU. Likewise, adequate EU institutions have 
to be willing to participate to joint projects and engage in social dialogue with local civil society 
organizations - CSOs and professional institutions need to have the capacity to carry out joint 
projects and produce quality project proposals - Call for proposals should encourage 
participation of relevant stakeholders such as the Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social 
Affairs, Socio-Economic Council, etc. in the selection process - Grants for civil society projects 
require 10% co-financing.
Totale 16.5 millions
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
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Table 4: “EU assistance to the civil sector development in Macedonia”.
2002 1.8 NGO support centres in socially and economically deprived areas of the country.
2003 1.4 millions Capacity building of civil society organizations. Support to a national civil society forum/platform.
2004 6.85 Establishment of Civil Society Unit within the Government. Support for the development of different civil society organizations.
Total 10 millions
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
Table 5: “EU priorities in promoting the development of Serbian civil society”.
2002 Outstanding issues concerning the NGO status and political or religious association should be resolved by mid 2002. 
2003 No further delay in putting conditions in place for the full implementation of freedom of expression or concerning NGO status and aspects of the right of 
association. 
2004 Create an environment (including financial aspects), conducive to the development of NGO and civil society organizations including social partners, notably by 
adopting the law on associations, and a law on the legal status of foreign NGOs. 
2006 Short-term priorities: Encourage the development of civil society organizations financially and otherwise, notably by adopting the law on associations, and 
legislation on the legal status of foreign NGOs. 
2007 Short-term priorities: Adopt legislation on associations and the legal status of NGOs, encourage the development of civil society organizations and regular dialogue 
with civil society on policy initiatives.
2008 Short-term priorities: Adopt legislation on associations and the legal status of NGOs, encourage the development of civil society organizations and regular dialogue 
with civil society on policy initiatives.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
Table 6: “EU priorities in promoting the development of Macedonian civil society”.
2002 Encourage development of civil society, and encourage the role of local NGOs.
2003 Encourage the development of civil society, and encourage the role of local NGOs.
2004 Encourage the development of civil society including social partners' organizations and their active participation to the decision-making processes.
2006 No priorities.
2007 Short-term priorities: Effectively implement the measures adopted to ensure transparency in the administration, in particular in the decision-making process, and 
further promote active participation by civil society. 
2008 Short-term priorities: Effectively implement the measures adopted to ensure transparency in the administration, in particular in the decision-making process, and 
further promote active participation by civil society. 
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 7: “Development of Macedonian civil society, external factors” (author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, 
integration process, access to the funds? No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process 
took place?
Yes (the period 98-99 coincides with the Macedonian 
ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and to the period of the more intensive work on the 
legislation concerning the human, political, civil rights and 
liberties. The period from 2004 on coincides with the period 
in which Macedonia was preparing for the candidate status 
and opening of the negotiations.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 10
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 4%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary for the democratization process.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic 
stakeholders? No.
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the 
country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, 
or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways? X
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Table 8: “Development of Serbian civil society, external factors” (author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration process, access to 
the funds? No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took place? No.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? -
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 16.05
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 1,34%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary for the democratization process.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? No.
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? No.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the 
domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
Published, yet without rising the 
public discussion.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking the 
external legitimization of the law in other ways? X
Table 9: “Development of Macedonian civil society, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: Present, yet not enough strong (civil society in the difficult situation).
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present, weak (civil society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Civil society/ruling elite.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Civil society. 
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid.
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Table 10: “Development of Serbian civil society, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: No.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present, weak (civil society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Civil society/ruling elite.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Civil society.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid/stable.
Table 11: “Development of Macedonian civil society, outcome” (author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: Inclusion of the NGO, domestic and foreign experts.
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: Difficult implementation.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Ruling elite.
The status (2008): Rule implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
With regard to freedom of assembly and association, the legal framework meets most 
international standards. There were no particular developments. However, involvement of 
civil society in the policy development process and in legislative drafting is minimal. Civil 
society organizations remain heavily dependent on foreign funding. The lack of sufficient 
financial resources is a serious constraint on their ability to deliver more professional and 
service-oriented activities. Government initiatives to support civil society development, such 
as tax relief, have not been forthcoming.
Table 12: “Development of Serbian civil society, outcome” (author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: Inclusion of the NGO, domestic and foreign experts.
The main deficiency in the legislation adopted: Not adopted.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: -
The status (2008): Rule adoption pending.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: The Constitution guarantees freedom of association, including political and trade union associations. Laws 
implementing the new Constitution in this area have, however, not yet been adopted. New legislation on associations 
and on political organizations has yet to be adopted. The existing legislation imposes restrictions which go beyond the 
constitutional provisions. 
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12. THE INSTITUTION OF THE 
OMBUDSMAN
“Il diritto è tale se uno lo può far valere. In caso contrario è  
solo una velleità”
Carlo Enea Pezzoli.
The institution of the ombudsman is one of the modern democratic institutions, born in 
Sweden as an instrument of the parliamentary control over the administration in an effort to 
offer  better  protection  of  the  citizens’  rights.  It  is  by  no  mean  a  necessary  institution  for 
democracy, but being an efficient mechanism of accountability and human rights protection, 
we decided to include it in the analysis of the development of democracy in the countries 
studied.  After  all,  as  Milosavljević  stressed,  the  institution  of  the  ombudsman  is  not 
conceivable in non-democratic societies, as its first function is to protect the citizens from the 
executive. 
The function of the ombudsman institution can therefore be conceived as twofold: on the 
one  hand  it  is  one  of  the  core  mechanisms  for  the  protection  of  the  citizen’s  rights, 
particularly  in  their  contact  with the  state’s  administration.  But on the  other hand (as  we 
mentioned  in  the  section  dedicated  to  the  fight  against  corruption)  it  is  an  important 
institution of control over the administration, the one that in its daily work examines possible 
abuses  of  power,  ill  treatment,  irregularities,  negligence  and  corruptive  practices  in  the 
functioning of the administration. For this reason, Morlino and Sadurski (2008) include the 
institution of the Ombudsman among the core mechanisms for keeping the state accountable 
for. It is a non-juridical mechanism of control; important exactly in those spheres where the 
legal remedy offered by the judiciary is not available, mainly due to the more or less large level 
of discretionality in the law implementation that the administration enjoys. 
In the following section we shall describe the process of introducing the institution of the 
ombudsman in Serbia and Macedonia and consider the factors that influence the manner in 
which  these  institutions  perform  their  role:  “the  institutional  design  of  their  office 
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(appointment,  term  of  office,  powers,  etc),  material  opportunities  available  to  the 
Ombudsman, the attitude of other institutions, and the personal characteristics and skills of a 
person holding the office” (Morlino and Sadurski, 2008, p. 19). As a data source we will use 
the relevant legislation, the official documents, the reports issued by the ombudsmen, reports 
of  the  NGOs  and  International  Actors  active  in  the  field,  as  well  as  the  media,  public 
statements and secondary literature.
12.1. SERBIA
12.1.1. PENELOPE’S LAW DRAFT 
In Serbian constitutional framework, the institutions were introduced already during the 
period of communism: immediately after the end of World War II,  as the United Nations 
started the promotion of human rights, the communist intellectual elite undertook the studies 
about the institutions, which resulted in the introduction of the 1974 SFRY constitution of 
what can be called “a proletarian version of the ombudsman”, an institution aimed to “defend 
the civic right for self-management”. Even though the institution was far from that of the 
ombudsman as  a  guarantor  of  human rights,  it  is  significant  to  remember  that,  with  the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the institution was excluded from the constitutions of the newly 
created  states  (Macedonia  being  an  exception).  While  the  Serbian  constitution  of  1990 
contains  42  articles  dedicated  to  the  protection  of  human  rights,  no  mention  of  an 
ombudsman can be found. The first initiative to establish such institution was undertaken by 
Panić’s federal government in 1993, but it failed together with the government’s dismissal. It 
was  obvious  that  in  Milošević’s  “pseudo  democratic”  Serbia  there  was  no  place  for  an 
institution of this kind417. 
With the change of the regime, the protection of human rights gained a high place on the 
political agenda, especially due to strong international pressures. The first steps to establish the 
institution followed, but the path taken was not well designed, and did not result in coherent 
and harmonized reforms: in 2002 the basis for local and provincial ombudsman were created, 
the institution of the republic ombudsman, after a long delay, was established only in 2005 
through ordinary legislation, while it was included in the constitution in 2006.
417 See Radivojević 2003.
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Nine years after the first proposal, in 2002 the initiative was undertaken for drafting the 
Law on Citizens Protector, as a response to the international pressure (beside the EU and 
CoE pressures,  the  law  was  also  a  part  of  the  Pact  for  Stability  of  South  East  Europe 
obligations). The ombudsman was supposed to be elected by the qualified 2/3 majority, it was 
a single ombudsman for the whole republic with a maximum of 5 deputies, with no power of 
investigation or law initiative. It was supposed to have the power to initiate the procedure 
before constitutional court and to be consulted about the laws concerning human rights. The 
bill was proposed to the assembly on 25 November 2002, and seen the assembly’s agenda, was 
supposed to be discussed and adopted by the beginning of 2003. The turbulent events in 2003 
blocked the work of the parliament and the adoption of the law. 
With the formation of Koštunica’s government, the ministry of administration and local 
government initiated the drafting of the new version of the Law on Citizens’ Defender, which 
also involved international actors such as OSCE, EU office in Belgrade and CoE. By request 
of the government, the Venice commission issued an assessment of the law draft, giving and 
identifying, however, the following shortcomings:
• Lack of constitutional basis for the institution
• The appointment and dismissal by the simple majority in the Parliament 
• Too restrictive criteria for becoming ombudsperson 
• Lack of functional immunity for the ombudsman and his/her deputies. 
• Formulation “protectors of citizens” excluding the citizens 
• The requirement of the exhaustion of judicial remedies before the ombudsperson can 
take up a complaint. 
• Lack of investigative powers.
However, most of these shortcomings were not eliminated from the final version (point 5 
was the only accepted one).  The law was adopted in September 2005 (one month before 
Serbia and Montenegro were supposed to initiate the SAA negotiations), and voted by 131 
deputies, both DS and SRS being against its adoption. The opposition criticized the lack of a 
constitutional basis of such office and underlined that the requirements for election were  too 
restrictive (bachelor’s degree in law; at  least  ten years of experience in jobs related to the 
purview of the Ombudsman; high moral character and qualifications; significant experience in 
the protection of civil rights). As Snežana Lakićević Stojačić, deputy of DS, noted, in Serbia, 
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where human rights protection started to develop only since 2000, it would be difficult to find 
a person with a ten-year experience that could be acceptable for the majority in the assembly. 
The law designed one ombudsman for the whole country, with five deputies, appointed by 
a simple majority in the assembly following their proposal of the committee for constitutional 
questions. Among other instruments, the ombudsman also has the right to challenge the laws 
to  CCs  and to  propose  amendments  in  those  cases  when legislation  is  partially  breaking 
human rights. The procedure prescribes that the ombudsman may initiate the procedure only 
after all other legal means have already been used, and within one year after the act of harming 
rights takes place. Given the inefficiency of the Serbian courts, this provision is rather critical.
Even though the Law on the Ombudsman was passed in 2005 and he was supposed to be 
appointed within 6 months, he was not appointed until June 29th 2007, showing that criticisms 
against the criteria were justified. In March 2006, on the DSS proposal to the committee for 
the constitutional issues, Saša Janković, a previously almost anonymous law consulter in the 
OSCE’s department for democracy, was candidated. However, few days after his candidacy, 
Janković withdraw the application, due to the protest expressed by 15 NGOs that claimed 
both Janković not fulfilling the legal requirements and the procedure of candidacy to be un-
transparent and conducted without consulting the civil  sector (Belgrade center for human 
rights, Helsinki committee in Belgrade). As the Helsinki 2006 report on Serbia notes: “the 
doubts on the qualifications of the candidate and dubious election procedure without public 
debate  undermined  the  whole  idea  of  Ombudsman.  The  NGOs also  demanded  broader 
consultations in order for the right person to be elected to the position of Ombudsman… and 
not a person with a clear professional and moral integrity”. No other nominations for the 
candidates took place until summer 2007, also due to the political moment: referendum in 
Montenegro, ceasing of the SAA negotiations, the crisis in the ruling government, constitution 
adoption and parliamentary elections that followed, together with the political crisis January – 
May 2007, all kept the elite and media attention away from the issue. 
The constitution adopted in 2006 gave the constitutional basis for the institution of the 
ombudsman, while the changes introduced in summer 2007 harmonized the legislation with 
the constitution, removed some shortcomings in the legislation (the simple relative majority is 
changed into simple absolute majority, the immunity is also guaranteed), added the protection 
of minority rights to the competences of the ombudsman and gave the institution a power of 
legislative initiative. However, as the Venice Committee in its Comment on the new Serbian 
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Constitution  underlines,  “It  is  [….]  regrettable  that  there  is  no  protection  of  the  Civic 
Defender  against  unjustified  pre-term dismissal  by  the  National  Assembly.  […],  it  seems 
questionable that the National Assembly supervises the Civic Defender and that the Civic 
Defender shall account for their work to the National Assembly.”
Finally,  in  June  2007,  the  first  Serbian  ombudsman  was  appointed.  It  was  again  Saša 
Janković, whose appointment this time did not cause any protest, apparently due to the “more 
positive atmosphere in the assembly” and due to the consensus in the ruling coalition over the 
candidate (quoted from the speech of DSS spokesman Aligrudić, cited in Čekerevac, 2007). 
After a two-year delay in appointing the ombudsman, the rule implementation continued to 
be obstructed by the government. The office experiences a series of difficulties in finding the 
elementary infrastructure (office, furniture), while the failure of the assembly to nominee the 
other  defenders  (appointed  only  in  October  2008)  and  the  lack  of  access  to  the  budget 
revenues delayed the recruitment of the staff. In his report to the assembly in march 2008, 
Janković underlined the difficulties faced in the functioning, arguing that in most of the cases 
the  lack  of  cooperation  in  the  administration  was  a  consequence  of  the  lack  of  a 
comprehensive, systematic approach and organization, irresponsibility and even corruption on 
the different levels of the state apparatus. 
It is still too soon to assess the role played by the ombudsman in Serbia, as the available 
data concern only the first few months of its functioning. In the report issued in march 2008, 
(covering the first six months of functioning), the ombudsman received about 400 complaints, 
53.4% of which in the range of the ombudsman’s competences and thus acted upon. Most of 
the complaints concerned the judiciary (121 complaints against the judiciary and prosecutor’s 
office and about 70 complaints for the violation of the right on free trial), most of which 
concerned problems that are not in the competences of the ombudsman, who is not allowed 
to control the functioning of the judiciary (article 17). To date, no data are available on the 
compliance of the state administration on the recommendations made by the ombudsman. 
12.1.2. THE EU ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S OFFICE
The  establishment  of  the  institution  of  the  ombudsman  was  strongly  requested  by 
international actors, both through the channels of conditionality and the socialization process. 
Both  the  Council  of  Europe  and the  EU included  the  establishment  of  the  ombudsman 
institution among the norms promoted through the conditionality,  EU including the issue 
among  the  priorities  of  the  EU partnership,  CoE including  the  issue  among  Serbia  and 
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Montenegro’s post-accession obligations. The entire process was monitored, both institutions 
criticizing  the  delays  and  obstacles  in  establishing  the  institutions  in  their  reports.  The 
international  actors  also  assisted  in  the  drafting  process,  providing  technical  and  legal 
assistance (CoE, OSCE, EU office UNHCR), and engaging in advocacy and law promoting 
activities. Material resources were also made available, as the international actors immediately 
initiated programs of institutional capacity building (EU dedicated one million of Euros to the 
development of the office, while OSCE signed the partnership agreement of support to the 
newly established office of Civic Defender)418. 
12.1.3. Assessment
As we could see, the process of establishing the ombudsman office in Serbia followed the 
pattern of most Serbian reforms. In the first period of transition, there was an initiative for the 
rule adoption that, however, failed mainly due to the prevalence of other issues on the agenda 
and the institutional crisis caused first by the conflict DSS vs. DS, then by the assassination of 
the prime minister and the crisis  in the parliament’s work. The newly elected government 
decided to re-initiate  the entire  process,  by  making a  new draft  in  collaboration  with the 
numerous  international  actors  offering  assistance.  However,  in  those  points  where  the 
international actor’s opinion was threatening to harm the elite’s interest, it was not taken into 
consideration. Thus, the shortcomings that concerned the appointment by the simple majority 
in  the  assembly  (which  would  allow  the  ruling  coalition  to  appoint  the  ombudsman 
unilaterally), the lack of civil society sector in the nomination of the candidate, the fact that he 
cannot make statements with “political content” (possibility of abuse due to the lack of clear 
formulation), the lack of immunity and the procedure that needs to be undertaken within one 
year and only after all other legal means were already used, all remained in the legislation to be, 
partially, changed with the 2007 amendments. As far as the rule implementation is considered, 
the delay in appointing the ombudsman, the effort made in 2005 to appoint the candidate 
without public debate, the failure to give the ombudsman access to the financial, human and 
technical resources even 5 months after his appointment, which blocked his functioning, are 
all signs of the immaturity of the Serbian democracy. 
418 On the role of the EU and CoE in promoting the institution of the ombudsman in Serbia, see Baracani,  
2005, Dallara, 2008.
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12.2. MACEDONIA
12.2.1. DEVELOPMENT
In the development of the institution of the ombudsman in Macedonia we can distinguish 
two crucial phases, one in 1997-1998, when this institution was established for the first time, 
and the second in 2003, when it was significantly changed in order to meet the new necessities 
after the signature of OFA.
As we already stressed when analyzing the Serbian case, the institution of the Ombudsman 
in the former Yugoslavia was not unknown, as the institution of the “defender of the civic 
right  on  self  government”  was  introduced  in  the  1974  SFRY  constitution  and  in  the 
constitution of the republics (Macedonia as well).
With the independence, the new Macedonian constitution (1991) introduced the institution 
of  the  ombudsman as a defender of  “the constitutional  and legal  freedoms and rights  of 
citizens, obliged to intervene whenever the citizens’ rights guaranteed by the constitution and 
laws were violated by bodies of state administration and by other bodies and organizations 
having public mandates”419. 
While envisaged by the constitution already in 1991, the ombudsman was not introduced in 
Macedonia until 1997, when the law that was necessary for its implementation, the Law on the 
Ombudsman,  was  adopted.  After  one  year  of  preparation,  the  first  ombudsperson  was 
appointed  in  March  1998.  At  that  time,  the  role  of  the  ombudsman  was  only  partially 
understood, as  in  the debate over the  law some criticisms were advanced underlining  the 
uselessness of such institution, proclaiming it as a “décor”, incapable to ensure the protection 
of the human rights420. 
The first years of the ombudsman’s presence showed these criticisms to be unfounded: 
about 1.500 written complaints  per year were submitted to the ombudsman in the period 
1998-2003421.  At  the  same  time,  the  low  compliance  of  the  state  agencies  with  the 
ombudsman’s recommendations, their slow response, their inadequate understanding of the 
role of the ombudsman represented major obstacles that the institution met in its work422.
419 Article 77 of the Macedonian constitution.
420 See Naumovski, 2005, pp. 480.
421 Data from the Ombudsman annual report 2007.
422 See  Naumovski,  2005,  pp.  481.  The Council  of  Europe report  2000 brings the  data  of  the  66% of 
ombudsman recommendations being implemented by the administration in 1999.
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After the 2001 violence, in order to meet the necessities deriving from the 2001 Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, the institution of the ombudsman underwent a significant change in 
its organization, appointment and functioning. As the OFA agreement introduced the non-
discrimination and the equal representation of the ethnic communities in public bodies as a 
key principle of the peace agreement, the public attorney’s function also changed. Beside the 
protection of the constitutional and legal rights of the citizens, the ombudsman was given the 
function of the guaranteeing the principle of equal representation too. Thus, according to the 
XI  amendment  to  the  constitution,  it  “shall  give  particular  attention  to  safeguarding  the 
principles of non-discrimination and equitable representation of communities in public bodies 
at  all  levels  and in  other  areas of  public  life”.  The procedure  of  the appointment  of  the 
ombudsman was also changed in  order  to give  the  veto power  to the  Albanian  minority 
through the application of the Badinter formula (this way the ombudsman and his deputies 
are appointed on the proposal  of  the parliamentary commission,  by the absolute majority 
within which there must be a majority of votes of the minority’s MPs).
Seen the importance of the institution in guaranteeing the implementation of OFA, the 
agreement also required that the Law on Public Attorney is amended in order to enlarge the 
institution’s powers, to give it the right to contest the conformity of laws with the constitution 
before the Constitutional Court, to enable the ombudsman to suspend the execution of an 
administrative act pending decision of the competent court, to grant him access to and the 
opportunity  to examine all  official  documents.  The OFA also required the  budget of  the 
ombudsman to be separately voted by the assembly, the institution to be decentralized and the 
regional offices established. 
As envisaged by the OFA, the amendments of the article 77 were adopted together with 
other amendments deriving from the OFA, and in 2003,  after the drafting procedure that 
included the  Council  of  Europe experts,  the new Law on the  Ombudsman was adopted. 
During  the  procedure  of  the  law  adoption,  the  opinion  of  the  Venice  Commission  was 
required, and if we compare the draft law submitted to the commission’s expert, the opinion 
adopted  by  the  Venice  Commission  and  the  final  document  voted  in  the  Macedonian 
assembly, we can see that all suggestions were included in the final version of the law. 
As the new Law on Ombudsman prescribed the establishment of 6 regional offices (to be 
headed by the ombudsman’s deputies), the budget of the institution significantly increased in 
order to ensure the correct implementation of the legislation (the 2004 ombudsman’s budget 
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was almost double than that in 2003). The new ombudsperson was appointed through a new 
procedure, while the enlarged competencies and powers, as well as the growing consciousness 
among the citizens,  resulted in an increase in the number of complaints  submitted to the 
institution  (from about  2000  in  2003-2004  to  more than  3.000  complaints  per  year  since 
2005)423.
In this period, however, some of the previously mentioned obstacles in the ombudsman’s 
work  persisted,  particularly  those  concerning  the  administration’s  compliance  with  the 
ombudsman’s recommendations and the communication with the Ministry of Interior. The 
lack  of  proper  channels  of  communication  between  the  MoI  and  the  Ombudsman  was 
particularly worrying, given the problems the Macedonian police had in ensuring respect for 
the human rights. The ethnic dimension of this conflict between the ministry of interior and 
the ombudsman should not be underestimated. As the new ombudsman, due to the Badinter 
procedure, was practically  appointed by the Albanian minority party DUI (on the political 
background of the appointed ombudsman and the negative consequences of such decision see 
the Helsinki report, 2005), the conflict (ethnically based) in the ruling coalition over the police 
reform had its negative consequences on the communication between the ministry of interior 
(SDSM) and the ombudsman (appointed by DUI). The attack of the ministry of interior, that 
accused the ombudsman over the media for ethnic discrimination in its functioning (without 
bringing  any  evidence  for  such  accusations),  reflects  the  lack  of  understanding  of  this 
institution. 
As  the  Helsinki  Committee  for  Human  Rights  pointed  out,  the  politically  backed 
appointment  of  the  ombudsman represented a serious  problem in the  functioning  of  the 
institution. According to this organization’s report, in few cases, all of which politically biased, 
the ombudsman failed to protect the citizens’ rights. In particular, it failed to act against the 
violation of the electoral rights that took place during the 2005 local elections (a potentially 
political decision, as the most severe violations took place where DUI won the majority) and it 
showed insufficient attention to the protection of the women’s rights (electoral rights as well), 
children’s  rights  and  protection  of  the  religious  freedoms.  He  also  showed  particular 
permissivity  to the  party’s  influence  in  the  procedure  of  the  formation  of  the  office  and 
election of the deputies (see the Helsinki report, 2005). 
The irregularities  concerning  the  appointment  procedure  were  also pointed  out  by  the 
Helsinki Committee, as, contrary to the constitution and the Law on Ombudsman (article 6 
423 Data from the Ombudsman annual report, 2007.
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and 8), the person appointed was a party member and without any experience in the field of 
protection of the human rights. During the appointment it was only the ethnic, and not the 
political consensus to be looked for, so that beside the hampered independence, the legitimacy 
of the institution was harmed as well424. 
While  the  politicization  of  the  ombudsman  institution  remains  a  potential  source  of 
concern, the compliance with his recommendations significantly grew. Particularly, thanks to 
the governmental decision from January 2006, according to which all ministries are obliged to 
report  on  a  three-monthly  basis  to  the  General  Secretariat  of  the  government  on  the 
implementation of recommendations or requests made by the Ombudsman, the response to 
the Ombudsman’s requirements and recommendation significantly increased (see Tab.1).
We already underlined how the number of complaints received per year increased. The 
majority  of these complaints concern the judiciary (23%) and police (17%), as well as the 
property ownership (15%) and labor relations (10.6%), while the majority of the complaints 
that  were  acted  upon  concerned  property  ownership  (ombudsman  report  2006).  It  is 
interesting to underline that while the complaints concerning the judiciary represented 23% of 
the total number of complaints, the share of the judiciary complaints acted upon makes only 
5% of the total number of issues the ombudsman took action in. 
12.2.2. THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND SETTLING OF OMBUDSMAN
As we already stressed, the Council of Europe and the ratification of the Convention on 
Human rights in 1997 appeared to be the incentives that finally brought to the implementation 
of the article 77 of the Macedonian constitution. As the compliance with the law was rather 
weak (even though the institution was given an important role in OFA), since 2003 the EU 
included  strengthening  the  ombudsman’s  office  and  improving  the  compliance  with  his 
recommendations among its priorities. With the increase in the compliance registered in 2006, 
the issue was omitted from the list of EU’s priorities in 2007 (see Tab.3). From the reports of 
the  European  Agency  for  Reconstruction  no  EU  funds  appear  to  be  dedicated  to  the 
institution of the Ombudsman in Macedonia. 
12.2.3. ASSESSMENT
In  the  introduction  and  settling  of  the  Ombudsman’s  office  in  the  country  we  can 
distinguish two significant moments. The first concerns the period 1997-1998, when the Law 
424 See Daneva, 2004, p.2.
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on the  Ombudsman was finally  adopted and the first  ombudsperson appointed.  Seen the 
country’s recent membership in the Council of Europe and the signature of the charter on 
Human rights in 1997, it is possible to consider the settling of the ombudsman’s office as part 
of the reforms fostering human and political rights in that period, partly also driven from the 
necessity  to  comply  with  the  Human  Rights  Charter.  However,  the  limited  powers,  the 
political control and the failure to respect the institution’s recommendations seriously limited 
the impact of the institution.
The changes in the legislative framework regulating the functioning of the ombudsman and 
its  strengthening that  took place in  the 2003 were a  direct  result  of  the  peace agreement 
implementation.  The  Albanian  minority  parties  were  particularly  interested  in  the  rule 
adoption, as the office of the ombudsman was to be given the power to, among other, protect 
the principle of non-discrimination and equal representation. The role of the external actors 
was mainly a consulting one. In this case, the rule adoption was mainly driven by the existing 
necessity, while the concrete solutions were already included in the OFA. While the legislation 
adopted  was  praised  for  the  improvements  it  introduced,  namely  in  increasing  the 
ombudsman’s  powers  and  strengthening  the  institutions,  the  political  influence  was  not 
removed. The double majority (majority of MPs and majority of the ethnic minorities’ MPs) 
procedure  prescribed for the  election  of  the institution,  and the  fact  that  the matter  was 
already decided by the OFA, spared the country from the international actor’s critics (unlike 
the case in Serbia) concerning the appointment procedure. But the provision revealed to be of 
utmost importance at the first election of the ombudsman, as the institution appeared to be a 
subject of the trade between the coalitional partners, ethnic and political principles prevailing 
even over the constitutionally prescribed requirements for the election.
It is interesting to point out the similarity the development of the ombudsman institution 
shares with other reforms tackling the ethnic issues: a particularly good compliance with those 
issues  dealing  with the  questions  of  the  minority,  and fake  compliance  with  those  norms 
concerning the accountability mechanisms or partisan appointment where only a credible IA 
pressure could bring to compliance. Thus, as far as the strengthening of the institution of the 
ombudsman, the ethnic veto for its appointment, the use of the languages, the composition of 
the office and its territorial decentralization are concerned, the Albanian ethnic minority was 
rather strong in pushing the issues onto the agenda. The necessity to ensure the compliance of 
the state bodies with the ombudsman requirements appeared more dynamic and problematic, 
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and it  was  due  to  the  joint  external  pressure  and  ombudsman’s  critics  that  the  situation 
improved.  Finally,  as  the  international  actors  did  not  question  the  procedure  for  the 
appointment,  no improvements were made in  the  field,  so that  the  relatively  problematic 
legislative  solutions  (ensuring  only  the  ethnic,  but  not  the  political  consensus  and 
independency of the institution) are even more badly interpreted and implemented (resulting 
in a de-facto party control over the institution).
12.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The introduction and development of the institution of the Ombudsman in Serbia  and 
Macedonia followed rather different paths, resulting, as we will see, in the establishment of 
institutions with slightly different functions and styles. 
Macedonia, which introduced the institution already in 1997-1998, is obviously far ahead of 
Serbia,  with  the  institution  now  fully  established  and  functioning,  whereas  the  Serbian 
ombudsman is still facing the lack of elementary conditions for work. As we can notice from 
the  Tabb.6,  7,  8  in  the  appendix,  the  Macedonian  ombudsman  appear  stronger,  more 
independent in its functioning, less limited in his powers and far better financially supported. 
The  recent  governmental  decision  further  strengthened  the  institution  increasing  the 
compliance with his recommendations from about 40% to more than 80% (the comparison 
with Serbia  is  still  impossible  due to the  very short  record of  functioning  of  the Serbian 
citizen’s  defender).  Yet,  as  we  could  see  from  the  report,  Macedonian  ombudsman’s 
legitimacy was seriously shaken by the accusations coming from the leading human rights 
watchdog agencies  about  his  politicization,  selective  application  of  the  law and failure  to 
protect  the  human rights  of  the  citizens  (see  the main text).  On the  other  hand there is 
Serbia’s case, where the adoption of the Law on the Ombudsman was delayed for 5 years, his 
appointment  took  two  more  years,  finding  him  an  office  and  providing  him  the  basic 
infrastructure to work took another year. Yet, the civic defender continues to be constantly 
present  in  the  public  debate  and  media,  proposing  the  amendments  to  the  legislations, 
criticizing the government and bringing to the public and to the attention of the authorities 
some of the issues concerning corruption and abuse of power, gaining the confidence of the 
citizens’  and  of  the  civil  sector  representatives’.  This  comparison  clearly  depicts  the 
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ombudsman as an institution standing between the state administration and the citizens, the 
support from the one side inducing resistance from the other. 
The different relation on the line citizens – ombudsman – government and, in particular, 
the deficiency in the functioning of the Macedonian civic defender, can be traced back to the 
changes in the role of the ombudsman after the 2001 OFA agreement. The strengthening of 
the institution was mainly guided by the importance that the ombudsman was given in the 
implementation  of  the  peace  agreement  and  in  ensuring  the  equal  representation  of  the 
Albanian ethnic minority in the state administration. Since the change actors promoting the 
institution of the ombudsman were mainly interested in the promotion of the narrow interests 
of their own inner-group, the role of the ombudsman was slightly altered. 
APPENDIX
Table 1: “Share of ombudsman’s recommendations followed by 
the Macedonian administration”.
2002* ≈40%
2004** ≈40%
2005*** 59.53%
2006*** 75.42%
2007*** 87.87%
* Approximate data deriving from the 2003 EU Stabilisation and Association 
report.
** Approximate data from the 2005 EU commission opinion on membership.
***Data from the Ombudsman annual report, elaborated by the author.
Table 3: “Ombudsman’s share in the state budget, Serbia”.
Ye
ar
Ombudsman’s 
budget
State budget Share
20
07*
92.247.657 646.466.666.100
0,014%
20
08
24.997.000 611.866.849.862
0,004%
(Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
sluzbeni list Srbije). The amount refers to the budget prescribed, yet as the 
institution was formed only in July 2007 and the government obstructed the access 
to resources, only a small part of these resources were actually made available.
Table 2: “Ombudsman’s share in the state budget, Macedonia”.
Y
ear
Ombudsman’s 
budget
State budget Share
20
02
19.606.583 71.700.273.000 0.027%
20
03
21.069.000 67.490.170.000 0.031%
20
04
42.264.000 66.666.000.000 0.063%
20
05
44.830.000 66.538.469.000 0.067%
20
06
48.008.000 81.749.000.000 0.059%
20
07
56.738.000 79.522.497.000 0.071%
20
08
62.500.000 89.397.520.000 0.070%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
Službeni vesnik.
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Table 4: “EU priorities concerning the Ombudsman institution in Macedonia”.
Year Recommendation
2003 Value the role of the Ombudsman’s Office in defence of the citizens and strengthen its means to tackle mismanagement and bad administration, including 
through the necessary legislative framework, and strengthen the independence of the Audit bodies.
2004 Short-term  priorities: Fully  implement  the  2003  Law  on  the  Ombudsman  and  complete  the  reform  of  the  Ombudsman's  office.  Ensure  that  the 
Ombudsman's recommendations are followed.
2006 Short-term priorities: Ensure proper cooperation of all State bodies with the ombudsman and improve the follow-up given to his recommendations.
Strengthen the cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and the ombudsman.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
Table 5: “EU priorities concerning the Ombudsman institution in Serbia”.
20
02
Coordination should be established between all Ombudspersons.
20
03
Creation of an ombudsman.
20
04
Short-term priorities: adopt the legislation to set up an Ombudsman Office.
20
06
Short-term priorities: Implement the legislation to set up an ombudsman’s office.
20
07
Short-term  priorities:  Establish  a  fully  functioning  ombudsman’s  office  in  line  with  the  legislative  requirements  and  ensure  proper  follow-up  to  the 
recommendations made by the ombudsman.
20
08
Short-term  priorities:  Establish  a  fully  functioning  ombudsman's  office  in  line  with  legislative  requirements  and  ensure  proper  follow-up  to  the 
recommendations made by the ombudsman.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 6: “The ombudsman institution in Serbia and Macedonia: appointment, mandate, dismissal procedures according to the legislation in 
force” (author's elaboration).
Macedonia Dimension Serbia
Parliamentary committee. Candidacy: Parliamentary  committee  for  the  constitutional  issues  proposes  a candidate among the candidates of the political groupings in parliament.
“A  person  who  fulfills  the  general  terms  stipulated  by  the  Law  on 
Employment in the State  Administration Bodies, a graduated lawyer who 
has a working experience in legal affairs of over nine years, whose activity 
has been proved in the sphere of protection of citizens’ rights and has a 
good reputation for performing the duties of the Ombudsman”.
Requirements:
Bachelor’s degree in law; at least ten years of experience in jobs related to 
the purview of the Ombudsman; high moral character and qualifications; 
significant experience in the protection of civil rights.
In assembly, Badinter majority (majority vote of the total number of MPs, 
whereby there must be a majority of votes of the total number of  MPs 
who  belong  to  the  non-majority  communities  in  the  Republic  of 
Macedonia).
Appointment:
In assembly, absolute majority (majority of the votes of all deputies).
8 years, maximum 2 mandates. Mandate: 5 years, maximum 2 mandates.
With the end of mandate, unless he/she is re-appointed
In case of dismissal.
The term in 
office ends:
With the end of mandate, unless he/she is re-appointed;
 In case of death; By resigning from office; By meeting requirements for 
mandatory  retirement  pursuant  to  regulations  on  labour  relations  in 
government agencies;  By dismissal; If he permanently loses his psycho-
physical  ability  to  perform  the  Ombudsman  function  –  which  is 
determined on the basis of a finding and opinion by a competent health 
centre; By loss of the status of citizen of Serbia, to be established upon 
the documentation of the relevant institution.
Dismissal  by  Badinter  majority  in  the  assembly,  upon proposal  of  the 
relevant Committee. The dismissal takes place: 1) if he himself requests it; 
2) if he is convicted of a criminal act with an unconditional sentence of 
imprisonment to at least six months; 3) if he permanently loses his psycho-
physical ability to perform the Ombudsman function what is determined 
on the basis of a finding and opinion by a competent health centre; 4) if he 
fulfills the terms of retirement according to age; 5) due to incompetent, 
biased and unconscientiously performing the function of Ombudsman.
The dismissal:
By absolute majority in the assembly, on proposal of the Committee for 
the constitutional issues or following the proposal of the 1/3 of deputies. 
The dismissal can take place only:
Due to incompetence or negligence in discharging his duties;
If he engages in an activity which is incompatible with his office;
If convicted for a criminal offence which makes him unsuitable for this 
function.
Table 7: “The ombudsman institution in Serbia  and Macedonia,  structure and finances,  according to relevant legislation in force”  (author's 
elaboration).
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Macedonia Dimension: Serbia
1  ombudsman,  deputies  (whose  number  the  ombudsperson 
proposes to the assembly). Office:
1 ombudsman and 4 deputies.
Badinter majority in assembly, on proposal of the Civic Defender. Appointment of the deputies: By majority in assembly, on proposal of the Civic Defender.
Eventual assignment of responsibilities and specialization should 
be regulated by the act passed by the Ombudsman. Specialization of the  
deputies:
Yes: Specialization particularity in the following fields: protection of 
the  rights  of  detainees,  gender  equality,  children’s  rights,  rights  of 
minorities, rights of persons with handicap.
Appointed by the Ombudsman. Conditions: the candidate  must 
be from among the managing civil servants. Secretary General of the  
Ombudsman’s office:
The  assembly  should  approve  his  nomination  by  ombudsman 
together with other provisions (see next point). Conditions: Bachelor 
degree in law, 5 years of experience, fulfills the conditions in work in 
the Public Administration.
Regulated by the act of Ombudsman (no veto players). Functioning of the  
professional office (organization  
and systematisation):
To be regulated by the act of Ombudsman that enters into force after 
the parliament’s approval.
6  regional  organizational  units  for  performance  of  the  affairs 
within the Ombudsman’s scope of competence: 1) Office of the 
Ombudsman in Tetovo; 2) Office of the Ombudsman in Kicevo; 
3)  Office  of  the  Ombudsman  in  Stip;  4)  Office  of  the 
Ombudsman  in  Strumica;  5)  Office  of  the  Ombudsman  in 
Kumanovo; 6) Office of the Ombudsman in Bitola.
Decentralization:
The  institution  is  centralized.  The  local  self-governments  and 
Autonomous Provinces are free to decide whether or not to adopt 
the institution of ombudsman. The national ombudsman is allowed 
to  control  the  functioning  of  the  local  self-government  in  those 
municipalities where the local ombudsman do not exist, or out of the 
competencies of the local ombudsman.
From state  budget.  The Parliament  vote  on the  section  in  the 
Budget for the purposes of the Ombudsman. Finances:
From the state budget.
0,055% The share in the state  
budget (media):
0.009% (for Serbia only 2007 and 2008).
Table 8: “The ombudsman institution in Serbia and Macedonia, competencies according to relevant legislation in force” (author's elaboration).
Macedonia Competencies: Serbia
None. Institutions omitted from the  
ombudsman’s control:
Citizens’  defender  is  not  entrusted  to  control  the  work of  the 
National  Assembly,  President  of  Republic,  Government, 
Constitutional Court, Judiciary and Public Prosecutor. 
Yes. Power of legislative  
initiative:
Yes.
Yes. Power to initiate procedure  
in front of CC for questioning  
the constitutionality of the legal  
acts:
Yes.
Demand  necessary  explanations,  information  and  evidence 
regarding  the  allegations  in  the  submission;  -  Enter  the  office 
premises and have a direct insight into the files and affairs within 
their competence; - Interview an appointed or nominated person, 
an  official  and  any  other  person  who  can  provide  certain 
information for the procedure; - Request the opinion of scientific 
and  specialized  institutions;  -  Undertake  other  actions  and 
measures stipulated by law or another regulation.
Investigative measures  
Ombudsman can undertake:
Administrative  authorities  are  obliged  to  cooperate  with  the 
ombudsman, to allow him the access to the offices, and to make him 
available all data relevant for the case in their possession, regardless 
the level of the secrecy of these acts, unless when it is forbidden by 
the law. The ombudsman, when exercising his duty, has a right to 
interview any employee of the administrative authorities.
The Ombudsman may visit at any time, without prior notice 
and approval,  the prisons,  educational-correctional facilities,  and 
the bodies,  organizations and institutions where the freedom of 
movement is restricted; to have insight of respect of human rights 
in these institutions, as well as to talk with the persons at these 
institutions without the presence of official persons.
Access to the penal  
institutions:
The Ombudsman shall have the authority, without prior notice, 
to undertake inspection of penal institutions and to speak in privacy 
with persons deprived of liberty. 
- Give recommendations, proposals, opinions and indications 
on the manner of the removal of the determined infringements; - 
Propose that a certain procedure be implemented pursuant to law; 
-  Raise  an  initiative  for  commencing  disciplinary  proceedings 
against an official, i.e. the responsible person; - Submit a request 
to the competent Public Prosecutor for initiation of a procedure in 
order to determine a criminal responsibility.
Measures to be undertaken  
in the case when ombudsman 
concludes that the state  
administration bodies infringe  
the constitutional and legal  
rights of the person who put  
forward the submissio:n
Publicly  recommend  the  dismissal  of  an  official  who  violated 
citizen’s rights, or to file a motion to initiate disciplinary proceedings 
against the employee, in the case when the official or the employee 
refuse  to  cooperate  with  ombudsman  or  when  the  citizen  have 
suffered significant material or other consequences; To file a motion 
to initiate misdemeanour, criminal or other appropriate proceedings 
against an official or employee of the administrative authorities when 
during his investigations he finds the elements of.
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Table 9: “Introduction and development of Ombudsman in Macedonia, external factors”(author's elaboration).
 The first law on Ombudsman and settlement of the office 1997-1998 Strengthening of the ombudsman (2003-)
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an 
important international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the 
important steps in the integration process took place? Yes.
Yes (the strengthening of the office coincide with the 
period of preparation for the EU candidate status and 
preparation for negotiations).
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? X No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities 
needing attention in the SAA reports? X Yes. 
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of 
the laws? X No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: X 0
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of 
EU assistance to the country: X 0%
Reform perceived by the IA as:  Instrument for HR protection and fight against corruption.
Essential part of OFA, instrument for HR protection 
and fight against corruption.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. Security, democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse 
of power by the domestic stakeholders? X
Partially (no reaction on the political appointee of the 
ombudsperson).
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, 
and was it used in the law drafting?
Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? X Yes.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully 
used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors 
vulnerable to external criticisms?
X X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its 
compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking the external 
legitimization of the law in other ways?
X The principle issue was OFA.
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Table 10: “Introduction and development of Ombudsman in Serbia, external factors” (author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration 
process, access to the funds? No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took 
place? X
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 0.00
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 0,00%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Essential part of OFA, instrument for HR protection and fight against corruption.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly (not all).
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the 
country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways? No.
Table 11: “Introduction and development of Ombudsman institution in Macedonia, domestic level” (author's elaboration). 
The first law on Ombudsman and settlement of the 
office 1997-1998 Strengthening of the ombudsman (2003-)
Domestic input for the change: Not present. Present: OFA.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Weak (civil society). Albanian ethnic minority.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low. Mid.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Government (administration)/citizens. Government (administration)/citizens; ethnic majority/ minorities.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No. Yes.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite/administration. Ruling elite/administration.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens. Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the 
central actors) Fluid. Fluid.
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Table 11: “Introduction and development of Ombudsman institution in Serbia, domestic level” (author's elaboration). 
Domestic input for the change: Non present.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Weak (civil society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Government (administration)/citizens.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite/administration.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Stable.
Table 12: “Introduction and development of Ombudsman institution in Macedonia, outcome” (author's elaboration).
The first law on Ombudsman and settlement 
of the office 1997-1998. Strengthening of the ombudsman (2003-).
The procedure of law drafting: X X
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: Difficult implementation.
Failure to ensure the mechanism of the accountability. Corruption of the 
mechanisms (istituzione esiste, funziona, ma non svolge il proprio 
ruolo).
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Government/administration. Government/administration.
The status (2008): - Rule adopted, implemented, yet, institution corrupted.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Positive assessment of the institution.
Table 13: “Introduction and development of Ombudsman institution in Serbia, outcome” (author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: X
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: Very slow, difficult and obstructed implementation. 
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Government/administration.
The status (2008): Rule adopted, difficult implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
The newly established Office of the State Ombudsman was very active. However, the Serbian authorities 
have not created the technical conditions necessary for proper functioning of the Office of the State 
Ombudsman. Temporary premises are inadequate and only 33 out of 64 posts have been filled. The Serbian 
administration lacks sufficient knowledge of the ombudsman institution and its role and has not paid 
sufficient attention to its recommendations.
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13. THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
“I order you to hold a free election, but forbid you to elect  
anyone but Richard my clerk”
Henry II, 1173.
Being free and fair elections considered a minimum requisite for democracy and a central 
piece of every procedural definition of democracy425, there is no need to specify the reasons 
that induced us to include this dimension in our analysis. In the following sections we will 
analyse the electoral framework in the two countries, identifying the possible shortcomings in 
legislation  or  in  implementation  hampering  the  citizen’s  right  to  vote,  and describing  the 
possible changes in the legislative framework that took place from the year 2000 onwards. As 
the electoral system is an important element for understanding the political process in the two 
countries,  we  will  analyse  not  only  the  part  of  the  legislations  concerning  the  citizens’ 
possibility  to  exercise  their  right  to  vote,  but  also  those  parts  concerning  the  electoral 
engineering. 
13.1. SERBIA
13.1.1. THE CHANGE OF THE ELECTORAL LAWS: INSTABILITY AND FLUIDITY
As in  many  others  fields  of  the  reform,  Serbia  failed  in  introducing  a  comprehensive 
reform of the electoral system. Expected after the constitutional reform, the building up and 
harmonization of the existing pieces of law regulating the presidential, parliamentary and local 
elections actually never took place, due to the lack of consensus and reformist capacity of the 
governments formed after the adoption of the constitution. As we will see, since the end of 
Milošević’s  regime,  several  changes were introduced all  the same. As there is  no electoral 
codex or specific legislation concerning the voter’s register, electoral commission etc, being 
425 See definitions of democracy offered by Dahl, Sartori, Schumpeter, to quote only some of the best known 
names in the political science. 
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these questions regulated in the legislation on local, parliamentary and presidential elections, 
we will follow the changes introduced in these laws, paying attention both to the implications 
of the changes on the political system and on those parts that concern the citizens’ right to 
vote and be voted, and the manner in which this right is exercised. As during Milošević the 
questions concerning the voters’  register, the commission for counting the votes etc. were 
used for malversation of the votes, this side legislation was of crucial importance in the case of 
Serbia. According to the OSCE assessment of the electoral legislation in Serbia in 2000, the 
following shortcomings were among the most serious ones: the lack of a definition of the 
citizens of Serbia (highly problematic in the context of the dissolution of the SFRY, and the 
high  number  of  reugees  from  both  the  former  republics  and  Kosovo),  municipal 
constituencies easily subject to gerrymandering, the failure to ensure the political plurality of 
the electoral commission, the failure to guarantee equal rights to the members of the electoral 
commission  in  administrating  the  elections,  the  inaccuracy  of  the  voters’  register  (double 
entries, dead and unexisting people called to vote), the failure to ensure transparency in the 
process, inadequate rules regulating the electoral campaign in media for ensuring equal access, 
low level of the ballot’s security etc. (see OSCE assessment on the electoral legislation in FRY 
and Serbia, 2000).
The first changes in the electoral laws after the overthrow of Milošević’s regime took place 
prior to the parliamentary elections in December 2000. After Koštunica’s victory in the federal 
presidential elections, the agreement over the transition period between DOS and the old elite 
was made. Part of the deal was the change of the Law on the Election of the Parliament 
Members.  This  new  law,  as  assessed  by  OSCE,  was  written  hastily  with  the  coming 
parliamentary elections in mind, and failed to introduce all the recommendations made back in 
1997.  Analysing the electoral  laws from 1990,  1992,  1997 and 2000,  Jovanović noticed an 
important pattern marking the Serbian approach to the electoral reforms: all the introduced 
changes concerned the electoral engineering (the electoral formula, procedure of assigning the 
post, size of the electoral units etc), but no change was introduced in the rest of the settling, 
while the questions which mattered for the citizens’ exercise of the right to vote (electoral 
administration,  voters’  register,  financing  of  the  electoral  campaign,  media  etc)  remained 
unchanged as they were considered less important, technical details (see Jovanović, 2003, p. 76). 
The  Law  on  the  Parliamentary  Elections  adopted  in  2000  established  Serbia  as  one 
electoral  constituency  and increased  the  transparency  and  independence  of  the  RIK (the 
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democratic  opposition underlined both changes as necessary conditions  for the December 
2000 parliamentary elections to be free). The law also introduced the provision according to 
which the political parties enjoyed full control over the assignment of mandates and control 
over the mandates of the deputies (see also the section on the political system).
After the 2000 parliamentary elections in Serbia, the Democratic Opposition overtook the 
power on the republican level. A series of reforms followed, the reform of the electoral system 
being one of  the issues on a list  of changes to be introduced.  However,  the intention to 
undertake the constitutional reform (potentially bringing to changes in the political system as 
well)  postponed the  reform of  the  electoral  legislative  framework.  In  2002,  however,  the 
political crisis caused by the failure to elect the president created an urgent necessity for a 
change in the Law on the Election of the President. 
A  part  of  the  transitional  agreement  between  DOS and  Milošević  regime achieved  in 
October 2000 opted to leave the then president of Serbia Milutinović in office. Milutinovic’s 
mandate expired in 2002, in a moment when DSS had already left DOS. The presidential 
elections were scheduled for 29/09/2002 and three candidates were running for the office: 
Koštunica, Labus and Šešelj, Koštunica and Labus passing to the second round. Koštunica 
won  (more  than  66%  percent  of  votes),  but  the  elections  failed  as  the  50%  turnout 
requirement was not met. The failure to elect the president not only created a crisis due to the 
vacant  post  of  the  president,  but  also  revealed  the  serious  shortcomings  of  the  electoral 
system: Koštunica’s DSS complained first to the RIK and then to the Constitutional court 
accusing  serious  shortcomings  in  the  voters’  register  for  faking  the  results.  According  to 
Koštunica, the voters’ register was not up to date, containing many voters that actually did not 
exist,  which at the end produced the failure of elections.  The urgent needs to reform the 
“Milošević’s electoral law”, to bring the voters’ register up to date and to abolish the turnout 
requirement  could  be  read  about  in  the  media.  The  request  to  abolish  the  50% turnout 
requirement, all together with serious concerns expressed, also came from the international 
community: OSCE, EU, USA, the Council of Europe, all expressed their concern about the 
institutional  crisis  created in  Serbia.  The actors  calling  for  the change in  the  Law on the 
Election of the President, beside the international community, were also the public and media, 
relevant NGOs like CESID and Koštunica’s DSS. While the other actors were calling for the 
abolishment  of  the  turnout  requirement  in  the  second  round,  DSS  was  requesting  the 
complete abolishment of the turnout requirement. The opposition in parliament was against 
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the changes in the electoral law, while the rest of DOS was actually for a larger constitutional 
reforms,  a  change  in  the  political  system  from  the  current  semi-presidentialism  to  a 
parliamentary  system with  the  president  elected  by  the  parliament  and  only  after  a  large 
electoral reform.
The discussion over the change in the electoral laws came in a very delicate moment: the 
conflict between DOS and DSS that busted out in that period meant that no parliamentary 
support for the constitutional reform was possible, thus ruling out DOS’s preference. As both 
the public opinion and the international community were requesting urgent actions, the ad 
hoc solution (i.e. to amend the law) was adopted. 
The content of the amendments (maintaining the turnout request for the first round) was a 
result of DOS’ intention to avoid the election of the president. Seen the powers granted to the 
president and the extremely difficult procedure for impeachment, seen the almost sure victory 
of Koštunica, at that time preferred by the citizens, it was convenient to opt for a formulation 
that  would  make both  the  election  of  the  president  and  the  obstruction  of  the  elections 
possible.  It  became clear  2 days after  the  law was amended that  DS had an intention  to 
obstruct the election of the president by boycotting the first round: in the words of Ilić, urgent 
negotiations of DOS were called to discuss how it  was possible that some partner in the 
coalition intended to boycott the elections called for by the parliament only two days before. 
As  far  as  the  issues  concerning  the  voter’s  rights  and  the  regularity  of  the  elections  are 
concerned,  the  law  introduced  the  mid-layer  of  the  electoral  commission  (positive 
development per se, yet controversial as this introduced two different electoral commissions 
in the country), it specified the procedure of vote-counting, it contributed to the increase of 
the transparency of the commission work. Considering the ruling elite’s intention to avoid the 
election of the president,  the legislation failed to introduce those norms that would make 
voting possible to the disabled, displaced, imprisoned, and citizen living abroad.
The DOS’s plane functioned. The president of Serbia was not elected neither in 2002 nor 
in  2003.  However,  they  were  not  able  to  ensure  that  the  rest  of  the  plan  (constitutional 
reform, change of the political system) was also put into practice. 
After the fall of Živković’s government and the parliamentary elections in December 2003, 
a new institutional crisis threatened to shock the country. As the negotiations between DSS 
and DS failed, it became obvious that either the new government will include Milošević’s SPS, 
or the parliament would be dismissed and new parliamentary elections called for. The risk of 
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repeated  electoral  results  induced  the  elite  to  search  for  a  change  in  the  electoral  laws. 
Nevertheless,  the large electoral reform was again not available a possibility,  as actually no 
parliamentary majority able to undertake the electoral reform existed. Another ad hoc solution 
was necessary. 
If we analyse the changes introduced in 2004, it is clear that they were the fruit of an effort 
to encompass the institutional crisis:  the Law on the President’s Election was amended in 
order to remove the census requirement for the first round and ensure that the president will 
be elected, while the Law on the Parliamentary Elections was changed in order to ensure that 
repeated parliamentary elections would not produce identical compositions of the parliament. 
This  way,  the  right  to  vote  was  for  the  first  time  granted  to  displaced  people,  to  the 
imprisoned citizens, and mobile vote was introduced in order to ensure the participation of 
the ill and disabled, and the citizens living outside the country were also given the right to vote 
in consulates and embassies. 
The census of 5% for the national minorities’ political parties was abolished, ensuring their 
entering the assembly. 
Even though the legislator significantly influenced the suffrage and improved the citizens’ 
right  to vote,  the  following  facts  argue in  favour  of  Jovanović’s  thesis  about  the Serbian 
legislator  being  guided  by  institutional  engineering  concerns  rather  than  by  international 
standards:
• A clear guidance on reforming the electoral law existed in that period, but was not fully 
followed: the OSCE assessment of the December 2003 parliamentary elections also 
underlined a call for urgent changes in the Law on the Election of Representatives. 
Only the  requirement to grant the  right to vote  to the disabled and displaced was 
included.  Other  two,  according  to  OSCE’s  urgent  priorities  (both  concerning  the 
parliamentary control over the mandates), were not included.
• The whole debate on the electoral law was about the distribution of mandates: how 
high  should  the  census  be?  Should  the  Diaspora  be  guaranteed  the  right  to  vote? 
Should  national  minorities  be  excluded  from the  census,  or  should  the  census  be 
lowered,  or  even  abolished  for  all  parties?  Should  the  turnout  requirement  be 
abolished?
• On  the  other  hand,  legislators  omit  to  introduce  some  amendments  that  were 
requested by ODIHR, even though some of these already were part of the practice and 
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no political conflict existed on the subject (for example, the provisions regulating the 
monitoring of the elections or the intermediate level of electoral administration, at that 
time regulated by the act of the electoral commission). 
By 2006 the constitutional reform finally took place, the constitutional law prescribed that 
the  legislation  regulating  the  local  and  presidential  elections  should  be  revised  and  the 
presidential and local elections called for prior to the 31/12/2007. The “reform” left aside the 
most important part of the legislation, that is the Law on the Parliamentary Election, which 
technical parts concerning the voters’ register, the electoral commission and voting procedures 
apply  to other pieces  of  legislation  as  well.  Even though the joint  opinion of  the Venice 
Commission and OSCE was made available underlining the shortcomings in the legislation 
that should be faced, almost none of these recommendations were included. Moreover, the 
part of the Law on the Election of the President that was considered positive (the one on the 
existence of the intermediate level of the electoral administration) was also abolished and the 
less favorable solution contained in the Law on Parliamentary Elections included. Finally, as 
we could see in the part about the decentralization process, the Law on the Local Elections 
included  the  imperative  mandate  on  the  local  level  as  well,  seriously  hampering  the 
relationship  between citizens  and their  local  representatives.  Even though proposals  were 
made for the introduction of the majority system for the local elections,  after the difficult 
party bargaining, the adopted document introduced only few changes (the most important of 
which was the threshold lowering from 5 to 3%).
According to the legislation in force, the electoral process in Serbia is regulated by the Law 
on  Parliamentary  Elections  (the  last  amendments  dating  back  to  2004),  the  Law on  the 
Presidential Elections (2007) and the Law on Local Elections. The suffrage is universal (the 
right to vote being guaranteed to every Serbian citizen who has turned 18 years of age and has 
working capacity). The municipal civil status data are used for the compliance of the voters’ 
register, the inclusion in the voting lists of voters who fulfilled the conditions for voting being 
automatic, passive and free of any charges. The voters’ lists are maintained on a continuous 
basis by municipal authorities under the supervision of the Ministry of Public Administration 
and Self-Governance and in cooperation with the Ministry of Interior. The voters’ list are a 
public  document,  available  to  the  consultation  of  citizens.  Even  though  the  legislation 
prescribed  that  the  voters’  lists  should  be  merged  in  a  unified,  computerized,  permanent 
national  register,  this  is  still  not  the  case.  The lack of  mechanisms capable  to ensure  the 
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accuracy and of  a  state body responsible  for the  maintenance of  a  central  voters’  list  are 
criticized by both the international and the domestic experts. 
As far as the candidacy procedure is concerned, every citizen with the right to vote has the 
right to be a candidate for the presidential, parliamentary or local elections. The Law on the 
Parliamentary  Elections  allows  the  political  parties,  coalitions,  other  political  parties  and 
groups of citizens to submit a list of candidates for the election. Each list has to be supported 
by 10.000 signatures, to be authenticated in a municipal court, for which a fee will be charged. 
The  failure  to  specify  the  clear  procedure  for  the  authentication  of  signatures  represents 
another shortcoming criticized in the Venice Commission opinion on the Serbian electoral 
legislation.  Another  point  of  concern  is  the  lack of  provisions  allowing  self-candidacy  by 
independent  candidates  who,  in  order  to  be  candidated,  need  the  support  of  a  group of 
citizens  (easy  to register)  and the  same 10.000  of  signatures  the  political  parties’  lists  are 
required. 
Such evident discrimination of the independent candidates is fully in line with what the 
constitution recently established, that is the institution of an imperative mandate which gives 
the political parties full control over the deputies. The possibility for the party to assign the 
mandates regardless the position of the candidates on the list “limits the transparency of the 
system and gives political parties a disproportionately strong position vis-à-vis the candidates” 
(Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR joint opinion on the Serbian electoral legislation, 
point 43). 
As far as the electoral administration is concerned, the electoral administration bodies are 
established  at  two  levels.  The  Republican  Electoral  Commission  is  a  permanent  body, 
responsible to administer the elections. It has a permanent and extended composition. The 17 
permanent members are appointed by the assembly for 4-year periods so as to reflect the 
composition of the parliament appointing the RIK (with limitation for any political party to 
have  more  than  half  of  the  members  in  the  extended  composition  of  the  RIK).  The 
permanent and additional members have equal voting rights and all decisions are to be taken 
with  the  majority.  During  the  elections,  each  candidate/candidate’s  list  appoints  one 
representative to the commission. The Pooling Boards are the bodies that serve the voters at 
the  polling  stations  on  Election  Day.  Composed  by  the  3  permanent  members,  in  the 
extended composition they include one representative of each candidates list. The electoral 
administration is considered to be satisfactory, except for the lack of legislative basis for the 
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functioning of evidently necessary intermediate level of the administration (in the need this 
layer is established by the decisions of the RIK). 
As far as exercising the right to vote is concerned, the legislation does not prescribe any 
kind of incentives for fostering the participation to elections, and the turnout of the last two 
parliamentary elections was around 61%. The representation of the national minorities in the 
assembly  is  guaranteed  by  lifting  the  5% census  for  the  national  minority  parties,  while 
mechanisms  of  positive  discrimination  of  woman  are  fostered  by  the  necessity  for  any 
candidates’ list to include at least 30% of women. 
13.1.2. EU ROLE IN THE REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Since the first SAA report published, EU underlined the need for a reform of the electoral 
laws. As the OSCE/ODHIR are international actors specialized in the promotion of free and 
fair  elections  and  monitoring  of  the  electoral  process,  the  EU  opted  to  back  the 
OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, calling for an electoral reform in the EU partnership that 
would respect them. 
13.1.3. ASSESSMENT
Eight years after the democratic transition, Serbia still did not undertake a comprehensive 
reform of its electoral system. Even though the elections are usually considered free and fair, 
the  legislative  framework  still  presents  some shortcomings,  some of  which  are  not  faced 
simply due to inertia, while others (in particular those concerning the party control over the 
mandates)  are  difficult  to  face,  considered  the  high  interest  of  the  political  leaders  in 
maintaining these norms. 
In  this  light  we  can  distinguish  between  the  changes  in  the  Law  on  the  Presidential 
Election  in  2002,  where  very  strong  international  pressure,  combined  with  the  domestic 
political crisis and inner pressures, forced Đinđic’s government to introduce amendments he 
actually was strongly against. The content of the amendments introduced and the subsequent 
obstruction annulled the desired effects the amendments were supposed to introduce, thus 
testifying the difficult implementation in cases of controversial compliance. 
In other cases (the change in both 2004 and 2007), the situation was slightly different. The 
rule adoption mainly represented an ad-hoc solution to the internal necessities or the response 
to the domestic input. The role of international actors in the process being almost absent, the 
documents adopted were a product of intra-party bargaining. Very low (almost absent) was 
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the concern of the decision makers for the recommendations of the international actors or for 
the international standards and best practices concerning the citizens’ political rights. In those 
matters where the legislation adopted meet the recommendations of the Venice Commission 
or OSCE/ODIHR (like for example the changes in 2004, when the citizens’ right to vote was 
significantly improved by making the voting of a large category of citizens easier, and when 
the national  minorities  were granted a simpler procedure for gaining  representation in the 
assembly),  it  was  only  due  to  the  convenience  that  political  elite  recognized  in  these 
recommendations.
13.2. MACEDONIA
13.2.1. ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORM 
Macedonia is the only case where the EU candidate status was granted to a country not 
complying with the minimum requirements for democracy: free and fair elections. Moreover, 
if we follow the reports of the international observers, and those of the EU, we can notice 
how the situation, at least by such reports, was actually degrading in time. 
The  extremely  high  stakes  the  elections  have  in  the  Macedonian  context  (seen  the 
politicization of  the  state institutions  and the oligarchy of  the  political  parties)  makes the 
electoral competition a zero sum fame, and the political leaders are further propelled to use 
any means to ensure their victory. This included continuous changes to the electoral system, a 
topic that, seen the lack of institutionalization and consolidation of the electoral formula, had 
its place in the agenda whenever new parliamentary elections were to be scheduled.
The  Macedonian  electoral  system  therefore  submitted  different  changes  since  the 
establishment  of  democracy  in  1991426.  In  line  with  what  seemed to  be  a  pattern  of  ex-
communist societies, the first electoral law prescribed the majority electoral formula that was 
at  the  time  perceived  as  the  most  advantageous  for  the  ruling  communist  party.  The 
justifications for such choice used by the ruling elite, paradoxically, concerned the attempt to 
avoid what very soon became the reality of the Macedonian party system: an atomized party 
system and the division on ethnic lines were perceived as the two threats to be avoided by the 
introduction of the majoritarian electoral  system (see Janevska,  1999,  p.  27).  The majority 
426 On the electoral system in Macedonia, its development and impact in the period of nienties, please see 
Karakamiševa, 2004.
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system in  Macedonia  not  only  failed  in  keeping  the  number  of  political  parties  low,  an 
expectation nurtured by Duverger’s thesis on the effects of majoritarian system, but it even 
failed to produce the majority in the assembly. The impulse for the change arrived from the 
government  in  1993  and  1994  (before  the  second  parliamentary  elections),  but  the 
negotiations  between  the  parties  did  not  succeeded  in  ensuring  the  adoption  of  the 
government’s proposal in the assembly.
In 1998, prior to the third parliamentary elections, the electoral reform was successfully put 
onto the agenda and the  majoritarian  system was replaced with  the  mixed one.  The new 
electoral formula prescribed the two-round majoritarian system for 71% of the mandates and 
the proportional system with the 5% census for the remaining 29%. This “correction” to the 
majoritarian system was introduced in order to compensate for the loss suffered by those 
parties  with  territorially  diffused  support.  The  law  was  negotiated  between  the  few large 
parties (Macedonian and Albanian),  pushing aside the smaller parties who were unsatisfied 
with the solution, considering the law even more penalizing than the previous majoritarian 
system as the proportional formula settled a 5% census, while the requirement for entering the 
second round were also severed. The measures supposed to “increase the proportionality” 
produced  a  containing  effect  on  the  number  of  candidates  (mainly  thanks  to  the  higher 
incentives for forming the coalitions) and a one-party majority in the assembly. Similarly to 
Serbia,  while  concentrated on the electoral  engineering,  the reform paid poor attention to 
questions concerning the implementation of the citizens’ right to vote: the voters’ register, the 
administrative  capacity  and democratic  procedures of  the electoral  administration,  and the 
ambiguities of the legislation that left room for abuse.
Another shift in the electoral system occurred prior to the fourth parliamentary elections in 
June 2002, when the Law on the Election of the Members of Parliament, the Law on Voters’ 
List and the Law on Election Districts for the Election of the Members of Parliament were 
adopted.
The electoral reform of 2002 was a product of a series of conditions joining to bring to the 
electoral  reform  the  political  parties  (especially  the  opposition  ones)  were  starving  for, 
especially after the 1999 presidential and 2000 local elections. The armed conflict in 2001 also 
had  a  deep  impact  on  the  political  representation  in  the  country  and  the  party  system, 
producing the fragmentation of the parliamentary parties, whose number doubled from 8 in 
1998 to 16 that were sitting in the assembly in 2001 427. Combined with:
427 See also Gaber-Damjanovska e Joveska, 2001.
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• The need to revise the electoral code in line with the Ohrid Framework agreement;
• The need to, following the OFA, call for early elections, a rather unpopular decision 
the ruling elite was trying to delay as much as possible;
• The irregularities registered in the previous elections that were supposed to be handled 
and that international community, now with increased pressures, was requiring to be 
removed;
• The internal pressures for a more proportional electoral system finally saw the opening 
of an opportunity for changing the electoral system;
a window of opportunity for the electoral reform was opened. The government initiated 
the process in 2001, when the first law draft was sent to the assembly. After the assembly 
adopted the draft and gave their recommendations in April 2002, the draft passed on to the 
government to be completed. 
The legislation represented a compromise reached between the parties signing the Ohrid 
framework agreement, and was a result of difficult negotiations undertaken in few steps. In 
the  first  phase  the conflict  implied  the  very design of  the electoral  system.  The previous 
legislation (Law on the Election of the Members of Parliament 1998),  requiring a  second 
round for the election of 71% of the mandates distributed through majority formula, not only 
penalized  the  smaller  parties,  but  was also said  to  allow the  parties  to prepare aggressive 
strategies and forbidden pressure methods for the second round where the winner is decided. 
The conflicting parts were therefore proposing different solutions, from the pure proportional 
system in the whole-country-one-constituency model, to maintaining the existing system with 
the elimination of the second round. The eventual solution agreed between the two largest 
Macedonian parties was the regional proportional model, dividing the country in six multi-
member constituencies, where each constituency shall produce 20 parliamentarian seats. The 
Albanian minority parties (in this first phase requiring the whole-country-one-constituency-
model), after the adjustment of the constituency boundaries, finally accepted the proposed 
solution (see Gaber-Damjanovska e Joveska, 2001).
The laws adopted included many of the OSCE’s recommendations gaining the approval of 
the international actors and the elections that followed were considered “mainly in accordance 
with  OSCE  commitments  and  international  standards  for  democratic  elections”  (OSCE 
report  on  the  Macedonian  parliamentary  elections  2002).  However,  the  following 
shortcomings in the legislation were identified: reliance on the judiciary for membership in the 
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election commissions; vague provisions about the role of security forces during the elections; 
ambiguous  and  inconsistent  provisions  for  the  annulment  of  results,  repeat  of  elections, 
complaints and appeals; voting rights of non-resident citizens; and lack of enforcement of 
financial regulations. 
The role of the security forces during the elections was an issue OSCE already criticized in 
its previous reports and in its opinion on the draft law that was submitted for the OSCE 
assessment.  Seen  the  diffusion  of  the  violence  in  the  pooling  station,  that  made  police 
intervention necessary, new and old versions of the law allowed a stronger presence of the 
security forces. Yet the failure, notwithstanding the intensive external pressures on the issue, 
to  unambiguously  provide  the  legislative  guarantees  and  limitation  of  the  security  forces 
authorizations on the elections day, opened the door to abuses. OSCE monitors registered 
numerous cases of intimidation of the voters and abuse of power by the ministry of interior 
during the subsequent parliamentary elections428.
Another  important  issue  that  notwithstanding  the  IA’s  strong  pressures  remained 
unchanged concerned  the  inclusion  of  the  judges  in  the  electoral  commissions.  Both  the 
previous and the 2002 legislation required the judges (some of  which to be appointed by 
political  parties)  to  be a  part  of  the electoral  commission.  Seen  the  high  politicization  of 
Macedonia’s judiciary, the independence of these members of the electoral commissions was 
highly  compromised,  while  at  the same time the membership in the electoral  commission 
further exposed the judges to the pressures coming from the parties. 
The last change in the electoral legislation took place in 2006 when the new electoral code, 
regulating the parliamentary, presidential and local elections, as well as all matters concerning 
the elections, was adopted. 
The adoption of  the electoral  code seemed a necessary step in order to answer to the 
problems born after the 2005 local elections. The local elections for the position of mayors (to 
be  conducted for  the  first  time in  the  newly  defined municipalities  and with significantly 
increased powers of the local authorities) were judged by the parties as elections with a rather 
high stake. Immediately after the first round, two different assessments of the elections were 
heard in media: according to official and governmental resources, the elections were regular, 
fair and democratic. According to the opposition, several irregularities were registered, so that 
428 Thus, while on one hand intimidations and threats, in some cases even the open violence between the 
Albanian minority parties, made the intervention of the police necessary, on the other the case of the ministry of 
interior confiscating the materials form the factory enrolled to stamp the ballots clearly examples the need for 
limiting the police powers on the election day. See OSCE report on the Parliamentary elections 2002.
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the  elections  were  far  from being  fair  or  democratic.  When the  international  community 
pronounced its judgment according to which even though in a high number of voting pools 
the  elections  were  in  line  with  the  international  standards,  there  were  also  very  serious 
irregularities,  particularly  in  the  western  part  of  the  country;  moreover,  the  media  finally 
reported a series of “folklorish” events, such as re-filling the electoral boxes, attacks on the 
members of the electoral commission, joint voting, manipulations with the voting lists (see 
Hristova, 2005). The same year Macedonia was clearly told that it can be granted the position 
of candidate country only as a political recognition of the efforts made (particularly for the 
efforts in implementing OFA) but no negotiation would take place until the electoral process 
is brought in line with the international standards. The international community started to 
press for the identified shortcomings, both in the legislation but also in the administration, to 
be removed. Main criticisms referred to the guarantees of the universal and equal right to vote 
as well as the secrecy of voting (an issue of particular salience in the western parts of the 
country,  mainly  inhabited  by  the  ethnic  Albanians,  where,  due  to  the  patriarchal  and 
traditional  society,  women’s  rights  were  seriously  undermined);  the  party  influences  and 
pressures  over  the  election  committees  and  the  lack  of  independence  of  judges.  The 
introduction of heavy sanctions for breaking the electoral laws was advocated in order to put a 
limit to the numerous violations of the democratic rules, especially in the western parts of the 
country. 
The need to face the problem of electoral irregularities was used by the political parties to 
delegitimize the existing legislative framework and to initiate the negotiations for the electoral 
reform.  As  Gaber-Damjanovska  and Janevska  stressed,  “Although reasons  for  the  largest 
number of repeated irregularities should not be put on the account of the election law (as it is 
evident that the main thing lacking is the political will to lead proper elections), still the idea of 
revising the current law in order to facilitate the election process is imposed” (2005, p.15). The 
position that the irregularities were not caused by inadequate electoral legislation but by the 
lack of political will and of democratic capacities of the political parties to respect the law is 
also supported by Hristova, according to whom the lack of democratic capacity resulted in a 
situation where the relatively good legislative framework, leaving room for fair and democratic 
elections,  was not implemented, and any ambiguity in the legislation was manipulated and 
abused (see Hristova, 2005). Mirčev (2005) went further claiming that not only the existing 
legislation, if implemented, would not permit the irregularities, but also, even if introduced, 
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the legislative changes would be of no use, given that the political parties are controlling all 
state institutions,  administration,  judiciary and electoral bodies.  Introducing changes to the 
legislative framework, rather than a solution to the deficiencies of the electoral process, was an 
expression of the lack of basic consensus over the rules, present in Macedonia from the very 
beginning of its democracy, where the electoral laws were negotiated over and over each time 
the parliamentary elections were scheduled. As domestic authors noticed, the reforms of the 
electoral system in Macedonia followed the parliamentary elections (Jovevska, 2005), and not 
two subsequent legislatures were elected under the same rules (Mirčev, 2005). This legislative 
instability represents another source of serious undermining of the stability and legitimacy of 
the country’s fragile democracy.
However,  the  political  elite  persisted  in  underlining  the  need  to  change  the  legislative 
framework,  a  solution  partially  stressed  also  by  OSCE which,  in  reports  concerning  the 
presidential elections, already recommended the unification of the existing legislations in one 
electoral code in order to avoid the ambiguities deriving from the complicated,  sometimes 
overlapping legislations. The electoral code was therefore adopted in March 2006, after a long 
period of debate, drafting, several working groups both partisan and expert, several rounds of 
reading  and  negotiations.  Even  though  many  parties  were  initially  hoping  to  succeed  in 
changing the electoral system, as a number of solutions were proposed (from the majoritarian 
system preferred by VMRO, to the one constituency proportional system), in the final version 
no changes to the electoral formula were introduced.
The  most  controversial  issue  in  the  political  negotiations  concerned  the  electoral 
administration,  where  the  ruling  parties  advocated  the  electoral  bodies  composed  by  the 
administration,  while  the  opposition,  seen  the  high  level  of  politicization  of  the  state 
bureaucracy, pressed for a solution according to which the party representatives should be 
introduced in the committees. 
The electoral code adopted was judged quite in line with the international standards, an 
important step further if compared to the previous solutions. It was praised as in line with the 
OSCE/ODIHR recommendations and considered capable to provide for an integrated and 
unitary legislative framework for the administration of most elections429.  The criminal code 
was also amended in order to provide for heavier punishments for the violation of the codex. 
Yet, according to some experts, the Codex still did not achieve to address the shortcoming 
concerning the party financial spending (see also the part on the fight against corruption).
429 See the joint comments by the Venice commission and OSCE/ODIHR on the Macedonian electoral code.
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According to the electoral code in force, every Macedonian citizen of 18 years of age and 
working capacity is given the right to vote. The Register of Citizens represents the basis for 
the Register of Voters, with automatic data processing in an electronic form. The Ministry of 
Justice is assigned the task to keep the Voters’ List. As the inclusion of the voters in the list is 
automatic, no financial charges are paid. While the provisions regulating the voters’ list are 
rather satisfactory, the complicated procedures for introducing changes in the citizens’ data in 
the Register of Citizens (causing the negligence of many citizens not to report an address 
change, migration and immigration) results in a difficult adjustment and updating of the data 
in the voters’ list as well. 
The right to candidacy is also allowed to all citizens who, beside fulfilling the conditions to 
vote, are also not serving a prison sentence for criminal offence and have not been given a 
final  court  decision  for  imprisonment  of  more  than  6  months.  The  registration  of  the 
candidates’  list  give  a  slight  advantage  to  those  political  parties  that,  once  registered  (a 
procedure requiring 500 signatures of citizens), can propose their lists, while groups made of 
citizens are required 1.000 signatures. 
The electoral administration has three layers and includes the State Electoral Commission 
(SEC), the Municipal Electoral Commissions (MECs) and the Electoral Boards. The electoral 
code has changed the composition of the electoral administration, excluding the judges and 
political appointments and opting for a professional commission made of civil servants. The 
SEC is a permanent body that oversees general preparations for the election; it is made of 7 
members (with a 5-year mandate) appointed by a 2/3 majority, thus requiring support from 
both  the  position  and the  oppositional  parties.  The  Municipal  Election  Commissions  are 
responsible  for overseeing  the election  process  in  each municipality.  They are  made of  5 
members  randomly  selected from the civil  servants  with  higher  education  resident  in  the 
municipality.  The mandate of the members also lasts 5 years.  Finally,  the electoral  boards 
serve the voting pools on the election day. They are made of 5 members, appointed by the 
relevant  MEC  by  random  selection  among  state  employees.  The  state  and  municipal 
commissions  are given explicit  supervisory  authority  over  subordinate  election bodies  and 
officials  and  the  disciplinary  tools  to  be  used  in  case  the  members  of  the  electoral 
administration are involved in any electoral fraud.
However, these positive changes and the electoral code praised for the improvements it 
introduced has not prevented electoral irregularities and even some cases of violence to take 
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place. The main problems Macedonia had still remained unchanged, as the solutions adopted 
attempted to heal the effect, not the cause of the problem. The political elite still remains the 
same, and therefore the tendency to break the low or to abuse any ambiguity is still present. 
The elections undertaken in 2006, immediately after the adoption of the electoral code, were 
judged as  fair,  with  the  number  of  the  irregularities,  even  though high,  was  much lower 
respect to the previous elections. However, these improvements were far from being durable, 
as the 2008 parliamentary elections showed. A series of irregularities, and the violence that 
took place (mainly in the constituencies  with the Albanian majority430)  clearly showed that 
Macedonia is still struggling to ensure the minimum conditions of democracy.
13.2.2. INTERNATIONAL ACTOR’S ROLE
The international  community  was  rather  active  in  promoting  free  and fair  elections  in 
Macedonia,  applying  a  large  spectrum  of  tactics  varying  from  socialization  to  strong 
conditionality.  Unfortunately,  as some domestic  authors stressed, free and fair  elections in 
Macedonia continue to seem “the necessity imposed from above, as if it was something we 
don’t need, but, as they are requiring and insisting, we are obliged to comply” (Hristova, 2005, p. 
2).
In the period prior to the 2005 local elections, the international actor mainly exercised its 
pressures through the socialization channels, through the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations, 
CoE and OSCE legal assistance, as well as advocating during the process of reforming the 
legislative framework.
Since  1991,  the  elections  were generally  judged as  reasonably  free  and fair,  with some 
problems to be faced, most of which appeared to be solved with the 2002 electoral reform. 
We can this way notice how generally positive assessments, in the reports of both the Council 
of Europe and European Union, were followed by the lack of strong conditionality on the 
issue, particularly in the period 2002-2005.
After the 2005 local elections, the international pressures on the issue significantly grew. 
The OSCE report raised concerns in the European regional organization as well as in the 
whole  international  community.  The  zero  tolerance  (a  radically  different  approach,  if 
430 See the OSCE/ODIHR report on the 2008 elections. According to the media, in the municipalities of 
Aracinovo and Cair “a war took place, rather than elections”. One dead and several wounded people were the 
result on election day’s eve. 
See:  http://www.utrinski.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=2E42485B4E8CB94487687C08462979B3; 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/default.asp?ItemID=B87D94391F34334B8D4704D8ABBE804C; 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=86A90ADE636B814491868ABD17E18DD4. 
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compared to the IA’s behaviour during the previous elections, where most of the irregularities 
registered in 2005 were present) is due to the importance these local elections had for the 
implementation of the troubled decentralization law adopted under the OFA (see the chapter 
on decentralization).
The reaction of the entire international community on the 2005 and 2008 irregularities was 
very  strong.  The  Council  of  Europe  underlined  its  concern  on  the  issue  and  required 
Macedonia to ensure that the electoral process complies with the Council of Europe standards 
of  freedom and fairness  throughout  its  territory  (Council  of  Europe,  Resolution  1440,  y. 
2005).  The European Union immediately included the free and fair election among its key 
short-term priorities in the partnership issued in 2006, and conditioned the opening of the 
negotiations with Macedonia to the establishment of free and fair  elections,  while  NATO 
made clear that Macedonia’s membership in this organization would depend on its capacity to 
organize free and fair  elections.  Such pressures were also undertaken through “unofficial” 
channels,  the  statement  of  the  USA  ambassador  day  before  the  2006  elections  clearly 
illustrating such trend:  “If anybody wins or wants to win by manipulating the elections, it is 
clear  that  we,  as  US  government,  cannot  see  them  as  the  ones  that  won  without 
manipulations. I imagine that one of the consequences for them is that they will soon realize 
that their possibilities for a career shall be interrupted!” 
However,  similarly  to  the  pattern  we  saw  in  2002-2005,  as  the  international  actor’s 
attention shifted to other issues, the 2008 elections showed that Macedonia is still far from 
fulfilling the requirements for opening the negotiations for the EU membership. 
13.2.3. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE CHANGE
As we saw, the changes in the electoral law took place in almost all legislatures. Over the 
period from 2000 on, in which we are particularly interested, there were two electoral reforms 
with rather similar dynamics as far as the decision-making process is concerned.
The pressures of the external actor for the change in order to remove the irregularities of 
the electoral process were very strong in both reforms, yet, as the interest and concerns of the 
international actor slightly changed from one case to another, the result of the process also 
changed. 
The first reform was started due to the political fluidity and the window of opportunity 
opened  by  the  2001  crisis  and  the  Ohrid  Framework  agreement.  OFA  prescribed  the 
parliamentary elections to be held before January 2002. The internal tensions and pressures in 
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order to change the electoral formula were strong, which brought to the situation where the 
need to ensure  the  consensus  of  all  relevant  actors  (mainly  the  consensus  of  the  biggest 
Macedonian and Albanian political parties, all crucial for the implementation of the OFA) was 
more important than ensuring the full compliance with the OSCE requirements. 
As far as the change agents and the veto players involved in the process are concerned, we 
can observe how the same actors took both positions in the reform, in  function of their 
interests. No change agents pushing for the reform for the sake of devotion to the democratic 
norms were  there.  A series  of  competitive  alternative  solutions  were  on the table,  as  the 
legislative reform concerned the electoral formula as well. The discussion concentrated on the 
electoral  formula,  and only  partially  on  the  “technical  issues”,  and  was  mainly  guided  by 
concerns not about “what is the most democratic, most efficient formula”, but on the partisan 
interests of the actors involved. As a result, some of the OSCE recommendations (such as the 
exclusion of the judiciary from the electoral commissions and its depoliticization) were not 
respected as all main political parties were strongly against them. The lack of political will to 
ensure free and fair elections and to cease the irregularities became more than obvious in the 
local elections in 2005.
The  second  electoral  reform,  again,  was  undertaken  due  to  strong  domestic  and 
international pressures caused by blatant frauds and irregularities committed during the 2005 
local elections. This time the pressure of the international community was decisive, and strong 
conditionality was used. 
The electoral frauds during the 2005 elections resulted in a serious conflict between the 
government and the opposition, undermining and delegitimizing elections which were crucial 
for the implementation of the OFA. This way, free and fair elections in Macedonia were not 
only an issue concerning the democratization of the country, but, even more importantly, a 
crucial element to ensure its stability. Macedonia was thus guaranteed the EU candidate status, 
but it was made clear that the negotiations for the membership are conditioned by the free 
and fair elections. The Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, as well as the single governments, 
all strongly pushed for the electoral reform.
The  pressures  of  the  international  community  were  supported  by  the  domestic  public 
opinion, pushing the political parties to nominally confirm their determination to solve the 
problem.  This  time,  even though the  parties  were  pushing  for  substantial  changes  in  the 
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electoral formula, the reform was mainly concentrated on the most “technical” issues of the 
matter.
The rule adopted (Electoral Code) was judged by the international community as a good 
legislative framework, and the first elections undertaken under the new legislation, supported 
by continuous international pressures, showed a much lower number of irregularities. 
Again, the problem in Macedonia, as testified by the repeated violence in 2008, remains not 
in the legislation, but in the lack of political will (at least in the case of part of the elite) to 
comply with the democratic rules of the game. The Macedonian political elite is divided by 
ethnic lines in two distinct blocks. The Albanian party system and political elite show quite a 
low level of acceptance of democratic practices and respect for the rule of law (we can recall 
the  electoral  violence  and  frauds  that  are  permanent  characteristics  of  the  Albanian 
municipalities, or the boycott of the parliament by the Albanian party, unsatisfied for staying 
out of the government, or the rumors about the effort to “divide” the spheres of influence 
between the Albanian leaders). We can question to what extent their Macedonian partners, 
forced to tolerate and legitimate such behavior from their Albanian colleagues in the name of 
peace and stability, are motivated to respect the democratic process themselves?
13.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The comparison of Macedonian and Serbian electoral systems and elections represents a 
clear illustration of the importance the political will has for ensuring free and fair elections. 
The history of the Macedonian elections shows that a legislative framework responding to the 
highest international standards is far from being a sufficient condition for free elections to 
take place. It is important to underline that we are not facing some endemic characteristic of 
the  Macedonian electorate  doomed to violence  or  lack of  political  culture,  as  the  relative 
fairness  of  2006  elections  in  Macedonia  testified  on the  political  background of  electoral 
irregularities, easily prevented by strong pressures from the international community. Similarly, 
the  Serbian case,  where the  elections  are judged as  mainly  free,  fair  and undertaken in  a 
professional manner notwithstanding the shortcomings in the legislative framework, shows 
that  even  an  imperfect  legislative  framework,  if  there  is  a  political  will  for  proper 
implementation, can produce a positive impact.
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What can explain and account for the lack of political will  to ensure a regular electoral 
process? First of all, we should underline that the pressures used in Macedonia in 2006 and 
2008  are  significantly  different.  In  2006  the  general,  official  conditionality  (country’s 
membership in EU and NATO) as well as direct, unofficial pressure over the political leaders 
were  exercised  (we recall  the  USA representative’s  announcement  and pressures  over  the 
political parties). In 2008 the prevalence of general incentives and weaker direct pressures over 
the political leadership showed that, for the politicians, the benefits deriving from achieving 
the power over the country are far higher than the benefits from Macedonia’s entry into EU 
(or from the costs in terms of legitimacy and electoral support in case the integrations are 
delayed). Furthermore, the prevalence of the concentration of irregularities and violence cases 
in  areas  controlled  by  ethnic  Albanians  is  striking431.  If  we pay attention  to the Albanian 
spectrum  of  the  Macedonian  political  system,  we  can  notice  very  low  levels  of 
institutionalization of the responsibility (Ieraci, 2003). The prevalence of one party (PDP) in 
the period 1990-1998 ended with DPA rising to power in  1998,  to be changed,  after the 
armed conflict, with the leadership of the Albanian paramilitary units that formed the political 
party DUI, the strongest Albanian political party since 2001. The refusal of DUI to accept the 
VMRO-DPA government in 2006-2008 that dragged Macedonia into a deep political crisis, 
the rumour about the alleged deal proposal between DPA and DUI over the “division of the 
electoral results”432, the prevalence of cases of violence in the areas prevalently inhabited by 
the Albanian ethnic minority, all testify the almost absent interiorization of the democratic 
norms into the Albanian spectrum of the political elite. In the interview with Hristova, it was 
underlined that even the Macedonian domestic experts are not sure what the mechanisms for 
the allocation of power within the Albanian ethnic community are, as it appears evident that 
the electoral will of the Albanian citizens is far from being the decisive factor in the struggle 
for power.
From this point of view, Serbia represents an opposite example, where, due to the ten-year 
long  negative  experience  of  electoral  frauds  and  malversation,  freedom  and  fairness  of 
elections became better internalized (we can recall  the three-month long protests in 1996-
431 See the OSCE/ODIHR report on the 2008 elections.
432 Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska quote the episode prior to the 2005 local elections when, during the 
unofficial  meeting between DUI and DPA leaders,  the DPA leadership offered Ahmeti  the “victory on the 
parliamentary elections in exchange for the DPA’s victory in the local elections”. An offer refused by DUI seen 
the hegemonic position the party enjoys in the Albanian electorate. As a result, DUI won both the 2005 local, as 
well as the 2006 parliamentary elections, but was cut out of the government due to the choice of VMRO to take 
DPA as a coalitional partner. 
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1997, as well as the 2000 protests, which had the respect for the citizens’ vote as their core). 
Such experience and relatively high levels of civic conscience when it comes to the fairness of 
the elections represent an important barrier for possible manipulations by the political elite. 
Limited in their possibility to manipulate the electoral results, the Serbian political elite opted 
to partially limit the effects of the citizen’s vote by introducing sort of an imperative mandate 
(see the section on the political system). The limiting effects such provision creates on the 
implications of the citizens capacity to exercise their power through the electoral participation 
can be best observed on the effects this provision produces on a local level. 
Turning to the process of building up the legislative framework, we can observe how, in 
Macedonia’s case, the very strong international pressures since 2005 resulted in rule adoption 
without  implementation.  All  recommendations  made  by  the  international  experts  were 
accepted and the legislative framework gained significant appraisals, the 2006 elections being 
rather fair, yet, as soon as the international attention was lowered, part of the political elite 
started to use violence again. 
In Serbia, given the relatively positive assessment of the electoral process, the international 
pressures  concerning  the  electoral  reform were  relatively  weak.  Thus,  the  changes  in  the 
electoral legislation were mainly driven by domestic factors, resulting in far more attention 
being paid to the electoral engineering rather than to other aspects of the electoral system. 
APPENDIX
Table 1: “The EU priorities concerning the Serbian electoral system”.
2002 Reform of electoral laws and provisions, a priority recommendation of the Council of Europe, should be brought into line with Council of Europe and OSCE 
standards by autumn 2002.
2003 Immediate revision of electoral laws and provisions, including media-related, to align with European standards.
2004 Short-term priorities: complete the ongoing electoral law reform (including electorate register) to bring the electoral system up to international standards 
notably by revising electoral laws, in line with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights recommendations and fully implementing legislation on 
financing of political parties.
2006 Short-term priorities: Complete the reform of the electoral law reform (including electoral register), in line with the recommendations of the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights; fully implement legislation on financing of political parties. 
2007 Short-term priorities: Complete the reform of the legal framework on elections (including the voters’ register), bring it into line with the new constitutional 
requirements and ensure transparency and accountability of political party financing, including revision of the existing legislation to provide for sufficient 
monitoring and sanctions.
2008 Short-term priorities: Complete the reform of the legal framework on elections (including the voters' register), bring it into line with the new constitutional 
requirements and ensure transparency and accountability of political party financing, including revision of the existing legislation to provide for sufficient 
monitoring and sanctions.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, my elaboration.
Table 2: “The EU priorities concerning the Macedonian electoral system”.
2002 Adapt electoral legislation in line with OSCE/ODHIR recommendations before the next Parliamentary elections in 2002, and enforce implementation.
2003 None.
2004 None.
2006 Key short-term priorities: Implement the recommendations regarding the electoral process made by the OSCE-Office for democratic institutions and human 
rights in time for the next elections. 
Short-term priorities: Address the shortcomings identified in the electoral process and ensure a free and fair process in the next parliamentary elections. 
Prosecute frauds and irregularities.
2007 Short-term priorities: Ensure that the next presidential and municipal elections are conducted in accordance with the electoral code. Deliver prompt decisions 
on any election irregularities and impose penalties that will deter further cases. 
2008 Short-term priorities: Ensure that all future elections are conducted in accordance with the electoral code. Deliver prompt decisions on any election 
irregularities and impose penalties that will deter further cases.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
Table 3: “The EU financial support to the Macedonian electoral system”.
2001 0.5 millions Support to the 2002 Parliamentary elections (voter education outreach programme, procurement of polling materials and equipment, training of 
police force on how to handle an election).
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007.
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Table 4: The election administration and right to vote in Serbia and Macedonia, according to relevant legislation in force” (author's elaboration).
Macedonia Dimension Serbia
Every citizen of the Republic of Macedonia who has turned 18 years of 
age and has working capacity. 
Universal suffrage:  
conditions for the right to  
vote:
Every citizen of the Republic of Macedonia who has turned 18 years 
of age and has working Capacity (the law on parliamentary elections, 
as  it  is  still  not  harmonized  with  the  constitution,  includes  the 
Yugoslav citizenship and residence in Serbia).
The Voters’ List (considered to be a public document the citizens have 
right to inspect and ask for the correction) is kept by the Ministry of 
Justice. It shall be maintained according to the Register of Citizens in 
the form of a Register of Voters, with automatic data processing in an 
electronic form. It is free of charge. According to OSCE due to the 
complicated procedures for changing the data in the Register of Citizens 
combined with high levels of migration and immigration, the register is 
not completely up to date. 
Voter’s register:
Conducted under a “passive” system. Voter lists (considered to be a 
public document the citizens have right to inspect and ask for the 
correction) are compiled from data contained in the municipal civil 
status offices. It is free of charge. The voter lists are maintained on a 
continuous basis by municipal authorities under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Public Administration and Self-Governance and in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Interior.  The voter lists are to be 
merged in a unified, computerized, permanent national register, still 
to be implemented. 
The right on candidacy is granted to any citizen that: is 18 years old; has 
working  capacity;  is  not  serving  a  prison  sentence  for  committed 
criminal  offence,  and  has  not  been  given  a  final  court  decision  for 
imprisonment of at least 6 months. 
Candidacy:
The right on candidacy is granted to all citizens that enjoy the right to 
vote.
For  the  parliamentary  elections:  1)  Registered  political  parties  can 
propose  the  candidate  lists.  2)  Group  of  citizens  and  independent 
candidates need 1.000 of signatures. 
For the presidential elections: Both party and independent candidates 
need of 10.000 signatures. 
Registration of Candidate  
Lists:
For  the  parliamentary  elections:  registration  requires  10.000  of 
signatures of voters (both for the lists of the political parties and for 
the  lists  of  group  of  citizens)  No  clear  criteria  for  assessing  the 
validity of signatures.
Presidential elections: 10.000 signatures.
Three  tier  administration:  State  Electoral  Commission,  Municipal 
Election Commission, Election Boards
SEC since 2006: permanent body that oversees general preparations for 
the election; 7 members on 5 years mandate, appointed by 2/3 majority 
in assembly in process including both position and oppositional parties.
Municipal  Election  Commissions:  responsible  for  overseeing  the 
election  process  in  each  municipality,  5  members  randomly  selected 
from the civil servants with higher education resident in the municipality 
for the five-year term.
EB:  5  members,  appointed  by  the  relevant  MEC upon  the  random 
selection from state employees.
Electoral Administration:
Two  tier  administration:  Republican  Electoral  Commission  and 
Polling Boards.
Republican  Electoral  Commission:  overall  responsibility  to 
administer  the  elections.  17  permanent  members,  appointed for  4 
years. No political party can have more than half its members in the 
permanent composition of the REC. The extended composition of 
REC  includes  the  17  members  and  one  representative  of  each 
candidate list submitted.
Polling  Boards:  serve  voters  at  polling  stations on election day.  3 
members  in  the  permanent  composition,  while  extended 
composition includes the representatives of each candidate list.
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Table 5: “The exercise of the right to vote in Serbia and Macedonia”.
Macedonia Dimension: Serbia
“In  most  of  the  country  the  elections  were  procedurally  well 
administered. However, expectations of progress were not realized 
because  of  a  failure  by  some  election  stakeholders  and  relevant 
authorities  to  prevent  violent  acts  in  predominantly  ethnic 
Albanian  areas,  including  limited  and  selective  enforcement  of 
laws.  Organized efforts  to  violently  disrupt  the process  early  on 
election day made it  impossible  for  voters  in many locations to 
freely express their will” (OSCE/ODIHR report, 2008).
Assessment of the most recent elections: “Overall  conducted in line with OSCE commitments 
and  other  international  standards  for  democratic 
elections, although they were overshadowed, in part, by 
a few negative aspects of the campaign. These elections 
provided  a  genuine  opportunity  for  the  citizens  of 
Serbia to choose freely from a range of political parties 
and coalitions” (OSCE/ODIHR report, 2008).
Every third candidate on the list must be female.
The family voting and violation of the women’ right to vote in the 
Albanian parts of the country were registered.
Participation of woman in most recent  
elections:
Every 4th candidate on the list must be female (yet, as 
the assignment of mandates is under party control and 
do not respect the list of candidates, the % of women 
in the assembly is lower).
No particular provisions. The national minorities gained 38 seats in 
assembly (31%), of which 29 by Albanian parties, and 9 of other 
minorities competing in coalition with Macedonian parties.
Participation of national minorities in most  
recent elections:
The census of 5% is not imposed on the minorities. 
Seven  deputies  from  the  minority  lists  were  elected, 
2,8%.
Registered, one dead, several wounded, intimidation both during 
the vote and during the vote count.
Cases of violence in most recent elections: Not registered.
Ballot  boxes  stolen  in  one  pooling  station,  30  cases  of  evident 
ballot  stuffing,  the  ballot  boxes  and  electoral  materials  stolen, 
voting assessed as bad in 8% of cases (20% in the predominantly 
ethnic  Albanian  areas),  family  voting  high  presence  of 
unauthorized persons in pooling stations, counting assessed as bad 
or very bad in 15% of polling stations observed. 
Irregularities in most recent elections: Polling was generally conducted professionally and in a 
calm  atmosphere,  and  co-operation  between  PB 
members and knowledge of procedures appeared to be 
high.  The  inadequate  layout  of  numerous  polling 
stations and the low quality of the ballot paper, were 
identified as potential source of risk for the secrecy of 
vote if not properly folded. Few cases of family voting 
in rural areas.
Source: For Macedonia, OSCE/ODIHR report on election in Macedonia, 2008, For Serbia, OSCE/ODIHR report on election in Serbia, 2008.
468
Table 6: “The electoral system in Serbia and Macedonia, according to the legislation on the parliamentary elections” (author's elaboration).
Macedonia Dimension: Serbia
120. Number of deputies: 250.
Proportional, D’Hondt. Electoral formula: Proportional, D’Hondt.
6. Number of constituency: 1.
20 deputies. Size of constituency: 250 deputies.
None. Threshold: 5%.
- Exemptions from census: National minorities.
The part of the ballot used for voting for election of Members of 
Parliament shall contain: Title of the ballot, number of election 
district, municipality and number of the polling station; Ordinal 
number, name and symbol (if any) of the list submitter; and Name 
and surname of the candidates on basis of data from the registry 
books, the voters should mark the ordinal number of the list 
submitter.
Ballot:
The ballot should contain: ordinal number placed in front of the 
name of the electoral list; the names of the electoral lists, 
according to the order determined in the general electoral list, 
with the name of the first candidate from the list; a remark 
stating that it is possible to vote for one list only, by circling the 
ordinal number in front of the name of the list.
Mandates assigned. Manner to assign the mandate: Party decide how to distribute the mandates.
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Table 7: “The electoral reform in Macedonia, external factors” (author's elaboration).
 2002 reform 2006 reform
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important 
international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? No. Yes.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the 
integration process took place? No. Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? - Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the 
SAA reports? Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No. No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 0,5. -
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the 
country:
0,76% (of the assistance made available in 
2001). -
Reform perceived by the IA as: Part of the implementation of OFA.
Step in the process of the 
democratization and 
implementation of OFA.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security/democratization. Democratization as a mean of security.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the 
domestic stakeholders?
Partially (it accepted the lack of full 
compliance with IA's recommendations in 
order to respect the inter-ethnic agreement).
No.
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the 
law drafting? Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly. Yes.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the 
status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? Partially. Yes.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the 
international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways? X Yes.
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Table 8: “The electoral reform in Serbia, external factors” (author's elaboration).
 2002 amendments to the Law on the Election of President
2004 amendments to the Law 
on Parliamentary elections 2007 "electoral reform"
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an 
important international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? No. No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important 
steps in the integration process took place? No. No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No. No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA reports?
Yes (combined with strong 
diplomatic pressure). Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the 
laws? No. No. No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 0.00 0.00 0.00
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU 
assistance to the country: 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary to avoid the political stagnation in the country.
Necessary in order to bring the 
legislation up to European 
standards and prevent from the 
eventual abuses.
Necessary in order to 
bring the legislation up 
to European standards 
and prevent from the 
eventual abuses.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization. Democratization. Democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of 
power by the domestic stakeholders? X X X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was 
it used in the law drafting? Yes. Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Yes. Partially. Mainly not.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to 
external criticisms?
No. No. No.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its 
compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization 
of the law in other ways?
No. No. No.
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Table 9: “The electoral reform in Macedonia, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
2002 reform 2006 reform
Domestic input for the change: Present (OFA). Present (the necessity to react to the irregularities 2005).
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present (political parties). Present yet weak (civil sector, citizens).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Mid. X
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Intra-party, inter-ethnic. X
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? X No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Positional (the reform mainly concerned the electoral engineering).
Salience (the reform mainly concerned 
the "technical issues".
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: X Political parties.
The main beneficiaries of the change: X Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes (all parties seeking for the change). Yes (but only nominally).
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity – stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors)? Fluid. Fluid.
Table 10: “The electoral reform in Serbia, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
2002 amendments to the Law on the Election 
of President
2004 amendments to the Law on 
Parliamentary elections 2007 "electoral reform"
Domestic input for the change: Present (institutional crisis after failure to elect the president).
Present (fear of the institutional crisis in case 
of the failure to appoint the government).
Present (constitutional 
reform).
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: DSS, NGOs, media. All political parties. X
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High. Low. High.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Intra-party. X Intra-party.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No. No. No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Positional (the amendments concerned mainly the electoral engineering).
Positional (the amendments concerned 
mainly the electoral engineering). Positional.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling DOS. X X
The main beneficiaries of the change: X Citizens (in particular those groups that saw their rights better protected). Political parties.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all 
relevant actors? Yes. X No.
Two or more alternative solutions present? Yes. X Yes.
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of 
power of the central actors) Fluid. Fluid. Fluid.
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Table 11: “The electoral reform in Macedonia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
2002 reform 2006 reform
The procedure of law drafting: Behind closed doors. X
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation:
Participation of judges in the electoral administration, vague provisions about the 
role of security forces during elections; ambiguous and inconsistent provisions for 
the annulment of results,  repeat of elections, complaints and appeals; the voting 
rights of non-resident citizens; the lack of enforcement of financial regulations.
In  line  with  European  standards,  but  the 
elections 2008 showed that the law was not 
respected.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Political parties. Political parties.
The status (2008): - Rule adoption successful; complete lack of rule implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
The OSCE-ODIHR election observation 
mission reported that key international 
standards were not met in the conduct of 
the elections.
The electoral campaign was marred by 
several incidents. In many instances attacks 
on campaign offices were not investigated 
by the authorities, which conveyed a sense 
of impunity to the perpetrators. Effective 
remedies were not taken against the alleged 
violations. 
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Table 12: “The electoral reform in Serbia, outcomes” (author's elaboration).
2002 amendments to the Law on the 
Election of President
2004 amendments to the Law on 
Parliamentary elections 2007 "electoral reform"
The procedure of law drafting: X X X
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation: Failure to meet existing shortcomings.
Failure to meet existing 
shortcomings.
Failure to meet existing shortcomings, introduction 
of the imperative mandate.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: X X Political parties.
The status (2008): - -
The electoral reform that would bring Serbian 
electoral legislation in line with European standards 
and remove the shortcomings still pending.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
International observation bodies qualified the 
elections as largely in line with international 
standards, but noted that they were partly 
overshadowed by negative aspects of the campaign. 
The electoral framework has not been revised and is 
not in line with European standards. Existing 
legislation continues to allow parties to appoint 
members of parliament arbitrarily from their 
electoral lists after the elections instead of 
determining the order beforehand. This system 
lacks transparency and gives political parties full 
control over the candidates.
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14. MINORITY RIGHTS
“The most certain test by which we judge whether a country  
is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities”
Lord Acton Dalberg, 1877.
The fall of the communism and the spread of ethnic nationalism that, rather than dead as 
some expected it  to be433,  revealed to be vivid and capable of deciding the destiny of the 
Eastern-Central Europe434, brought the question of the minorities’ rights to the centre of the 
debate in political philosophy, the moral arguments backing these rights and their relations to 
the underlying principles of liberal democracy435. The overlapping of the nation-state building 
and democratization,  especially  in  the  Balkans,  the emergence of  the  nationalism and the 
ethnically-based violence that took place strengthened the attention on the minorities’ rights 
as being fundamental for peace in the region. Ethnically and religiously heterogeneous, in an 
area where ethnicity was a key for the distribution of political power during the long history 
under  the  Ottoman  and  Habsburg  empires,  and  where  ethnicity  continued,  during  the 
communism,  to  be  a  key  for  distributing  rights  and  obligations436,  former  Yugoslavia 
represented a  case  where  the  institutional  legacies,  combined  with  the  perceptions  of  the 
nation  and  the  “subversive  structure  of  opportunities”,  became  fertile  ground  for  ethnic 
tensions  and violence.  The definition  of  political  community,  nation,  nation-state and the 
status of minorities became a key problem in the democratization of the states created after 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
As Linz and Stepan (1996) argued, the nation building process raises serious threats to 
democratization, especially where the “ethnic” definition of the nation prevails in the context 
of a heterogeneous society. The definition of state as a state of the specific ethnic group, as 
opposed to the civic state, creates citizens of first and second order. It then results that the 
433 For example, Bunce (2005) argues that both Tismaneanu (1999) as well as Hobsbawm (1990) speak about 
communism as the ideology which, underlining the class conflict, might put an end to nationalism.
434 According to Bunce it was at the same time an impetus for democratization and an obstacle to it, see 
Bunce, 1999.
435 Kymlicka, 2001.
436 See Bunce, 2005.
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civic, inclusive definition of polity and state would avoid the problems of the ethnic conflict. 
Yet, as Bunce convincingly argued, the structure of the opportunities, the institutional setting 
and the process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia made such more favourable solutions 
almost impossible to follow437. As Hayden showed, all the states created after the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia opted for the creation of nation-states with “constitutional nationalism”, thus 
creating the problem of big national minorities and their treatment438. 
The inter-ethnic relations and the national minorities’ rights are particularly relevant for the 
democratization  process.  The presence of  different  politicized  (or  potentially  politicizable) 
ethnic/nation/religious communities can represent a problem for the polity-making process, 
offering competitive principles for the definition of the political community and rising conflict 
in the very foundations of the state. The existence of the conflict over the political community 
raises questions about democratization, because the universalistic, inclusive values upon which 
the  democracy  should  be  founded  are  in  contradiction  with  the  exclusivists’  process  of 
defining the nation and drawing a distinction between inner and outer groups. The definition 
of polity and citizenship is therefore a first step where the heterogeneity of the group might 
bring to a situation where the prevalence of the ethnic principle brings to the negation of the 
rights to the citizens with ethnic origins different from that of the majority.
Finally, even where, due to the universal suffrage, the minimal political, civil and human 
rights  are  granted to all,  the  members  of  the  minorities  might  face practical  problems in 
exercising their own rights, resulting in a de-facto marginalization and discrimination due to 
their minority status. The simplest example concerns the existence of linguistic minorities. The 
right to information, the right to vote, the day-to-day contacts with the state administration, all 
might become far more difficult for those citizens whose mother tongue is different from the 
standardized language. Seen the distributive  implications  and the political  relevance of  the 
language policy, the presence of policies aiming to decrease the marginalizing effects produced 
by the standardization of language for the linguistic minorities is of crucial importance for 
exercising their basic human, political and civil rights. 
In the following sections we shall analyse the development of the minority rights in Serbia 
and Macedonia.  As we will  see,  the two countries  are very different on a level  of  ethnic 
heterogeneity, the relationship between the majority and minorities, the problems that brought 
to the rise of nationalism and specificities of the nation-building process. 
437 See Bunce, 1999, 2005, 2006.
438 Hayden, 2001.
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14.1. SERBIA
14.1.1. STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OTHERS
Both due to the multiethnic character of Serbia, but particularly due to the nationalism that 
since the end of 80s was systematically developed through a series of nationalization policies 
creating and maintaining (but also created and maintained by) the regime, the protection of 
the several national minorities is one of the most important issues in the field of protection of 
the human rights in Serbia. The period of Milošević’s regime, sinking its roots in nationalistic 
ideology, was a period of suppression of minority rights. The high regional concentration of 
minority groups was used as an excuse for centralization, ethnicity and “patriotism” being the 
criteria distinguishing between the citizens, while the secret services particularly kept an eye on 
those “who were not Serbs enough”439. 
The change of the regime saw a temporary decrease in the “ethnic temperature” in the 
country: the extreme nationalist parties lost the support and in the first two years of transition 
it appeared that Serbian nationalism was left to history. 
The climate, however, changed, as the question of the cooperation with ICTY made the 
“soft  nationalistic”  DSS  and  “liberal”  DS  split  up.  The  questions  of  the  relation  with 
Montenegro and the Kosovo status, together with the assassination of the Prime Minister 
Đinđić, gave nationalism new strength that grew together with the support to the nationalistic 
SRS, which was increasing since the presidential elections in 2003. The public opinion survey, 
measuring  the  (in)tolerance  of  majority,  also showed this  trend:  while  the  level  of  ethnic 
distance showed a tendency to decrease in 2001 if compared to the previous period, in 2003 it 
increased  again  and  remained  stable  until  present.  Thus,  42%  of  citizens  do  not  accept 
Albanians as citizens of Serbia, while 25% do not want any contacts with Croats440. The results 
concerning the rights granted to the minorities are similar, perceived to be too wide: according 
to the Belgrade centre for human rights (report 2003): “ 65% of citizens think that ethnic 
minorities in Serbia and Montenegro have the right to publish books and attend schools in 
their mother tongue, without any limitations, but only slightly more than half (52%) approve 
439 See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/tema.php?yyyy=2006&mm=12&nav_id=224151.
440 Beoradski Centar za Ljudska Prava, Report 2006.
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of this policy; 16% would limit these rights to disloyal ethnic minorities, and 26% to all ethnic 
minorities”441. 
In such an atmosphere it is no surprise that on one side there is some compliance with the 
international standards and in the development of the institutional framework, while on the 
other the human rights agencies continue to report cases of serious violations of minority 
rights and ethnic based violence. 
The minority rights protection was one of the few competencies of the federal level in FR 
Yugoslavia and in Serbia and Montenegro. As soon as the transition took place, the protection 
of human and minorities’ rights became a priority of the new ruling elite, both as an attempt 
to distinguish themselves from the previous regime and in a response to the international (and 
at the time most significant CoE) pressures on the issue. Thus, already back in May 2001, 
Yugoslavia signed the Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, while 
the  federal  assembly  passed  the  Law on  the  Protection  of  Rights  and  Freedoms  of  the 
National Minorities in February 2002. The constitutional chart of the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro adoption in February 2003 also included,  as one of the components,  the 
Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties Charter that laid down all major provisions of 
the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of the National Minorities442. 
Other pieces of legislation also fostered the protection of the minority rights. In 2002, the 
Law on the Local Government established the institution of advisory ethnic councils, to be 
formed  in  all  multi-ethnic  municipalities.  The  councils  were  given  the  veto  power  in  all 
matters  concerning  the  minorities  rights.  The  establishment  of  the  local  and  provincial 
ombudsman in 2002 was also judged as a positive step in the field, even though the republic 
ombudsman with constitutional basis would obviously have been a better solution. Finally, as 
part of the police reform and management of the inter-ethnic conflict in the south Serbia, 
multi-ethnic  policing  (and,  later,  the  administration)  was  established  in  cooperation  with 
OSCE in Southern Serbia. 
In the period after the adoption of the Constitutional Charter, the process of building the 
institutional capacity took place. On a federal level, the Ministry for Protection of Minority 
Rights of Yugoslavia now became one of the ministries of the state union. As the Law on 
Protection of Minorities allowed the minorities to form their national councils, the biggest 
minorities  organized  themselves  creating  such  councils  as  a  new  instrument  for  the 
441 Beogradski Centar za Ljudska prava, Report 2002.
442 Biserko (eds), 2005.
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organization and protection of their rights. In 2004, the councils made a request to the Serbian 
government for the formation of the National Council for the Protection of Minorities, in line 
with the Constitutional Charter and the other State Union’s legislation. It also proposed the 
inclusion  of  the  national  councils  in  the  republican  budget  and  changes  in  the  electoral 
legislation that would ensure the mandate for at least one deputy for each of the national 
minority present in the council. Koštunica’s government only partially met these suggestions. 
The National Council for the Protection of Minorities was formed, under the Prime Minister’s 
control, but it remained inactive. The financing of the national councils entered the revised 
Law on Budget for 2004, with 41.400.000 dinars dedicated to the councils (341.000.000 were 
for the financing of political parties). The Law on the Election of Deputies adopted in 2004 
removed the 5% census for the national minorities’ parties, ensuring the representation of the 
largest minorities in the national assembly. 
After the referendum for the independence of Montenegro,  the state level  Ministry for 
Protection of Human and Minority Rights was turned into a government’s agency with the 
same  powers,  while  the  Law  on  Human  Rights  and  National  Minorities,  as  well  as  all 
international conventions signed by the State Union, became part of the Serbian legislation. 
The Venice Commission praised the constitution adopted in 2006 in those parts concerning 
the protection of the minorities’ rights, but it called for proper implementation. 
In this sense, the Law on National Councils drafted by the Agency for the Minority Rights 
surely  isn’t  a  positive  step towards  full  substantive  respect  of  minority  rights.  Both  CoE 
experts and the representatives of national minorities criticized the law due to the mandatory 
tasks imposed to the councils.  The Agency argues that the councils have delegated public 
authority,  which  implies  increased  obligation  and  control;  whereas  the  experts  and  the 
minority  representatives  consider  that  most  powers  envisaged  by  the  law  are  merely 
consultative, not involving public power  per se. It was felt that the councils should be given 
adequate room to decide on their  priorities  and areas of  work as  opposed to the current 
provision according to which they are obliged to work on a certain number of issues or they 
will  be closed down. This would likely  be especially  difficult  for smaller minorities,  or for 
those communities who may not wish to engage in all areas mentioned. 
While the legislative framework was slowly developing and was judged rather positively, its 
implementation and the situation “on the grounds” was strongly undermined. Not only the 
ethnically inspired violence, but also the inadequate reaction of the state authorities brought to 
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the 2005 CoE resolution expressing concern for the lack of protection of human rights in 
Vojvodina443. The presence of ultra-nationalists in the public administration was the issue that 
rose the concern. Thus, according to the reports of the NGOs for human rights, the cases of 
a police officer abusing minorities,  or lack of intervention in case of violation of minority 
rights, the tendency to label cases of ethnic discrimination and violence as “ordinary violence 
without ethnic basis” creates a climate where the national minorities do not feel safe. The 
behaviour of the political elite is also a matter of concern, as the national assembly often was a 
place  of  “hate  speech”,  while  the  minister  of  religion  accused the  NGOs advocating  the 
protection of human rights for their anti-serbism and for undermining the Serbian Orthodox 
Church.  In 2005,  the intolerance  of  the  governmental  officials  against  well-known human 
rights  activists  (Nataša  Kandić,  Sonja  Biserko  and  Biljana  Kovačević  Vučo)  resulted  in 
physical assaults against them and verbal harassment in public places. The members of the 
ruling elite claimed that the leading human rights’ organizations in Serbia were working for 
unspecified foreign powers, accusing them to be indifferent to the Serbian victims of war 
crimes, and underlining their “lack of patriotism”444. 
It  is  also necessary to mention that,  in some cases, the protection of minority  rights is 
undermined by the cleavages within the minorities: the number of members of the minorities, 
their  “union”  and  the  support  from  their  motherland  influence  the  level  of  their 
organizational capacity, and, by consequence, their ability to fight for their rights. The very 
difficult situation of Romas and Vlachs is mainly a product of their low level of instruction, 
the lack of a standardized written language and the conflict persisting within these groups. 
Seen the lack of organization of these minorities, they are underrepresented, and, especially 
the Romas, unprotected and often targets of violence. 
The definition of Serbia as a nation state in the constitution of 2006 did not contribute to 
settle down the ethnic spirits, while the current discussion over the Kosovo status is used by 
the national elite in a manner similar to how the ethnic conflicts were used by Milošević. The 
ethnic tensions and nationalism of the majority group are in constant increase. At the same 
time, through induction, it also brings to the rise of nationalism of the national minorities, 
whose loyalty to the state is very narrow445, an obvious response to the negative treatment the 
443 See also Dallara, 2008.
444 See “Ljudska prava u primeni”, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, 2006, 2007. 
445 Miladinović’s 2006 study of the minorities identifications shows that the members of the Serbian ethnic minorities are 
most identified with the motherland and with the local community, while their identification with the Serbian state is rather  
low. 
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national minorities enjoyed in Serbia. As Pešić (2006) underlines in an analysis of the origins 
of Serbian nationalism, it is the historically present application of double standards (territorial 
sovereignty  mixed  with  the  right  to  self-determination)  that  made  the  “Serbian  dream” 
impossible.  While  Serbia  continues  to  claim  its  rights  over  Kosovo  (and  the  Albanian 
majority) as a historical part of the Serbian territory (right to territorial sovereignty), it also 
makes claims over those parts of Croatia and Bosnia that, due to the presence of the Serbs, 
should be given the “right to self-determination”. This actually makes Serbia an impossible 
state, in an endless quest for an impossible ideal, which always keeps the “historic national 
question” on the agenda, nurturing the nationalism and ensuring, as it usually is the case, the 
strengthening of the executive. In this kind of environment, the undertaken policies of nation-
building  are  usually  hostile  towards  the  national  minorities  whose  loyalty  to  the  state  is 
therefore undermined446. 
 14.1.2. THE EU AND MINORITY RIGHTS
The international  community (the Council  of Europe and EU in particular) played and 
important role in fostering the minority rights in Serbia. The pressures were strong, being the 
question  of  minorities  a  rather  important  question  in  all  regions  of  the  Balkans.  The 
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities and the Law on Protection 
of Human and Minority Rights were a subject of the CoE conditionality, the Law on Local 
Government as well, while the EU was very active in designing the State Union Constitutional 
Charter (and its part on the protection of human rights). 
The  EU conditionality  in  this  field  concerned  the  lack  of  clarity  of  the  constitutional 
distribution of competencies in the field, and the lack of legislative harmonization between 
different  levels  of  government,  which  is  considered  a  main  obstacle  in  the  protection  of 
minority rights. As it was also the case with other priorities calling for the harmonization and 
coordination between state and republic level, the issue remained unsolved until it was put off 
the  agenda  due  to  the  state  disintegration.  Other  recommendations  concerned  the 
strengthening of the minority national councils, the promotion of good inter-ethnic relations 
(in  particular  by  taking  adequate  measures  in  the  field  of  education),  promotion  of  the 
minorities’ participation to the judiciary and in other law enforcement bodies. The response 
446 Not to go too far in history, the Hungarian national council expressed its concerns in autumn 2007, claiming that the 
police is making a list of the empty houses in Vojvodina with an aim to use them to solve the problems of the Serbs illegally  
staying in the EU countries that will rise after signing the accord on readmission. This would be only an example of the state’s 
policy aiming to change the ethnic composition of Vojvodina. 
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 482
the Serbian government gave to these issues was the already mentioned Law on National 
Councils (still in drafting procedures), the introduction of education for the police officers in 
the  minorities’  language  (in  order  to  increase  the  representatives  of  minorities  in  police), 
education training, and a series of programs in cooperation with international actors. 
14.1.3. ASSESSMENT
The issue of the minorities’ rights protection is a rather delicate issue in Serbia, given the 
ethnic conflicts in the Balkans as well as the persistence of nationalism, due to the unfinished 
settlement of the state borders.  On the one hand, we can see the functioning of the rule 
adoption and relatively sensible answer of the government to the issue, while on the other, the 
radicalization of the majority group is bringing to both cases of ethnic violence, and, more 
concerning, radicalized statements of that part of political elite that seems prone to use the 
nationalist cause in the political struggle with the opponents. This resulted both in the increase 
of the minority rights on one side, and on the other the ethnic distance and the temperature 
got back to the levels prior to the transition. 
The role of the international community was very strong in this field, while on the other 
hand there were no “official” veto players, which all resulted in a smooth adoption of the rule. 
The passage of the competence from a federal level to the Serbian state, can be potentially 
fruitful  for  further  development,  as  it  can  contribute  to  increase  the  determinacy  of  the 
conditionality:  we  saw  how  the  most  important  protection  mechanisms  remained  poorly 
implemented due to the lack of coordination between state union and republic. 
While  the legislative guarantees of the minority  rights saw some developments and will 
surely continue to develop, the potential ethnic conflict still persists. The definition of Serbia 
as a nation state and the shape of the Serbian nationalism are not helpful for the development 
of  the  minorities’  loyalty  towards  the  state,  a  necessary  condition  for  all  heterogeneous 
societies. 
14.2. MACEDONIA
14.2.1. MINORITY RIGHTS
The inter-ethnic relations and the minority rights represented the key issue of Macedonian 
difficult paths towards the democratization. The position of the ethnic Albanians, the rights 
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and  status  they  aspired  to  and  those  they  enjoyed  were  a  crucial  problem  in  the 
democratization of Macedonia, the ethnic violence ongoing in the neighborhood not being a 
positive environment at all. 
The inter-ethnic  relations  and the  status  of  ethnic  Albanians  actually  monopolized  the 
entire agenda concerning the protection of minority rights, concentrating the legislation in the 
field of the search for balance between the majority and the biggest minority in the country. In 
such asset, the other minorities on the territory (Serbs, Turks, Romas, Vlachs, Bosniaks and 
others) were beneficiaries (and victims) of the Albanians fight for rights and Macedonian’s 
intention to balance and alienate the effects of the concessions made.
In almost all  dimensions analyzed we underlined the importance of the ethnic conflict, 
showing how, in  many cases,  the key for understanding the changes in different fields of 
policy  making in  Macedonia  is  the  relationship  between the ethnic  groups and the issues 
concerning the protection of the minority rights.  We saw how the OFA tackled the issue, 
prescribing power-sharing mechanisms, the veto power to the minorities and the principle of 
equal representation in all state institutions. We saw how these provisions reflected on the 
parliament’s functioning, their impact on the reforms of the police, territorial organization, 
administration and judiciary. In this paragraph we will face some of the remaining issues, like 
the  legislation  on citizenship,  the  use  of  the  language,  the  use  of  the  symbols  of  ethnic 
communities,  the  functioning  of  the  committee  for  inter-ethnic  relations,  as  well  as  the 
position of other ethnic minorities.
The  Macedonian  constitution  from 1991,  excluding  the  preamble  where  Macedonia  is 
defined “the national state of the Macedonian people, where equality between all citizens and 
harmony between Macedonians and Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Romas and other nationalities 
living  on the territory  are protected”,  adopted the civil  and citizen-based approach to the 
organization of the state and protection of the rights, underlining the devotion to equality and 
protection of all citizens and offering the national minorities a series of cultural and political 
rights.  However,  the  status  of  the  ethnic  minority  was  the  issue  that  raised  the  greatest 
malcontent of the Albanian ethnic community, causing withdrawal of loyalty, boycott of the 
referendum on the independence and of the adoption of the constitution. Being the major 
ethnic community in the country, the Albanians were hoping for the status of constituent 
nation of a bi-national state, strongly opposing the formulation that defined Macedonia as a 
nation state. In 1992, the minority even organized a referendum asking for the independence 
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of the  “Illirian Republic”,  the western part  of  Macedonia where the Albanian  minority  is 
concentrated, raising the distrust of the Macedonian majority.
The right to free expression of own ethnic origin, the right to expression of identity and 
ethnic particularities, the right to association and formation of political parties, the right to use 
own language,  education  in  own language,  use  of  the  national  minority  language  in  state 
institutions on a local level, were all granted already in the 1991 constitution (articles 7, 8, 48, 
preamble).  The council  for the inter-ethnic relations was to be formed and was given the 
consultative role in all issues concerning the inter-ethnic relations. The council was to be made 
of 12 members:  two of each for Albanians,  Macedonians,  Turks, Vlachs,  Romas and two 
members of other minorities (article 79). 
Even though the  constitution  did  not  prescribe  the  power-sharing  mechanisms  in  the 
formation  of  the  government,  the  practice  was  established  according  to  which  the 
Macedonian parties always included the ethnic Albanian party in the government. As far as the 
representation of the minority in the state institutions is concerned, we already underlined in 
other sections that it was a source of tensions between the ethnic groups, and was mainly a 
consequence of the lower level of education in the Albanian population447. The education on 
the languages of the national minorities was therefore identified as a key request of the ethnic 
Albanians and was a source of conflict between the two ethnic groups.
The  education  in  the  language  of  the  ethnic  minorities  was  guaranteed  by  the  1991 
constitution, where the minorities were allowed primary, secondary and high school education 
in their own language (art 48). The formulation of article 48 strictly limited the education in 
the  language  of  the  ethnic  minorities  to  primary  and  secondary  education,  leaving  out 
academic education. Until 1992, the lack of universities in Albanian language in Macedonia 
was compensated with the existence  of  the University  of  Priština in  Kosovo that  offered 
formation  in  Albanian  language,  where  most  of  the  ethnic  Albanian  elite  was  educated. 
However,  when Milošević  denied the  right  to higher  education  in  Albanian  language,  the 
source of qualified staff for teaching in the primary, secondary and high schools in Macedonia 
were cut away, increasing the pressure for formation of the university in Albanian language. 
Even  though  the  Law  on  the  University  did  forbid  any  discrimination  of  the  ethnic 
communities, the Albanian pupils that received all their education in Albanian language meet 
de-facto obstacles once they were supposed to sustain the exam for entering the University 
447 On the  demographic  data  and the  levels  of  education across  the  ethnic  groups,  see  Nikolovska  and 
Siljanovska-Davkova, 2001.
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and then to attend the lessons in Macedonian448. The introduction of the 10% minority quota 
in 1993 partially removed the obstacle to the access to the university education, but however it 
wasn’t enough for satisfying the needs, neither was it a solution able to offer well-qualified 
staff, as the double standards followed in order to ensure that the quota is respected. 
After further pressures and requests for the establishment of the university in Albanian 
language  coming  from the  minority,  and  after  the  formation  of  the  controversial  private 
Albanian University in Tetovo in 1994, whose accreditations were refused by the government, 
in  1997  a special  law was  introduced in  order  to allow formation in  the  language of  the 
minorities  at  the  pedagogy  faculty449.  This  provision  brought  only  modest  results,  as  the 
problem of higher education in minority language persisted and the pressures were growing 
stronger in time.
The use of the minorities’ languages in the local municipalities was guaranteed by the article 
7  of  the  constitution,  allowing  the  official  use  of  the  language  of  the  minority  in  those 
municipalities  where  the  minorities  are  present in  great  number.  The Law on Local  Self-
government from 1995 established that the language of the national minority should be used 
in a municipality where more than 20% of the citizens belong to that minority. The Law on 
the  Use  of  Flags  and  Symbols  Expressing  the  Ethnic  Identity  of  the  Members  of  the 
Minorities was also adopted in 1997, allowing these symbols to be exposed on the buildings of 
the local self-government in those municipalities where the ethnic community is a majority. 
During the national holidays, the symbols of the ethnic community were also allowed to be 
exposed together with the symbols of the state. The use of symbols in private life was allowed 
and not  limited.  As  far  as  the  functioning  of  the  council  for  the  inter-ethnic  relations  is 
concerned, while it was praised as a positive example in the Balkans struggling in the ethnic 
conflict,  the  institution  however  did  not  prove  to  be  an  efficient  instrument  for  the 
establishment of the inter-ethnic dialogue450. As the 2001 ethnic violence testified, the council 
failed to serve its primary purpose.
The ethnic conflict that bursted in 2001 brought to the signature of OFA, that further 
increased the rights  enjoyed by the  minorities  (in  a,  however,  un-proportional  way as  the 
smaller minorities were not so successful in pushing their own issues onto the agenda). The 
448 See the European Union Commission service report, regional approach to the countries of South Eastern 
Europe, 1997.
449 The staff for the primary and secondary school is enrolled from this faculty, while the teachers in high 
school are graduated from the faculties specialized in the subjects they are teaching.
450 See the European Union Commission service report, regional approach to the countries of South Eastern 
Europe, 1997.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 486
amendments agreed upon in the peace treaty tackled the use of the language (5th amendment), 
the principle of equal representation in all state and public institutions (6th amendment), the 
use of symbols and the right to the formation of institutions with educational objectives and 
scientific associations (8th amendment). The “Badinter double majority”, as it was named, an 
instrument guaranteeing the veto power to the minorities, was prescribed for the adoption of 
those laws that directly tackle culture, use of languages, education, personal documents and 
use of symbols (10th amendment), while the two-third majority combined with the support of 
most  of  the  deputies  belonging  to  the  non-Macedonian  ethnic  group is  required  for  the 
legislation concerning the local self-government and territorial organization (16th amendment) 
and for the change of the constitution. Minorities were given the veto power in the procedure 
prescribed  for  the  appointment  of  the  members  of  the  judiciary  council  and  3  out  of  9 
members of the constitutional court (amendments 14th and 15th), while the 12th amendment 
prescribed the establishment of the Committee for inter-ethnic relations, changing both its 
composition and role if compared to the Council established by the 1991 constitution.
Instead of the previous 12 ethnic representatives, plus the president of the council,  the 
committee  for  the  inter-ethnic  relations  was  supposed  to  count  19  members,  over-
representing the two most numerous groups (the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic groups 
were  given  7  members  each,  while  Serbs,  Bosniaks,  Turks,  Romas  and Vlachs  have  one 
member  each).  The  political  composition  of  the  committee  is  similar  to  that  of  the 
government, as the majority in the assembly appoints the members (according to the ethnic 
barometer 2006 report, the success of the committee to see its recommendations adopted in 
the assembly is a direct consequence of its political composition, rather than a sign of the 
importance  given  to  the  committee).  Beside  the  consultative  role  (the  opinions  and  the 
recommendations issued by the committee have to be discussed in the assembly,  and the 
assembly has to bring a decision upon these documents), it was also given the role to decide 
whether the legislation is to be adopted by the Badinter majority or by the simple majority in 
the assembly. 
The peace agreement also prescribed that, beside Macedonian as the official language of 
the state, “any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official 
language”  (art  6.5.  of  OFA).  The  interpretation  of  this  article  remained  dubious  and 
conflictive, as the use of language was further regulated prescribing the necessary legislative 
changes,  which  allowed  different  interpretations  of  the  principle  (narrow  vs.  broad 
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interpretation). The Law on the Use of Languages was adopted only in July 2008 after a long 
and difficult process, and in a manner seriously questioning the democratic procedure of the 
rule adoption. The issue of the education in the minorities’ language was also dealt with in 
OFA, where the agreement required that “state funding will be provided for university level 
education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia” (art 
6.2), while the principle of the positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State 
universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of 
Macedonia,  until  the  enrolment  reflects  equitably  the  composition  of  the  population  of 
Macedonia (art 6.3). 
As the particular rights were to be attributed according to the percentage enjoyed by each 
community, the OFA also scheduled the national census, which was supposed to take place by 
the  end of  2001.  Maximizing  their  requirements  for  the  equal  representation  in  the  state 
administration, the Albanian leaders were arguing that the Albanian ethnic group accounts for 
more than one third of the population, questioning the validity of the 1994 census. The OFA 
thus prescribed that a new census should be carried out in order to establish the demographic 
composition of the country which would further serve as a basis for a series of solutions 
concerning the local self-government and the use of languages. 
Similarly,  OFA tackled the  question  of  the  expression  of  identity,  were the  article  7.1. 
stated  that  “local  authorities  will  be  free  to  place  on  the front  of  local  public  buildings 
emblems marking the identity of the community in the majority of the municipality, respecting 
international rules and usages”. The concrete interpretation of this provision also remained 
problematic in the process of implementation, where its politicization was used in order to 
exercise pressures over the Macedonian parties in bargaining over different policy issues. 
Even though expressed in terms of guarantees to the ethnic minorities, OFA, as well as 
subsequently  adopted  legislation,  actually  favoured  the  Albanian  ethnic  minority,  other 
minorities often being the subject to discrimination coming from the Macedonian majority as 
well as from the Albanian minority.  The same Badinter rule,  granting collectively the veto 
power to a number of different ethnic minorities acting as a single veto block, seen the ethnic 
composition of Macedonia, de-facto functioned as a veto power of the Albanian minority, 
protecting  the  interests  of  other  ethnic  groups  only  when  they  are  overlapping  with  the 
interests  of the ethnic Albanians451.  Seen the particular  distribution of  power between the 
ethnic  Albanian  parties,  it  also  allowed  the  politicization  of  the  veto  power  where  the 
451 See also Kelleher, 2005.
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dominant  party  in  the  ethnic  Albanian  party  system,  DUI,  was  controlling  the  necessary 
votes452. The blockage of the Macedonian institutions in the period 2006-2008 was a direct 
consequence of this particular combination of the Badinter rule, party system characteristics 
and the  social  composition  of  the  country.  Furthermore,  linking  the  use  of  language and 
symbols with the 20% threshold also significantly favoured the Albanian minority (counting 
about 25.17%), that in most of the cases is the only one profiting from these provisions453. 
The implementation of the principle of the equal representation is also much more difficult 
with the other ethnic groups. Finally, the Committee for the inter-ethnic relations also made 
the rights of the other ethnic minority  a matter of balance between the Macedonians and 
Albanians. As Balalovska (2006) stressed: “The role of this Committee is somewhat negligible 
in  the  practice… [According  to  the  statements  of  its]  other  members,  the  Committee  is  taken 
somewhat  lightly.  It  was,  for  instance,  set  up  late,  one  year  after  all  other  parliamentary 
commissions. In addition, according to a representative of the smaller ethnic communities, 
although it  was agreed that the Presidency of the Committee would be based on a yearly 
rotation  and include  MPs  from all  ethnic  communities,  this  still  did  not  happen.  Finally, 
members felt that important issues, such as the use of community languages and symbols, 
were not given a prominent place on its agenda” (Balalovska, 2006, p.22).
After the signature of OFA and constitutional changes introduced, the implementation of 
the framework agreement slowly started454. The delay in the constitutional amendments also 
brought to a one-year delay of the census. The international experts were engaged for the 
training of the poolers and actively took part to organizing the census. The results, published 
after  further  delay  in  December  2003,  brought  to  the  malcontent  of  all  political  actors. 
Macedonian experts were claiming that the Albanians are far under the 25% established by the 
census, arguing that the increase from 441.104 members of the community in 1994 to 509.083 
after only eight years is impossible considering the natural population growth of 8,5 per mils, 
while the Albanian experts, counting all the Albanians present in Macedonia regardless their 
citizenship,  were  claiming  such  figure  was  28%455.  However,  the  international  actor’s 
452 Made of the NLA fighters, since the 2002 parliamentary elections, this party controls about 60/70% of the 
Albanian votes.
453 On the OFA and (lack of) respect of (some) minorities’ rights, see Novakova, 2007.
454 For the mechanisms of the protection of minority rights and power-sharing mechanisms introduced in 
different policy areas, please see other sections, particularly the ones on decentralization, administrative reform, 
police  reform,  judiciary.  The  problems  deriving  from  the  power-sharing  mechanisms  introduced  and  the 
bargaining  process  along  ethnic  and  partisan  lines  is  also  described  in  those  chapters.  On  the  questions 
concerning  the  definition  of  the  Macedonian state,  and the  conflict  over  the  definition  of  the  state  (civic, 
national, bi-national), see the chapter on the constitution.
455 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2003.
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involvement  in  the  process  represented a  guarantee that  ensured that  both ethnic  groups 
finally accepted the results and proceeded with the implementation of OFA according to the 
results of the census (as we could see, the decentralization and the equal representation in the 
administration  were  the  two  areas  in  which  the  census  results  had  the  most  important 
implications).
The other significant changes introduced after the OFA (beside those we already discussed 
in  other  sections)  included  the  Law on Citizenship,  the  use  of  symbols,  the  Law on the 
Committee for the inter-ethnic Relations and the Use of Language. At the same time, some of 
these issues were also among the most difficult ones, and the maximizing of the requirements 
concerning the use of language was often a source of obstacles for reforms in other spheres. 
In  February  2004,  the  amendments  on  the  Law on  Citizenship  were  introduced.  The 
changes allowed all state-less people and their children born and living in Macedonia to be 
granted the citizenship, reducing the time necessary for the foreign citizens to be naturalized 
from 15 to 8 years, 6 for the refugees (thus allowing numerous refugees from Kosovo during 
1998 and particularly  1999 to be granted citizenship in  2004/2005),  and made citizenship 
more easily available for the Diaspora members of Macedonian origins, allowing them to keep 
the double citizenship. The changes in the requirements for the citizenship, judged to be too 
restrictive, were prepared already in 1999 in order to meet the standards prescribed in the 
“European citizenship convention”. Seen the impact the legislation was feared to produce on 
the ethnic composition of the country, the law adoption was delayed until the ratification of 
the European Convention of Citizenship in 2002 opened a new window of opportunity for 
the law to be finally changed. 
In 2005, the Law on the Use of the Symbols of Ethnic Communities was adopted. Rather 
than changing, the legislation appeared to be partially overlapping with the Law on the Use of 
the Symbols Expressing the Ethnic Identity of the Members of the Minorities adopted in July 
1997. Thus, the formulation in the two laws was slightly different, one regulating the use of 
the symbols of communities, the other regulating the use of symbols expressing the identity of 
communities’  members.  Further on,  the law adopted in 2005 did not, as it  is  usually  the case, 
prescribe the annulment of the 1997 legislation or its parts. In line with OFA and, as the case 
was with many other solutions, the law, adopted due to the strong pressure of the Albanian 
minority, favoured this minority as it prescribed a larger use of the ethnic community symbols 
in those cases where this community is the majority in the ethnic municipality. The law allowed 
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 490
the ethnic minority’s symbols to be permanently exposed together with the state ones in the 
buildings of the local  self-government, in the municipalities  where the ethnic groups is  in 
majority, and allowed the same symbols to be exposed also on the state institutions as well in 
particular occasions prescribed by the law (festivities, manifestations etc). The adoption of the 
law was a particularly troubled process, the discussion of the Albanian deputies being mainly 
concentrated on the census (shall a census of 50% or 20% be the threshold for allowing the 
use of symbols?), while a stronger opposition was coming from the Macedonian deputies, who 
were requiring that the change of the flag used by the Albanian community, as it is identical to 
the national flag of the Albanian state, arguing that the official usage of a symbol identical to 
that of another sovereign state would bring confusion about the status and sovereignty of the 
Republic of Macedonia. These requirements were not satisfied and the law was adopted with 
50 favourable votes456. 
Even though the amendments proposed by the Macedonian deputies were refused, a vast 
use of ethnic symbols prescribed and the support of the major Albanian party for the law 
ensured,  the  respect  for  the  provision  was  seriously  hampered  in  the  municipalities  with 
Albanian majority,  independently  on the colours  of  the municipal  government,  where the 
symbols of the Albanian community (identical to those of the Albanian state) were exposed in 
unlawful manner, without respecting the provision requiring the simultaneous usage of state 
symbols. 
Two years  later,  the  decision  of  the  constitutional  court  from the  24th  October  2007 
declared some key provisions of this law unconstitutional, causing the great rebellion in the 
Albanian public  opinion.  Claiming that,  according to its constitution,  Macedonia is  a state 
based on civic and not ethnic principles, that all citizens and all ethnic communities are equal 
before  the  law and that  the  ethnic  communities  are  free  to  use  their  symbols,  the  court 
declared as unconstitutional the limitation that the law introduced on the use of the ethnic 
community symbols only to those municipalities where the ethnic community represents the 
majority. On the other hand, the permission to use the ethnic community symbols together 
with  the  state  symbols  during  the  state  festivities,  was  also  declared  unconstitutional. 
Interpreting  the  difference  between  the  symbols  of  the  community  and  the  symbols 
expressing the identity of the community members, the court claimed that the use of symbols 
of the ethnic communities are the expression of the stathood. Being Macedonia a unitary, and 
456 http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?pBroj=1829&stID=39804&pR=2, http://star.utrinski.com.mk/?
pBroj=1397&stID=7749&pR=2. 
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not be-national state, the provisions of the 2005 law allowing the use of ethnic communities’ 
symbols together with the Macedonian state’s were declared unconstitutional.
The decision of the constitutional court caused an earthquake in the lines of the Albanian 
parties. With already aggravated inter-ethnic relations, due to the ongoing conflict between 
DUI and VMRO and security issues in Tanuševci, the decision of the constitutional court only 
worsened the tensions, parties accusing the constitutional court to be politicized, while DUI 
again threatened that shall  the Albanian rights not be respected, the events of 2001 might 
repeat457. The Albanian members of the constitutional court resigned, the publication of the 
decision was blocked by the official gazette, the SDSM and ruling VMRO accused each other 
of politicization of the constitutional court458. On the insistence of DUI, the use of symbols 
was included in the agreement between VMRO and DUI, signed in 2007, and were part of the 
DUIs conditions for forming the governmental coalition with VMRO in summer 2008. 
The Law on the Committee for the Inter-ethnic Relations was adopted in 2007, again as 
part of the agreement between DUI and VMRO signed in may 2007. The failure of VMRO to 
form the ruling coalition with DUI after 2006 made an enraged DUI decide to boycott the 
assembly and obstruct its functioning. The key point in DUI’s tactic of obstructing the new 
government’s work was the use of the Badinter rule (see Jovevska and Gaber-Damjanovska, 
2006) and so the committee for the inter-ethnic relations, having the decisive vote in deciding 
whether the Badinter shall be used or not, came to DUI’s attention459. After the decision of 
the committee that the Law on Police does not require the double majority, DUI initiated 
strong pressures against  the  committee,  as  the Albanian  parties  were  doubting  the  ethnic 
background of one of the Committee members. The malcontent grew even stronger when the 
Broadcasting law was passed in the Committee for inter-ethnic relations without respecting 
the double majority rule. 
The boycott of the assembly by the strongest Albanian party rose a series of problems in 
the period the country was hoping for the EU candidate status and NATO membership. In 
February, the committee was dismissed, as a first step government made towards DUI, while 
in May 2007 a secret agreement was signed between DUI and VMRO (the content being kept 
away from public)  in  order  to ensure  that  DUI re-enters  the  assembly.  The Law on the 
Committee  for  Inter-Ethnic  Relations  was  part  of  such  agreement,  and  was  adopted  in 
457 http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=CAB5702A2E4A4B47BAF411A851376DFE. 
458http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=A6D3D518D4641D40A442360E01070F0B  , 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=4B3452D65D8C174FB62D2F23049352E4. 
459 http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/?itemID=50D52838F431924881A560C7B8D173B8&arc=1. 
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December 2007. The law precised the procedure for appointing the members and prescribed 
the list (required by DUI) of the 46 laws to be adopted by the Badinter majority.
The use of language and the Law on the Use of Language also were hot issues hampering 
the reforms in many other areas of policy as well. Seen the imprecision concerning the use of 
language included in the OFA, two interpretations emerged: the thin one, advocated by the 
Macedonians, that would strictly respect the provisions in OFA, creating high respect for the 
human rights, avoiding any discrimination based on language, but maintaining the status of 
the official language to Macedonian; and the somewhat thicker interpretation of the Albanian 
parties,  requiring  the  status  of  official  language for  the  Albanian  and the  introduction  of 
bilingualism. The requirements to include the Albanian as the official language in the police 
and army were used by DUI to maximize their negotiating position in the police and security 
sector reform (see the relevant sections). 
The  question  of  the  use  of  the  Albanian  language  was  tackled  by  much  legislation 
introduced after the OFA, that regulated the possibilities of the use of minorities’ language in 
particular areas and institutions. The use of the Albanian language was prescribed to be used 
in  communications  with  the  central  administration  and  with  the  local  administration  in 
municipalities  with  Albanian  community  making  up  to  20%  of  the  population;  in  the 
assembly; in the personal documents that are bilingual. Other languages should be used at a 
municipal  level  if  so  decided  by  the  municipalities.  The  Broadcasting  Law  imposed  an 
obligation to public national  broadcasters to broadcast programmes in the languages of all 
communities, while the Macedonian Radio and Television switched its third channel to sort of 
an  “ethnic  communities’”  channel.  The  universities,  both  private  and  state-funded,  were 
organized in Albanian language. However, the requests for widening the use of the minority 
language were continuously on the agenda of the Albanian political parties as an important 
bargaining card in the decision-making process.
The Law on the Use of Languages was voted in July 2008, in a marathon procedure and 
without any public discussion as part of the coalitional agreement for a government formation 
between DUI and VMRO (some deputies  of  the ruling  coalition admitted that  they were 
surprised when the law came for voting,  they had not even heard that the law was being 
prepared and did not have the opportunity to get familiar with its content, see Utrinski, 28 
July, 2008). The procedure through which the law was adopted rose the malcontent of the 
public opinion, as one of the most important and difficult pieces of legislation was introduced 
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“through the small  door”,  as  part of  the coalition bargaining,  without  consulting the civil 
society or other minorities, in an assembly boycotted by the oppositional parties460. 
The solutions adopted prescribed the use of the law in the assembly, in communication 
between citizens and ministries, ombudsman, in the judicial and common law practices, during 
elections and referendums, in the identification documents, in the contact of the police with 
the  citizens,  and  many  other  fields.  The  content  mainly  legalized  the  already  existing 
framework,  introducing  some  of  the  Albanian  requests,  but  not  the  much  longed  for 
bilingualism, which was the main criticism from the oppositional Albanian parties.
14.2.2. INTERNATIONAL ACTOR’S ROLE IN THE PROMOTION OF THE MINORITY RIGHTS
Both EU and CoE played an active role in promoting the protection of the minority rights, 
where conditionality  (concerning  the implementation  of  OFA),  strong support,  mediation, 
technical and material assistance were offered. Being the position of the Albanian minority 
and inter-ethnic relations a key issue for the stability of the country, in order to assess the 
importance of the international actors in maintaining the inter-ethnic dialogue and stability, 
many dimensions shall be taken into consideration, as well as the efforts in the fields of police 
reform,  security  sector  reform,  decentralization,  administrative  reform  and  judiciary.  The 
membership in the CoE and ratification of the different conventions opened the opportunity 
for the introduction of the mechanisms for the protection of minority rights as envisaged in 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of the National Minorities, European Charter 
of Local Self-Government, European Convention on Human Rights, European Charter for 
Regional  or  Minority  Languages.  After  the  2001  conflict,  EU and  NATO undertook  an 
important  role  in  promoting  the implantation  of  the  OFA. The EU priorities  concerning 
directly  the  minority  rights  are  therefore  rather  few,  mainly  concentrating  on  better 
implementation of the existing instruments towards the minor ethnic groups (Serbs, Vlachs, 
Romas, Turks, Bosniaks), far less successful than the Albanian minority in protecting their 
rights (for the EU priorities and assistance, please see the Tabb.1 and 2).
14.2.3. ASSESSMENT
Due to the strong presence of the Albanian ethnic group, the guarantees for minority rights 
were introduced already in the 1991 constitution.  Thanks to the strength of the Albanian 
minority,  these rights and their  interpretation were continuously pushed forward and their 
460 See Utrinski from 28 and 29 July 2008 for the reactions on the law.
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gradual increase can be noticed already in the Nineties.  After 2001, this process was even 
more accelerated, where the threat/fear for further violence maximized the requirements of 
the Albanian political parties (combined with the Macedonian fear for the federalization or 
creation of the bi-national state, perceived as a loss of statehood) and the efficiently exercised 
veto power contributed to increase the powers granted to the national minority(-ies). In such 
asset, the incentive for the rule adoption was primarily domestic (especially seen that the levels 
of autonomy and right enjoyed by the Albanian minority in Macedonia are far above many 
European countries), where the international actors served as mediators and guarantors of the 
credibility of the commitments made between domestic actors. In the latest period we can also 
register a rather particular, involuntary influence of the EU and NATO on the process. The 
desire  to  make  further  steps  towards  the  EU  and  NATO  integrations  increased  the 
Macedonian parties vulnerability  towards the Albanian requirements.  Thus,  by successfully 
using their veto power and obstructing/blocking the adoption of legislation considered crucial 
for the Macedonian integrations, Albanian parties and in particular DUI succeeded in further 
pushing  ahead  the  rights  enjoyed  by  the  Albanian  minority.  An important  lesson on  the 
international  influence over the domestic process can be drawn from here: the democracy 
promotion means pushing onto the domestic agenda a series of issues which in a more-or less 
already established form should be adopted. If the party which is most vulnerable to the EU 
leverage does not control all the veto-points for the rule adoption, it is forced to seek the 
support of other stakeholders. And this opens a window of opportunity for the requirements 
of the stakeholders. The international actor’s influence over the domestic agenda is double: 
the  norms  promoted  by  the  IA,  but  also  the  norms  promoted  by  the  stake-holders  in 
exchange for their  support.  In such light,  the Law on the Committee on the Inter-ethnic 
Relations and the much larger use of the Badinter rule prescribed, as well as the Law on the 
Use of the Languages can be perceived as a price paid by the Macedonian parties for passing 
the necessary legislations for its advancing in the EU/NATO integration process.
14.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
In the following paragraphs we described the development of the legislation aiming to 
protect the rights of the minorities in Serbia and Macedonia. As we could see, the two cases 
are rather different and open different questions. In the case of nowadays Serbia (as in this 
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work we are concentrating on Serbia  without Kosovo),  the national  minorities  are weaker 
(about  20%  of  the  population,  while  the  biggest  minority  is  the  Hungarian  minority 
accounting for about 4% of the population and is not militant), while intolerance and tensions 
should be considered deriving from the process of the nation-state building, from the strong 
nationalism during the '90s, from unsolved territorial disputes and problems with Kosovo and 
from the wars to which Serbia took part during the Nineties. The unsolved problem of the 
borders  and  the  Kosovo  status  (together  with  all  the  events  that  took  place  during  the 
Nineties  and  the  recent  dissolution  of  the  State  Union  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro)  are 
continuously  nourishing  nationalism  which,  on  turn,  harms  the  relationship  between  the 
Serbian  majority  and  the  existing  national  minorities.  While  rather  threatening,  as  the 
intolerance  of  the  majority  group  and  the  radical  nationalism  often  brings  to  ethnically 
inspired cases of violence, the phenomenon at the same time appears controllable in the long 
run, as we might hope that once the territorial disputes are settled, there is space for peaceful 
co-existence of the ethnic groups. In her study of the minorities claims, Bunce argues that the 
lack of  secessionist  claims of  the  Hungarian minority  in  Serbia  is  explained  by a  lack of 
external support for such project461 and by the dynamics of party competitions that induced 
the ethnic minority to moderate their requirements from secession to decentralization and to 
seek the support of the majority's parties promoting the decentralization. The future of the 
inter-ethnic relations in Serbia then strongly depends on the resolution of the problem of the 
Kosovo status and the approach the Serbian political elite would adopt towards Vojvodina, 
that after the unilateral secession of Kosovo is in a rather delicate position respect to the 
center462.  Yet,  as  the  period  Serbia  experienced  immediately  after  the  change  of  regime 
showed, the moderation of nationalism in Serbia is possible, inducing to more favorable and 
tolerant  environment  for  the  ethnic  minorities  and  peaceful  coexistence.  The  recent 
reshuffling  of  the  Serbian  party scene,  and the  breakdown of the  nationalistic  party  SRS, 
whose  more  moderated  block  stepped  out  and  formed  a  party  of  far  more  moderate 
aspirations, represent positive steps in the decline of the nationalistic logic in the country. 
The problem in Macedonia is rather different: the presence of the strong militant ethnic 
group (about 23% of the Macedonian citizens declared to be from the Albanian ethnic group, 
see tables in Appendix) with a secessionist agenda brings to the situation where the question 
461 The lack of support for Hungarian nationalism from their homeland can be illustrated by the failure of the 
referendum held in Hungary on the double-citizenship that would allow acquisition of the Hungarian citizenship 
for the Hungarian minority in the neighbouring countries.
462 See Bunce, 2006.
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of the  minority  rights  turns into political  bargaining  and struggle for power  between two 
ethnic groups. Due to the institutionalization of the ethnicity,  institutional legacies and the 
structure of opportunities in the country, both the national unity and the sustainability of the 
Macedonian  state  are  brought  into  the  question.  It  was  and  remains  a  key  issue  in 
understanding the entire process of democratization in Macedonia, and seen the structure of 
opportunities created by the existing system that institutionalized ethnicity (see Brieber, 2003) 
it continues, as we saw in other chapters, to create an impetus for using nationalistic rhetorics 
and for maximizing the requirements of the Albanian ethnic elite that is basing its power on 
the  ethnic  conflict.  In  such asset,  while  the  ethnic  minorities  enjoys  large  political  rights 
(Albanians  being  much  more  capable  than  others  in  enforcement  and  protection  of  the 
interests  of  the  members  of  communities),  the  ethnic  conflict  between  the  majority  and 
militant, strong ethnic minority seeking the creation of a bi-national state and threatening the 
secession still persist in time.
Consequentially,  the  international  actor's  approach  to  the  two  countries  was  radically 
different. While in Serbia we register the promotion of the minorities’ rights with the usual 
mechanisms and contents that the promotion of the minority rights had in other countries as 
well  (CoE playing the most prominent role in the process),  in the case of Macedonia the 
international  community  played  the  role  of  mediator  between  the  two  sides  in  conflict, 
concentrating on the commitments negotiated between partners.  The results are obviously 
impossible  to  compare,  as  in  one  case  we  have  a  legislative  framework  in  line  with  the 
minimum international standards, whose proper implementation is hampered by the overall 
lack of tolerance and presence of nationalistic logics of the majority group, while in the other 
the  minorities’  rights  are maximized and there is  a  relatively  good implementation of  the 
existing  provisions,  combined  with  the  threat  of  maximization  of  militant  minority’s 
requirements, continuous destabilization of the national  consensus and threat of the inter-
ethnic conflict.
APPENDIX
Table 1: “Ethnic composition of Macedonia”.
Macedonian
s 1,297,981 64.18
Albanians 509,083 25.17
Turks 77,959 3.85
Roma 
people 53,879 2.66
Serbs 35,939 1.78
Vlachs 9,695 0.48
others 38,011 1.88
TOTAL 2,022,547 100
Source: “State Statistical Office of the Republic of 
Macedonia”author's elaboration.
Table 2: “Ethnic composition of Serbia”.
Serbs 6,212,000 82.86%
Hungaria
ns 293,172 3.91%
Bosniaks 136,464 1.82%
Roma 107,971 1.44%
Yugoslav
s 80,978 1.08%
Croats 70,602 0.94%
Slovaks 57,900 0.89%
Others 474,323 6.33%
TOTAL 7,498,001 100
Source: "Statistical office of the Republic of Serbia", author's elaboration.
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Table 3: “EU priorities and the protection of minority rights in Serbia”.
2002 Legislation on minority rights, including relevant changes to criminal and other codes in line with the CoE FCPNM should be urgently adopted and implemented.
2003 Clarity on the constitutional distribution of competencies, particularly on minorities. Implementation of the new constitutional arrangements in such a way as to 
provide for the full respect and protection of minority rights through the country, in line with the council of Europe framework convention for the protection of 
national minorities.
2004 Short-term priorities: Ensure adequate cooperation between the State Union and Republics as concerns the legislative basis and practical protection of the rights 
of refugees, displaced persons and minorities. Strengthen cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to enable returns. Engage in dialogue with Priština 
on the return of displaced persons and related issues such as property and social rights. In b o t h R e p u b l i c s : amend legislation to repeal all discriminatory 
provisions.
2006 Short-term priorities: Ensure adequate cooperation between the State Union and Republics and where appropriate the provincial and local level as concerns the 
legislative basis for and practical protection of the rights of minorities. Implement the strategies and action plans relevant to the integration of Roma people, 
including returnees. Strengthen the functioning of minority national councils. Promote good inter – ethnic relations, in particular by taking adequate measures in 
the field of education. Promote participation of minorities in the judiciary and la enforcement bodies. 
2007 Short-term priorities: Ensure that constitutional provisions on minority rights and protection of minorities are observed and fully implement the strategies and 
action plans relevant to integration of Roma, including returnees. Continue efforts to promote good inter – ethnic relations, including measures in the field of 
education, strengthen the functioning of minority national councils, including adoption of pending legislation, promote participation by minorities in the judiciary 
and law enforcement bodies and continue awareness raising activities, including use of minority languages Adopt new legislation on refugees and continue to 
implement the national strategy on refugees. 
2008 Short-term priorities: Ensure that constitutional provisions on minority rights and protection of minorities are observed and fully implement the strategies and 
action plans relevant to integration of Roma, including returnees. Continue efforts to promote good inter – ethnic relations, including measures in the field of 
education, strengthen the functioning of minority national councils, including adoption of pending legislation, promote participation by minorities in the judiciary 
and law enforcement bodies and continue awareness raising activities, including use of minority languages Adopt new legislation on refugees and continue to 
implement the national strategy on refugees. 
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author's elaboration.
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Table 4: “EU Support to Serbia minority rights”.
Year EC funds Programs 
2005 1 million Targeted assistance to Roma in Serbia.
2006 2 millions Support for the Roma Community adjacent to 
the Gazella Bridge.
Within the framework of the Belgrade Poverty Action Plan an implementation agreement will 
be signed between EAR and the City of Belgrade detailing actions and responsibilities to 
address needs of the Roma Community.
2007 1.5 millions Implementation of priorities in the area of 
human rights and protection of national 
minority groups.
In order to implement project it is necessary that Agency for Human and Minority Rights 
assure adequate resources and structures to perform activities so as to be able to absorb the 
assistance, and meet its responsibilities as the main focal point for this project. - Cooperation 
with central and municipal authorities should be fostered. - Involvement of relevant 
governmental institutions, key actors and stakeholders in transparent consultation processes is 
necessary. - Organization, selection and (gender balanced) appointment of members of working 
groups,
training sessions, seminars and study visits by the beneficiaries as per project workplan.
Source: European Agency for Reconstruction, 2006 annual report; IPE documentation for 2007 author's elaboration.
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Table 5: “EU priorities and the protection of minority rights in Macedonia”.
2002 Implement the Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001, respecting its timetable for adoption of legislation, carry out the Census of population.
2003 Continue to accelerate the implementation of the Framework Agreement of 13 August 2001. The full implementation of the FA remains a key step on the 
country’s path towards closer relations with the EU and requires sustained commitment from all communities and political stakeholders. Ensure that next steps in 
the processing of census data are carried out, with the support of the international monitoring mission, in line with international standards. 
2004 Short-term priorities: Implement the legislation already adopted to implement the Framework Agreement (FA). Adopt remaining legislation required by the FA. 
Adopt a medium term strategic plan for equitable representation of minorities, including adequate budgetary means, and ensure speedy implementation. Take 
further measures to ensure the implementation of the FA provisions on the use of language and on community symbols. Ensure that the process of establishing a 
third State university in Tetovo is completed in a way that creates synergy with the South East European University and provides for academic standards in line 
with the Bologna declaration.
2006 Short-term priorities: Ensure the effective implementation of the legislative framework adopted in accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement, with a 
view, inter alia, to promoting inter-ethnic confidence-building. Adopt and begin to implement a medium-term strategic plan for equitable representation of 
minorities in the public administration (including in the judiciary) and public enterprises. Promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the principles laid out in the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 
in line with best practice in EU Member States. Further promote access to education for all ethnic communities.
2007 Short-term priorities: Sustain implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement with a view, inter alia, to promoting inter-ethnic confidence building. Fully 
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the recommendations made by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture as well as the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Upgrade and implement the strategy on equitable representation of non-majority communities, notably by 
providing adequate resources and imposing effective sanctions for failure to meet targets. Promote access to education, justice and social welfare for members of 
minority groups.
2008 Short-term priorities: Sustain implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement with a view, inter alia, to promoting inter-ethnic confidence building. Fully 
comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the recommendations made by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture as well as the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Upgrade and implement the strategy on equitable representation of non-majority communities, notably by 
providing adequate resources and imposing effective sanctions for failure to meet targets. Promote access to education, justice and social welfare for members of 
minority groups.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 6: “EU Support to Macedonia minority rights”.
Year EC funds Programs 
2002 3.9 million Promotion of inter-ethnic relations, Equitable representation of minorities in the 
civil service; South East Europe University Books Translation and Printing; 
Reconstruction of Leshok church and Neprosteno mosque.
Full respect of ethnic and minority rights in accordance 
with the dispositions of the Framework Agreement and 
adoption of the Constitutional amendments and 
legislative modifications set out in annexes A and B of the 
Framework Agreement.
2003 2 million Promotion of inter-ethnic relations.
2004 4.9 million Support to the Sector for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
agreement; Training of minority groups for civil servants; Support to minority 
community activities; Extension of the South East Europe University Campus.
2005 2 million Assistance to the sector for the implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
agreement and training of minority civil servants.
The key conditionality for the project is Government’s 
commitment of resources to the implementation of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement. It is also crucial that the 
Government secures adequate budget resources for this 
purpose and personnel allocated.
European Agency for Reconstruction, 2006 annual report; IPE documentation for 2007, author's elaboration.
Table 7: “Development of the legislative framework for the protection of ethnic minorities in Macedonia, external factors” (author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration 
process, access to the funds?
Yes (this practically means the 
implementation of OFA, a necessary 
condition for Macedonia).
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took 
place? X
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes. 
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 12, 8
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 5.1%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary step in the peace building.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? Partially (it tolerated the solutions putting a side the other minorities).
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? X
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
No (key issue was Albanian-Macedonian 
relationships).
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Table 8: “Development of the legislative framework for the protection of ethnic minorities in Serbia, external factors”(author's elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration 
process, access to the funds? Yes (membership in CoE).
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took 
place? Yes. 
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 3 millions
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: 0,27%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary for the peace and democratization. 
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security and democratization.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? X
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways? No.
Table 9: “Development of the legislative framework for the protection of ethnic minorities in Macedonia, domestic factors”.
Domestic input for the change: Present, strong.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present and strong (Albanian minority).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-ethnic.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Macedonian ethnic majority.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Albanian ethnic minority.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? No.
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid.
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Table 10: “Development of the legislative framework for the protection of ethnic minorities in Serbia, domestic factors” (author's elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: X
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present yet weak (minorities).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Mid.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-ethnic.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Serbian ethnic majority.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Ethnic minorities.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? No.
Two or more alternative solutions present? X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Stable/fluid.
Table 11: “Development of the legislative framework for 
the  protection  of  ethnic  minorities  in  Macedonia, 
outcomes”(author's elaboration).
The procedure of law 
drafting:
Behind the closed doors, non-transparent, 
inter-ethnic, intra-party bargaining.
The main deficiency in the 
adopted legislation:
The lack of full protection of the minorities 
other than Albanian.
The main beneficiaries of 
such deficiencies: Albanian ethnic minority.
The status (2008):
Rule adopted, rules mainly implemented, 
weaknesses in protection of the minorities 
other than Albanian.
Table  12:  “Development  of  the  legislative  framework  for  the 
protection of ethnic minorities in Serbia, outcomes”(author's elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: Open, inclusion of the relevant actors.
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation:
The lack of 
implementation, 
persistence of the 
intolerance.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: X
The status (2008): Rule adopted, slow implementation.
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15. REFORM OF THE MILITARY
“Those who have the command of the arms in a country are  
masters of the state, and have it in their power to make what  
revolutions they please” 
Aristotele.
Starting from Weber’s definition of the state that includes the monopoly on the legitimate 
use of violence463, the security forces (police, military, intelligence service and similar) and the 
control over these forces become central for understanding the functioning of the state. 
How the monopoly over the use of violence is exercised, becomes the crucial determinant 
of the type of government (authoritarian or democratic) we are facing. As Vankovska and 
Wiberg  underlined,  even  though  often  omitted  from  the  studies  on  democracy  and  not 
included into the definition of democracy, if we accept the existence of the link between the 
state  and  the  monopoly  of  violence,  then  two other  criteria,  concerning  the  civil-military 
relations, should be added for a state to be considered democracy: “The monopoly must also 
be effective, at least for any level of force beyond the level of ordinary crime; and the way in 
which the state uses force of internal or external coercion is subject to the public democratic 
scrutiny and control” (Vankovska and Wiberg, 2003, p. 4).
The importance of these criteria, and particularly the importance of the democratic scrutiny 
and control over the use of force, was proved by many transitional studies (especially those 
concentrated on Latin  America)  that  offered the evidence on how the security  sector can 
become one of the crucial obstacles to democratization, as the existence of the armed troupes, 
if  left  out of  control,  represents a continuous threat  for the newly established democratic 
regime. Very often the non-democratic  regimes are based on a coalition that  includes the 
security forces (military or police) as part of the narrow authoritarian elite (Linz makes the 
classification of the authoritarian regimes where one of the important classificatory criteria 
includes the role of the security sector), which then models the entire process of transition to 
democracy that must face the difficult process of the depoliticization of the security sector. 
463 See Weber, 1919.
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Huntington also identifies the politicization of the military and their involvement in political 
life as main source of threat for the democratization process, putting a strong accent on the 
professionalization of the military and the separation of military and political actors as a key 
for maintaining the civilian control over the armed forces464. The strong criticisms advanced 
against  Huntington’s  thesis  did  not  undermine  its  importance,  testified  by  the 
professionalization of the army and its depoliticization as one of the issues usually included in 
the security-sector reforms during the democratization process. 
Another  important  dimension  that  should  be  taken  into  account  when  analyzing  the 
civilian-military relationships concerns the concept of national security and threat. According 
to Vankovska (2003), “One of the main dangers for a democracy on a national level comes 
from the military that has no precisely and legally defined mission, or when the political order 
is collapsing and the military believes that it is its main mission to preserve the state order” 
(Vankovska, 2003, p. 319). In this light, the unsolved territorial disputes, the unclear definition 
of the state or the lack of consensus on the concept of “threat” all  represent very serious 
obstacles in offering a precise definition of (and thus limitating) the military’s engagements, 
prerogatives  and  powers.  As  we  will  see,  in  both  Serbia  and  Macedonia  the  concept  of 
national security met a series of problems. In Macedonia, the lack of national consensus and 
the  inter-ethnic  conflict  obstructed  the  definition  of  the  role  of  the  military  (what  is 
threatening the nation?), while in Serbia the unsolved statehood problems, together with the 
territorial deputies and secessionism in Kosovo, obstructed the legitimacy of the army and 
hampered the clear definition of its usage on the territory (threat to what nation?).
In the following section we will examine the process of the military reform, in order to 
understand the role the military had in the process of transition and democratization in the 
two studied countries and in order to understand the relationship between the civilians and 
the military. We will pay particular attention to the relationships between the president, the 
ministry of  defense,  chief  of  staff  and the  parliament,  examining the  (lack of)  process of 
establishment of the democratic control over the security forces. As Vankovska stressed, the 
parliamentarian oversight of the security sector is the basic mechanism of citizen’s control 
464 According to  Huntington the civilian control  over the military is  characterized by:  1)  a  high level  of 
military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competences; 2) 
the effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign 
and military policy; 3) the recognition and acceptance by the leadership of an area of professional competence 
and autonomy for the military; and 4) as a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of 
political intervention in the military. (Huntington 1996: 3, in Vankovska and Wiberg, 2003, p. 19).
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over the monopoly of violence, as it gives effective means for controlling the military and 
security  forces  to  elected  politicians,  accountable  to  the  citizens  via  the  parliament  (see 
Vankovska, 2003, p. 317). The powers of the parliament are at the centre of this problem: 
only normative (legislative) function or control as well? Does the parliament have some role in 
the process of appointing the chiefs of different security agencies? Who decides the military 
budget and who controls and monitors the military spending? Who defines what the national 
security, national interest, and national threat are? Who decides on the role of the army and its 
usage? To whom does the president or executive answer for the decisions made concerning 
the army, defense, security?
As  we  will  see,  the  two  countries  followed  completely  different  developments,  facing 
different problems and arriving to different results. Macedonia established the basic principles 
of the civilian control already at the beginning of the '90s, the inter-ethnic tensions and ethnic-
military, rather than civilian-military, relations being the most salient issue, while in Serbia the 
complicated  institutional  design  combined  with  sharp  political  conflict  and  the  problems 
deriving from the unsolved statehood represented the main obstacle that delayed the reforms 
and improvements in the issue until the recent constitutional reform.
15.1. SERBIA: AN ARMY WITHOUT A STATE
15.1.1. DEVELOPMENTS
As we will see, a series of factors obstructed the reform of the military in Serbia, delaying 
the  establishment  of  the  full  civilian  control  over  the  army  until  2008.  The  complex 
institutional design (the military sector was a competency of the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro), the political conflict between the republics and in Serbia between the political 
actors and the unsolved issues concerning the state building were the main causes of such 
delay. As Zveržhanovski argues, one of the most important obstacles in the establishment of 
the civilian control over the army is the level of stathood and the lack of legitimacy. According 
to the author, clear  stathood is the precondition for the democratic civilian control of the 
armed forces and it is the lack of clear statehood that in the case of Serbia and Montenegro 
hampered the reform of the military: 
“… The new authorities face the challenge of dealing with a legacy of lack of legitimacy of 
both state and the military, a key obstacle in achieving any meaningful transition. The regime of 
Slobodan Milošević has left a legacy where by the only element covering the federation as a whole 
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was an armed force predominantly oriented to one of the constituent elements in the federation 
(Serbia) and with a history of implication in political process. As democratic forces wrestled power 
out  of  Milošević  and his  cronies,  the  FRY did not  represent  an agreed political  community. 
Resolving this issue would be a conditio sine qua non of transformation of civil-military relations, 
albeit one that would prove elusive for Belgrade’s new masters” (Zveržhanovski , 2003, p. 9)
In the moment the democratic forces took the power away from Milošević, FRY did not 
represent an agreed political community. Serbia gained independence only in May 2006, being, 
before, part of the state of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, transformed in the State Union of 
Serbia and Montenegro in 2003. Both according to the constitution of the FR of Yugoslavia 
and Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the military was a 
competency of the federal level, its reform requiring not only a political consensus in Serbia, 
but also an agreement between the two republics. Further on, both the FR of Yugoslavia and 
the State Union suffered from a serious lack of legitimacy, challenged by the Montenegrin 
requirements  for  independence.  The  lack  of  interest  from  one  of  the  two  republics  to 
strengthen  the  central  institution  resulted  in  the  blockage  of  the  decision-making  on  the 
federal (later State Union) level, making the reform of the military difficult to pursue. 
While  the lack of  clear  statehood hampered the army’s  legitimacy and the institutional 
blockage made changes difficult to undertake, the political conflict between Serbian leaders 
and the army’s legacy with the past contributed to the complete blockage of the changes in the 
sector. 
The heritage of the army was strictly linked with its role in the communistic and, later, 
Milošević’s regime. The army Milošević inherited at the beginning of the Nineties was a strong 
army representing the SFR of Yugoslavia, a political actor whose legitimacy came from its role 
in establishing the communism and fighting against the fascism. The JNA (Yugoslav People 
Army) was involved in the political  life  of  the communist  Yugoslavia,  represented on the 
federal level where it was given the same decisional powers as the six Yugoslav republics465. As 
the army was in a large share composed of Serbian leadership, and as in the process of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia the army’s interests (maintenance of the SFRY and its centralization) 
largely converged with those of Milošević, it was easy for Milošević to transform JNA into VJ, 
army of  the newly  formed Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia.  However,  due to the political 
legitimacy and influence the army enjoyed in the communistic regime, Milošević never fully 
trusted the military forces, seeking to significantly diminish its political strength and choosing 
465 See Pietz, 2005.
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to create, reinforce and base its regime on other security agencies (police, secret police and 
intelligence). This produced an anomalous security system in the FRY at the end: 
“Officially  one  army,  but  with  three  distinct  territories  (Serbia,  Kosovo,  Montenegro), 
connected  to  which  is  a  complex  of  other  forces:  two  ministries  of  interior  and  two  law 
enforcement forces with their special units, semi-autonomous paramilitary units controlled by the 
Security Service, insurgent force with its off shot (UCK in Kosovo) and latter on the international 
presence in the form of KFOR all  contributed to the unique complexity of the FRY security 
sector.” (Zveržhanovski , 2003, p. 9). 
The FRY constitution gave the crucial role in the defense policy to the Supreme Defense 
Council,  composed of the three Presidents (President of Serbia,  President of Montenegro, 
President of FRY), the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, the latter two not having a 
vote. As Milošević was controlling at least two of three presidential posts466, he enjoyed the 
control over the security and defense policies. In 1992 he withdrew the General Staff from the 
Ministry of Defense, putting it under the direct control of the Supreme Defense Council and 
president  of  Yugoslavia.  He  also  incorporated  the  Military  counter-intelligence  into  the 
General staff, strengthening his influence over the entire sector. The structure put in place, by-
passing the Ministry of Defense, allowed direct strong influence of the Commander in Chief 
who,  after  the  decline  of  Milošević’s  power,  put  the  army  under  the  control  of  its  new 
Commander, Koštunica467. 
Beside  the  institutional  design  strengthening  the  federal  president’s  control  over  the 
military, two other factors induced the army to grant their loyalty to Koštunica. The first is the 
Serbian traditional  attachment to “the leader” that usually  made the army “the president’s 
army”468,  but  even  more  important  in  this  process  was  Koštunica’s  soft,  continuity-based 
approach  to  the  transition.  Involved  in  the  Balkan  ethnic  violence,  the  army  feared  the 
cooperation with the ICTY469 and lustration,  so that  the military leadership recognized in 
Koštunica  a  political  force  that  could  offer  them  protection470.  The  composition  of  the 
466 Due to his influence in Montenegro, the control over his party and distribution of forces in the federal 
assembly who appointed the president of FRY, Milošević succeeded to control the positions of the president of 
FRY and Serbia, and until 1996 he also exercised strong influence over the president of Montenegro.
467 In 2000 the change of the federal constitution prescribed that the president of the Federation, according to 
the  old  design  appointed  by  the  federal  assembly,  was  supposed  to  be  directly  elected.  In  the  presidential 
elections held in September 2000, Milošević lost against the united opposition’s candidate Koštunica. After a few 
days’ protest during which he was seeking to annul Koštunica’s victory, he was forced to accept the victory of 
Koštunica, marking the end of his regime.
468 We thus recall the notions of “King Petar’s army”, “Tito’s army”, “Milošević’s army”.
469 On the war-crime legacy and the security reform in Serbia see also Gow, 2005.
470 The bias between DS and DSS on the issues concerning the military reform was registered on the level of 
the supporters of these political parties as well, in the study of Atanasović (2006) on the political parties in Serbia 
and their approach to the security sector reform. The electorate of the DSS clearly shows a tendency to share the 
higher level of trust in the military, and decline in the support for the reforms. Compared with the other parties, 
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Supreme Defense Council (where Milošević’s loyal crony Milutinović held place as a President 
of Serbia) ensured that Koštunica’s continuity-based approach will prevail and allowed him 
full control over the military forces. 
What followed after  the regime change was,  contrary to what was needed,  the lack of 
reform in the first years of transition471. The reform was hampered by the permanence of the 
ancient regime forces in military and by the political conflict between Koštunica and Đinđić 
over the continuity-discontinuity approach to the transition process. The military sector soon 
became Koštunica’s powerful instrument in the struggle for power within the new democratic 
elite. Challenging the will of other DOS parties and requirements coming from the NATO, he 
decided to keep Milošević’s friend Pavković, compromised by allegations of war crimes, as 
Chief of General Staff472. This decision was justified on the grounds of preserving stability, but 
it was clear that a deal had been struck that would allow Pavković to stay and would preserve 
many  of  VJ’s  privileges  in  exchange  for  support  to  the  democratic  changes473.  As  the 
relationship  between  Koštunica  and  Đinđić  became  more  tense,  and  the  conflict  over 
continuity vs. discontinuity became sharper and sharper, the security sector started to be used 
to the struggle  between the  two political  forces.  Koštunica’s  decision to maintain the old 
cadres  on  key  positions  raised  a  series  of  objections  from  DOS  and  the  international 
community,  but  served  Koštunica’s  struggle  against  Đinđić.  Beside  Pavković,  Koštunica 
decided  to  keep  in  power  also  Aco  Tomić,  chief  of  the  military  secret  service,  another 
Milošević’s faithful general accused of war crimes. The ancient regime supporters shifted their 
support to Koštunica, putting the entire military sector and military intelligence service in his 
hands. Some of the biggest security scandals that took place in 2001-2002 were all the product 
of one man’s private usage of the security sector. The arrestment of the Serbian Deputy Prime 
Minister by the military secret service, as well as the protest of the Unit for Special Operations 
(JSO, see further) were all organized by general Tomić on behalf of Koštunica.
The arrestment of the Serbian Deputy Prime Minister by the military secret service pushed 
DOS to  urge  for  the  reform of  the  military  sector  in  an  effort  to  diminish  Koštunica’s 
influence. The law withdrawing the military counter-intelligence agency from the General Staff 
and putting it  back under the Minister of Defense was urgently drafted and passed in the 
they are positioned in the center of the political spectrum, between the parties of the former regime and the DS. 
See Atanasović, 2006. See also Popović, 2006.
471 On the heritage hampering the military system reform and the obstacles delaying the reform, see Dallara, 
2008.
472 See Pietz, 2005, Zveržhanovski , 2003, Caparini, 2004.
473 See Zveržhanovski , 2003, p. 10.
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federal assembly. Finally, the formation of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro put an 
end to this  “war”  between the  federal  and republican  authorities,  as  the  signature  of  the 
Constitutional Charter brought Koštunica’s presidential mandate to the end. 
While  praised  for  many  of  its  provisions,  the  constitutional  charter  of  Serbia  and 
Montenegro failed to bring the military under the civilian control and the part on civil-military 
relationship represented the most criticized part of this document. The solution adopted was, 
if not equally, then even more problematic than the previous: again, the democratic control 
was not established as the parliament had no constitutional powers over the military. Such 
control was given to the Supreme Defense council, similar in its composition to the council 
established by Milošević (three presidents), but this time with even less democratic legitimacy 
as the president of the State Union was not directly elected, but appointed by the state union’s 
assembly, on its turn appointed by the two republics’ assemblies. From the functional point of 
view, the solution made the use of military impossible if there was no consensus of the three 
presidents,  a situation judged by the experts to be potentially  dangerous in case of  a war 
conflict. The legitimacy of the council was further hampered due to the fact that until the 
election of Tadić in summer 2004, the council was composed by one nominated president, 
one  acting  president,  and  only  one  directly  elected  member  (Vujanović,  the  president  of 
Montenegro).
The reform of the military started in 2002 with the adoption of the Law on Secret Service 
and continued only in 2003, when the long awaited for amendments to the Law on the Army 
were  adopted,  reducing  the  compulsory  military  service  and  introducing  the  principle  of 
conscientious  objection474.  The reform gained particular  strength after  the  assassination  of 
Đinđić when Boris Tadić was appointed to be Minister of Defense. He played a role of the 
change agent in the field, promoting a series of reformist steps, the most important being the 
incorporation  of  the  General  Staff  under  the  Minister  of  Defense  in  order  to  avoid  the 
General  Staff’s  direct  contact  with  the  Chief  Commander.  The  Ministry  of  Defense  also 
established  previously  lacking  financial  control  over  the  military.  The  counter-intelligence 
service was transformed and renamed into military security agency. The Commission of the 
General Staff for cooperation with the ICTY, a body suspected by the ICTY prosecutor to 
undermine the cooperation instead of fostering it, was dismantled. The problematic ties with 
the army of Republika Srpska (a part of thee Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) were 
loosened, made more transparent and brought in line within the Dayton agreement. Some 
474 See also Dallara, 2008, Baracani, 2005.
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personnel changes also took place, with the retirement or dismissal of a considerable number 
of high-ranking officers, some of whom were closely linked with the former regime or accused 
of  war crimes.  Tadić’s  reformist  activities  included the drafting  of  a  series  of  legislations, 
aiming  to  establish  a  “modern,  non-aggressive  army that  is  under  strict  civilian  control”. 
However, the rule adoption, requiring the co-operation between the federal and republican 
levels, was slow and difficult475. The State Union parliamentary committee was supposed to 
ensure democratic control over the military but had never succeeded in that function, being a 
rather  weak  body  and  lacking  the  necessary  competencies.  As  far  as  the  conscientious 
objection and establishment of the alternative service is concerned, while in 2003 and 2004 
positive developments took place, in practice the possibility to be of an alternative service was 
strongly limited, and the amendments adopted in January 2005 introduced further limitations. 
The  peaceful  dissolution  of  the  State  Union  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro  removed  the 
deadlock created by the uncertainty and blockage of the federal institutions. Being Serbia the 
heir of the state union, it also inherited the union’s army, settling with Montenegro the issues 
of military property and personnel. The Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
were passed to the level of Serbia (the minister of defense being nominated with delay). The 
constitution adopted in 2006 underlined the principle of the civil and democratic control over 
the army, but left it to the Law on Army to settle the mood in which this control will be 
exercised. In the meantime, the parliamentary procedures were amended in order to allow the 
formation of the Committee for Defense and Security that shall supervise the security sector. 
While  the new constitution,  in its  part on the military and army, was positively  judged 
(international actors underlining the necessity for its further implementation, see the Venice 
commission’s opinion on the constitution of Serbia, EU Commission report on Serbia 2006), 
according to the domestic experts the constitution failed to address a series of issues, and in 
some cases it even opens the possibility for some undemocratic interpretations. The national 
assembly  is  given  the  power  to  “supervise  the  work  of  the  security  services”,  but  this 
formulation, according to the domestic analysts, is unsatisfactory as it does not include other 
agencies of the security sector, such as army, police, or private security services. They also 
underline that, instead of “supervision”, the assembly shall be given the power to “control” 
the  work  of  the  entire  security  sector.  The  constitution,  while  stating  that  the  National 
475 Jazbec,  2005,  underlines  the  complex  characteristics  of  the  Union  (an  increasingly  loose  federation, 
ongoing internal political rivalry in Serbia between progressive and conservative nationalistic forces, economic 
and social impoverishment, and the issue of Kosovo) as the major reasons for the very slow pace of the reform 
during the last years.
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Defense Strategy should be adopted in parliament, failed to ensure that the National Security 
Strategy, according to domestic analysts much more important document, is also adopted in 
the assembly.476 
The president of Serbia kept the large competencies of the Commander in Chief: according 
to the Article 112, he commands the Army and appoints, promotes and relieves the army’s 
officers. The constitution, however, failed to address the problem of relationship between the 
president and the Ministry of Interior. And, even more important, the president can be held 
responsible only for acting against the constitution,  which leaves us with the question “to 
whom is  the  president  responsible  for  commanding the  army?”.  The article  on the  army 
underlines that the army can be active outside Serbia only if allowed by the assembly, leaving 
the use of the army within Serbia’s borders to the president, who is the Commander in Chief. 
As,  moreover,  the  constitution  left  the  role  of  the  army  rather  vague,  and  as  Kosovo, 
according to the constitution,  is  part  of the Serbian territory,  this  means that  the Serbian 
president can, without the approval of the parliament or of any other body, unilaterally decide 
and at any moment to use the army against Kosovo477. Such solutions were a source of serious 
security concerns in the period of the presidential election, when the possible victory of the 
nationalistic candidate Nikolić was perceived as a potential threat to the fragile peace in the 
Balkans. As authors Ejdus, Popović and Savković concluded, the Serbian constitution in the 
hands of the democratically-oriented leader has good potentials  for developing democratic 
civil-military  relationships.  But,  seen  the  possibility  for  ambiguous  interpretations,  such 
democratic control is not given adequate constitutional guarantees. 
The constitution also failed to establish the National Security Council,  even though the 
creation of such body was proposed already in January 2006. It was finally formed as a part of 
the long and difficult negotiations over the control of the security sector in the process of 
government  formation  in  May  2007,  when  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Minister  of  Defense, 
Minister  of  Police,  the  heads  of  all  security  agencies,  prime  minister  and  president  were 
assigned as the members of the newly formed council.  The dynamics that brought to the 
creation  of  the  National  Security  Councils  show the  importance  of  the  control  over  the 
security sector in Serbia and reveals the importance of the political pluralism for the process 
of  democratization.  The  formation  of  the  government  in  spring  2007  was,  among  other, 
obstructed by the question over who will control the security sector (revealing the political 
476 See Ejdus, Popović, and Savković, 2006.
477 See Ejdus, Popović, and Savković, 2006.
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rather than civilian democratic nature of the control over the use of violence). The lack of 
prevalent actors brought to a situation where the compromise was necessary, bringing to the 
creation of the council as an institution that, through the inclusion of different actors, will 
ensure the joint control and limit one actor’s prevalence in the sector.
After  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  the  reform of  the  military  continued  with  the 
preparation  of  the  Laws  on  Defense,  the  Law  on  the  Army  and  the  Law  on  Basic 
Organization of Security Services being prepared and adopted in the deadline prescribed by 
the Constitutional Law (December 2007). Even though repeating some shortcomings from 
the constitution, mainly due to the short-time period for the rule adoption (like the unclear 
distinctions of competencies between the president, minister of defense, chief of staff etc), the 
legislation put in place in December 2007 is perceived to be the first positive step towards the 
establishment of the civilian control over the military. Some of the loopholes identified in the 
constitution were removed, and the principle of the civilian democratic control was included 
in the legislation478. However, as underlined by the EU report, “the reform in this sector still 
has to be completed and the new parliament needs to ensure effective democratic oversight”. 
The legislative basis for such oversight were put in place, but, as showed by the blockage and 
inactivity of the Parliamentary Committee for Security and Defense provoked by the political 
crisis during the 2008, the existence of the legislative guarantees does not automatically means 
their implementation.
 15.1.2. EU PROMOTION OF THE MILITARY SERVICE REFORM
The reform of the military forces was a subject of the rules promotion by EU, CoE, and 
NATO. The civil control over the armed forces and the reform of the army were subject to 
the conditionality as well as to the socialization strategies,479. 
The  EU was  pushing  strongly  for  the  reform of  the  military  sector,  considering  it  a 
necessary  step in  the  democratization  process,  as  well  as  the biggest  (together  with other 
security forces) potential obstacle to the cooperation with ICTY. The cooperation with ICTY 
was also a very salient issue in the reform of the army, as many members of the VJ were 
involved  in  war  crimes.  The  technical  assistance  and monitoring  were  undertaken by the 
Geneva Centre for the Control of Armed Forces, giving the recommendations for the reform 
478 See EU Commission progress report for Serbia, 2008. For the analysis of the law draft and for the detailed 
analysis of the provisions concerning the lines of command and civilian control over the military in constitution 
and drafted laws, see Popović, 2007. See also the Law on Defense, Law on Military, Law on Basic Organization 
of Security Services.
479 For the actions undertaken by the EU in promoting the military reform in Serbia, see also Baracani, 2005.
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process. In the priorities needing attention in the following 12 months, the recommendations 
of the EU Commission tackled the army reform by underlining the necessity to undertake the 
reform “in line with the proposal by the Geneva Center for Control of Armed Forces”. The 
lack of civilian control and the “disturbing presence of elements from the previous regime”, 
the “potentially problematic links with the army of the Republika Srpska” and the obstruction 
of cooperation with ICTY were considered as the most important issues in the reports 2002 – 
2003. 
The steps undertaken by Tadić during his performing as the minister of defense and the 
reformist turn in the 2003 – beginning of 2004 were all praised as positive steps, resulting in a 
positive assessments in the 2004 report, and the lack of explicit requests for the strengthening 
of the civilian control  over the armed forces in the 2004 EU partnership with Serbia and 
Montenegro. However, the lack of effective reform and the lack of implementation of the 
existing laws resulted in a return to the establishment of the civilian and democratic control as 
a priority in 2006 EU partnership, showing the EU malcontent with the lack of progress in the 
sector. 
The NATO’s influence over the democratization process was limited, as the prevalence of 
the security and strategic concerns over the normative criteria brought to the Serbian entrance 
in the Partnership for Peace even though it did not comply with some of the crucial political 
requirements made by NATO.480 However, the membership in the Partnership for Peace is an 
important  step  in  the  socialization  of  Serbian  army.  NATO  already  stressed  that  it  will 
strengthen the assistance for the reform of the army in Serbia. 
15.1.3. ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM
The reform of the military sector proved to be an even more complicated process than the 
reform of other forces of the security sector, as the different levels of competencies, the lack 
of  legitimacy and the  unclear  statehood seriously  blocked the  reform. We can distinguish 
different moments in the reform, different cycles of change or stagnation: the period prior to 
the assassination of Đinđić and Tadić assuming the office (2000-2003), characterized by the 
lack of any significant progress,  the period of  the positive  developments  (2003-2004),  the 
period of stagnation due to the lack of coordination between the different state levels (2005-
480 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2006&mm=11&dd=29&nav_id=221737&nav_category=11. 
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2006) and the current positive moment that begun with the dissolution of the State Union and 
continued with the adoption of the new constitution. 
In the first years the reform was blocked due to the presence of strong veto players on key 
positions (Pavković, Tomić, but also Milutinović and Koštunica) and political conflict both 
between the constituent republics and within the Serbian ruling elite (Serbia – Montenegro, 
Koštunica  –  Đinđić).  In  this  period  only  a  few  changes  took  place  (replacing  Pavković, 
severing relations with Republika Srpska), mainly due to the strong international pressures. 
The change started in  2002,  when the reform of the security  sector and especially  the 
intelligence service became Đinđić’s government’s priority after the arrestment of Perišić. But 
the steps taken were clearly dictated by this event, and only after the assassination of Đinđić 
and Tadić’s nomination for the Minister of Defense on the federal level, a strong impetus for 
the reform came, this time from the sector itself. The period of 2003-2004 was dedicated to 
the army reform and legislation drafting, but, unfortunately, the laws drafted in a transparent 
manner were not adopted due to the blockage in the assembly of the state union. 
The  parliamentary  elections  in  Serbia  brought  to  a  change  in  the  government  and 
cohabitation between the Federal Minister of the Defense (Tadić) and the new Serbian Prime 
Minister  (Koštunica).  At  the  same time,  the  Montenegrin  insistence  on the  independence 
further undermined the functioning of the state union’s parliament. The reform was blocked 
between the plurality of the decision makers in conflict, non-functional state level institutions, 
obstructions from within and the lack of financial resources. The further developments in the 
period  2004-2005  showed very  slow and difficult  improvements.  On the  other  hand,  the 
international pressures for the reform were weakened seen the positive developments in the 
previous period that gave the hope that the process of the reform was underway. 
Some significant steps in the reform of the civil-military relationships were seen only after 
the  disintegration  of  the  state  union  and  the  adoption  of  the  new constitution  in  2006, 
confirming Zveržhanovski’s  thesis on the statehood problem as a fundamental obstacle in 
establishing the civilian control over the military. Not only did the solution of the statehood 
problem increase the legitimacy of the military, but also the newly gained independence re-
opened a window of opportunity for the reform of the military sector, while the dissolution of 
the State Union diminished the number of the veto-players. The current distribution of power 
is also more positive, as there is no situation of cohabitation between the president and the 
government, and, at the same time, none of the actors is capable to monopolize the control 
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over the security sector, making the introduction of checks and balances a best solution for all 
actors involved. The efficiency in the rule adoption, finally reached in December 2007, was a 
product of a series of positive factors joining together to make such reform possible. 
15.2. MACEDONIA: A STATE WITHOUT AN ARMY
15.2.1. DEVELOPMENTS
Unlike in Serbia, the military did not represent a threat to the process of democratization in 
Macedonia. Being the smallest and among the least developed republics of the Federation, 
Macedonia was a security consumer rather than producer in the former Yugoslavia. As other 
Yugoslav republics, it had the Units of the Territorial Defense (UTD), but differently from 
Slovenia or Croatia, where these units were used as a basis for the future national army of the 
independent  states,  in  Macedonia  the  formation  of  any  military/paramilitary  sector  was 
avoided until the withdraw of the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) from Macedonia in 1992. 
Seeking to maintain Yugoslavia, and further, when such goal proved impossible, seeking for 
the  peaceful  secession,  the  Macedonian  president  Gligorov  opened  the  negotiations  with 
Belgrade to ensure the peaceful withdraw of the Yugoslav military forces from Macedonia. 
The withdraw of the JNA left Macedonia with very modest means of self protection: beside 
the police forces, the only remained security forces were the Units of Territorial  Defense, 
poorly trained and, as the JNA withdrew all weapons, practically disarmed. The neighborhood 
hostile to the creation of the Macedonian state (the Bulgarians questioned the existence of the 
Macedonian nation,  the Greeks denied the use of  the name while  the domestic  Albanian 
minority boycotted the state institutions) combined with the ethnic conflict in the Balkans 
induced Gligorov to call  for the UN preventive deployment of the peacekeeping forces  in 
1992.  The  UNPREDEP mission  significantly  fostered  the  security  of  the  country  in  the 
period of its biggest vulnerability. Seen the difficulties in building up the security sector, the 
presence  of  the  UN  mission  appeared  precious  in  those  first  years  of  Macedonian 
independence481.
The  building  up  of  Macedonia’s  security  sector  initiated  with  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution and Law on Defense in 1992. Such asset, while partially favourable as the military 
did not represent a threat to the newly established democracy as it is often the case, was also a 
481 See Vankovska 2003a, Vankovska 2003b.
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source of a series of shortcomings, mainly deriving from the particularity  of regulating an 
institution that still does not exist, thus not having any idea about its future necessities. 
The building up of the Macedonian army was a process full of improvisations shaped by 
the available means rather than by the security needs of the country. The new army was not 
formed, as it was the case in the other Yugoslav republics, by the staff from the UTD, but also 
used the staff that previously served in the JNA, called by the government to come back to 
the country and get enrolled in the new national forces, this way causing the dissatisfaction of 
the UTD members struggling to strengthen their influence over the emerging security sector. 
The improvisation in the staff resulted in its inadequate structure: while the UTD members 
were poorly trained, the generals and officers from JNA were not always adequately trained 
(many of them were trained to serve the navy or air forces)482. 
Another  serious  problem was  the  weaponry.  The price  Macedonia  was  to pay  for  the 
secession was that the JNA withdrew all weapons, and destroyed whatever army property that 
it could not take. The UN prohibition to sell arms to the former Yugoslav republics, the UN 
economic sanctions towards Serbia  and the Greek embargo to Macedonia in combination 
with the fiscal austerity, all made the process of acquiring the necessary weapons very difficult. 
The new army weapons, similarly to what happened with the staff, was built from available 
sources,  donations  from  third  countries  and  through  the  illegal  channels  of  the  arm 
trafficking.  The  arms  purchased  this  way  were  mainly  outmoded,  cast-off  weapons,  not 
suitable for the structure of Macedonian forces483.
A further challenge in the creation of the security sector that the country faced was the 
definition  of  the  security  threat  and definition  of  the  line  of  defense.  The main issue  of 
concern was the multi-ethnic nature of the state, bringing the ethnic-military, rather than the 
civilian-military questions to focus. There was a lack of basic consensus on what is actually a 
threat to the Macedonian state and, consequently, what shall the competencies of the military 
be. The role of the army in the nation-building process was rather troublesome. While in the 
constitution the army was defined as those whose task is to protect all citizens of Macedonia, and 
while  Macedonians  insisted  to  avoid  the  nationality  key  in  the  requirement  based  on the 
professionalism principle,  the very low representation of the Albanians in the army caused 
their dissatisfaction. Combined with the boycott of the Macedonian institutions and of the 
obligatory military service, and the calls for the creation of the Albanian paramilitary security 
482 See Gareva, 2003b.
483 See Vankovska, 2003a, Vankovska 2003b, Gareva, 2003b.
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sector, this only brought to the further deepening of the inter-ethnic mistrust484. The question 
of the loyalty persisted for years as the key question of the Macedonian security sector. Can 
the  state  of  Macedonia  rely  on  its  citizens  belonging  to  the  Albanian  minority  when the 
security of the country is at the stake? And similarly: can the Albanians trust the Macedonian 
state  and  army?  The  answers  to  these  questions  did  not  only  divide  the  Albanians  and 
Macedonians, but also drew a line between more nationalistic and less nationalistic political 
options within the same ethnic group485. 
It was no surprise then that Macedonia did not succeed in reaching the consensus on its 
national  interest  and  definition  of  the  national  security  threats,  which,  consequentially, 
hampered the creation of a comprehensive national  defense strategy. The army was given 
mainly the role of the defense of the independence and territorial integrity of the country, 
considering the hostile neighborhood as a main threat. It was assigned the responsibility in the 
external security,  without envisaging any domestic missions for it.  During the 2001 ethnic 
violence, the army was also included in the conflict, the surveillance of the borders being of 
great importance seen the links between the Albanian paramilitary forces in Macedonia and 
the UCK, active in the neighboring Kosovo. The 2001 crisis revealed a series of shortcomings 
in the Macedonian security sector: lack of clear division of competences between the Ministry 
of Interior and Ministry of Defense, unclear lines of command, inadequacy of the security 
strategy  and,  above  all,  the  lack  of  political  and ethnic  consensus  over  what  Macedonian 
national interests are.
As far as the civilian control over the military forces is concerned, the legislative framework 
put in place in 1991-1992 (made of the constitution and the Law on Defense), included the 
principle of the civilian control over the security forces, envisaging a series of measures in the 
field. The importance of such principle can be found in the constitutional Article 97, which 
prescribes that the key position in the administration of the security sector (the minister of 
defense and the minister of interior) can be occupied only by the civilians that prior to the 
appointment on these position had a civilian status at least for 3 years. However, due to the 
complicated constitutional design of Macedonia and the political system with nominally strong 
parliament and dual executive, the complicated balance between these institutions and a large 
difference between the legal principles and every day practice, the difficulties in exercising the 
civilian control over the military emerged, particularly during the 2001 ethnic conflict.  The 
484 See Vankovska 1998, Vankovska 2003a, Vankovska 2003b.
485 See Vankovska 2001, Pietz, 2005.
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lack of defense strategy, as well as the timetable of the reforms, the mechanisms of control 
and  accountability  being  prescribed  before  the  creation  of  the  body  to  be  controlled,  all 
contributed to such problems486.
By the Law on Defense, the assembly was given a crucial role in controlling the army, as it 
was assigned the power to control the government in the matters of the defense policy, the 
power  to decide  on war  and peace,  the  control  over  the  security  sector’s  budget.  In  the 
changes introduced in June 2001 (the legislation was a part of the reformist efforts initiated in 
1998 due to the country’s determination to enter the NATO), the powers of the assembly 
were increased, giving the assembly an important role in the adoption of the National Security 
and Defense Concept that would later serve as a basis for the president to adopt the National 
Security  Strategy  and Defense  Plan487.  While  the  competencies  of  the  assembly  increased, 
however, the general position of the Macedonian assembly, which is often reduced to play a 
role of the rubber stamp for what was already decided in the government, and, in particular, 
the lack of civilian experts in the assembly that would allow the effective parliamentary control 
over the security, continued to hamper the democratic control over the military488.
The president is another important institution in the chain of the control over Macedonian 
army. Like in Serbia,  the president is  given the role of the Chief  Commander and enjoys 
important powers in the control over the security sector. The presidential  power over the 
defense sector and the relationship between the president and the government in the security 
issues is not tackled by the constitution and it is supposed to be established by the Law on 
Defense.  However,  the  1992  legislation  failed  to  precise  the  presidential  powers  and  to 
distinguish between the Ministry of Defense’s competences and those of the president, leaving 
the relationship between the president, Ministry of Defense and Chief Staff unspecified. The 
dual accountability of the General Staff both towards the Chief Commander (the president 
appoints and dismiss the Chief of Staff) and towards the Ministry of Defense (to which the 
General Staff is accountable and submitted), creates a situation of potential deadlock in the 
cases of  the conflict  between the president  and the minister  of defense. During the 2001 
violence the conflict between these two figures created a problem in the coordination and use 
of military forces.
486 See Gareva 2003a, Gareva 2003b, Vankovska 2003a, Vankovska 2003b.
487 See article 14 and article 17 of the Law on Defense 2001.
488 See Pietz, 2005.
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While the president appears to be given the guiding role in the executive on the matters 
concerning the defense, due to the lack of clear definition of his competencies the role of the 
president and his influence over the defense issues practically depend mainly on the identity of 
the president. In the period of Gligorov’s presidency, due to his strong personality and respect 
he enjoyed as a father of the country, due to the partisan fidelity of the army staff (particularly 
of those coming from the JNA, supportive for the SDSM, heir of the communistic party in 
Macedonia), and due to the position Gligorov enjoyed in the party, the president succeeded in 
keeping  full  control  over  the  army and defense  sector.489 Local  and international  analysts 
underlined  the  personalistic,  rather  than constitutional  character  of  the  security  system in 
Macedonia in that period490. As the minister of defense, in his work, is strongly linked to the 
president,  in  the  period  of  Gligorov’s  presidency  he  also  exercised  a  crucial  role  in  the 
appointment of the minister of defense.
The president’s dominance over the security sector vanished with the arrival of the far less 
charismatic Trajkovski to the position of the president in 1998, when the control over the 
defense sector practically passed in the hands of the government, prime minister and minister 
of defense being the principal actors, in some cases even overpassing the president. 
The power of the president to influence the army through the appointing of the high army 
officials  was  used,  together  with  the  powers  in  recruitment  and  staffing  enjoyed  by  the 
Ministry of Defense, to influence the composition of the army, bringing to its politicization – 
which represented a further source of concern. We already underlined how Gligorov enjoyed 
the support of the army officers, due to the “communist” legacy they had in common. After 
the change of the government,  the political  purges began, resulting in what some authors 
labeled as the VMRO-isation of the army491. Such changes in the staff of the security sector, 
particularly in the Ministry of Defense, remained constant in the years to come, following a 
similar pattern of the overall politicization of Macedonian institutions.
Another important institution in the design of the mechanisms of the control  over the 
military is the National Security Council, designed by the Constitution as a body with advisory 
function. According to the 1991 constitution, the council was composed by the President of 
Republic, the president of the national assembly, the Prime Minister, the Ministers of Defense, 
the  Minister  of  Inner  Affairs,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  three  members  to  be 
489 See Vankovska, 2003, 2004.
490 See Vankovska 2004.
491 See Vankovska 2003, 2004.
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appointed by the president. After the signature of OFA, the Article 86 of the constitution was 
amended in order to allow an equal representation of the national minorities in the National 
Security Council, this way ensuring a better inclusion of the Albanian minority492.
After the 2001 and OFA signature, the reforms of the security sector were pushed forward 
in a much more intense manner. The security of the country revealed to be fragile, opening a 
window of opportunity to foster the reforms. Some measures, like the adoption of the Law on 
the  Defense  in  June  2001,  were  undertaken  already  during  the  conflict.  A  series  of 
shortcomings that  were revealed during  the crisis  threatening the  country’s  security493,  the 
financial scandals that bursted showing the abuse of the funds, the necessities created by the 
OFA, the pressures from the NATO in order to foster the country’s security and ambition to 
enter  the  NATO  all  represented  strong  inputs  pushing  forward  a  more  intense  and 
comprehensive reform.
As prescribed by the Article 17 of the Law on Defense adopted in 2001,  the assembly 
finally adopted the National Security and Defense Concept in 2003, which represented the 
basis for the Strategic Defense review adopted in 2004. The Army Service Regulation Law was 
adopted in 2002 and amended in 2003 and 2005, providing support for the recruitment and 
retention  of  the  military  by  creating  a  personnel  management  system  based  on  a  rank 
structure, developing a NCO corps and systematic military education. In line with the NATO 
requirements,  the reorganization of  the army was mainly concentrated on downsizing  and 
restructuring the forces, rather unpopular and costly measures that created internal resistance 
to the reforms and caused the further increase in an already very high unemployment rate. 
Further resistance to the reform was created due to the obligation deriving from OFA to 
ensure the  equal  representation  of  the  minorities,  and actively  promoted by the  Albanian 
minority  and  the  international  actors.  In  practical  terms,  this  meant  the  downsizing  and 
degradation  of  the  staff494 on  one  side,  and the  training  and the  requirement  of  national 
minorities,  in particular the Albanian national  minority members, on the other. The actors 
opposing  the  reforms used  arguments  similar  to  the  ones  we  reported  above:  would  the 
492 See Ohrid Framework Agreement..
493 Among the shortcomings revealed in 2001 we should remember in particular the old and inadequate 
weapons, failures of the security forces to react preventively even though the information on the activities near 
the Kosovo border were available, the lack of coordination between the army and police, and lack of cooperation 
between the president, Prime Minister, minister of defense and minister of interior.
494 As it can be seen from the data published in the Strategic Defense Reviews, the new structure prescribed 
major cuts in the officer, NCO and civilian staff, but an increase in number of the contract soldiers.
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Albanians be loyal to the Macedonian state? Shouldn’t the profession and merit-based system 
prevail in the process of recruitment, instead of using the ethnic key?495 
In 2003 the first steps were also introduced in order to clarify the roles of the ministries of 
interior and defense and to pass the border protection from the army to the border police. 
The duties were completely transferred by the end of the 2005, together with a part of the 
staff that undertook the re-qualification training. 
Strongly determined to apply for the NATO membership, the Macedonian government 
pushed forward the necessary reforms, completing the reform and full professionalization of 
the army by 2007 and passing from security user to security producer by participating to the 
NATO missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
15.2.2. THE ROLE OF THE IA
As the principle  of the civilian control  over the military  was already introduced in  the 
Macedonian constitution and, within the limits of the Macedonian democracy, reflected in the 
legislation, the issue was not a subject to the EU or CoE recommendations (if not indirectly, 
through the requirements concerning the strengthening of the parliament, the de-politicization 
of the administration or the more active inclusion of the civil  society organizations in the 
decision-making process in general). Seen that the army was given mainly the competencies in 
the external security, leaving the internal threats to be dealt with by the police forces, the EU 
mainly concentrated on the issues concerning the police reform (see the next section), the 
only  requirement  tackling  the  Ministry  of  Defense  being  that  of  calling  for  a  clear  and 
comprehensive  definition  of  the  respective  competences  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  and 
Defense, and with this linked the transfer of the control of borders to the competencies of the 
ministry of the interior. 
Far more important in promoting the changes in Macedonian military sector was NATO, 
as the country’s ambition to join this institution gave NATO the possibility to successfully 
promote its standards and norms in the country. The importance of the role NATO played in 
restructuring the security sector in Macedonia was so high that the reform of the Macedonian 
army is classified as an “external project” where the domestic institutions served only as a 
rubber  stamp.  The  country  even  succeeded  in  gaining  the  appraisals  for  the  reform, 
considered in different points far ahead of Albania and Croatia, other two countries seeking 
495 See Pietz, 2005.
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for membership in the same period. However, the final goal of the country, the membership 
in the NATO, was blocked in July 2008 by the Greek veto due to the name dispute496. 
15.2.3. ASSESSMENT
Unlike in Serbia, the principle of the civil control over the security forces in Macedonia was 
guaranteed from the early periods of its independence. The implementation of such norms 
met some obstacles in practice, particularly in the first years, due to the overall deficiencies of 
Macedonian democracy, the lack of institutional capacity of the parliament and weakness of 
the civil society in particular.
However, even though not a subject of our study, we shall underline NATO’s capacity of 
promoting the reform of the military sector even in a situation when unpopular decisions and 
delicate problems are to be handled (like the downsizing of the military forces and the equal 
representation of the minorities). Even though the international actor differs, here again we 
can  identify  a  similar  pattern  to  the  one  we  found  in  the  administration  reform  or 
decentralization  process:  the  compliance  with  the  externally  imposed  requirements  and 
recommendations was achieved thanks to the International Actor’s action coupled with the 
presence of  the  domestic  agents  pushing  for  the  reform.  The Albanian  minority  strongly 
pushed for the equal representation, a most difficult issue in the entire process, while at the 
same time,  the  spread consciousness  of  the  need to reform the country’s  security  sector, 
(strengthen by the 2001 crisis that showed the inadequacy of the domestic structures) induced 
the Macedonian politicians to seek for the changes. Finally, the deficiencies in the sector are 
those we found in other fields as well, politicization of the ministry and the prevalence of the 
spoilt system in the requirement, which can be explained with the security-prevailing approach 
of the international actors that chose not to push too strongly on those matters that are of 
utmost importance for their domestic partners.
15.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The two analyzed countries  faced completely  different problems in  the  process  of  the 
establishment of the civilian control over the military, which correspond to the substantial 
differences  between  a  state  without  an  army  (Macedonia)  and  an  army  without  a  state 
496 On the international influence on Macedonian security sector see Kljusev, 2003. Also Pietz, 2005, b.
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(Yugoslavian People’s Army). In Macedonia the civilian control over the army was established 
much earlier, at the very beginning of this state’s transition towards democracy, as the process 
of building the military sector ex-novo (starting from the institutional emptiness) created a 
situation where there was no military sector which could oppose the process. At the same 
time, though, this meant the lack of input from within and a legislation that prescribed the 
mechanisms for controlling an institution that still does not exist. While the civilian control of 
the military was included as a principle of the Macedonian newly created independent state, its 
implementation  and realization  met  some difficulties,  mainly  deriving  from the  lack  of  a 
comprehensive legislative framework and of a clear division of competencies, weakness of the 
Macedonian civil society and the shortcomings in the Macedonian parliamentarianism that put 
the  assembly  aside  and  brings  to  the  prevalence  of  the  executive  in  the  decision-making 
process. 
Consequentially, the military reform in Macedonia was not subject to the EU pressures or 
activities,  and  the  reforms  undertaken  were  mainly  induced  by  NATO in  the  project  of 
Macedonia’s  integration  into  NATO.  However,  if  we  follow  the  developments,  we  can 
perceive how even the military reform in its more technical-military side follows the pattern 
we registered in other areas concerning the democratization process: the very efficient formula 
consisting  of  the  external  influence  in  form of  a  credible  conditionality,  socialization  and 
financial  assistance combined with the presence of  the domestic  change agents  motivated 
mainly  by  the  inter-ethnic  re-distributive  effects  and influence  on the  inter-ethnic  power-
sharing  mechanisms that  the  reform produces.  But here  again,  similarly  to  other  areas  of 
development, the result is only a partial professionalization of the military: the persistence of 
the politicization of the sector. 
Serbia faced a completely different reality: it inherited the army, destroyed in the wars in 
the Nineties, destroyed by Milošević’s fear of the JNA, whose key people were accused in 
front of the ICTY and were the former supporters of Milošević’s regime. It also needed to 
cope with a complicated institutional  design, unsolved questions of statehood and political 
leaders  who,  instead  of  reforming,  thought  of  (ab-)using  the  military  for  their  political 
struggles. The international pressure did not bring any result until a more decisive approach 
from abroad coincided with the favorable setting on the domestic side. It appears that, at least 
as far as the civilian control over the military forces is concerned, Serbia is on the good track. 
It strengthened the parliamentary control over the military, a solution that is mediated by the 
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executives and political parties’ control over the assembly. This brings Serbia to a position 
similar to Macedonia’s:  the level of the civilian-military control depending on the perils  of 
their parliamentarianisms, on the weaknesses of their civil society and on the overall level of 
democracy in the country, rather than on the legislative framework which is considered mainly 
in place in both countries (and which, as we can see from the tables in the appendix, have 
similar  structure as  far  as  the institutional  design of the sector and system of checks and 
balances in the sector are concerned). 
APPENDIX
Table 1: “EU priorities concerning the military sector in Serbia”.
2002 Army reform including security policy, the role of the army and secret services, civilian control, general modernization/ restructuring, and budgetary issues, in 
line with the proposals by the Geneva Centre for Control of Armed Forces - should be under way by the end of 2002. Reform of the security and police services 
should continue, transforming them into a service, adopting the Council of Europe's Police Code of Ethics, bringing them under clear internal and external 
control and improving coordination between the various services and with other state services. State security and law enforcement agencies must be separated. 
Prisons must be urgently brought in line with Council of Europe standards. The demilitarization of borders should be put into effect at the earliest opportunity. 
The principle of conscientious objection should be safeguarded and implemented.
2003 Urgent implementation of army reform in line with the proposals by the Geneva-based Centre for the Control of Armed Forces.
2004 Short-term priorities: Adopt a defense strategy and military doctrine in line with democratic principles; prepare and adopt a transparent and appropriate legal 
framework to clarify the outstanding issue of military property.
2006 Key short term priorities: Ensure effective democratic control over the military by strengthening parliamentary control and establishing a transparent financial 
management.
2007 Short term priorities: Ensure greater democratic oversight by tightening parliamentary control and establishing more transparent financial management.
2008 Ensure greater democratic oversight by tightening parliamentary control and establishing more transparent financial management.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
Table 2: “EU priorities concerning the military sector in Macedonia”.
2004 Strengthen the coordination between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense to facilitate the transfer of competences on border control to the 
border police, and ensure the institutional development of border police service.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 3: “The budget of the Ministry of Defense in Macedonia”.
Year MoD recivings from the 
state budget
State budget Ministry of 
Interior, 
budget
MoD share in 
state budget
MoD/MIA
2002 5483323 71700273 5160965000 7.65 0,94
2003 5889129 67490170 5635972000 8.73 0,96
2004 6107549 66666000 5677838000 9.16 0,93
2005 5998000 66538469 6255784000 9.01 1,04
2006 5901642 81749000 6914018000 7.22 1,17
2007 6865888 79522497 6890753000 8.63 1,00
2008 7602434 89397520 8097000000 8.50 1,06
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Sluzbeni Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, author’s elaboration.
Table 4: “The budget of the Ministry of Defense in Serbia”.
Year MoD recivings from the 
state budget
State budget Ministry of Interior 
budget
MoD share in 
state budget
MoD/MIA
2003 36217000000° 23887954000 1,52
2004 41161770000° 27809068000 1,48
2005 43213627000° 28433768000 1,52
2006 29712777000°° 548.405.821.000 33917228000 5.42% 0,89
2007 60444075000 646.466.666.100 41454312000 9,35% 1,46
2008 65344363000 611.866.849.862 41604344000 10,68% 1,57
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, Službeni list Srbije, author’s elaboration.
° Ministry of Defense was finance by the federal budget. As the share in state budget is not comparable (on the federal level the MoD absorbed large part of the budget due 
to the narrow federal competencies), we bring the data for the budget of the Ministry of Interior in order to give an idea on the relative amount of MoD budget.
°°For the period may 2006 – December 2006, as Serbian Ministry of Defense was formed only after the independence of Montenegro.
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Table 5: “Military reform in Macedonia, external factors” (author’s elaboration).
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration process, 
access to the funds?
NATO.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took place? -
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? No.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: -
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: -
Reform perceived by the IA as:  (NATO: security, military relations).
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security, military, strategy.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? -
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes (UNDEP presence. NATO 
mission).
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Yes. 
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
-
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
Yes (NATO requirements).
Table 6: “Military reform in Macedonia, domestic factors” (author’s elaboration).
Domestic input for the change: Shortcomings relieved during 2001.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present partially (Albanian minority requiring the equal representation).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-ethnic, inner opposition to the reform.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Macedonian ethnic group, parts of the military fearing cuts.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Albanian ethnic group.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? No.
Two or more alternative solutions present? No.
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluidity.
529
Table 7: “Military reform in Macedonia, outcomes” (author’s elaboration).
The procedure of law drafting: Prevalence of the international actor in giving the suggestions during the law drafting 
(NATO).
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: Still persistent politicization and spoil system.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: Political parties.
The status (2008): Rules adopted, mainly implemented, reform successfully completed.
The EU comment in the 2008 report: Not commented.
Table 8: “Military reform in Serbia, external factors” (author’s elaboration).
The lack of reform 
2000-2003
The reform 2006 - 
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an important international treaty, integration 
process, access to the funds? No.
No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important steps in the integration process took 
place? -
-
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No. Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the laws? No. No.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: - -
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU assistance to the country: - -
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary in the 
process of 
democratization.
Necessary in the 
process of the 
democratization.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization, 
security.
Democratization, 
security.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? - -
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was it used in the law drafting? Made available yet not used.
Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? No. Yes.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms? -
-
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways? -
Yes.
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Table 9: “Military reform in Serbia, domestic factors” (author’s elaboration).
The lack of reform 2000-2003 The reform 2006 - 
Domestic input for the change: Present (regime change). Constitutional reform.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: - -
Level of conflictuality of the issue: Very high. Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Continuity-discontinuity. -
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes. -
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Salience. -
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Old elite, army.  
The main beneficiaries of the change: New democratic elite.  
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes. -
Two or more alternative solutions present? Yes. -
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluidity. Stability/fluidity (since 2008).
Table 10: “Military reform in Serbia, outcomes” (author’s elaboration).
The lack of reform 2000-2003 The reform 2006 - 
The procedure of law drafting: - Transparent, inclusive.
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation: No rules adopted.
Mainly good.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: President (elite commanding the forces).
-
The status (2008): - Rule adopted, need to be implemented.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
 Overall, there has been some progress on civilian oversight of the security forces, 
with the adoption of a number of laws. Reform in this sector still has to be completed 
and the new parliament needs to ensure effective democratic oversight.
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Table 11: “The civil control over the military sector in Macedonia and Serbia, according to the relevant legislation in force” (author’s elaboration).
Macedonia Serbia
President. Commander in Chief: President.
Constitution (1991). National Council  
established thought:
Government’s regulation (May 2007), Legislation (December 
2007).
The President of Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the Prime 
Minister, Ministers of Defense, Minister of Inner Affairs, the Minister Foreign 
Affairs and three members to be appointed by the president. The equal 
representation criteria should be satisfied.
National Council  
composed by:
President of Republic, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, 
Minister of Interior, Minister of Justice, the Chief of Staff, the 
heads of the security services.
Prime Minister. Minister of Defense  
proposed by:
Prime Minister.
Assembly. Appointed by: Assembly.
Assembly. Accountable to: Assembly.
Ministry of Defense. General Staff under: Ministry of Defense.
President. Chief of Staff  
appointed by:
President, in consultation with the Minister of Defense.
President. Chief of Staff  
dismissed by:
President, in consultation with the Minister of Defense.
President, Minister of Defense. Accountable to: President, Ministry of Defense.
Ministry of Defense (one agency). Military security  
agency, Military  
intelligence agency  
controlled by:
Ministry of Defense (two distinct agencies)..
- Controls the governmental acts concerning the defense e monitors the 
preparation of the defense of the state; - Establish the existence of the direct 
military threat of attack on the state; - declares the state of state of war; - 
Decides on the amount of the financial resources for financing the defense; - 
Approves the budget for the war emergency; - Decides on the entrance and 
exit of Macedonia in the (international) collective systems of security and 
defense; - Ratifies international treaties concerning the entrance, transfer or 
hospitality to the foreign armed forces on Macedonian territory for the needs 
of training activities, training, participation in the military and humanitarian 
operations, as well as for the participation of the army of Macedonia in such 
activities abroad; - Adopts the National Conception of Security and Defense; 
- Decides on the commemoration day of the Army and Civil Protection Unit; 
Parliament: - Decides on war and peace, declares the state of emergency and 
the state of war; - Adopts the strategy of the national security; - 
Adopts the Strategy on defense; - Adopts the plan of development 
of the defense system; - Ratifies the international treaties in the 
field of the defense and military cooperation; - Decides on the 
limitation of human rights during the state of emergency and state 
of war; - Adopts the annual report of the Government on the state 
of affairs in the field of preparation for defense; - Decides on usage 
of the Army of Serbia out of the borders of Serbia; - Decides on 
the participation of the staff of civil protection and of employees of 
the state administration in the humanitarian or other activities 
abroad; - Decides on the amount of the financial resources for 
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- Adopts the decisions and resolutions concerning the implementation of the 
system of defense, plans on the development of the defense; - On the request 
of the Assembly, and non less than each two years, the Government is 
obliged to submit a report on the system of defense and plan of development; 
-In order to acquire the necessary understanding of the activities of 
Macedonian Army, each deputy has a right to require from the minister of 
defense to organize his visit to the units, commands and headquarters of the 
Army.
financing the defense; - Analyze the implementation of the Plan of 
Defense; - Monitors the work of the security agencies; - Undertakes 
other activities prescribed by the law.
- Adopts the Strategy on the Defense; - Adopts the Plane of Defense; - 
Prescribes the measures of readiness and orders their implementation; - 
Establishes the organizations and formations of the Army; - Adopts the 
documents necessary for the functioning of the Army and orders their 
implementation; - Approves the documents concerning the development of the 
Army; - Prescribes the measures for increase of the military readiness and 
orders their implementation; - Orders the mobilization of the Army; - 
Prescribes the lines of command in the Army; - Adopts the documents 
concerning the military readiness, armed conflict and mobilization of the army; 
- Appoints and dismiss the generals and the commandeer staff; - Appoints and 
dismiss the military representatives of Macedonia abroad; - In exercising the 
functions in the field of the defense, the president of Republic is a Chief 
Commander and adopts the sub-legislative acts. 
President: -Together with government the president submits to the assembly 
the proposal for declaration of the state of war or state of 
emergency; - Approves the draft on the Strategic review of defense 
of the Republic of Serbia; - Following the proposal of the MoD, 
adopts the Doctrine of Army of Serbia; - Orders the 
implementation of the Plan of the Defense of RS; - Establishes the 
basic peacetime and wartime organizations of the Army of Serbia, 
following the proposal of the MoD; - Adopts the Plan of 
Mobilization of the Army of Serbia; - Orders the implementation 
of the measures of military readiness, general or partial 
mobilization.
Sources: Law on Defense of Republic of Serbia, Constitution of Republic of Serbia, Law on Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. 
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16. POLICE REFORM
“The main political problem is how to prevent the police  
power from becoming tyrannical This is the meaning of all the  
struggles for liberty”
Ludvig Von Mises.
In  the  previous  section  we underlined  the  importance  of  the  civilian  control  over  the 
security sector and included the democratic scrutiny over the use of violence, on which the 
state has the monopoly, among the criteria for a state to be considered democratic497. We also 
underlined how the security forces often threatened the democratization process, particularly 
in those cases where the non-democratic regime was guided by the military, generals, juntas 
and similar corps or where these figures were included in the coalition at the head of the 
authoritarian regime. The security agencies thus have their own interests in the process of the 
regime change and, where the security agency as the political actors got involved in the abuses 
of  power,  violation  of  human  rights,  repression  and  criminal  activities  during  the  non-
democratic regime, they are unwilling to give away the power or they might even fear judicial 
prosecution. In these cases the security sector represents the difficult heritage from an ancient 
regime which has to be handled with care. This was precisely the situation of the police forces 
in  Serbia  that,  due  to  the  importance  they  had  in  maintaining  Milošević’s  regime498, 
represented one of the obstacles to the democratization in Serbia,  representing what some 
Serbian authors named the “limits of Serbian democracy”. The control over the security sector 
(in this section we will analyze the police forces and intelligence service), the mechanisms of 
the accountability of the security forces, their ethics and relations towards the rule of law and 
human rights are important dimensions of any political regime, and the democratic control 
over  the  efficient,  professionalized,  responsible  police  represents  a  key  dimension  of 
democracy. 
497 On the link between the state and monopoly of violence, see Weber. On the link between the civilian 
control  over  the  use  of  the  violence  the  state  has  monopoly  on  as  a  criteria  for  a  state  to  be  considered 
democratic, see Vankovsa and Wiberg, 2003.
498 See Trivunović, 2003.
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Further on, as Caparini and Marenin argued, “The police occupy a crucial political role in 
any society – by virtue of the realities of their work (their structural position in state-society 
relations, and by what they do and how they do it), and by the symbolic representations of 
their work and its impacts upon the political and social discourse (Manning 1997). The police 
are  part  of  the  system of  governance  (Shearing  1996).  They matter  in  processes  of  state 
creation, the reproduction of peaceful social relations, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and 
in the creation of social identities and bonds which underpin political life (Loader and Walker 
2001)” (Caparini and Marenin, 2003, p. 2). The lack of legitimacy or of capacity and efficiency 
can  hamper  the  police’s  capacity  to  perform  its  duties,  hampering  the  rule  of  law  and 
democracy in the country. We will see how in Macedonia’s case one of the biggest obstacles to 
the democratization of the country and a most serious threat to its security derived form the 
difficulties in maintaining the control over parts of the territory.
The problem becomes twofold: how to ensure that the police are given enough power and 
authority to do their work but, at the same, to avoid the risk that they harm the well being of 
society and individuals? The democratization process usually means also the reform of the 
police sector with the legitimacy, professionalism and accountability as the main values to be 
pursued through the reform (see Caparini and Marenin, 2003). 
In the following sections we will describe the police reform in the two studied countries. 
Both countries  experienced the violence  that saw the extensive  involvement of the police 
forces  and brought  to  the  creation  of  paramilitary  units.  The politicization  of  the  police, 
corruption, the lack of accountability mechanisms capable to ensure the respect for human 
rights and the power abuses were also the characteristics in common. On the other hand, 
while in Serbia the strong police forces represented a heavy heritage from the previous regime 
that  based its  rule  on  the  police,  intelligence  service  and secret  police,  in  Macedonia  the 
ethnically homogenized police forces coped with the difficulties to maintain the control over 
the parts of the territory and to fight back organized crime gangs that used the ethnicization of 
the issue to challenge the justice.
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16.1. SERBIA: BURDENS OF THE HERITAGE
16.1.1. POLICE AND SECRET POLICE: DEALING WITH THE PAST.
Developed  as  a  crucial  pillar  of  Milošević’s  regime,  involved  in  war  crimes,  every  day 
violation of human rights,  and even in corruption and organized crime, Serbian police,  its 
special units and intelligence service were sectors urging for immediate reform after the 5th 
October499. However, as literature on the democratization teaches us, the security sector was 
also the most difficult to reform and might represent the biggest obstacle to democracy.
Even though labeled  “revolution”,  the  risk  of  Milošević  using  police  and special  units 
against the citizens made the “negotiation approach” a necessary step in the process of regime 
change in Serbia. The resignation of the police forces in front of the participants to the protest 
and  the  support  offered  by  the  Unit  for  Special  Operations  (JSO)  testified  that  the 
cooperation  of  security  forces  was  ensured  through  the  agreements  achieved  during  the 
preparation of the protest. As the murder of the Prime Minister Đinđić by the head of the 
JSO and different testimonies would later show, the commitments given to the paramilitary 
forces in the eve before October the 5th included the promise of amnesty for all its members. 
The  assassination  of  the  Prime  Minister,  caused  by  his  determination  to  strike  on  the 
organized gang with which the security forces were involved, clearly testifies on the difficulties 
the new democracies face in all those cases where the security forces fear the prosecution for 
their past and current criminal activities. 
Beside the police forces and its Unit for Special Operations, another extremely important 
body controlled by the Ministry of Interior was the intelligence service, known as “DB”- by 
the secret police that everyone feared. Both the communistic and Milošević’s regime made a 
large use  of  the  DB,  so that  after  the transition  this  institution  became one of  the  most 
difficult sectors to reform. Beside the difficulties that are usually linked to the security sector 
reform in general, the intelligence agencies are specific for their nature. The very purpose of 
the intelligence agencies implies secrecy and the use of special measures, making their control 
(and reform) a very difficult and sensitive issue500.
While the presence of the corrupted and compromised officers within the security sector 
represented an “inner” obstacle to the reform, the new elite starting to enjoy the benefits of the 
499 See  http://www.ldpkula.org/vladimir_beba_popovic/vladimir_popovic_beba/index.html, 
http://www.surcin.com/?meni=informacije&podmeni=vesti&pm2=5&id=1215. On police as a key instrument 
of Milošević’s regime, see also Antonić, 2001.
500 See Janković, 2006, 2007.
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politicized police lost the will to initiate the difficult reforms501. As an OSCE report on the 
policing in Serbia assessed, in Serbia there is no distinction between the terms “accountability” 
and “control”, and there is an accepted view that the police shall be controlled by the executive 
(Ministry of Interior). The centralized structure of the police, its dependence on the Ministry 
of Interior,  the lack of clear,  professional  criteria  for the career and recruitment,  a strong 
influence the senior officers have on the promotion of their lower rank colleagues, all these 
create a fertile ground for the political influence in the police lines. Similarly, the DB (and 
afterwards  BIA)  were  also  controlled  by  the  ruling  political  parties,  with  the  political 
appointees at the head of the agency.
16.1.2. THE (STRUGGLE TO) REFORM
In the first period after the regime change (2000-2003), even though the overall structural 
reform and modernization were recommendable502,  the approach adopted by the domestic 
actors  and  external  experts  was  more  “individual”  than  “systemic”.  The  problem  of  the 
accountability of the police was perceived as mainly a problem of some individuals, and sought 
to be solved through changes of the personnel. The shifts in the position of the Minister of 
Internal Affairs and Chief of Security Services were followed by replacements on a large scale: 
the heads of directorates, the heads of regional secretariats and the commanders of police 
stations were all replaced. The reduction in size of the police forces also took place, some 
2.500  police  officers  being  dismissed.  Some  officers  were  even  arrested  for  crimes  and 
corruption. However, the lustration was far from being complete. The Helsinki Committee 
for Human rights in Serbia and the Humanitarian Law center reported that numerous army 
and police officials who took part to war crimes and serious violations of human rights still 
occupy key police and army positions (Helsinki Committee 2002: 28), which shows that the 
“lustration” that took place was selective and mainly concerned the lower level rank officers. 
The lustration was thus limited in its goal, mainly leaving aside the members of the Unit for 
the  Special  Operations  or  intelligence  service503.  As  soon  as  the  ruling  elite  showed  the 
501 When in 2004 the new minister of interior set in the office, beside replacing 16 heads of police districts, he 
also replaced about 700 senior policemen, and this is just an example of the continuous political purges that take 
place on all levels. (See Pešić, 2006). As Zveržhanovski (2003) argued, fearing the lustration, parts of the security 
forces started to search for political protection.
502 According  to  the  OSCE,  the  following  steps  were  necessary:  depoliticization,  demilitarization, 
decentralization, law enforcement, reduction in size and increase in civilian control over the police, human rights 
training, strengthening of the transparency and efficiency, establishing of the independent internal control and 
complaint investigation.
503 As Janković (2006, 2007) underlined, the reform of the secret service was mainly – a secret process. The 
agency chiefs  had announced several times that the inner reform, cuts in personnel  and the lustration were 
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intention to tackle the sensitive question of the war crimes and to start the fight against the 
organized crime, the limits of the Serbian democracy emerged. The JSO protest was organized 
(according to some authors, directed by Koštunica and with the involvement of the military 
intelligence) during which the paramilitary group under the arms occupied the road, requiring 
the release of the two members of the Unit arrested under the ICTY charges for war crimes504. 
The  changes  introduced  in  this  period  where  mainly  concentrated  on  the  individual 
members of the security forces. In cooperation with OSCE and CoE, the training in ethical 
and technical issues of the members of police took place. In southern Serbia, in order to calm 
the  emerging  inter-ethnic  tensions,  the  government  embraced  OSCE’s  program of  multi-
ethnic  policing,  and the training  and inclusion  of  the  ethnic  minority  and female  officers 
increased the representativity of the police505. As the OSCE report 2004 assesses, the approach 
this organization and the international community had to the reforms in Serbia in the first few 
years  was  to increase  the  individual  integrity  and strategy.  However,  as  underlined  in  the 
report, the necessity to tackle the structural integrity and strategy soon became evident506. 
In  the field  of  the legislative  framework,  no structural  changes took place  in  this  first 
period  of  the  reform.  In  2001  the  Law  on  Police  was  drafted  in  cooperation  with  the 
international experts and the domestic civil society, but it was not adopted. The law draft was 
submitted to several revisions and changes, undertaken mainly within the government and in a 
process criticized as untransparent. In the following two years, the “Vision Document on the 
Police Reform” was also drafted, again as reported by OSCE with a very low participation of 
the local NGOs. However, none of these documents was adopted. 
There  were  also  some  positive  developments  in  this  period:  the  Amendments  to  the 
Criminal Code were adopted and praised as a significant achievement (the legislation finally 
abolished the death penalty, defined new corruption offenses and established the institutions 
of the protected witness). Another positive step was the adoption of the Law on Organization 
and Jurisdiction  of  Government Authorities  in  Suppression  of  the Organized Crime (July 
2002),  which  provided  for  a  special  public  prosecutor  and  established  teams  within  the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs for dealing with cases of organized crime. In this period the law 
transforming DB into BIA (Security Intelligence Agency) was also passed.
ongoing, yet the only evidence for these are the statements of the heads of agency, other data not being available 
to public.
504 See Zveržhanovski 2003.
505 See also Dallara, 2008.
506 See Police Reform in Serbia: Towards a modern and accountable police service, OSCE, 2004.
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The Law on the Security Intelligence Agency was adopted in July 2002, representing one of 
the most important laws adopted in this first stage. The law finally abolished the old secret 
police and established an intelligence service under the governmental control. In commenting 
the  rule  adoption,  the  then  Minister  of  Interior,  Mihajlović,  stressed  that  “the  law  is  a 
necessary step towards the democratization and (it is) in line with the European democratic 
standards we aspire to comply with”507. 
Even though announced as a step in the democratization process, the rule adoption was 
part of Đinđić’s government’s reaction on the serious strike coming from the military secret 
service controlled by Koštunica’s (former Milošević’s) alley Tomić508. Đinđić realized that the 
security  agencies  should be reformed as soon as  possible,  initiating  the procedure for the 
amendments of the existing legislation. While the changes introduced in the federal Law on 
the Security Agencies gained positive assessment by the EU, the Law on BIA represented a 
series of shortcomings that were mainly the product of the ruling elite’s desire to maintain the 
control over the agency. The agency was subtracted from the Ministry of Interior and put 
under the control of the government (which in that moment meant under the control of the 
DOS), even though domestic and external experts advised that the authority to nominate the 
head of  agency should be given to the  parliament.  The control  over the agency was also 
perceived as problematic, as the only basis for the parliament to control it means the necessity 
of the agency to submit periodical reports to the MPs. According to the assessment of the 
researchers, as well as according to the findings of the international organizations, beside the 
abovementioned shortcomings, the provisions on the internal and the external control were 
lacking, protection of human rights also being an issue of concern509. 
The assassination of the Prime Minister by a member of the JSO opened a new chapter in 
the reform of the security service in Serbia. Following the assassination of the PM, the state of 
emergency  was  proclaimed,  during  which  the  Sablja  investigation,  aiming  to  identify  and 
capture the murders of Đinđić, took place. The government amended a series of laws, giving 
large  powers  to  the  police  and  prosecutor  in  investigations  on  the  organized  crime,  and 
strengthening the political control over the judiciary, the prosecutor office, and the police. 
507Mihajlović, 17. 07. 2002. B92,
 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?nav_category=11&dd=17&mm=7&yyyy=2002..
508 The military secret agency was spying on Serbia’s deputy prime minister Perišić, behind the back of the PM 
Đinđić or any other authority on the level of the republic, bringing to the scandal when the deputy PM was 
arrested by the military police. According to domestic authors, this event was just a part of the spy-war that was 
taking place between military controlled by Koštunica and police forces controlled by Đinđić (see Zveržhanovski 
, 2003, p. 10).
509 Janković 2005, 2006, Zveržhanovski , 2003.
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Some of these amendments were declared to be against the constitution by the constitutional 
court and abolished through the 2003 and 2005 amendments. 
While the Sablja action was on the one hand praised to have effectively solved some high-
profile political murders and dismantled several organized crime channels, on the other it was 
strongly criticized for the violation of human rights that took place during the action (NGOs 
reported  numerous  cases  of  torture  during  the  investigation)510.  The  unit  for  the  special 
operations was immediately disbanded, and those members with a clear criminal record were 
re-integrated  in  the  gendarmerie.  The severe  international  and  domestic  criticisms  on the 
human rights violations during the state of emergency brought to the adoption of the Code of 
Ethics for the police in 2003, where the compliance with the European Code of Ethics was 
underlined. The General Inspector Office, designed to ensure the internal accountability, was 
also established. 
In the period following the state of emergency the reforms stagnated due to the political 
instability and scandals shaking the ruling coalition. The new government was formed only in 
February 2004 and, in a sign of discontinuity with the previous period, it decided to start the 
reform of the police all over again511. The existing structure (complete integration between the 
Ministry of Interior and Police Service) was judged as too centralized, while the recruitment 
and career criteria were considered inadequate by the OSCE. Both these issues favored the 
politicization of the service and were hoping to be solved through the reform that as its main 
goals  underlined  decentralization,  depoliticization,  demilitarization  and introduction  of  the 
accountability mechanisms512. 
The so long awaited for legislation on the police was drafted all over again and was finally 
adopted in November 2005. Even though numerous consultations with the CoE and OSCE 
experts took place, and even though the document was revised few times by the CoE, the 
adopted law was still criticized for a number of shortcomings, including: (1) a lack of a clear 
organizational  structure;  (2)  a lack of  a transparent control  mechanism; (3)  an insufficient 
510 See for example 
http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/03/serbia032503-ltr.htm, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/03/25/serbia5429.htm, 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/04/07/serbia5507.htm, http://www.hrw.org/update/2003/04.html#12.
511 New Minister Jocić stressed that in the previous period almost no reforms took place in the field, also 
underlining the necessity  to bring the legislation in line with CoE standards and recommendations.  He also 
questioned the Sablja police action, arguing that more than an investigation on the assassination it was an action 
guided by political revanshism. Dnevni list Danas, 15-16 maj 2004.
512 http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2004&mm=03&dd=10&nav_id=134801&nav_category=16, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2004&mm=04&dd=10&nav_category=11&nav_id=137830. 
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definition  of  the  powers  of  police  officials  in  performing  their  functions513.  The 
implementation of the legislation is judged to be slow, and the legislation establishing police 
academy is still pending. 
During 2006 further developments took place, as the Law on Witness Protection in the 
Criminal Proceedings, the Criminal Procedure Code, the by-laws on the responsibility of the 
police members and on the complaints against police behavior were introduced. 
However,  the  slow implementation of  the  adopted legislation,  as  well  as  the failure  to 
ensure  transparent  control  mechanisms,  resulted  in  the  persistence  of  power-abuses  and 
neglect for the human rights protection. Here we refer both to the police failing to protect the 
most  vulnerable  and  marginalized  groups  from the  violence  and to  the  cases  of  torture, 
discrimination and harassment by the police. The reports of the Helsinki Committee on the 
protection of human rights in Serbia identified cases of torture by the police, while in the 
interviews with the local human rights activists the inadequate attitude of the police towards 
the  socially  marginalized  groups  and in  particular  the  LGBT and Roma population  were 
reported. The lack of actions to protect their basic human rights and to ensure their physical 
integrity, the failure to investigate on the cases concerning the members of the marginalized 
communities, the refusal of the local police stations to cooperate with the NGOs protecting 
the rights of these groups and, in some cases, even the discrimination, the hate speech and the 
intolerance  combined with unlawful arrests  and ill-treatment by some police  officers  were 
reported in the interviews with human rights activists514. 
The administrative capacity in terms of available technical resources is one of the most 
important issues when we discuss the development of the police in those countries where the 
financial resources are insufficient to satisfy the needs in the equipment. In 2004 the OSCE 
report  underlined  the  need  for  the  national  government  to  assign  more resources  to  the 
budget for the police reform. The budget destined to the Ministry of Interior was around 6-
7% of the national budget. While in this period the police budget’s share in the state budget 
was decreasing (from 9.5% in 2002 to 6.4% in 2007), in absolute terms it actually grew, and 
the relative decrease was produced by the growth of the state budget. Thus, in absolute terms, 
taking  in  consideration  the  inflation  rates,  the  budget  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior  was 
513 See Council of Europe, SG/Inf (2005) 16 final, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/serbian/news/2005/10/051019_serbia_police.html, also, 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/pregled_stampe.php?yyyy=2005&mm=10&dd=23&nav_id=179009. 
514 From the interview with Jelena Ajdarević, human rights activist, Lambda, Nis, 2008.
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diminished in 2003 respect to 2002, then, in 2003, 2004 and 2005 it was stable, only to sign a 
growth in 2006 and then another significant increase in 2007 (see the Tables in the appendix). 
As far as the reform of BIA is concerned, the developments that followed the adoption of 
the Law on the Security Intelligence Agency are difficult to follow due to the lack of available 
information. It is a process that mainly took place from within: in search of legitimacy, the 
service made the investigations on its members possible, and replaced about 50% of cadres, 
increasing the education level of the service. But this kind of inside-out driven reform brings 
all shortcomings that derive from the lack of political will to help the reform of the agency: as 
Janković (2006, 2007) stresses, until the “controllers” do not provide clear signals, it is difficult 
that the members of BIA would find the answers to the difficult questions concerning the 
distinction between the state and the party politics,  the national and the state security, the 
efficiency  and  the  abuse  of  power,  the  blind  obedience  and  the  respect  for  law  all  by 
themselves. 
16.1.3. THE ACTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The Council of Europe and OSCE played a significant role in the reform of Serbian police, 
especially in terms of technical and financial assistance. In the first period (2001-2002), the 
OSCE and the  Council  of  Europe  were  proclaimed  strategic  partners  of  the  Ministry  of 
Interior. They invested significant resources, and OSCE organized the training in ethical and 
technical issues, for the newly recruited as well as for the existing cadres. The international 
organizations also provided clear road maps for the reform, the Monk Report on the Situation 
in the Police in 2001 and OSCE Report on the Developments and Further Necessities in 2004 
being  two crucial  documents  where  more than 100 recommendations  were  made to help 
Serbia overcome the existing shortcomings. However, as the shortcomings identified in the 
new legislation testify, these recommendations were not always taken into account. 
As far as the reform of the intelligence service is concerned, the sensitivity of the issue is 
also reflected in the approach of the international actors. While ensuring civil control over the 
security forces was recommended in the OSCE, CoE and EU reports, the issue was never 
included among the partnership priorities or was made the subject of the conditionality. Such 
lack of information should not be interpreted as a lack of international attention and influence 
in the field, as testified by the incidents following the government formation in May 2007 
when the EU representative was trying to influence the assignment of the chief of the BIA515.
515 See http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/articleview/7320/1/218 ,
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16.1.4. ASSESSMENT OF THE REFORM
As we saw, the reform of the police was a slow and difficult process, with some positive 
goals  achieved  (particularly  in  the  training),  but  with  delays  in  the  rule  adoption  and 
implementation. The main cause of such difficulties in the reform can be found in the difficult 
legacies from the previous regime and the lack of political will to make the difficult decisions 
associated with the reform. 
In the process of the reform, we can distinguish the period immediately after the transition, 
when  the  changes  in  the  governing  personnel  and  trainings  took  place,  the  international 
organization acting mainly through the socialization channel, in very good and highly praised 
cooperation with the Ministry of Interior; and the period after the assassination of Đinđić. 
The investigation on the assassination of the PM was at first associated with the violations of 
human rights  and  abuses  of  power,  police  once  again  becoming  a  “force”  rather  than  a 
“service”, but immediately afterwards, in search for legitimacy, actions like the adoption of the 
new Code of Ethics and establishment of the bodies for the internal control were undertaken. 
In the second period the international pressures were strengthened, this time concentrated on 
the legislative framework with requests for the substantive reform, not only modernization, as 
it was the case in previous periods. The pressures increased, and, as expressed in the OSCE 
recommendations  in  2004,  the  assistance  was  to  be  both  oriented  at and  conditioned  by the 
structural changes. 
The international pressure in the field became much stronger after the assassination of the 
prime minister,  resulting in the positive  developments in the rule adoption,  while  the rule 
implementation is still undermined. Serbian police, even though it had significantly changed 
after the change of regime, still need to be substantially reformed, such process being only 
partially tackled by the adoption of the Law on Police. According to the authors, supportive 
of the thesis of the political party’s capture of the state in Serbia, the main obstacle, beside the 
persistence of the supporters of the ancient regime and the need for lustration, consists in the 
politicization (as we already described in the part on the judiciary), where the political leaders 
actually have no interest in the reform, as it would leave them without a significant source of 
power (see Pešić, 2006 p. 23) According to these authors, only a strong international pressure 
can bring to the reforms in the field, necessary for the consolidation of democracy. 
http://www.farmaceuti.com/forum/index.php?topic=4720.75;wap  , ,
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2007&mm=05&dd=09&nav_category=11&version=print.
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16.2. MACEDONIA: IN SEARCH FOR CONFIDENCE
16.2.1. THE POLICE SERVICE REFORM
Since the crash between the Macedonian police and the Albanian paramilitary groupings in 
2001, the reform and re-structuring of the police forces became one of the most important 
issues in the process of peace building. The already low Albanians’ confidence in the state 
institutions and police (mainly composed of ethnic Macedonians) particularly grew during the 
conflict between the NLA516 and the Macedonian security forces. The NLA underlined, the ill 
treatment,  ethnic  discrimination and abuse of  power by the police  in  the ethnic-Albanian 
villages  were  the  reasons  for  the  uprising517,  so  that  the  structure  and  organization  of 
Macedonian police forces became a central part of the Peace Agreement. The changes in the 
legislative framework regulating the police were included in the OFA in order to allow greater 
participation  and  more  influence  of  the  Albanian  minority  in  this  sector.  The  municipal 
councils were supposed to be given the power to select the local heads of police, the power to 
control  their work (through reports) and the power to give recommendations to the local 
heads of police518. The principle of the equal representation in the police service was supposed 
to be ensured with “particular  attention” and “as rapidly  as  possible”  (article  4  comma 2 
OFA),  in  order  to  achieve  a  police  service  that  perfectly  reflects  the  composition  and 
territorial  distribution of the population by 2004.  The training,  particularly  in the fields of 
human rights protection, professionalism and development of a code of police conduct was 
assigned to the international actors (OSCE, EU, USA in particular) who were also asked for 
technical assistance and deployment of international monitors and police advisors in sensitive 
areas. 
In the aftermath of the 2001 conflict, Macedonia had a police service mainly composed of 
Macedonian ethnic majority,  mainly distrusted by the Albanian minority,  with a record of 
serious violation of human rights and the feeling of impunity inherited from the “old times”. 
The special unit “Lions”, formed within the police by VMRO (which then was in power), 
represented another serious problem, seen the criminal background of some of its members, 
516 NLA is the acronym for “National Liberation Army”, a paramilitary grouping of the Albanian ethnic 
community in Macedonia.
517 The Amnesty International and Council of Europe reports also on the cases of the ill-treatment and even 
the crimes against humanity committed by the police forces(2001).
518 “…In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of the local 
population”, art. 3 comma 3 of OFA, art. 4 of the annex B OFA.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 546
the partisan nature of the unit and its paramilitary characteristics. The unit was accused of 
abuse of power, uncontrolled use of weapons and killings, and acts of brutality and violence. 
Further on, during the conflict the Macedonian government lost control over some parts of its 
territory  that  remained  under  control  of  the  NLA,  that,  still  in  possess  of  weapons, 
represented a serious challenge to peace and stability in the country. The links between some 
of the NLA members with UCK and Kosovo mafia, and, more in general, the existence of the 
Albanian mafia, represented another challenge to the police, as any action against the Albanian 
criminal  gangs  was  easily  ethnicized  and  politicized,  making  the  action  impossible  to 
undertake. Seen on one hand the prevalence of Macedonians in the police service, the ill-
treatment and violence abuse record of the police forces, and on the other the presence of the 
NLA armed fighters fearing revenge and their links with the organized crime, the re-entrance 
of the police into the villages under NLA control was a highly problematic issue.
16.2.2. GAINING THE CONFIDENCE 
The first efforts in reforming the police after the 2001 violence concerned the disarming of 
the  paramilitary  groups  and regaining  control  over  the  western  part  of  the  country.  The 
amnesty for the NLA fighters became the central Albanian requirement already during the 
process of OFA ratification and the adoption of the new constitution (second half of 2001). 
The Albanian political parties therefore conditioned their vote on the constitution with the 
guarantees  of  non-prosecution  for  the  Albanian  fighters,  further  complicating  the  already 
difficult  process  of  constitutional  reform (see  the  chapter  on  the  constitution).  The  EU 
representative Mr. Le Roy, who arrived in Skopje with the task to solve the crisis blocking the 
constitutional reform, stated that he will personally care for two basic questions important for 
the  Albanians  living  in  Macedonia:  1.  Amnesty  realization  and  2.  Improvement  of  the 
education  of  the  Albanian  students519.  By  granting  amnesty  only  to  those  fighters  that 
submitted  their  arms  until  September  the  27th,  the  international  authorities  tried  to  use 
amnesty as an incentive for the Albanians to submit the arms.
Thanks to the  international  pressures,  the  Macedonian counterpart  accepted to issue  a 
presidential decree granting the amnesty to the NLA fighters, with the exception of those 
individuals  condemned by the  ICTY and for those involved  in  some particularly  difficult 
crime (a list of 30 crimes for which the amnesty shall not be granted was issued). Yet, the 
Albanian parties required that the assembly adopt a special law (if possible with the consensus 
519 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2002, p. 10.
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of all  actors that signed the OFA) and that the amnesty is given to  all NLA fighters. The 
minister of justice (from the Albanian party) initiated the drafting of the Law on Amnesty 
that,  after  a  series  of  conflicts  between the  Macedonian  and Albanian  parties  and strong 
international pressures, was adopted on March the 7th in a form proposed by the Minister. The 
ambiguous formulations in the legislation and very large definition of the crimes amnestied520 
were the price to be paid in exchange for the police regaining control over the whole territory, 
while the donors’ conference, set to take place only few days after the rule adoption, served as 
a  mean to “help”  convincing  the  Macedonian parties.  The adopted law was  another  case 
where the political bargaining prevailed over the legal and rule of law principles, according to 
domestic  legal experts a “political  act that derogates the legal system of the country” (see 
Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2002, p. 12), but still a necessary step in the solution of a 
problem that would otherwise threaten the country’s stability. 
In order to facilitate the re-entrance of the police forces in zones previously involved in the 
conflict, and in order to implement the OFA, the authorities (in collaboration with OSCE) 
initiated the multi-ethnic policing program. The training was organized for the members of 
the national minorities and the process of building up a multi-ethnic police service started. At 
the same time, within the existing centre for education and training (formed in the 1998), 
OSCE and the Council of Europe organized the training aiming to increase the enforcement 
agents’ awareness on human rights.
In June 2002 the amendments to the  Law on Inner  Affairs  were  adopted in  order  to 
implement the provisions of OFA. The municipal councils were given the power to elect the 
heads  of  police  and  to  exercise  the  monitoring  over  their  work,  while  the  provisions 
concerning the equal representation put the basis for the enrollment of the ethnic Albanians 
in the lines of the police. Together with OSCE, the program aiming at establishment of the 
community policing was launched, and the “Citizen Advisory Groups” (CAGs) were formed 
in order to foster  the dialogue between the local  police  and citizens.  Drafted as  informal 
bodies, the CAGs represented the forum that brought citizens, police and municipal structures 
together to discuss issues of common interest, with a goal to increase the citizens’ trust in the 
police. 
While  efforts  aiming to establish  police  as  a  service  of  citizens  were  taking  place,  the 
reports of the Council  of Europe,  Amnesty International  and human-right watch agencies 
520 All crimes “linked with the 2001 conflict”, despite the recommendations of the international legal experts 
to limit the period to which the amnesty is applied to the crimes committed since the beginning of 2001.
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were reporting continuous cases of unpunished ill treatment and torture. Some improvements 
were  registered  only  after  the  2003  Anti-torture  Committee  Report  that  caused  strong 
criticisms  from the  CoE,  EU and other  international  actors.  Pushed  by  the  international 
criticism, the government undertook a series of measures in order to tackle the problem. The 
Professional Standards Unit was formed within the Ministry of Interior as an instrument of 
inner control, and the Code of Ethics was adopted in January 2004. In order to improve the 
training, the Law on the Police Academy was adopted in June 2003, offering specialized high 
education as well as continuous training and courses for the police servants. However, the lack 
of communication between the Ombudsman, Prosecutor and the Ministry and, in particular, 
the lack of the prosecutor’s and judiciary independence, contributed to the impunity of the 
police officers.
During 2003, the problem of the Unit for Special Tasks “Lions” also emerged. The new 
elite, fearing the politicized unit under the opposition’s influence, embraced the international 
pressures coming from EU and NATO and declared that the unit shall be dismissed. The 
Lions responded with a protest in January 2003, during which the unit threatened to open the 
fire  on  the  police  forces.  An  agreement  was  achieved  between  the  government  and  the 
representatives of the unit, according to which half of the 1200 unit members, those with 
clean dossier, shall be employed in the Ministry of Defense and interior. The amnesty for the 
unit’s members was also requested, but the government refused it. 
Triggered by the protest of the Lions521, by the international pressures and by the necessity 
to ensure the control over the whole territory, the strategy for the police reform was adopted 
in summer 2003. The Law on the Inner Affairs was amended again, making the distinction 
between the Ministry of Interior’s and the Ministry of Defense’s competences clearer, bringing 
the border control under the Ministry of Interior, and changing the structure of the Ministry 
of Inner Affairs. According to the new setting, the Ministry is composed of the Directorate 
for Security and Counter-Intelligence and the newly established Bureau for Public Security. 
The Police department, border police and criminal police were put under the bureau’s control. 
The security concerns that rose in the autumn 2003 further pushed the issue of the police 
reform onto the agenda, revealing the problem of the ethnicization of the organized crime. 
With the aim to “weaken  the military bases of the Slavo-Macedonian occupier” and as the 
521 The protests of the Lions assumed a new, more threatening dimension in March 2003, when the members 
of a similar unit  in Serbia (JSO) murdered the Prime Minister Đinđić, testifying on the importance that the 
developments in the neighbouring countries can have for the domestic perception of the problems.
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expression  of  the  “Albanians’  desire  to  withdraw themselves  from the  slavo-Macedonian 
colonizers and to join Albania”, the group labeled “ANA” (Albanian Liberation Army) placed 
bombs in the centre of Skopje. At the same time, in Tetovo and on the northern border zone 
(involved  in  the  2001  conflict),  clashes  between the  police  and the  armed criminal  gangs 
accused of robbery and kidnappings took place. As the strengthened police presence in the 
areas provoked the dissatisfaction of the local population, the Albanian political parties and 
the  representatives  of  the  armed  group  required  the  withdrawal  of  the  police  and  their 
replacement with multiethnic patrols, the application of the Amnesty Law, the cessation of all 
political  court processes in  the country and the release of the imprisoned Albanians.  The 
conflict became severe when the local armed group opened the fire on the security forces, 
which responded causing the death of two members of the group. The DUI underlined its 
dissatisfaction with the action undertaken by the police  bringing  the government into the 
crisis. After the international community‘s support for the police action, the DUI increased 
the pressures for the reform of the police forces in line with NATO standards522.
In December 2003, the EU military mission Concordia ended its mandate and was replaced 
by a new EU mission, “Proxima”, with the task to help the reform and strengthen the police. 
The police mission was to be lead by OSCE’s police chief, and it was expected to promote the 
efficiency of the police forces, to improve the cooperation between the citizens and the police, 
and to offer the training for the Special Forces. The mission’s task was mainly to offer advice 
and to monitor the developments in order to help the country comply with the EU standards.
During 2004, the work on preparing the police reform was intensified: the strategy was 
modified in January 2004 to meet the EU requirements, while the action plan was drafted in 
cooperation with Proxima experts and was adopted in December 2004. In 2005, the Law on 
the Inner Affairs was further amended to precise the procedure for the election of the local 
heads of police station. The Law on Police, the central piece of legislation according to the 
strategy, was drafted in the ministry already in 2005, but its adoption was postponed523. 
The delay in the adoption of the law caused strong critics from the EU that included the 
reform of the police among the conditions for granting the negotiating status to Macedonia. 
The security threats that rose in Kondovo in 2005-2006 only contributed to the perception 
522 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2003.
523 According to the official statements by the government, both the coalitional partners (SDSM and DUI) 
offered their support for the law proposal accepted by the government, and the delay was caused by technical 
questions. However, some domestic authors argue that the rule adoption was delayed due to the disagreement 
between the SDSM and DUI. See Gaber Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2005.
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that the police reform would, hopefully, put an end to the ethnicization and politicization of 
the  police  functioning.  The  reform  appeared  more  urgent  than  ever,  resulting  in  strong 
international pressures in order to accelerate the rule adoption524. 
After the 2006 elections, the newly elected government proceeded with the adoption of the 
law drafted by the previous government. Even though there appeared to be the consensus 
over the law (as it was drafted by SDSM and DUI and then embraced by the VMRO/DPA 
government), the process proved to be difficult, seen that DUI, unsatisfied by its position in 
the opposition, used its parliamentary strength to obstruct the process. The party required the 
Badinter majority for the rule adoption525, trying to use the Law on Police (strongly required 
by IA) for its bargaining with VMRO. 
The discussion over the law was very intense as the ethnicization of the question further 
heated the already high temperature. The core questions of disagreement were: the number 
and allocation of police stations (the law proposed 38 police sectors while DUI was requiring 
81, one for each community), the number and allocation of the police sectors526, the years of 
experience necessary for the head positions within the Ministry of Interior527, the procedure of 
the  appointment  of  the  commanders  of  police  stations  and of  the  heads  of  the  8  police 
sectors,  as  well  as  the  respective  powers  of  the  minister  of  interior  in  this  appointments 
procedure. Trying to maximize their negotiating positions, DUI included the introduction of 
bilingualism in the police and the army among their requirements, issues very difficult to be 
accepted by the Macedonian majority. Each of the issues in discussion was crucial for the 
distribution of power between the two ethnic groups (and political parties) and their future 
control over the local police forces. Seen the political influence that can be exercised on the 
524 The Kondovo case represents another example of criminal gangs using the ethnic discourse in order to 
avoid the justice. In summer 2005, Agim Krasniqi, accused of several criminal deeds and wanted by the police, 
imposed control over the Kondovo village. Seen the village’s strategic position on the hills over Skopje and the 
strength of Krasniqi’s gang (about 80 men and heavy weaponry), following strong foreign and domestic pressure, 
a political solution of dealing with Krasniqi’s case in front of Macedonian courts was found. The continuous 
presence of his armed gang represented a serious problem for the zone, as some members of the group were 
involved in  criminal  acts.  When,  in  March 2006,  the  police  undertook an action in  Kondovo for  arresting 
criminals at large, one of them got killed while resisting the arrest and opening the fire on the police. And as in 
the case of ANA, the issue  was again politicized provoking a  clash between the Albanian and Macedonian 
parties. See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2005, 2006.
525 Seen the distribution of the mandates, the use of Badinter would give DUI the veto power.
526 The police sector is the intermediate unit between the local police stations and the central bureau, with the 
task to control and coordinate the work of the police stations, as well as with the competences concerning the 
criminal police. According to the old legislation there were 12 police sectors, but the new law draft established 
only 8 units.
527 The  original  draft  settled  the  experience  criteria  on  12  years,  but  seen  the  low  participation  of  the 
Albanians to the police service prior to the 2001 conflict, Albanian leaders argued that so high standards are 
discriminatory. 
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heads of single departments and seen the territorial concentration of the ethnic groups, the 
horizontal  conflict between the different levels of power in Macedonia’s case assumed the 
characteristics  of  an inter-ethnic  and inter-party conflict  resulting  in  the prevalence  of  the 
political/ethnic  rather  than  professional/efficiency/functionality  concerns  in  the  decision-
making process.
After a few months of fierce discussion in the parliament and protest of the DUI members, 
the president of the assembly, pressed by the deadline settled by the EU, put the law to vote 
despite the DUI’s protest and lack of large consensus to the proposal. As the compromise was 
reached between the  ruling  VMRO and SDSM,  the  solutions  proposed  in  the  legislation 
represented a compromise that satisfied some of the requirements of all parties. The eight 
police sectors were to be established (by request of SDSM, no police sector in Struga, a city 
with Albanian majority in the south-western Macedonia), whose heads are to be appointed by 
the Ministry of Inner Affairs. The criteria for the election of the candidates for the heads of 
the police sectors and for the commanders of the police stations were lowered to 6 years of 
experience (as required by Albanian parties). A significant part of the legislation was dedicated 
to the  regulations  of  the  work of  the  police  with  the  goal  to  improve  the  human rights 
protection and limit the use of power. The use of informative talks, an issue of great concern 
due  to  frequent  abuse  of  unclear  rules,  was  finally  regulated.  The  law  was  considered  a 
necessary step in the process of EU integrations, which is reflected in the statements of the 
government and media and the timing of its adoption. 
 During 2007 the reform proceeded mainly with preparations for implementation of the 
Law on Police. The side-legislation was prepared and adopted, including the new police code 
and the action plan for its implementation (as envisaged by the Law on Police and in the 
national  strategy).  However,  the (lack of) solutions concerning the resources management, 
budgetary planning, and the mechanisms of oversight remained a main weakness. The Law on 
Police prescribed these issues to be solved with the internal documents of the ministry. The 
ministry did adopt the necessary documents, but the solutions offered were not in line with 
the European standards528. The most important criticism concerned the failure to establish an 
independent  control  over  the  police  service’s  functioning,  where  the  only  channels  of 
responsibility remained the hierarchical/political ones within the ministry529. During 2006 and 
528 See EU and OSCE reports on Macedonia.
529 From the interview with Buttini, the police advisor in the EU commission delegation to Skopje, August 
2008.
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2007, a series of politically inspired changes in the personnel involving not only the heads of 
the  police  stations,  but,  according  to  media,  even  the  lowest-level  employees  offered  an 
illustration of the channels of political influence within the service530. The politicization of the 
appointees in the Ministry of Interior (and generally in the whole system) was identified by the 
EU representatives as the main source of concern: “Not only are the professionalism and 
efficiency hampered by such practice, but, even more seriously, this raises the costs of the 
reforms.  Together with  other  international  partners  we invested time and money to train 
people, and now they are fired due to political affiliations, and new people, lacking experience 
and training, came”531. Moreover, the DUI’s dissatisfaction with the content, and even more, 
with the way in which the legislation was adopted, hampered the rule implementation as DUI 
refused  to  comply  with  the  law.  Not  satisfied  with  the  solution  according  to  which  the 
Ministry  of  Interior  (and  not,  as  required  by  them,  the  local  mayor)  shall  propose  the 
candidates  for the local  head of  police  unit  (to be further appointed by the  community’s 
council), the heads of police station were not approved by the council in the 16 communities 
that were under DUI’s control. This postponed the implementation of the law until mid-2008, 
when the process was finally accomplished. The unofficial pre-electoral deal made between 
VMRO and DUI532 settled things down, allowing the whole process to be finally brought to an 
end,  and even winning the government the appraisal  for reaching the consensus with the 
opposition.
The efforts to foster the reforms and, in particular,  to help the decentralization of the 
police  service,  were  supported  with  the  budgetary  means  of  the  Ministry  of  Interior,  in 
constant growth since 2004,  where we can account for a very significant growth (both in 
absolute terms and as a share in the state budget) in 2005 and 2008 budget (see Table 3).
16.2.3. EU AND THE POLICE REFORM IN MACEDONIA
Since  the  signature  of  OFA,  the  international  actors  were  strongly  pushing  the 
restructuring of Macedonian police forces, seen their central role for the country’s stability. 
The inter-ethnic relations, the fight with the organized crime, dismantling of the armed gangs 
530 See Utrinski, 02.02.2007.
531 From the interview with Buttini, police advisor in the Eureopan Commission delegation to Skopje, August, 
2008.
532 For the “May agreement” see the part on the constitution. It appears that even the current governmental 
coalition between the VMRO and DUI might well be settled prior to the elections held in 2008, indicating the 
possible existence of an unofficial channel of negotiations and deal-settling prior to the creation of the coalition 
in  July  2008.  On the  “March agreement”  between the  VMRO and DUI see  also Gaber  Damjanovska  and 
Jovevska, 2007.
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and paramilitary structures, all these issues were at the stake in the extremely difficult process 
of reforming the police. 
The first efforts were concentrated in ensuring the state control over the entire territory, 
where the dismantling of the paramilitary forces and the implementation of the OFA (and of 
the related articles on the police) were the core aspects.
With  the  introduction  of  the  Accession/European partnerships,  and the  reaching  of  a 
certain level of the stability in the country, the record of the recommendations and priorities 
became more detailed, tackling the questions of human rights and accountability as well (see 
the table in the appendix).
An important instrument of the EU’s influence in the field of the police service reform was 
the mission Proxima, active in Macedonia since 2004, that through twining projects gave a 
substantial support in the fields of training and police reform. Thus, the police reform was 
realized in cooperation and with technical  counseling by the EU experts,  while substantial 
financial and technical support was given to the newly formed police academy. EU financial 
resources dedicated to the reform of the police in 2005 and 2006 represented about 20% of 
the total EU funds allocated to Macedonia in these two years, showing the salience of the 
police reform (see the tables in the Appendix).
Other actors involved in the reform were the OSCE and Council of Europe. Since the 
OFA signature, OSCE was given the role to promote the inter-ethnic confidence building, 
which, among other, meant the assistance to the development of the community policing and 
help  to  develop  a  multi-ethnic  police.  The  Council  of  Europe  was  particularly  active  in 
monitoring the respect for human rights and in strengthening the safeguards against police’s 
power abuse. The compliance with the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, signed and ratified by Macedonia in 
1997, was monitored and the necessary measures were recommended. The compliance with 
the measures recommended by the European Committee for Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
became one of the requirements of the EU as well. The EU support for the CoE and CPT 
agenda was decisive for ensuring the compliance as the improvements were registered only 
after the 2004, when the EU’s pressures for the police reform (and, among other, compliance 
with the convention) were strengthened. 
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16.2.4. THE REFORM OF THE POLICE: ASSESSMENT
As we could see, the police reform in Macedonia represented a key issue for a series of 
reforms in other areas (fight against organized crime in particular) and a key for the country’s 
fragile stability. The presence of armed groupings, militant ethnic minority, organized crime 
groupings (some of which ethnically homogeneous and connected with the militant ethnic 
extremists), high animosity between the ethnic groups and the political elite incline to (ab)use 
the nationalistic rhetorics, all this contributed to a situation where the police reform became 
an extremely delicate issue.
The international actors’ involvement in the process was therefore crucial, as they engaged 
in mediations between the ethnic groups and represented a guarantee that the commitments 
made  would  be  respected.  Combined  with  the  financial/technical  assistance  and  the 
conditionality, these efforts of the international actors successfully pushed the reforms ahead. 
As far as the domestic level variables are concerned, we should distinguish between the 
issues concerning inter-ethnic relations and those that were not a subject to the strong inter-
ethnic conflict. The two groups were subject to different logics on the domestic levels, with 
different responses to the internationally promoted norms. The issues concerning the inter-
ethnic  relations  found  the  strong  domestic  change  agents  between  Macedonians  and 
Albanians, the first fearful for the country’s future, the second pushing the requirements for 
the  decentralization  of  the  police  forces  and  the  equal  representation  of  the  minorities 
forwards. However, as none of these institutionally strong actors is fully democratic-devoted 
and as their interests and preferences in the police reform are modeled with values other than 
democracy, issues like the respect of human rights and the independent control of the law 
enforcement agencies, the de-politicization or fight against corruption were promoted only by 
the  actors  from  the  civil  society,  far  weaker  and  without  any  decision-making  powers. 
Consequentially, the few improvements achieved in these areas represented the response to 
the external pressure. 
 
16.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
As the two analyzed countries faced different problems in their police sectors, the reform 
paths significantly differ. The common characteristics, politicization, the war experience and 
militarization, the presence of paramilitary groups were combined with the particularities of 
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the two countries that have mainly influenced the course of the reforms. The international 
pressures for the reform of the police were far stronger in Macedonia than in Serbia, while, on 
the domestic level, the two countries again score significant differences, the presence of the 
Albanian ethnic minority in Macedonia representing a strong domestic change agent pushing 
for the rule adoption from within, bringing to better compliance. Yet, the prevalence of the 
security concerns on the level of the international actor and the bargaining based on the inter-
ethnic conflict significantly influenced the content of the adopted rules. The decentralization 
of police thus represented a clear consequence of the ethnic power-sharing approach to the 
inter-ethnic relations to Macedonia. Similarly, the failure to comply also with those parts of 
the  internationally  promoted  norms  that  did  not  concern  the  inter-ethnic  relations  (the 
accountability, politicization or respect for human rights) also testifies on how the dynamic of 
the rule adoption influences the content of the adopted rules. 
In Serbia the development in this area produced similar results as in other fields of policy, 
the reform being only limited and failing to face the problems of the politicization and the 
accountability of the police forces. The relatively low external pressures were combined with 
the reform mainly guided by domestic inputs (transition, political struggle for the control of 
BIA,  the  assassination  of  the  Prime  Minister  by  the  security  forces’  member).  As  a 
consequence,  the  solution  mainly  reflected  the  ruling  elite’s  short  terms  preferences.  The 
clearest example was the Law on BIA, where the rule adoption was dictated by the inner 
struggle for control over the intelligence service, the strong executive’s control and absence of 
the parliamentary influence over the intelligence agency being the result. The timing of the 
police reform (2005 -) also matches a period of rather high level of political certainty, when 
the characteristics of the party system (polarized pluralism) appeared to significantly favor the 
central  actor in  the system (DSS),  whose level  of electoral  uncertainty  was very low.  The 
failure of the police reform to face the issues of politicization and accountability is in line with 
the hypothesis that too-stable settings hamper the reforms that are aiming to limit the power 
or to introduce mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability, as the central actor, certain to 
remain in power and thus withdrawn from the scrutiny of the electoral accountability, is not 
induced to introduce mechanisms of horizontal accountability neither. 
For  one  reason  or  another,  the  weaknesses  that  we  identified  in  the  two  countries, 
politicization and the lack of accountability mechanisms, persist, representing the main threat 
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to the protection  of  the human rights,  law enforcement and efficient  struggle against  the 
organized crime and corruption.
APPENDIX
Table 1: “EU priorities and the police reform in Macedonia.”
2002 Dismantle of those legalized police forces which still display the behavior of paramilitary forces; Strengthen the fight against all violations of human rights and 
intensify training on human rights issues for law enforcement officials in co-operation with international organizations.
2003 Pursue key reforms in the security sector, in particular in the police, to ensure a professional, modern and well-trained service, of multi-ethnic composition, trusted 
by the community, and able to re-establish law and order throughout the territory. Complete the dismantling of the police forces which display paramilitary behavior. 
Strengthen the fight against all violations of human rights and intensify training on human rights issues for law enforcement officials, in co-operation with 
international organizations.
2004 Short-term priorities: Ensure that the police services, in particular the special police forces, behave according to international standards and practices. Clarify the 
respective roles of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense in crisis management situations in line with EU practices. Adopt and implement an Action 
Plan for the reform of the police, taking into consideration equitable representation at all levels, and plan the necessary resources for its implementation. Take urgent 
measures to reform human resources management. Improve cooperation with the Judiciary. Enhance training capacities and ensure the proper functioning of the 
Police Academy, including the proper allocation of budgetary resources. Reduce corruption and irregular behavior within police ranks. Promote cooperation with 
Interpol and other international law enforcement organization, in particular through improved consultation of their databases.
2006 Key short-term priorities: Adopt the Law on Police.
Short-term priorities: Continue to implement the action plan for the reform of the police. Provide adequate funding and training. Strengthen coordination and 
cooperation both among police bodies and between the police and other law enforcement agencies. Develop and implement a comprehensive human resources and 
training strategy for the police. Upgrade the equipment, particularly in specialized fields of investigation.
2007 Key short-term priorities: Ensure effective implementation of the Law on Police.
Short-term priorities: Provide adequate funding and training for implementation of the police reform, strengthen coordination and cooperation both among police 
bodies and between the police and other law enforcement agencies and strengthen cooperation between the criminal police and the public prosecutors.
Develop and implement a comprehensive human resources and training strategy for the police and upgrade their equipment.
2008 Key short-term priorities: Ensure effective implementation of the Law on Police.
Short-term priorities: Provide adequate funding and training for implementation of the police reform, strengthen coordination and cooperation both among police 
bodies and between the police and other law enforcement agencies and strengthen cooperation between the criminal police and the public prosecutors.
Develop and implement a comprehensive human resources and training strategy for the police and upgrade their equipment.
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 2: “EU priorities and the police reform in Serbia”.
2002 Reform of the security and police services should continue, transforming them into a service, adopting the Council of Europe’s police code of ethics, bringing them 
under clear internal and external control and improving coordination between the various services and with other state services. 
2003 Continued legislative reform and implementation concerning the security and police services, reducing their size and transforming them into a public service under 
clear internal and external control and accountability, with improved co – ordination between these and other start services, adopting the CoE police code of ethics.
2004 Short-term priorities:  adopt Law on Police in order to improve professionalism and accountability.  Implement a revision of the laws on the organization of the 
judiciary (Law on Courts, Law on Judges, Law on Prosecutors, and Law on High Judicial Council) and on criminal legislation (Criminal Procedure Code, Criminal Code 
and Law on Enforcement of Criminal Sanctions), as provided for in the protocol on cooperation with the Council of Europe. 
Medium term priorities Continue restructuring the police: ensure accountability; reform police education; ensure cooperation among law enforcement agencies. 
2006 Short-term priorities: Implement the Law on Police in order to establish professionalism and accountability.
2007 Short-term priorities: Ensure full implementation of the Law on Police in order to establish professionalism and accountability, improve transparency, develop a 
modern police force free from undue political interference and increase capacity by means of specialized training. Take necessary steps to conclude a cooperation 
agreement with Europol.
2008 Short-term priorities: Ensure full implementation of the Law on Police in order to establish professionalism and accountability, improve transparency, develop a 
modern police force free from undue political interference and increase capacity by means of specialized training. Take necessary steps to conclude a cooperation 
agreement with Europol.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 3: “EU financial assistance to the police reform in Macedonia”.
Year Amount Program
2000 0.5 Support for the police academy.
2001 1.5 Police reform.
2003 2 mil Police reform. Renovation of the police academy.
2004 7.7 mil Twinning- technical assistance to the police academy. Twinning technical assistance to the police reform. 
Development of police evidence management and forensic analysis capacity.
2005 5.8 Grant – Local level police 
reform.
Conditionalities: It is imperative that there is a continued political will on the part of the national authorities to support 
implementation of the Police Reform strategy and that the Government allocates sufficient resources for this purpose.
2006 2 mil Equipment supply to Rapid development unit.
2007 9 mil Support to the 
implementation of the 
Police Reform Strategy.
Conditionalities: Endorsement by all key stakeholders of the Terms of Reference, specifications for the individual contracts to 
be engaged; 2) Appointment of counterpart personnel by the beneficiary before the launch of the tender process; 3) Allocation of 
working space and facilities by the beneficiary for technical assistance before the launch of the tender process; 4) Arrangement by 
the beneficiary of all legal procedures to allow construction (e.g. construction permits, urban plan amendments), refurbishment 
activities before the launch of the tender process; 5) Participation by the beneficiary in the tender process as per EU regulations; 
6) Organization, selection and appointment of members of working groups, steering and coordination committees, seminars by 
the beneficiary as per work plan of the project; 7) Appointing the relevant staff by the beneficiaries to participate in training 
activities as per work plan; In the event that conditionalities are not met, suspension or cancellation of projects will be 
considered.
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007, author’s elaboration.
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Table 4: “EU financial assistance to the police reform in Serbia”.
Year Amount Program
2003 12 millions Support to the Law Enforcement 
Agencies in Serbia (enhance and 
modernize the professional capacities 
and capabilities of departments 
within the police force).
Conditionality (2002-2004) The relevant federal and entity Ministries/Departments will introduce and 
monitor control measures and safeguards to sustain the process in a transparent manner in line with the 
Stabilization and Association process. The relevant federal and entity Ministries/Departments will continue 
their efforts to work out a scheme for appropriate remuneration of its police and judicial service in the 
framework of the Government's Public Administration Reform Program. The Ministries/Departments will 
continue their efforts to reduce the turnover of personnel. The entities will demonstrate visible and tangible 
cooperation amongst themselves. And with the federal level whilst undertaking the necessary reforms and in 
their daily work. A proper maintenance and service of the equipment already provided or to be provided 
needs to be done and demonstrated. In parallel with the international assistance programs the Government 
will gradually allocate more money from the national budget to sustain the progress from its own resource.
2004 1 million Supply of equipment to the Forensic 
Unit within Serbian Criminal Police / 
support to action-oriented measures 
in the field of organized crime.
2005 6.5 millions Capacity Building and strengthening 
the capacities of the Organized Crime 
Directorate in the MoI.
Conditionality: The beneficiaries must agree to commit the necessary resources to realize project objectives 
prior to launch of activities. The MOI must develop an Integrated Border Management Strategy consistent 
with EU guidelines. The OCD must have legally based checks and balances, with regard to special 
investigative measures, that allow a proper balance between the police/OCD’s need to investigate organized 
crime activities and simultaneously protect the privacy of citizens not under justified investigation 
2006 4.5 millions Support to Juvenile Detention Centre
Support to implementation of 
Criminal Sanctions Twinning: 
Implementation of IBM strategy
Twinning: Capacity Building, Bureau 
for International Cooperation.
Conditionality: Funding of all proposed programs is conditional upon the signing of an Implementation
Agreement with the main project partners clearly outlining roles and responsibilities. Each of the project 
partners will be required to implement the necessary institutional arrangements ensuring a smooth 
implementation of the proposed projects. Outstanding issues, particularly support to the computerization of 
the court system under the 2004 program, should be addressed before program support begins.
2007 1 million Assist Serbian Police force in meeting 
EU standards of professionalism and 
conduct.
Conditionality: The Internal Section must be ready to commit the necessary time and resources to maximize 
the benefits of the Twinning contract. Project implemented through a Twinning requires full commitment 
and participation of the senior management of the beneficiary institution. - In addition to providing the 
Twinning partner with adequate staff and other resources to effectively operate, the senior management must 
be fully involved in the development and implementation of the policies and institutional change required to 
deliver the project results - Implementation of the project is also conditioned upon involvement and 
commitment of the stakeholders towards fulfillment of the project objectives. - Special efforts shall be made 
to ensure minority groups are fully included in project initiatives and benefit from project results. This 
includes a) giving special attention to importance to minority groups, and b) ensuring gender equality 
mechanisms.
Source: European Agency for reconstruction report 2006, IPE documents 2007, author’s elaboration.
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Table 5: “The budget of the Ministry of Interior in Serbia”.
Year Ministry of Interior Budget
Ministry of Interior, 
share in budget
2002 20.656.000.000 217.379.629.540 9. 5%
2003 23.887.954.000 318.691.919.000 7. 4%
2004 27.809.068.000 362.045.252.000 7. 7%
2005 28.433.768.000 429.764.926.000 6. 6%
2006 33.917.228.000 548.405.821.000 6. 2%
2007 41.454.312.000 646.466.666.100 6. 4%
2008 41.604.344.000 611.866.849.862 6.8%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
Službeni List Republike Srbije, author’s elaboration.
Table 6: „The budget of the Ministry of Interior in Macedonia“.
Year MIA budget State budget MIA share in state budget
2002 5.160.965.000 71.700.273.000 7.198%
2003 5.635.972.000 67.490.170.000 8.35%
2004 5.677.838.000 66.666.000.000 8.517%
2005 6.255.784.000 66.538.469.000 9.40%
2006 6.914.018.000 81.749.000.000 8.457%
2007 6.890.753.000 79.522.497.000 8.665%
2008 8.097.000.000 89.397.520.000 9.057%
Source of data: Law on State Budget 2002. 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 
Sluzbeni Vesnik na Republika Makedonia, author’s elaboration.
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Table 7: “The police reform in Macedonia, external factors” (author’s elaboration).
  Issues concerning the equal representation and decentralization of police service.
Issues concerning the human rights protection 
and accountability.
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the 
signature of an important international treaty, integration process, 
access to the funds?
Yes (the adoption of OFA, the amnesty were 
conditioned by the donor's conference, the Law on 
Police was conditioned with the negotiating status.
Partially (the Law on Police... Difficult to 
assess in which measure the conditionality was 
considering the issues of the human rights 
rather than the more "difficult" issues of inter-
ethnic relations.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately 
prior/after the important steps in the integration process took 
place?
Yes (the law on the police). Yes (the law on the police).
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? Yes. Yes.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the 
priorities needing attention in the SAA reports? Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the 
adoption of the laws? Yes. Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: 28,5 28,5 (the same resources).
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in 
the whole of EU assistance to the country: 9, 25% 9.25%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Necessary step in peace building. Necessary for the democratization of the country.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Security. Security.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic 
behavior and abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders? X X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made 
available, and was it used in the law drafting? Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly. Partially (mainly avoiding).
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations 
successfully used to delegitimize the status quo in the country? 
Were the domestic actors vulnerable to external criticisms?
X Yes.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government 
underlining its compliance with the international norms, or was it 
seeking the external legitimization of the law in other ways?
X X
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Table 8: “The police reform in Serbia, external factors” (author’s elaboration).
 2001-2003 2004-
Was rule adoption explicitly made a necessary condition for the signature of an 
important international treaty, integration process, access to the funds? No. No.
Did the rule adoption take place in the period immediately prior/after the important 
steps in the integration process took place? X X
Was the issue part of the EU key short-term priorities? No. No.
Was the issue part of the EU short-term priorities or among the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA reports? Yes. Yes.
Was CARDS financial support to the process conditioned by the adoption of the 
laws? No. Yes.
Amount of the EU financial support to the reform in general: - 25 mill (2003 - 2007).
Share of resources dedicated to promote reform in the sector in the whole of EU 
assistance to the country: 0,00% 1.93%
Reform perceived by the IA as: Part of the democratization process and fight against organized crime in the EU as well.
Part of the democratization 
process and fight against organized 
crime in the EU as well.
The main concern guiding IA’s intervention in the field: Democratization/security. Democratization/security.
In promoting the norm, did the IA tolerate undemocratic behavior and abuse of 
power by the domestic stakeholders? X X
Was consulting, advice, technical support of external experts made available, and was 
it used in the law drafting? Yes. Yes.
Were the recommendations made by the IA accepted? Mainly. Partially.
Were the reports and analysis of the international organizations successfully used to 
delegitimize the status quo in the country? Were the domestic actors vulnerable to 
external criticisms?
No. No.
In publicizing the adoption of the law, was the government underlining its 
compliance with the international norms, or was it seeking the external legitimization 
of the law in other ways?
- Yes.
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Table 9: “The police reform in Macedonia, domestic factors” (author’s elaboration).
 Issues concerning the equal representation and decentralization of police service:
Issues concerning the human 
rights protection and 
accountability:
Domestic input for the change: Present (OFA). Absent.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: Present, strong (Albanian ethnic community). Present, weak (civil society).
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High. Low.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: Inter-ethnic, inter-party. Rulers vs. Ruled.
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Yes. No.
Type of the issue (salience - positional): Positional. Salience.
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Macedonian majority. Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Albanian ethnic minority. Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? X X
Two or more alternative solutions present? X X
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid. Fluid. 
Table 10: “The police reform in Serbia, domestic factors” (author’s elaboration).
 2001-2003 2004-
Domestic input for the change: Regime change. Assassination of PM.
Domestic actors pushing for the reform: New ruling elite. Ruling elite.
Level of conflictuality of the issue: High. Mid.
Type of the conflict and main line of the conflict: New vs. old elite, intra-party, political conflict. X
Did the issue concern the deep divisions in society? Partially (problem of continuity - discontinuity). X
Type of the issue (salience - positional): X X
The main beneficiaries of the status quo: Ruling elite. Ruling elite.
The main beneficiaries of the change: Citizens. Citizens.
Is the existing status quo strongly delegitimized by all relevant actors? Yes. Yes.
Two or more alternative solutions present? No. No.
Political fluidity/stability (in terms of the perspective of power of the central actors) Fluid. Stable.
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Table 11: “The police reform in Macedonia, outcomes” (author’s elaboration).
 Issues concerning the equal representation and decentralization of police service
Issues concerning the human rights protection and 
accountability
The procedure of law drafting: Away from the public debate. Away from the public debate.
The main deficiency in the adopted legislation: -
Failure to establish the mechanisms of the control. 
Persistence of the politicization.
The main beneficiaries of such deficiencies: - Ruling elite.
The status (2008): Rule adopted. Implementation ongoing. Rule adopted, implementation obstructed.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
The decentralization element of the police reform strategy 
has been implemented. All the implementing legislation has 
been adopted, and the necessary organizational 
arrangements were made by the Ministry of the Interior to 
prepare for effective implementation of the Police Law.
The Ombudsman regretted the lack of effective control 
over special police units, notably the Alpha units. The 
prosecutor's office should make further significant efforts to 
promptly and in an independent manner investigate and 
prosecute allegations of ill treatment. There are increasing 
calls for an independent, external mechanism for 
monitoring of police misconduct to be established.
Table 12: “The police reform in Serbia, outcomes” (author’s elaboration).
  2001-2003 2004-
The procedure of law drafting:
The main deficiency in the adopted 
legislation:
Approach concentrated on the individual integrity 
rather than on the systemic reform. Failure to 
ensure the parliamentary control over the 
intelligence agency.
Failure to ensure for the independent mechanisms of external control, still 
persistent politicization.
The main beneficiaries of such 
deficiencies:
Ruling elite. Ruling elite.
The status (2008):  - Rule adopted, implementation.
The EU comment in the 2008 report:
Progress in the area of police and policing has been limited. However, 
structural problems in the police forces persist. In the absence of new 
legislation concerning the division of responsibilities, there is a lack of 
coordination. The internal control department has not been sufficiently 
effective owing to limited support within the police, staff shortages and a lack 
of resources. Concerns remain over the level of transparency in police work 
and potential undue political influence. Overall, Serbia is moderately advanced 
in the area of policing.
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17. ECONOMIC ISSUES
The creation of the linkages with the EU, beside the political requirements, also has its 
economic dimension producing a series of costs and benefits for the domestic economic and 
political elite. In this section we will try to ponder on the possibility for the economic ties to 
serve as a mean of supporting the process of democratization and we will assess the structure 
of incentives for compliance/integration deriving from the creation of the economic ties and 
financial incentives of the EU. 
The  belief  that  the  EU  integrations  would  foster  the  economic  development  often 
represents  one  of  the  key  motives  inducing  countries  to  seek  the  EU membership.  The 
expected benefits are many-fold, from access to the EU internal market of goods, capital and 
labour and access to EU funds, to the belief that the EU membership, a guarantee for the 
country’s  political  stability  and  security,  would  attract  foreign  direct  investments  into  the 
domestic  economy.  Finally,  as  Vachudova  stresses,  the  dependence  of  the  South-East 
European countries on the trade with EU increased the vulnerability of these states to the 
effects of the EU market regulations. Following the logic described by Hurrell, according to 
whom “the more prepared the dominant power is to accept a rule-constrained hegemonic 
order, the more acceptable is a strategy of  band-wagoning for the weaker states” (Hurrell, 
1995, p. 343, cited in Vachudova, 2001, p. 8), the countries depending on the EU trade are 
strongly motivated to seek for integration. This is particularly true for both Macedonia and 
Serbia  in  the  context  of  the  last  EU  enlargements  after  which  the  Balkan  states  found 
themselves being isolated islands surrounded by the EU. As for both countries the markets of 
the Central-Eastern Europe were crucial trade partners, the entrance of the Eastern European 
countries, and, in particular, the entrance of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU, significantly 
increased the share of the trade with EU in both Serbia and Macedonia (if we compare the 
share of the EU trade with Serbia and Macedonia for EU15, EU25 and EU27, we can notice 
the significant increase of the dependence on the trade with EU for both countries after the 
last enlargement in 2007. See Tab.1 and 2). Further on, seen that for both Macedonia and 
Serbia the main trade-partners other than EU are the other Balkan countries,  the possible 
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entrance in the EU family of any of the candidates or potential candidates countries would 
further  increase  the  trade  dependence  on  the  EU.  What  Vachudova  underlined  in  2001 
becomes even more important for the current candidate and potential candidate countries: 
those excluded would bear the huge costs deriving both from the missed opportunity and 
from the increased EU influence and strength. 
Table 1: “Serbia’s trade with the EU in 2002, share in total import and export”.
Share in total import Share in total export
EU 15 40% 42%
EU 25 55.2% 51.8%
EU 27 59.6% 59.6%
Source: Statistical annex of the SAA report for Serbia 2004, 2006 and 2007, author's elaboration.
Table 2: “Macedonia’s trade with the EU in 2002, share in total import and export”.
Share in total import Share in total export
EU 15 44.9% 51.1%
EU 25 54.7% 53.9%
EU 27 61.7 55.9%
Source: Statistical annex of the SAA report for Macedonia 2004, 2006 and 2007, author's elaboration.
To  the  consideration  of  the  costs  and  benefits  that  a  single  country  gets  from  the 
integration in the EU, we should add the consideration of the costs and benefits that the EU 
integrations have for the domestic economic elite. The interests of the particular economic 
actors are not necessarily identical to what is the “national”, overall interest in the process of 
the economic integrations. The example of Serbia is very important in this sense: while the 
further liberalization of trade and increased competitiveness of the market would surely favour 
the citizens of Serbia (whose costs of life are similar to those in the more developed countries 
of the EU but with far lower wages), Serbian monopolists (see the next section) would endure 
significant costs from losing the control over the internal market. The political and economic 
integrations in the EU might have important re-distributive effects not only on an inter-state 
level,  but  also within a  single state533.  It  would be therefore erroneous to assume that the 
linkage incentives  offered by the  international  actors  are always positively  assessed by the 
domestic actors. In the context of the state capture and strong business’ influence on the 
533 See Koutsiaras, 2006.
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decision-making process, the interests of the economic actors in the field of the foreign policy 
become a  crucial  factor  in  shaping  the  dynamics  and  the  exit  of  the  process  of  the  EU 
integrations,  and,  thus,  the  exit  of  the  development  of  the  EU  anchors  of  domestic 
democracy. 
The interests  of  the economic  actors  are one of  the important  factors  influencing  the 
democratization process as well. In the cases of the international anchoring of democracy, a 
process characterized by  the  interception  of  two otherwise  distinct  processes  (the foreign 
policy choices and the change of the domestic political regime), the interests of the economic 
elite in foreign policy are combined with their interests in the process of the regime change. 
The importance of this linkage is the core of many studies of the international dimension of 
democratization that start with the belief that by offering economic incentives in the shape of 
foreign trade or integration into the International Organizations, the international actors can 
induce the skeptical  domestic  economic elite  to accept the domestic  regime change. Thus 
Whitehead, when analyzing the democratization process in Southern Europe, underlined the 
important role of the EC, showing how the presence of the supranational organizations is 
capable to favor the democratization as it can offer external guarantees for the property rights 
of the economic elite,  this way settling their fear of transition (Whitehead, 1996).  In these 
cases it was precisely the boundary removal and the perspective of European integration to 
induce  the  economic  elite  to  accept  the  regime  change  and  support  the  democratization 
(Whitehead, 1996), an acceptance that, according to Morlino (1998), is the necessary condition 
for democratic consolidation. 
The role of the economic elite in the theoretical framework of the international anchoring 
is particularly interesting if we consider the effects that the process of the EU integration can 
produce for the  already existing  domestic  anchors  of  democracy (Morlino,  1998.  We will 
further explore this argument in the conclusive chapters). With its deep implications for both 
economy and the political regime, the norms promoted by the EU can strongly influence the 
pre-existing equilibrium in the country. The international actor’s action can thus strengthen 
the existing patterns of linkage between the political and economic elite, or it might disturb 
the balance between the domestic actors, and for what is  the core interest of this section, 
between  the  economic  and  political  elite.  The  domestic,  pre-existing  anchors  of  the 
democratization might therefore be strengthened by the international influence (strengthening 
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the established regime but not necessarily increasing the quality of the established democracy), 
or they might be harmed, causing an internal crisis.
For these reasons in the following sections we will  concentrate on the domestic elite’s 
interest in the fields of EU integration and process of democratization. As the space of this 
work does not allow a detailed analysis of the economic elite’s interests, which would require a 
new research, we will concentrate on the course of the economic reforms in the two countries, 
paying particular attention to the process and context in which the birth of economic elite 
took place, to the privatization process and the analysis of the business-politics relationship. A 
series of studies on the political  and economic transition in the post-communist countries 
underlined the importance this first period of reforms had for the opportunity structure the 
political  and economic  elite  would face  in  both  further  reforms and EU integrations.  As 
Vachudova underlined, one of the important factors in assessing the country’s approach to the 
EU integrations concerns the beginnings of the transition to democracy and market economy, 
the distribution of forces between the old and new political elite and the timing of economic 
reforms534.  Kitschelt  and  Maleski  also  underlined  Fish’s  finding,  according  to  which  “the 
immediate  aftermath  of  the  communist  collapse  makes  the  greatest  difference  for  the 
development  of  economic  reform in  the  entire  hemisphere”  (Fish 1998,  in  Kitschelt  and 
Maleski,  2000,  p.9).  Hellman’s  analysis  brought  in  light  the  particularity  of  the  economic 
transition in the former communist countries where it was the net winners from the early 
phases of transition to obstruct the further reforms535,  while Walder (2003) underlined the 
importance of the opportunity structure the former communist elite meet at the first years of 
transition for understanding the pattern the transition followed. Finally, Bruszt (2002) makes a 
strong argument on the link between the state making and market making, where the level of 
the accountability  and the representation of interests as build in the constitutional  designs 
534 See Vachudova 2001.
535 Thus, Hellman underlines: “The most common obstacles to the progress of economic reform in post-
communist transitions have come from very different sources: from enterprise insiders who have become new 
owners  only  to  strip  their  firms'  assets;  from  commercial  bankers  who  have  opposed  macroeconomic 
stabilization to preserve their enormously profitable arbitrage opportunities in distorted financial markets; from 
local officials who have prevented market entry into their regions to protect their share of local monopoly rents;  
and from so-called Mafiosi  who have  undermined the  creation of  a  stable  legal  foundation for  the  market 
economy. These actors can hardly be classified as short-term net losers in the overall reform process. On the 
contrary, they were its earliest and biggest winners. These net winners did not oppose the initiation of the reform 
process, nor have they sought a full-scale reversal of reform. Instead, they have frequently attempted to block 
specific advances in the reform process that threaten to eliminate the special advantages and market distortions 
upon which their own early reform gains were based. Instead of forming a constituency in support of advancing 
reforms, the short-term winners have often sought to stall  the economy in a partial  reform equilibrium that 
generates concentrated rents for themselves, while imposing high costs on the rest of society” Hellman, 1998, p. 
204. 
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influenced  the  emerging  economic  elite’s  capacity  to  capture  the  state  and  the  market, 
obstructing the process of market building.
The  economic  and  political  reforms  in  the  post-communist  Europe  appeared  to  go 
together,  as  many researchers  have illustrated.  The causal  link between the two, however, 
remains disputable. As Gould underlined, “while privatization is endogenous to legacies in 
authoritarian  and  liberal  democracies,  this  causal  direction  might  reverse  itself  in  illiberal 
democracies. Weaker democratic institutions will provide insiders with an edge, but as state 
assets come into play, so too will democratic institutions. Conflict surrounding privatization 
could thus contribute to democratic backsliding and regime instability” (Gould, 2003, p. 287). 
All this induces us to believe that the context that shaped the early development of the market 
economy would be a key for understanding the path the economic transition followed in these 
two countries, and the preferences of the economic actors in the democratization of Serbia 
and Macedonia. In an effort to reconstruct the interest of Serbian and Macedonian economic 
elite, we will therefore use these theoretical models as a guide in exploring the incentives the 
particular assets produced on the business elite’s structure of opportunities.
17.1. SERBIA
17.1.1. THE BIRTH OF SERBIAN TYCOONS: ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN THE CONTEXT 
OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION
Unlike  other  central-European  countries,  Serbia’s  post-communist  economy  was 
developed in a climate of international  isolation,  by an authoritarian regime and in a war-
shaken society where corruption, grey economy and organized crime were tightly linked to the 
central authorities. The rising of an economic elite with capitals of dubious origins, used to 
playing by unfair rules, and a situation where a closed market was split among politicians and 
businessmen, controlling all legal and illegal flows, were its logical consequence536:
“In Serbia and Croatia the ethnic conflicts have influenced the formation of the political elite, 
by serving as a powerful form of external legitimacy, by strengthening nationalism and by offering 
an efficient background for the imaginative financial embezzlement and the convergence between 
536 For the links between the political, economic elite and organized crime in Serbia and Croatia, see Rotta, 
2003. On the link between nationalism, organized crime and corruption and on the influence the international 
isolation has on the development of such links, see Kemp, 2003. On the links between Serbian elite (political and 
economic)  and  the  organized  crime  during  the  ‘90s,  see  the  report  of  the  Southeast  European  Legal 
Development Initiative, “Anti corruption in southeast Europe: first steps and policies”, on the difficulties and 
costs  of the integration with EU rising from the existence of the economic elite  linked with the nationalist 
pattern governments, see Vachudova, 2003.
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the state, politics and criminality. After the changes that made the main protagonists of the '90s 
disappear, in both countries the legacies of the previous economic management represented a 
heavy burden on their road towards the reforms and European integration.” (Rotta, 2003, p.5, 
translated by I.M.).
The market  created under  the  isolation  by  the  authoritarian  elite  was a  closed market, 
regulated by a series of laws allowing not only the state’s intervention, but also abuse and 
politicization of the public sector. In all sectors of economy centralization took place, and 
Milošević’s “democratic government”, officially devoted to the transition to market economy, 
used the  ethnic  conflict  and the  external  sanctions  as  an excuse  to centralize  even  those 
segments,  like  external  trade,  that  were  rather  liberal  in  the  period  of  the  communistic 
regime537. This resulted in the creation of monopoly or monopoly-like positions, where people 
near to the regime and included in its corruption/criminal network were granted the exclusive 
rights to control the export/import flows, to open companies and to buy the state’s property 
for ridiculously low prices in the few attempts to privatization that took place in that period. 
The public sector, enormously large in Milošević’s period (as the privatization did not take 
place  until  1997,  and  even  then  with  a  very  narrow  range  and  only  in  those  lines  and 
modalities decided by the regime rather than by the market), was used on one side to ensure 
the political support of employees fearing unemployment, while on the other it represented a 
resource for side payment for the narrow elite and their supporters.  The first ten years of 
“transition” in Serbia matched very well to the second type of transition described by Welder: 
the  low  extension  of  regime  change  combined  with  the  delayed  privatization  and  weak 
institutional  framework. According to Walder, and as confirmed in the example of Serbia, 
such setting is characterized by the “assets conversion”, rather than “assets appropriation”:
“The state agencies and public firms may engage in a form of asset conversion in which they 
transfer public assets to private entities that are under their own organizational control.  These 
strategies permit state firms to evade state regulation and taxes by earning larger incomes off the 
books (Lin 2001). The proceeds may be used for a variety of purposes, including larger executive 
compensation (in salaries and fringe benefits) and potentially also the (corrupt) diversion of funds 
into private hands.  In  these  cases,  incumbent officials  may  extract  larger  incomes from such 
arrangements, but they do not assume ownership of these still-public assets. (…) In these regimes, 
private sector expansion occurs primarily outside the state economy, in agriculture and small-scale 
enterprise. (…) The old elites will tend to remain in their existing public posts, combining them, if 
possible, with new income-earning activities in emerging markets” (Walder, 2003, pp. 906-909).
This property “conversion” brought by the end of the '90s to a situation where even those 
few  assets  left  after  the  decade  of  disastrous  economic  policy,  war  and  sanctions,  were 
537 The  EBRD transition  index  in  1994  registered  this  phenomenon,  diminishing  Serbia’s  score  on  the 
dimension Foreign Trade from 2 to 1 point.
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subverted by the regime in order to keep on filling the bank accounts of the managers538. We 
should underline that the effects of the assets conversion are even more devastating than the 
effects of the assets appropriation: as the elite “does not assume the ownership of the still-
public asset, but it only expropriates its wealth, the managers are not interested in fostering the 
development of the business. This way not only the public property passes to the privates in 
an un-transparent, unlawful way, but due to the bad management many state companies were 
brought to bankruptcy, with disastrous effects for the state economy. In ten years (from ‘89 to 
’99) the GDP fell for more than 50%, GDP per capita slid down from nearly 3.000 USD to 
1.200 USD, the import coverage by export dropped from 78% in the beginning of the '90s to 
36%  prior  to  the  regime  change,  while  the  foreign  debt,  partially  inherited  from  Tito’s 
Yugoslavia,  partially  created in  the  nineties  for  sustaining  the war  economy,  reached 12.5 
billion USD and was almost equal to the GDP539. 
The economic system inherited from Milošević’s regime was thus particularly unfavorable, 
as  due to inadequate legislative  framework,  to the lack of rule of  law, and to the general 
selective  application  of  rules  during  the  ancient  regime,  the  mechanisms  of  economic 
functioning were all  negative. The inefficient social and state property dominated over the 
private sector, and politics  dominated over economy. The public business companies were 
transformed  into  institutions  of  partisan  social  assistance.  The  market  was  only  partially 
liberalized,  through the reductionist  definition of a market embracing only the goods, and 
leaving  money,  currency,  finances  and  labour  market  in  a  semi-legal  position  with  prices 
dictated by  the administration.  The foreign trade was  restricted,  favoring  only  the  regime 
supporters.  Similarly,  the access to state aid and subsidies,  to finances, to foreign currency 
according to the official prices, all were preferential and dedicated to the narrow circles of the 
regime-supportive economic circles. 
The regime change thus brought to an earthquake in the economic sphere as well.  For 
Serbian businessmen, the costs from the transition were not limited to the loss of preferential 
treatment and of the political power. The shift in the foreign policy and the economic reforms 
were  among the  new elite’s  highest  priorities,  substantially  changing  the  entire  context  in 
which the economy was functioning. Moreover, the fear of lustration and re-examination of 
538 See Mijatović, 2005.
539 Data taken from Prokopijević, 2002.
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the property’s origins was also on the agenda, increasing the economic elite’s concerns for the 
future540.
In  the initial  stage  of  the  transition  the economic elite,  fearing  that  the  “revolutionary 
enthusiasm” could result in the questioning of their links with the previous regime, kept itself 
as far from the public attention as possible. Yet, as time passed, it paradoxically succeeded in 
establishing  ties  with  the  new  political  elite  through  the  process  of  the  disastrous 
implementation of the even more disastrous Law on “Extra Profit” (see Mijatović, 2005). 
The  so-called  “Law  on  Extra  Profit”  (adopted  in  June  2001)  represented  a  one-rate 
taxation aiming to compensate the re-distribution effects of the previous regime’s economic 
policy. The profit gained in the last 12 years through “particularistic preferential treatments” 
was to be taxed. Even though the issue was opening a series of questions requiring in-depth 
investigation on the abuse of state goods and even criminal acts, the courts, prosecutors and 
the investigative bodies were all kept aside. The authority to examine the cases (and to decide 
what profits were realized due to such benefits and which companies should be taxed) was 
given to the ministry of finance and its administration, which were also in charge of taxing the 
profits.  Due  to  the  lack  of  investigative  competencies  of  the  bodies  included  in  the 
implementation,  most  of  the  cases  were  successfully  challenged  in  front  of  the  Supreme 
Court. The law implementation not only failed to meet one of its primary goals (re-filling the 
state budget), but also harmed already bankrupted public companies for the gains realized and 
than expropriated by the managerial boards. The procedure prescribed for the implementation 
of this law represented a further incentive for the politicization of the economy and actually 
served as the mean to legalize illicit gains. It was in this moment that the business elite re-
established  the  ties  with  the  new  political  elite,  ensuring  to  avoid  too  severe  taxation, 
scapegoating  already  destroyed  public  sector  companies  and  legitimizing  the  rest  of  the 
income  as  the  illegal  profits  of  dubious  origins  were  “washed”  by  the  payment  of  this 
particular fee541. The failure of the Ministry of Finance and its administration to tax the well-
known companies that gained their wealth during -and due to their support to- the ancient 
regime  (like  for  example  Delta  Holding,  held  by  Serbia’s  richest  businessmen  Mišković, 
540 The calls for re-examination of the origins of the property was one of the most current issues in Serbian 
public  opinion  in  the  aftermath  of  Milošević’s  regime.  See  for  example  the  articles  in  Glas  Javnosti, 
http://arhiva.glas-javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2000/11/19/srpski/D00111804.shtm or  NIN, 
http://www.nin.co.yu/2001-01/11/16124.html . In 2003, the round table on the issue was organized by media 
center (see http://www.transparentnost.org.yu/ts_mediji/1408-s02.html). 
541 On the Law on extra profit, its implementation and effects, see Mijatović, 2005, Bisić, 2005, Prokopijević, 
2002.
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former  member  of  Milošević’s  government  who  built  his  wealth  during  the  '90s  and, 
according to Wprost’s list,  one of the wealthiest persons of the post-communist countries 
excluding Russia) represented one of the most evident illustrations of the inadequacy of the 
rule implementation. 
After this legitimization of their profits, the new-old economic elite, free from the burden 
of its past misdeeds, initiated the activities which are normal for any elite in the democratic 
settlement: lobbying.  Their interest,  consisting in preserving as much of the structure they 
were functioning  in  and maintaining  their  economic  position  in  Serbian  closed market  as 
possible, was successfully pursued by their success in shaping Serbian economic policies. The 
lack  of  democratic  institutions  capable  to  ensure  the  transparency  of  the  process  of 
representation of interests brought to a situation where, more conveniently  for both sides 
included in the process, lobbying assumed the shapes of corruption542. The lobbing activity of 
the old economic elite combined well not only with the political elite’s personal interests, but 
also with the political parties’ short-run political interests. The economic reforms are usually 
difficult to undertake due to the unpopular measures and the negative short-run effects they 
produce on the  population.  As  a  result,  the  ruling  elite  is  not  incentivized  to pursue the 
reforms as, in the short-run, it brings to the loss of the electoral support. Moreover, in Serbia’s 
case, a very large public sector under the control of the state represents a high incentive for 
what some authors labeled “state-capture”. As the control over the public sector shifted from 
the hands of the “enemy” to the hands of the new elite, it became an important resource for 
the  party’s  clientelistic  payments  to  its  members.  As  we  will  see,  the  so  long-awaited 
privatization process therefore represented not only a source for filling the state’s budget, but 
even more importantly, the control over the privatization was a good opportunity for quick 
personal enrichment through the corruption in the untransparent seizure of state assets. 
The Law on Privatization was adopted soon after the change of government (June, 2001 
with the by-laws adopted in the second half of 2001 and the beginning of the privatization in 
2002. This time-line, according to some authors, was rather slow, seen that the law draft was 
already prepared in cooperation with the World Bank543). It represented a solution (according 
some authors, like Prokopijević,  an inadequate one) that further centralized the process of 
privatization by giving the government’s agency for privatization a significant influence on the 
process. The idea that the companies’ management is much more successful in a situation of 
542 See Mijatović, 2005.
543 See Prokopijevič, 2002, Mijatović, 2005. 
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concentrated capital, the belief that what is paid for is handled with more care than what was 
received  through vouchers  and,  last  but  not  least,  the  necessity  to  fill  the  state’s  budget 
resulted in the preferences for privatization through the selling to the strategic buyer, where 
the country gave 70% of the actions to one, best-offer buyer. The social peace and the costs 
of the privatization for the workers were thought to be faced by offering the remaining 30% 
of the actions to the workers and by requiring buyers to include in their offer also a plan of 
the investments and the social program, as well as to accept the very un-popular prohibition 
of dismissals in the first 3 years544. The method chosen for privatization was the one known 
and usually implied in the well-developed economies, and it presupposed wide openness of 
the market, a developed financial market and high levels of competition, conditions that were 
surely lacking in Serbia. The lack of such pre-conditions for successful privatization, according 
to some authors (Prokopijević, 2002, Janković, 2006), brought to the following consequences: 
1)  due  to  the  fact  of  being  carried  out  in  conditions  of  close  market,  the  procedure  of 
privatization significantly favoured the domestic buyers (the economic elite inherited from the 
previous period);  2) due to the lack of transparent criteria  for deciding the winner of the 
auction/tender  (both  the  price  offered  and  the  social  program  proposed  were  to  be 
examined),  the  bureaucratic  arbitration  prevailed;  3)  and  finally,  due  to  the  low levels  of 
competitiveness  of  Serbian  economy,  the  sale  of  enterprise  actually  turned into  a  sale  of 
market-shares and monopoly as well. This last characteristic remained a hallmark of Serbia’s 
privatization,  as  the  anti-monopoly  legislature  pended  for  long  periods  and  it  is  still  not 
properly implemented. Moreover, as some authors noted, the monopoly on the market was 
not only produced by the domestic economic structures, but was also negotiated between the 
state and the buyers. In order to raise the privatization revenue by securing the monopolist 
position to the buyer , together with the asset and the share of the market,  the state also 
guaranteed the adoption of the legislation that would create legal barriers  for the possible 
entry in the field of the competitors, securing to the buyer the maintenance of the acquired 
market share (see Janković, 2006).
544 This  last  provision was particularly  demotivating due the inadequate structure of labour in the public 
companies. As during the '90s the public companies were perceived as a mean of solving the social problems of 
the SPS party members, most of the public companies were overcrowded, with inadequate organization schemes 
and staff that was not only lacking the professional skills,  but also had very bad working habits summarized 
under the well-known slogan “you can never diminish my wage so much as I can diminish my efficiency”. The 
prohibition to dismiss the workers, required by the ruling elite in order to maintain the social peace and in order 
to keep the unemployment rate from increasing, had a significant negative impact on the potential buyers and 
contributed to diminish the price of the assets.
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In line with the protectionist economic policy of Serbian government, the approach the 
country adopted towards foreign direct investments also resulted in the failure to create a 
positive environment that would bring to an increase in the economy’s competitiveness (see 
Popović, 2005). Even though the figures show an increase in the FDI in Serbia since 2001, the 
Greenfield investments are almost absent and the high levels  of FDI in the last years are 
created by the acquisition rather than the initiation of new business. The international (and 
multinationals’,  see Kekić,  2005) pressure to  privatize, combined with the internal  need to 
dismantle the gross public sector, produced figures of intensive FDI in the last years, but this 
increase in investments did not bring to a significant increase of the export, neither to the 
creation  of  new  jobs.  Rather  contrary,  the  trade  deficit  continued  to  grow,  as  did  the 
unemployment. The lack of rule of law, the corruption, the negative political climate, the state 
intervention and protectionism policies, the complicated procedures, the closure of the market 
and difficult entries due to the obstructions in the administration, combined with the state-
guaranteed monopoly, are among the main obstacles for business and investments in Serbia. 
Such a situation of low competitiveness and difficult entry is obviously in the interest of both 
the international  and the domestic  business elite  that,  seeking  to protect  their  preferential 
treatments, continue to press the government to keep on the course of partial reforms. 
The economic transition in Serbia registered a very positive push in all fields immediately 
after the change of the regime, to slow down after 2003-2004 (see Figure 3). Such pattern fits 
well into the Hellman’s concept of the “partial reform” created as a product of the obstacles 
from the  initial  new-winners  of  the  transition  (Hellman,  1998).  In  Serbia’s  case  we  shall 
moreover  recall  that  the  inherited  elite,  the  elite  that  dictated  the  reforms,  the  only  elite 
capable to represent itself as the strategic buyers in the process of transition, was actually the 
same old economic elite inherited from the Nineties. For, as Walder stressed:
”If an economy spends a significant period of time in circumstances that provide incumbent 
elites with large opportunities, by the time more complete reforms are put into place, old regime 
elites will  already have seized available advantages. Subsequent reform does not turn back the 
clock:  property appropriated and income accumulated will  remain in the hands of those who 
possess them” (Walder, 2003, p. 913).
In the “the winner takes it all” style described by Hellman, this new-old economic elite, 
legitimized through the process that allowed them to create the links with the new political 
elite, continued to exercise its slowing effect on the reforms: as we can see from Figure 3 in 
the appendix, Serbian index of transition marks a significant growth in the first two years of 
transition, to slow down in the period that followed. While countries like Slovenia and Croatia 
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reached 3 points as the average of their indicator of transition in the first five years of reforms, 
in Serbia this was not achieved even after eight years. Similarly, much in line with Hellman’s 
insight, the low competitiveness of Serbian political system in the period 2003-2008 and the 
security of tenure for Koštunica’s staff guaranteed by the characteristics of the party system 
favored the slowing down of the economic reforms545. In a context where the economic stake 
holders have preferential access to the decision-making process, the winners of the transition 
have both the interest and the capacity to block further reforms, resulting in a “partial reform 
equilibrium that concentrates gains among the winners at a high social costs” (Hellman, 1998, 
p. 232). The dimension of the reforms that in Serbia suffered the most from this influence, 
and where the lobby was most interested and most successful in delaying the reforms, was the 
competition policy which remained at the same levels from 1989 until 2006, and even then, 
after  strong  international  pressures,  it  only  moderately  improved  by  the  introduction  of 
nominal changes without real effects. 
What  is,  then,  this  economic  elite’s  interest  in  the  process  of  democratization  and 
European integration? The political requirements of the EU that call for more transparent and 
open policy making processes, the fight against corruption, the free and independent judiciary, 
the rule of law, would on one hand surely contribute to the improvement of the “environment 
for business”, but on the other it would also take away the political protection the economic 
elite enjoys. The state’s intervention in the market and economy, the lack of anti-monopoly 
legislation, the state aid and closed market, the lack of rule of law, the corruption and the lack 
of judiciary independence, all these shortcomings of Serbian democracy actually represent the 
545 “The slow reformers generally have political leaders with the longest and most secure tenures in the region. 
With the exception of Belarus and Ukraine, all of the slow reformers have been ruled continuously by the same 
respective presidents since the start of their transitions (…) The postcommunist countries with more frequent 
executive  turnovers  and  shorter  government  tenures  have  generally  been  the  most  far-reaching  economic 
reformers.  Politicians with  shorter  expected time horizons  have  nevertheless  been far  more  likely  to  adopt 
economic reforms. Those political leaders with the greatest security of tenure have tended to introduce partial 
economic reforms or have delayed reforms altogether, even though they would appear to have faced the weakest 
threat of electoral or popular challenge to more comprehensive reforms. Although this evidence cannot support 
a causal link between executive turnovers,  government stability,  and economic reform, it  does challenge the 
notion that the threat of electoral revenge against the short-term costs of economic reform is a substantial ex 
ante obstacle to the adoption of reform in the  post-communist transitions” (Hellman, 1998, p. 214).  Bruszt 
further develops the argument and to the stability of tenures adds the level of the executive’s accountability as a 
factor that influence the possibility of the economic elite to capture the state and the market: “In countries with 
high concentration of state power the probability is higher that powerful economic actors can use the state to 
redistribute wealth and opportunities to themselves both within the state and the market” (Bruszt, 2002, p.69). In 
Serbia the more secure tenure for the central actor of the political regime is combined with the complete lack of 
mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability (see the section on form of government and on judiciary and 
corruption).
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mechanisms that this elite was (and it seems to continue) using for their own benefit546. The 
political reform would surely create a tidier and more certain environment, but this would 
award the competitors and the newcomers, not the existing economic elite whose interests are 
already  pampered  by  the  links  with  the  political  leaders,  the  judiciary  and  the  state 
bureaucracy547.  While  the  political  requirements  of  the  possible  EU  membership  would 
indirectly put the system upon which the economic oligarchs are now basing their business at 
risk, the EU economic requirements would tackle their position on the market. The increase 
of the market and economic competitiveness, the opening up of the market, the control of the 
state aid, the strengthening of the anty-monopoly legislative framework, all these requirements 
are directly undermining the economic elite’s interests. At the same time, due to the extremely 
unfavourable structure of Serbian export to the EU, in which the agricultural products and the 
unfinished goods and raw materials with the lower added value prevail, the interests in the 
integration of the economic elite, whose main resources come from the import monopolies 
and domestic trade, are still rather low.
The economic elite’s interest in the EU integration appears to be one of the significant 
factors  influencing  Serbian  foreign  policy,  mainly  due  to  the  linkages  (corporatist  and 
corruptive) going from the economic to the political elite. The court in Belgrade is currently 
investigating  on the  charges  brought  by  LDP political  party,  according  to  which  Serbian 
richest  businessman,  Mišković  (owner  of  the  Delta  Company,  accused  of  holding  a 
monopolistic  position  over  Serbian  market548)  offered  his  influence  on  the  government’s 
policy  on  Kosovo in  exchange  for  a  USA visa549.  The  charges  were  based  upon  a  titled 
document by  the USA embassy in which the offer and the analyses of Mišković’s offer are 
confirmed. Even though the origin of the document is disputed, on Mišković’s (and other 
546 We  notice  that  the  main  destination  of  Serbia’s  companies  investing  abroad  are  Bosnia,  Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, USA, Russia (data of the National Bank of Serbia), where a large percentage (88%) was 
invested in countries that, among European countries, score high on the flows of corruption and lack of respect 
for the rule of law, which obviously do not appear to be  that crucial in the calculation of the risk of Serbian 
investors (according to the transparency international corruption perception index: Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia 
and Montenegro all score 3.3, Russia scores 2.3).
547 For an analysis of the links between Serbian political leaders and the economic elite see Pešić, 2006.
548 According  to  the  findings  of  Serbian Commission  for  the  protection of  the  concurrency,  Mišković's 
company Delta controls more than 50% of the market in Belgrade. This result was questioned by the experts 
who, on behalf of Delta, undertook their own estimation according to which, due to the definition of the market 
differing from the one adopted by the state’s Commission, Delta controls only about 30-40%. It is interesting to 
underline how the owner of the expert’s company that made the assessment is the former vice-president of 
Serbia  and  former  leader  of  G17plus.  See  http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=04&nav_id=279204,  also  http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Ekonomija/Labus-radi-za-
Mishkovica.sr.html. 
549 Data from the news on the official site of LDP.
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businessmen’s)  influence  on Serbian  political  parties,  beside  the  LDP,  the  anti-corruption 
council also issued documents confirming the existence of such links already pointed out by 
the  domestic  political  analysts550.  Finally,  after  the  exit  from  SRS,  Nikolić,  former  vice 
president of SRS, confirmed that Mišković financed his campaign for the presidential elections 
(see the section on corruption). In this light, the most recent effort of the richest and most 
controversial economic magnate to lobby for the “Serbian economy”’s interests in Brussels is 
a significant step marking the shift  in the economic elite’s  interests.  The comment of the 
British ambassador in Serbia in such occasion is an interesting illustration of the importance 
the economic elite’s support for the integrations has:
“I do not want to comment on the travel of Serbian businessmen in Brussels,  which is a 
matter concerning him and Brussels, but generally, I see that the situation changed and that today 
there  are  many  persons  capable  to  give  a  positive  contribution.  These  may  be  the  persons 
involved in business, but not only. I believe that for many, politicians, businessmen or other, it is 
not so important what they have done in the past, but what they are trying to do now.” (Source: 
B92, 20/10/2008). 
Such effort of re-orientation in the business is surely influenced by the recent signature of 
SAA and increase of the domestic political  support to the EU integrations, which had an 
important impact in the economic elite’s  calculation and strategies as the new realities  are 
requiring the adaptation. As Vachudova stressed, “As candidates move forward in the process, 
governments are locked into a predictable course of policymaking that serves as an important 
signal to internal and external economic actors about the future business environment”. In 
this light the opposition and obstruction of the ratification of the SAA in Serbia in the period 
march-September  2008  should  be  seen  as  an  effort  of  the  anti-EU forces  to  avoid  this 
“locking in” and commitment the signature of SAA represented. As they failed (mainly due to 
the  capacity  of  the  EU to  attract  support  from  the  former  Milošević’s  party,  SPS),  the 
economic elite was induced to change its strategy and start to adapt to the new situation. It is 
however, far from creating a situation similar to that we meet in Macedonia (see below) where 
the economic elite’s  influence is vanishing in front of the country’s strong dependence on 
international factors.
As far as the political elite is concerned, the domestic economic and financial structures 
further decreased the elite’s devotion to full democratization and to more radical economic 
reforms.  The  pressures  of  the  economic  elite  are  added  to  the  already  well-known  high 
political  costs  of  economic reforms,  and to the  pressures of  a  large public  sector fearing 
unemployment,  as  a  further  incentive  for  the  political  elite  to  follow  its  own  private 
550 See for example Pešić, 2006.
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corporative interests instead of pushing for difficult reforms. After a decade and a half since 
the  “economic  transition”  and  “capitalism”,  Serbian  political  elite  does  not  enjoy  the 
enthusiastic  unconditional  support  the  leaders  of  the  EEC  had  at  the  beginning  of  the 
Nineties (Winner, 1998, uses the widespread popular support for the transition and capitalism 
as an explanation for the possibility the leaders have to pursue the reform). Further on, the 
stability  of  tenure  enjoyed  by  a  part  of  the  political  elite  also  represented  a  factor  that, 
according  to  Hellman,  favoured  the  delay  of  the  reforms,  both  political  and  economic. 
Strongly influenced by the tycoons who offered financial support to the politicians, and due to 
the weak mechanisms of  the  electoral  and horizontal  accountability  not vulnerable  to the 
citizens’  pressures, the new, “democratic” ruling elite of Serbia became an obstacle to the 
economic and political reforms, driving benefits from the status quo. Predictably and in line 
with  the  findings  of  different  studies  underlining  how,  in  Eastern Europe,  the  economic 
reforms followed a rhythm similar to the political transition551, the partial democratization and 
low quality of established democracy we registered in other sections is repeated in the field of 
the economic reforms as well.
 17.1.2. EU ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
Beside  the  interests  of  the  economic  elite  in  the  process  of  democratization  and  EU 
integrations, another important aspect we should examine concerns the economic costs and 
benefits the political elite could derive from the process of EU integration. The main thesis 
upon which the entire process of the democracy promotion is based underlines the possibility 
to use incentives (political but also economic) to shift the domestic decision-makers’ costs and 
benefits balance. The eventual loss suffered due to the adoption of the externally promoted 
norm is compensated by the gains deriving from the IA. In this section we will  therefore 
examine the incentives used by the EU in promoting the democracy and reforms in Serbia and 
their capacity to switch the costs-benefits balance of the domestic stakeholders.
Surely  one  of  the  most  important  means  of  influence  that  the  EU and  international 
community  had  at  hand was  the  financial  incentives  in  the  shape  of  financial  assistance, 
donations, the large foreign debt Serbia had towards the governments of the EU countries, all 
these  represented  significant  sources  of  the  EU economic  influence  on  Serbian  decision 
makers. Furthermore, as the western democracies could also use their veto power in the WB, 
551 Vachudova, 2001, Hellman 1998, Bruszt, 2002.
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IMF,  EBRD  and  other  international  monetary  institutions,  they  could  further  use  the 
economic incentives to promote their own agenda in Serbia.
Serbia,  after  Milošević,  registered  a  situation  of  destroyed  economy and finances.  The 
external debts amounted to 14 billion dollars, representing the 140% of the national GDP. As 
part of Serbia’s loan derived from the interests maturated during the '90s when, due to the 
financial  sanctions  to the  country,  Serbia  was  not  allowed to service  its  debt,  getting  the 
sanctions lifted and to getting the country integrated in the international financial institutions 
was  an  absolute  priority  of  the  new  political  elite.  This  made  Serbia’s  authorities  very 
vulnerable to the international conditionality which was, as we will see in the next section, 
concentrated on the requirement to cooperate with the ICTY. The cooperation with the ICTY 
and the arrestment and delivery of Milošević to ICTY in 2001 were central conditions for the 
grants  offered  in  this  period,  for  the  participation  of  the  USA  and  EU on  the  donors 
conference for Serbia and for the membership in IMF which was made a necessary condition 
for other assistance and arrangements. The agreement with the Paris club, which wrote off 
66% of Serbian foreign debt, was concluded thanks to the USA advocacy as a reward for the 
cooperation with the ICTY (see Begović and Đilas,  2005).  The first stand-by arrangement 
with  IMF  was  concluded  in  June  2001,  again  including,  among  political  conditions,  the 
cooperation with the ICTY. Finally, the date and context of Milošević’s delivery to Hague (see 
next section) just a morning before the donor’s conference for Serbia, where €1,6 billion of 
assistance were raised, is rather indicative on what the key condition the Serbia was supposed 
to meet was. 
The  financial  assistance  offered  to  Serbia  was  surely  among  the  highest  in  the  region 
(according to some domestic media such generosity was also aimed to compensate for the 
western  policy  towards  Serbia  during  the  '90s).  In  2004  Serbia  was  among  the  biggest 
recipients of the EU assistance in the Europe (both in absolute and in per capita terms), the 
biggest recipient of the EC net aid, it was among the priority area of assistance for 10 member 
states  of the EU and was one of the top five recipients  and priorities  of  the overall  EU 
assistance. The CARDS/IPE programs in Serbia reached €1.3 billion, almost four times the 
CARDS/IPE assistance made available to Macedonia. However, as we will see, financial aid is 
not a sufficient  condition for the compliance  with the norms promoted,  on the contrary, 
regardless the high level of the EU financial assistance invested in the country, Serbia is the 
only potential candidate where a significant opposition to the integration into EU is present. 
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Beside the presence of the anti-EU option, other reasons also contributed to the incapacity 
of the EU financial aid to foster the compliance with the norms promoted. The first reason to 
be found lied in the rather low credibility of the EU conditionality in Serbia, hampered by the 
EU’s security concerns that prevailed as the main goal of the EU’s policy in Serbia. According 
to the European Agency for Reconstruction’s documentation, only in few fields the access to 
funds was explicitly conditioned by the rule adoption (in the field of both police and civil 
service reform, all assistance was conditioned by the rule adoption, while the funds concerning 
the  civil  society,  media  development  and  fight  against  corruption  became  subject  to  the 
conditionality only in 2005).
Further on, while the international assistance was decisive to support Serbian economy in 
the period of the reforms and it was of particular importance to fill the gap in those fields 
where the private capital would not have interest to flow, as some authors pointed out, the 
international donations might also hamper the elite’s commitment to the reform: 
“Governments receiving funds try to satisfy interest groups and don’t risk the loss of votes 
due to the difficult structural changes. Secondly, if the amount of money available by the state 
increases, it increases the political and economical power of the bureaucrats and the state. Thirdly, 
some space opens up for corruption. It is rather questionable what would have happened if there 
had been no donations to fill some large “holes” in Serbian economy, such as the energetic, social 
affairs,  etc? Would the authorities be forced to speed up the reforms or would they look for 
alternative  sources  of  money,  through  privatization,  sales  of  monopolistic  rights,  quotas  and 
licenses?” (Prokopijević, 2002 pp. 56-57).
The funds granted to Serbia  were conditioned by both the political  and the economic- 
structural  reforms.  The  fragility  of  the  peace  in  the  Balkans  and  the  importance  the 
international community gave to the compliance with the issues concerning security (ICTY, 
Kosovo, see the next section) resulted in a situation where the insufficient compliance with 
the economic and political reforms was also tolerated. Thus, the entire process of financial 
assistance  to  the  country  was  based  on  the  “other”  political  issues  rather  than  on  issues 
concerning the economic and democratic transition. As Prokopjević stressed, 
“The credibility of the government in front of the foreign governments and non-market based 
funds (the credibility gained by political cooperativeness for example) is something completely 
different from the credibility of a country for private domestic and foreign direct investors, which 
can be achieved only through the creation of favourable conditions for investments,  and not 
through  political  moves.  Donations  are  economically  far  less  efficient  than  direct  private 
investments. They go mostly into budgetary consumption and subsidies. Even when a state uses 
them for investments, their efficiency level is much lower than that of the private investment. 
Unlike donations, which amount does significantly diminish before they reach the target (they 
diminish as a result of the costs of equipment, expert work, corruption, etc.), private capital brings 
even more advantages – increase in productivity and employment, transfer of know-how, increase 
in exports, etc.” (Prokopijević, 2002, p. 58).
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The  financial  assistance  in  Serbia  aimed  at  political  goals  rather  than  at  fostering  the 
economic development of the country or its democratization. The political conditionality in 
financial assistance was important even in those institutions that officially did not condition 
their grants with political criteria (we can recall  the USA threatening that,  in case of weak 
cooperation with ICTY, they would use their vote in the IMF to stop the arrangements with 
FRY). Such financial assistance on one side failed to credibly foster the democratization and/
or economic development of the country, while on the other the content of these requirements 
(ICTY cooperation)  only further increased the already high costs  the old-regime elite  was 
bearing (see the following section). The strongest pressures were exercised in the first years of 
transition in order to promote the cooperation with ICTY (as we will see, an issue drastically 
increasing the costs of integration for the old elite), and the creation of the State Union with 
Montenegro. Since the split Đinđić – Koštunica, the rise of the nationalist forces in 2002 – 
2003 (a process guided also by the old economic elite, that surely preferred the nationalists and 
Koštunica due to the guarantees and the policy of continuity these forces represented), and 
the assassination of the Prime Minister Đinđić, the international community security concerns 
significantly  rose,  which  contributed  to  diminish  the  credibility  of  the  conditionality 
concerning the economic reforms. 
As  the  security  threat  of  the  rising  Serbian  nationalism  diminished  the  country’s 
vulnerability  to  the  international  actors,  the  IA’s  financial  assistance,  guided  by  the  IA’s 
security  concerns  rather  than  by  the  democracy  promotion  or  by  ideals  of  economic 
development,  became  an  instrument  in  the  hands  of  the  incumbent  elite.  In  a  scenario 
described by Prokopijević (see citation above), the donations were used mainly to ensure the 
maintenance in power of the ruling elite that continued pursuing its policy of fake compliance.
Finally,  the  assistance  made  available  through  the  CARDS  program,  while  surely 
indispensable for many of the reforms and in particular for building up the administrative 
capacity  of  the  institutions,  because  of  its  very  nature  does  not  have  the  possibility  to 
rebalance the distribution of  the  costs  and benefits  deriving  from the process of  the  EU 
integrations. The CARDS represent a fund that is mainly dedicated to those areas defined as 
priorities  in  the  Stabilization  and  Association  Program.  As  such,  while  these  funds  can 
decrease  the  cost  of  compliance,  or,  better,  the  budgetary  costs  necessary  for  the 
implementation of the norms promoted, they do not tackle those costs that derive from the 
change of the existing status quo and by no means succeeded in changing the position of the 
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veto-players opposing the reform. Even though we can easily imagine the citizens’ benefits 
from  the  creation  of  the  efficient  institutions  for  the  fight  against  corruption,  for  the 
protection of consumers, for the fight against money-laundering or the benefits deriving from 
the independent judiciary, all issues strongly supported with the EU CARDS assistance, it is 
hard to imagine how the forces opposing the change (the corrupted official,  the politician 
abusing their power, the judge whose incompetence is covered by his political background) 
would change their opinion on the reform due to the realization of the CARDS programs. 
This was even more the case in Serbia, where the supply-driven conception of CARDS and 
the lack of basic consensus over the desired reforms resulted in a complete lack of domestic 
vision  that  CARDS  assistance  would  have  supported.  The  programs  were  thus  strongly 
decided by the EU’s agenda and the country missed the opportunity to be an equal partner in 
deciding the use of the assistance (see Begović and Đilas, 2005).
17.2. MACEDONIA
17.2.1.  THE BIRTH OF MACEDONIAN ECONOMIC ELITE:  ADAPTING TO 
INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES
Unlike Serbia, that had been cut away from the international economic flows for almost 10 
years  and  delayed  the  political  and  economic  reforms,  the  development  of  Macedonian 
economic  elite  took  place  in  an  environment  that  was  more  open  to  the  international 
influence and in the setting of the political pluralism552. Despite the former communist elite 
keeping the power in both countries, different levels of political change brought to radically 
different  patterns of  economic transition:  a  delay  of  reforms in  Serbia  and its  rather  fast 
development in Macedonia. As Walder convincingly argued, the extent of the regime change 
and  the  extent  of  regulatory  constrain  on  the  asset  appropriation  defines  the  type  of 
transitional  economies  and  determines  the  elite’s  opportunity  and  behavior  under  such 
assets553. As we will see, the similarities and differences between the transitions in Serbia and 
Macedonia, among other factors, were strongly influenced by the combination of international 
influence and domestic factors. 
552 When we consider Macedonia as a case of the political  pluralism, we actually  make comparison with 
Serbia. Obviously that if compared with some other countries of the CEE Macedonian would show the lower 
levels of the political pluralism.
553 See Walder, 2003.
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Immediately after independence, Macedonia faced a difficult process where the nation-state 
building, democratization and economic transition process were contemporarily taking place. 
The biggest controversy appeared to be the name of the country that raised the opposition of 
Greece, who objected on the country’s name, flag and some articles of constitution. Even 
though the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on former Yugoslavia declared 
that the country met the conditions set by the EC for international recognition, Greece used 
its influence in EC to block the recognition of Macedonia as an independent state554. 
In this first period Macedonia undertook a series of stabilization policies, minting its own 
currency, fighting back the hyperinflation inherited from the old Yugoslavia and pursuing the 
privatization  of  the  public  assets  according  to  the  1990  federal  Law  on  Social  Capital. 
According to this law, the companies were corporatized and the employees allowed to buy 
shares in their own firms at a substantial discount to their market value555. As Petkovski and 
Bishev (2004), Slaveski (1997), Georgiev and Nedanovski (2002) underlined, the process of 
privatization  that  took  place  in  these  first  years  allowed  the  powerful  managers  of  these 
companies  to  easily  seize  the  public  assets.  The  strong  lobby  of  managers  of  the  public 
enterprises  ensured  that  the  federal  law  regulating  the  transformation  of  the  property 
remained in force even after the independence, until 1993 when the new Law on Privatization 
was adopted. The low regulatory constrain on the asset appropriation was the most salient 
characteristic of Macedonian privatization in this period that allowed the existing elite (former 
communists and managers of the state companies) to abuse of their positions and to easily 
switch their political power and social privileges enjoyed in the previous regime into economic 
power and wealth in the newly emerging capitalist economy556. Officials used their possibility 
to extract incomes from their posts so “the new propertied and corporate elite was created out 
of the old elite” (see Walder, 2003,  p. 907).  As the regime change was not extensive (the 
transformed communists kept the power until 1998), the former communist party continued 
to exercise power, retained the control over the appointments but, as a part of its ideological 
transformation, refused the previous ideology and decided to privatize the assets:
“(In these  cases,  n.d.a.)  communist  hierarchies do not collapse. Instead,  they withdraw from 
multinational federations like the former USSR or Yugoslavia  and continue to rule  initially as 
dictatorships  while  they  abandon  their  commitment  to  state  ownership  and  the  command 
554 "Recognition of States - Annex 2", Declaration on Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, 
Brussels, 16 December 1991). See the section on the name-dispute.
555 See Petkovski and Bishev, 2004, IMF report on Macedonia 1998.
556 On the elite’s opportunity structure in the process of the economic transition, see Walder, 2003. On the 
process of privatization in Macedonia and the assets appropriation through the abuse of power see Labovik, 
2005, pp. 274-325.
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economy. The initial period of reform in these countries proceeds with the entire Communist-era 
elite  still  largely  in  place,  and  constrained  neither  by  continuing  state  commitment  to  public 
property or by effective regulations to restrict asset appropriation” (Walder, 2003, p. 906).
“This situation permits the widespread transfer of state assets into the hands of officials, their 
kin,  and their  associates,  or the extraction of large incomes from the discretionary powers of 
office. Elites may continue in political posts or depart from them at their discretion” (idem, p. 
903).
In those companies that were not privatized,  the managerial elite  (in collision with the 
ruling elite) used its position to empty the company’s accounts, making many firms valueless 
in order to allow the management teams and individuals close to the ruling parties to purchase 
the firms at the lowest possible price (see Georgiev and Nedanovski, 2002, Labovik, 2005). 
Some authors  (like  Nikolov,  2004),  underlined  that  Macedonian  institutions  provided  the 
incentive for re-distributing the existing capital rather than for its growth and development, 
considering the patterns of privatization as one of the obstacles in the process of Macedonia’s 
economic development. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Nineties  the  situation  in  Macedonia  appeared  to  satisfy  the 
conditions for the development of the “winner takes it all” mechanism described by Hellman 
(1998). The partial reform (or better said, the initiated economic transformation that, due to 
inadequate  regulation,  opened  the  possibility  for  the  appropriation  of  public  property 
described above) combined by the rather low level of democratization (the transition was at 
the very beginning), a rather stable tenure (the communists stayed in power until 1998), and 
the  developed  links  between  the  newly  emerging  economic  elite  and  the  ruling  parties 
according  to  Hellman’s  model  represented an asset  in  which  the  net-winners  of  the  first 
economic reforms would be induced to obstruct further reforming. However, in Macedonia’s 
case, Hellman’s puzzle on how to limit the winners’ negative influence on further reforms557 
found its  answer  in  the  role  of  the  international  financial  institutions.  The integration  of 
Macedonia  in  the  international  financial  institutions,  together  with  the  country’s  high 
vulnerability to the external influence, pushed forward the economic reforms in Macedonia.
As the  name dispute  with Greece was calmed with  the “temporary” solution  in  1993, 
Macedonia finally entered the UN, WB and IMF (a membership until 1993 vetoed by Greece), 
which  allowed  the  country  to  access  the  cooperation  and  assistance  programs  of  these 
institutions. As Petkovski and Bishev argued, since 1993 “The stabilization and reforms in 
Macedonia  have  been  supported  considerably  by  the  international  multilateral  financial 
557 Ekiert, Kubick and Vachudova, 2007, mentioned three possibilities for preventing/braking the creation of 
the vicious circle  of the “partial  reform trap”:  1)  expansion of  welfare policies 2)  provision of the external 
incentives too costly to ignore (such as EU membership), 3) relaying on possible external or internal shocks or 
political crisis.
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institutions. The cooperation with IMF and World Bank during the transition was permanent” 
(Petkovski  and Bishev,  2004,  p.  9).  Of particular  importance was the IMF,  who played a 
“leading role in designing and monitoring the implementation of stabilization and structural 
adjustment policies. The role of IMF was threefold. First, IMF substituted the lack of a strong 
political  base,  “visionary  and  authoritarian  leadership”,  and  non-existence  of  coherent 
economic  team.  Second,  IMF  contributed  to  the  creation  of  consensus  among  different 
interest groups and political parties. Third, the IMF was free to focus on economic goals and 
had undertaken the role of top political leaders to supervise the bureaucracy” (Petkovski and 
Bishev,  2004,  p.5).  In  fact,  the  index  of  Macedonia’s  economic  reform  signs  its  most 
significant growth in the period immediately after its integration in the international financial 
institutions, its average index of economic reforms surpassing even Bulgaria and Romania in 
the same period (see Figure 3 in the appendix). The external influence thus pushed forward 
the reforms in what,  at least according to factors identified by Hellman’s model of partial 
reform,  appeared as  a  potentially  un-favorable  ground for  further  building  of  the  market 
economy. Even the most difficult decisions (the cuts in the state expenditure, the stability of 
the currency, the cuts in the state administration, the “shock-therapy” approach that according 
to some domestic authors deepened Macedonia’s economic crisis instead of bringing further 
development558) found their response in Macedonia, mainly due to the state’s extremely high 
vulnerability towards the international community.  Such particularly high vulnerability to the 
international influence that made the international actors rather important in both the process 
of  democratization  and  the  economic  transition  in  Macedonia  can  be  explained  by  the 
following three factors:
1. The disputed statehood and necessity to ensure the international recognition under its 
constitutional name made Macedonian policy makers particularly sensitive to questions 
like the international standards, membership in the IO and the requirements deriving 
from  the  membership  in  these  organizations.  The  research  for  the  international 
recognition thus increased the incentive for compliance, inducing Macedonia to respect 
558 It is not an aim of this work to analyze the effect on the economic development of the reforms promoted 
in Macedonia by the IMF and WB. The economic reforms do not necessarily bring to economic development 
and Macedonia is one of the examples. The failure of the economic strengthening in Macedonia was caused by a 
series  of  factors,  domestic  and  international,  from  the  difficult  starting  point  to  the  bad  solutions  (like 
privatization), weak state, unfavorable export structure, the dissolution and war in Yugoslavia, Kosovo conflict, 
the  2001  domestic  conflict.  According  to  Nikolovska  and  Silajnovska-Davkova  (2001)  the  reform-package 
promoted by the IMF and WB also were among the causes for the stagnation of Macedonia’s economy. The key 
point of this discussion is: which ever, positive or negative, effect of the norms promoted by the international 
actors, Macedonia showed a rather high level of compliance with these norms. 
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even those obligations that were highly costly for the country (like the UN embargo to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia’s most important trade partner).
2. The fragile domestic stability and inter-ethnic peace and existence of the secessionist 
Albanian  ethnic  minority,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  inter-ethnic  conflicts 
devastating the rest of former Yugoslavia, and the hostile neighborhood559 increased 
the  country’s  security  concerns.  Lacking  the  army and almost  without  any security 
sector (see the section on the security sector) and collocated in an extremely instable 
region, Macedonian political  leadership was forced to seek for international  military 
protection, which further increased the international influence on the domestic political 
process.  After  the  2001  inter-ethnic  conflict,  as  we  could  see  in  this  work,  the 
international  actors  became  even  more  important  as  they  assumed  the  role  of 
guarantees for the respect of the inter-ethnic agreement. Not only military and police 
international  missions,  but  also  diplomatic  activities,  mediation  in  negotiations  and 
strong pressure were used by the USA and EU in order to maintain the fragile inter-
ethnic balance in the country.
3. Last but not least, the disastrous economic situation of the newly independent state, 
the least developed republic of the SFRY, whose economy was strongly integrated with 
those  of  the  other  republics  and  depended  on  the  overall  performance,  made 
Macedonia  economically  dependent  on  the  international  assistance,  credits  and 
arrangements with IMF and WB. As the SFR Yugoslavia experienced a deep economic 
crisis  during  the  80s,  in  the  aftermath  of  its  independence  Macedonia  was  facing 
hyperinflation, unemployment, lack of foreign exchange reserves and an economy that 
had been contracting for more than six years560. Finally, the small territory and the lack 
of natural resources of various kinds made the external economic ties of enormous 
importance  for  the  country561.  The  economic  vulnerability  further  increased  the 
importance of the international influence on the country, making Macedonia extremely 
559 We already underlined the name dispute between Macedonia and Greece. Further on, Bulgaria also had 
some objections concerning Macedonian language and nation that threatened the country’s process of nation 
building. Even though it was the first to recognize Macedonian state after its independence, Bulgaria continued 
to argue that Macedonian is not a language but a Bulgarian dialect and to negate the existence of Macedonian 
nation, a question that had developed already at the end of 40s, after the Tito-Stalin split. Further on, according 
to the vision of the most radical Serbian nationalists, the project of the Great Serbia included the territory of 
Macedonia  too,  considered  by  Serbian  nationalists  as  “southern  Serbia”.  The  fear  existed  that  Milošević’s 
acceptance of the peaceful secession was only a temporary approach dictated by his attention to the ongoing war 
in Bosnia and Croatia. See Bozzo and Simon Beli, 2000.
560 See Petkovski and Bishev, 2004; also Hristova and Petkovski, 1999.
561 See Petkovski, 2001.
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open to the financial  (and political)  influence of  the richer  West.  Due to the  slow 
economic  development  (caused  by  a  series  of  factors,  the  most  serious  of  which 
concerned the regional instability and the armed conflict in Kosovo and Macedonia), as 
well as due to its small, open economy, the country’s prosperity is closely linked with 
its foreign trade and external relations562, which thus represents the further source of 
international influence on the domestic economic and political development.
The international leverage of Macedonia is thus supported by three key factors (foreign 
relations, economy, security) making the country far more vulnerable to the external pressures 
than  any  other  candidate/member  countries,  except  for  two  international  protectorates, 
Bosnia  and  Kosovo.  The  domestic  support  for  the  EU  and  NATO  integrations  is 
strengthening this influence, in a manner that makes the country’s strategic, political, security 
and economic interest coincide  with the preference of its  citizens.  Last,  but not least,  the 
evident necessity for external legitimization563 and eventually for the foreign financial support 
to the political parties564 made the EU and USA become important stakeholders in the process 
of the decision making in Macedonia.
Immediately after the integration in the international monetary institutions, the new Law 
on Privatization was adopted, under which the privatization could take a number of different 
forms.  The  company’s  management  was  allowed  to  choose  the  method  of  privatization, 
submitting their plan to the Privatization Agency565. However, the high levels of politicization 
of  both  company’s  managerial  boards  and Privatization  Agency566 actually  meant  that  the 
prevailing  pattern  of  privatization  remained  the  same.  The  insider’s  privatization  with 
management  and  “employee  buy-out”  model  prevailed,  amounting  for  87%  of  the 
privatization that took place until 1998 (IMF data, 1998) and about 70% of the total number 
of companies in Macedonia.
562 See Petkovski, 2001.
563 The  importance  of  the  external  legitimization  for  Macedonian  ruling  elite  clearly  emerges  from  the 
statement of the USA ambassador’s prior to the 2006 election in Macedonia: “If anybody wins or wants to win 
by manipulating the elections, it is clear that we as US government cannot see them as the ones that won without 
manipulations.  I  imagine  that  one  of  the  consequences  for  them  is  that  they  will  soon  realize  that  their 
possibilities for a career shall be interrupted!”.
564 The lack of transparency in the financing of the political parties in Macedonia does not allow a more 
precise analysis of this aspect. Yet, the Southeast European Legal Development Initiative, 2002 underlines that in 
several cases during the electoral campaign the international transfers of money to the accounts of the ruling 
political parties were registered. See also Traneska, 2004.
565 IMF report on Macedonia 1998.
566 See Georgiev and Nadevski, 2002.
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Even in those cases when the outsiders were allowed to participate to the privatization of 
Macedonian companies, a series of negative factors obstructed the attracting of flows of the 
foreign capital into the country. The weak institution, problematic neighborhood and internal 
instability all contributed to the extremely low levels of FDI in a country which started to 
grow only in 1998, when the price stabilization and the government’s policies aiming to attract 
foreign investors took place. However, the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the 2001 violence 
halted the emerging positive trends in Macedonian economy and trade, and again obstructed 
the attraction of foreign capital into the country. In the mid '90s, Macedonia was among the 
countries with the lowest levels of the FDI and FDI per capita567 and the attraction of foreign 
capital remained a serious problem Macedonian policy makers are coping nowadays as well 
(according to the World Bank data, Macedonia attracted 172 USD of FDI per capita until 
2007, a very low sum for a EU candidate country, particularly if compared to Croatia’s 767 or 
Serbia’s 692568).
The liberalization of Macedonian economy also initiated far earlier than in Serbia. As the 
country  inherited  the  rather  liberalized  trade  regime  of  the  former  Yugoslavia,  it  further 
liberalized and rationalized the tariff system, lowering the average tariff rate first in 1996, and 
then again in 2001. Since 1996 the country entered numerous bilateral trade agreements as 
part of the government’s main vehicle for trade liberalization569. 
Such quick  opening  of  Macedonian  economy,  according  to  Petkovski  (2001),  is  to  be 
explained with the commitment to liberalization of Macedonian elite, with the links between 
Macedonian economy and that of other former Yugoslav republics, and finally with the fact 
that the foreign trade grew much faster than the output. The small size of the country and its 
strong linkage with the economies of the former Yugoslavia pushed Macedonia to open its 
economy, resulting very soon to be the most open and most integrated in the international 
trade country in the region. In ‘98 its merchandise trade accounted for 103% of the GDP, 
more than any other South European Country (Croatia’s merchandise trade was 95% of its 
GDP, Bulgaria’s  98%570).  Until  2008 this  figure  grew to 113%, almost double  of  Serbia’s 
65%571.
567 In 1996 it attracted only 40 millions of USD of FDI, meaning 20USD of FDI per capita, an amount even 
smaller than Moldova and Albania,  not to  mention Croatia  or  Slovenia),  while  at  the  beginning of  2000 it 
counted  for  a  better  result  in  terms  of  FDI  per  capita  than  Bosnia,  Moldova,  Albania  and  Romania.  See 
Zakharov and Kušić, 2003).
568 Data source: World Development Indicators database, September 2008.
569 See Petkovski and Bishev, 2004.
570 Data source Petkovski, 2001.
571 Data source: World Development Indicators database, September 2008.
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The growth of  the merchandise trade however did not help Macedonia to successfully 
service its external debt, as the misbalance between import and export made the foreign trade 
performance rather unsatisfactory. On the contrary, due to very strong import and far weaker 
exports, the external debt of the country actually doubled from 2000 to 2006. Among the 
causes of this poor performance (in the period from 1995 to 2000 the average trade deficit 
amounted for about 13% of GDP, to increase to 19% for the period 2001-2004572), we find 
the external and internal political shocks and instability (Kosovo crisis and 2001 violence in 
Macedonia),  combined  with  the  inadequate  specialization  in  production  and  trade. 
Macedonian  export  is  strongly  concentrated  and it  has  been  intensified  in  sectors  with  a 
declining share in world manufacturing trade573. Moreover, the country is specialized in the 
export of semi-final goods and rough materials with lower added value, and in the export of 
goods produced by heavily import-dependent industries. This makes the increase of exports 
without  increase  of  imports  impossible,  which  further  contributes  to  the  difficulty  in 
surpassing the large trade deficit574. The standardization, very often used by the states for the 
protection  of  the  own market,  is  not  allowing  Macedonia  to  fully  benefit  from its  trade 
agreements and membership in the WTO, as its industry is not always capable to meet the 
highly settled standards575. Last, but not least, among the causes of the low competitiveness of 
Macedonian economy, also hampering its attractiveness for the FDI, we find the weakness of 
the state institutions, a weakness that we described in the previous chapters dealing with the 
different areas of state functioning. The difficulty in the economic strengthening, the high 
foreign debt and the trade deficit, the low amount of the FDI still represent the problems of 
Macedonian  economy,  which,  together  with  the  high  levels  of  the  economy’s  openness 
continue to nurture the  country’s  vulnerability  to the  international  influence we described 
above.
What  can  be  said  about  Macedonian  economic  elite’s  preferences  and  interest  in  the 
process of the democratization and EU integrations?
Born together with the process of the democratization, the economic elite of Macedonia 
got quickly adapted to the political pluralism and did not perceive the political transition as a 
threat the way Serbian business did immediately after the fall of the regime in 2000. They got 
quickly used to the dynamics of the competitive political system and learned to adapt to the 
572 Gutierrez, 2006.
573 Gutierrez, 2006.
574 See Mojsovska, 2005.
575 See Mojsovska, 2005.
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changes on the political  scene.  Here  again,  the existence of  strong international  influence 
played an important role in the distribution of power between the business and the politics. In 
dynamics  similar  to  that  of  Putnam’s  two-level  game,  the  weakness  on  one  side  can 
successively be used as a resource on the other, so that the increased dependence of political 
actors on the international community at the same time decreased their vulnerability to the 
domestic economic elite. As a consequence, the state-capture and business influence over the 
decision-making process, even though widely  spread, are limited in the International Actors' 
priority dimensions. There is thus an interesting ambiguity in the Macedonian setting, that can 
be blamed on the divergent influence of internal and external dynamics. On the one hand, in 
the chapter dedicated to the corruption, we registered a high levels of the state capture, on the 
other, here we register the certain weakness of the economic elite vis-à-vis political elite and 
the  limits  to  their  influence  deriving  from the International  Actors’  intervention.  Yet,  we 
should also recall that, in the asset of the weak institutions and low administrative capacity, the 
Macedonian compliance with the externally promoted norms often represents a combination 
between the rule adoption and lack of implementation, which thus relativize the conclusions 
concerning the IA’s influence on the economic reforms. If we summarize the factors that 
brought to such setting we find: on the one hand the situation that, according to Hellman, 
favored the partial reforms; the shortcomings in the inter-institutional accountability (see the 
section on the form of government, judiciary and corruption) that according to Bruszt favor 
the  state  capture;  the  overall  politicization  that  strengthen the  political  parties;  all  factors 
pushing towards a setting similar to the one registered in Serbia. On the other hand, however, 
we find the strong IA leverage that, due to the country’s high vulnerability to the external 
influence and economic dependence on the International  Actors is  capable to successfully 
push forward at  least  the  rule  adoption.  In  such assets,  the  exit  is  rather  ambiguous:  the 
reforms are pushed forward, but their implementation is filtered through the domestic factors. 
We can recall the Law on Privatization: it was changed in line with external recommendations, 
still,  the  prevailing  pattern  did  not  change;  similarly,  the  IMF and WB recommendations 
concerning the downsizing of public spending and the transparency of public procurement 
were all filtered through the domestic ruling elite’s interests bringing to the fake compliance. 
When ever possible, the ruling elite seeks to avoid the undesirable reforms, but due to the 
high external leverage, it can do so only in a measure in which the IA allows so. 
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The economic  elite  in  such ambiguous  setting  creates  a  rather  ambiguous  preferences. 
According  to  some  domestic  experts,  not  only  is  Macedonian  economic  elite  weaker  if 
compared to the international community, but also it is not stronger than, and it might even 
be subordinated  to,  the more dominant  political  elite576.  Their  possibility  to  influence the 
politics is limited by the interests of the political elite and by the interests of the International 
Actors who also exercise an important impact. They have an important interest in maintaining 
of the status quo,  as they are among the principle  users of the politicized administration, 
corrupted judiciary, untransparent decision making. But at the same time, not being strong 
enough to fully control the legislative process, and as, due to the often changes in office all of 
them experienced the difficulties and discrimination based on the party lines, they are also 
interested in the creation of the clear rules of the game that would bring more certainty in the 
market functioning577. 
Similarly, the integration of Macedonia in the international flows and institutions and the 
opening of its economy started already during the mid '90s, so that the emerging business elite 
learned  rather  quickly  to  deal  with  and  to  accept  the  economic  effects  international 
environment. The long history of arrangements and the high level of IMF and WB leverage 
on Macedonia actually meant that Macedonian economic elite was already well used to the fact 
that it  lost its  influence over some aspects of policy (like for example the macro-financial 
policy dictated by the IMF). This created a far more favorable approach to the further opening 
of the economy and further international influence than in Serbia, where the economic elite 
was  developed  in  a  period  of  the  international  isolation.  Aware  of  the  inevitability  of 
Macedonia’s process of integration and of the lack of any perspective for those who do not 
achieve international legitimacy, the economic elite has already long ago started to adapt its 
own strategies  to  the  new realities578.  This  acceptance  and the  lack  of  opposition  to  the 
process  of  democratization  and/or  EU  integrations  is  therefore  combined  with  a  low 
influence on the  decision-making process  that  an anti-EU,  anti-democratic  economic  elite 
could exercise. 
576 Based on the e-mail interview with prof.  Hristova Lidija,  Institute of Sociological,  Political  and Legal 
Studies, Skopje, 1.12.2008.
577 Based on the e-mail interview with prof.  Hristova Lidija,  Institute of Sociological,  Political  and Legal 
Studies, Skopje, 1.12.2008.
578 Based on the e-mail interview with prof.  Hristova Lidija,  Institute of Sociological,  Political  and Legal 
Studies, Skopje, 1.12.2008. 
595
Irena Marčeta
Building Democracy with External Help
17.2.2. EU ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN THE ANCHORING PROCESS.
We have already underlined that the deep economic crisis on one side, and the high level of 
the openness of the economy and importance of the external  trade on the other,  pushed 
Macedonia into an economic dependence on the west, increasing both the economic and the 
political leverage of the international  actors.  The economic dependence (that, according to 
some domestic authors, reaches the levels of a real “lack of economic sovereignty”579) thus 
diminished  the  influence  of  the  domestic  economic  elite  (fostering  it  to  adapt  to  the 
internationally promoted norms as we described), and represented a substantial dimension in 
the cost-benefits calculation of the ruling elite. The economic dependence, combined with the 
country’s  security  dependence on the  west  and its  elite’s  political  dependence on external 
legitimization actually produced an asset in which a high level of compliance could be reached 
with a low level of financial assistance. We can thus observe that the EU’s financial assistance 
to Macedonia in absolute amount was much lower than in Serbia (320 millions compared to 
1.300). In terms of the foreign aid per capita, the two countries are on a similar level, Serbia 
still maintaining a slight difference (in the period 2001-2004 Serbia scored 83 dollars of EU aid 
per capita, while Macedonia, in the far longer period between 1997 and 2004, was granted 77 
dollars of EU aid per capita)580. Moreover, while in Serbia the EU aid accounted for 58% of 
the external donations, this share is slightly higher in Macedonia, 62%, illustrating the stronger 
EU influence in Macedonia than in Serbia. Finally, while Serbia was a top recipient for many 
of  the  EU member  states  and  for  the  EU  in  general,  the  only  EU  country  for  which 
Macedonia was one of the top 5 recipients of financial assistance was Slovenia (it is relevant to 
underline that the Slovenian financial assistance is mainly directed to the Former Yugoslav 
republics, where the Slovenian outward investments is mainly concentrated581). 
Again, unlike what was registered in Serbia, the stronger EU leverage in Macedonia was 
combined with other factors favoring the positive compliance with the externally promoted 
norms: as the analysis of the CARDS documentation (available on the EAR website) showed, 
the financial assistance in Macedonia was much more often conditioned by the rule adoption/
implementation than it was in Serbia.
As far as the capacity of CARDS to diminish the losses suffered by the actors, similarly to 
what was the case in Serbia, the CARDS assistance in Macedonia was capable only to tackle 
the  government’s  costs  of  the  realization  of  particular  norms,  not  those  that  the  actors 
579 See Nikolovska and Siljanovska-Davkova, 2001.
580 See EU donors’ atlas. See also the European Agency for Reconstruction’s annual report 2006.
581 See Svetličić, 2007.
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suffered due to the introduction of the new norm. However, unlike in Serbia, where the losers 
from the process of democratization, from the process of EU integration and, often, from the 
particular policy promoted coincided, in Macedonia’s case, due to the content of the norms 
promoted  and  the  EU priorities  in  Macedonia,  the  groups  enduring  the  costs  from  the 
compliance with the EU-promoted norms were either too weak to reverse the process (like 
for example the employees who lost their jobs due to the cuts in the civil service or in the 
military), or were the actors whose costs were compensated due to their strong preference for 
the EU integrations. 
The  causes  for  the  negative  developments  and  the  rather  low  level  of  the  quality  of 
democracy established in Macedonia is therefore not to be sought in the inefficiency of the 
CARDS and  financial  assistance  in  promoting  the  rule  adoption,  but,  as  we  have  often 
underlined in this paper, in the content  of some of the norms promoted by the EU (here we 
mainly  refer  to  the  inter-ethnic  power-sharing  mechanisms  that  brought  to  the 
institutionalization  of  the  ethnicity  in  Macedonia,  see  the  previous  chapters),  and  in  the 
priorities and interests of the EU engagement in Macedonia. The necessity to ensure the peace 
in the country and the EU security concerns brought to a situation where security was more 
crucial  than  democratization.  Unfortunately,  as  we  argued  in  the  chapter  about  the 
constitutional issues, the solutions adopted by the international actors (ethnically based power-
sharing) produced a segmentation along ethnic lines of the struggle for power582, introducing 
thus  potentially  unstable  solutions  that  actually  favored  the  further  politicization  of  the 
ethnicity. 
The  security  agenda  of  the  EU  was  evident  from  both  the  repeat  of  the  OFA 
implementation as a key-condition for all financial assistance (and EU integrations as well), 
and from the structure of the CARDS program where decentralization,  police reform and 
minority  rights  (all  key  dimensions  of  OFA)  absorbed  more  than  35% of  the  total  EU 
assistance to Macedonia. The net beneficiaries in these dimensions were the members of the 
Albanian ethnic groups (being the main beneficiaries of the OFA, they are obviously most 
582 The “segmentation” of the struggle for power in the ethnically based power-sharing settings is a term 
corresponding to what Goio (2008) labeled “decentralization of the struggle for power” in the ethnic federalism. 
The mechanism the two phenomena refer to are rather similar: the closing of the political competition within the 
ethnic community. As Goio stresses,  this enclosing of the political struggle in ethnic groups strengthens the 
identifications within the ethnic group, favoring the politicization of the ethnicity. The segmentation on the social 
level is thus further re-strengthened and the national unity is created on a level of political regime, where the 
ethnic elites are joined together. This makes the entire setting potentially instable (unless the segmentation on the 
social level is not avoided by the establishment of ties between the communities), as any shock at the level at the 
central level might bring to disintegration. 
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favored by its implementation) who often were also the main recipients of this assistance. At 
least in some of the fields the effect of the EU engagement in Macedonia had a strong re-
distributive effect and the CARDS program only further strengthened this re-distribution. A 
good example is the case of the programs aiming to foster the equal representation in the state 
administration. Not only did the rule implementation actually bring to a re-distributive effect 
(particularly seen the parallel downsizing in administration, see the part on the civil service 
reform), but also the CARDS programs were concentrated in financing the trainings for the 
members of the minorities. In the EU key-fields of action, the most important actor enduring 
costs from compliance was Macedonian ethnic group, whose losses were both economic and 
political,  on both  elite  and citizen  level.  However,  the  fear  for  potential  conflict  and the 
presumed  security,  economic  and  political  gains  from  the  EU  and  NATO  integrations, 
ensured the support also of those actors that endured huge costs from the implementation of 
the norms promoted. 
17.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
In the previous sections we described the interests of the economic elite in the process of 
the  international  anchoring  of  democracy  in  Macedonia  and Serbia.  We showed how the 
different settings in which these elites developed, together with the particularities of the EU 
approach to the two countries, produced different patterns of business interest and influence. 
First of all, the setting in which the economic elite was born and socialized significantly 
differed  in  the  two countries.  While  Serbia,  in  the  Nineties,  did  not  further  develop  the 
economic  reforms  undertaken  in  Yugoslavia  during  the  Eighties  (a  part  some  small 
developments in the price liberalization and small scale privatization),  Macedonia advanced 
with the economic reforms, particularly in the period after its integration in the international 
monetary institutions in 1993.
Further on, the political environment in the two countries also differed. While Macedonian 
transition to democracy started already with its independence in 1991,  registering the first 
peaceful change of government in 1998 and holding free, competitive elections in the entire 
period  1991-1998,  in  Serbia  the  transition  was  interrupted  by  the  establishment  of  the 
authoritarian  regime with  nationalistic  mobilization.  This  significantly  influenced  the  links 
between politics  and  the  economic  elite,  and  marked  the  economic  elite’s  interest  in  the 
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democratization process. We thus underlined how, in Serbia’s case, the economic elite born 
during the '90s was strongly linked with Milošević’s regime, which made them part of the 
authoritarian  regime’s  ruling  coalition.  Once  the  regime  changed,  the  economic  elite 
experienced  a  period  of  high  uncertainty  until  they  succeeded  in  establishing  ties  and 
corruptive links with the new political elite. Differently, in Macedonia the economic elite was 
born in a context of political pluralism, thus avoiding the establishment of strong linkages 
with one particular political actor (even though the prevalence of the former communists in 
the first  years and the weak regulation in the process of appropriation of the assets have 
significantly  favored the  enrichment  of  the  former  communists  in  managerial  positions583, 
however the emerging political pluralism forced this elite to adapt to possible changes in the 
ruling elite). The level of political participation and competitiveness of the system appears to 
be crucial in this point: Hellman (1998) convincingly argued that the level of competition of 
the political system significantly influences the possibility for winners from the first years of 
the  transition  to  obstruct  further  reforms.  While  Macedonia,  since  the  beginning  of  the 
transition, scored numerous shifts of government (also due to the nature of its party system, 
please see the section on the political system), in Serbia the electoral accountability was rather 
limited, first due to the authoritarian regime in place until 2000, and then due to the polarized-
pluralism type of party system, that produces the peripheral turnover on government. This 
becomes evident if we analyze the party-affiliation of the ministers of economy and governors 
of the central bank: while,  unsurprisingly,  in the '90s it  was Milošević’s SPS to keep these 
positions,  since  2000  this  privilege  was  assigned  to  G17plus,  a  political  party  formed by 
“economic experts”. It is often forgotten that, being formed by a group of economic experts, 
the members of the G17 NGO, and then members of the party G17plus,  in all  different 
governments formed since October 2000, held positions linked to the economic sector (the 
minister of finance and economy and the governor of the central bank in 2001 – 2003 were 
members of the NGO G17, the minister of finance and the governor of the central bank in 
2004 – 2007 were members of the party G17plus, the minister of economy and the governor 
of  the  central  bank  in  Koštunica’s  government  in  2007  –  2008  and  then  in  the  current 
Cvetković’s government in 2008 – also are members of this party). Such prevalence of the 
party incumbents in key positions controlling Serbian economy reveals a de-facto absence of 
political pluralism in this area of policy. In this light, the accusations advanced by the political 
583 See Walder, 2003, Labovik, 2005, Petkovski and Bishev, 2004, Slaveski 1997, Georgiev and Nedanovski 
2002.
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party LDP,  according  to which the  G17plus  leader is  the  “personal  employee  of  Serbian 
tycoons”584, particularly when supported by the well-documented case of corruption involving 
the Minister of Finance - and leader of this party – gain particular importance.
Last but not least, we saw how the strength and importance of the economic elite towards 
the political leadership changes as we pass from Macedonia to Serbia. In Macedonia, due to 
the country’s high dependence on external actors, the business elite is less influential than in 
Serbia.  Thus,  while  Serbian  authors  are  underlining  the  tycoons’  control  over  politics585, 
Macedonian  authors  are  underlining  the  weakness  of  the  domestic  business  elite  in 
determining  the  decision-making  process,  hypothesizing  that  most  probably  the  political 
parties represent the stronger partner in the relationship politics-business.586 In the sections 
above we made a logical argument explaining such relative weakness of Macedonian business 
influence as a consequence of the EU and other international actors’ support as a necessary 
(and, respect to the business elite’s influence, also a sufficient) condition for gaining the power 
in Macedonia. The extremely high influence of the international community over Macedonian 
leadership represents a case of “weakness” that can be turned into benefits in the political 
leader’s negotiations with the business.
The link between the economic and political elite thus significantly shaped the economic 
elite’s preference in the process of the democratization. We underlined how a certain degree 
of  political  pluralism  and political  uncertainty  might  serve  as  a  safeguard  to  Macedonian 
economic elite from the complete subordination to the political parties, while in Serbia the 
only change in the field of finances (due to the fall of Milošević regime) created a short period 
of economic elite’s fear and induced the costs of the creation of the new network of influence. 
In both countries the rather low level of the rule of law, lack of institutional accountability, the 
corruption and the state capture are characteristics welcomed by the businessmen who are 
among  the  main  beneficiaries  of  such  asset  and  are  well-socialized  and  set  in  such 
environment.  However,  some differences between the two countries  still  persist,  and here 
again mainly due to the different levels of political stability/fluidity, particularly in the area of 
the economic politics. As reported by Hristova587, the corruption and lack of clear rules of the 
584 Such link appears even stronger if we recall the fact that Mišković relayed on this party’s former leader’s 
expertise  in his  claiming against  Serbian Commission for  the protection of the market competitiveness.  See 
footnote 7 to this chapter. Also: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Ekonomija/Labus-radi-za-Mishkovica.sr.html.
585 See for example Pešić, 2006.
586 Based on the e-mail interview with prof.  Hristova Lidija,  Institute of Sociological,  Political  and Legal 
Studies, Skopje, 1.12.2008.
587 The e-mail interview, 1.12.2008.
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game, while surely favoring the economic elite, are perceived at the same time as a two-edge 
knife and obstacle to the development of the business. Precisely due to the relatively frequent 
turn-over on power, all businessmen in Macedonia also experienced difficulties caused by the 
change of the incumbent elite and the lack of predictability. This is why they were forced to 
develop  a  relatively  high  capacity  for  adaptation  to  the  shifts  in  government.  So,  their 
approach to the questions of the democratization appears more complicated and ambiguous 
than in Serbia, where, due to the magnate’s strong control over the decision-making process588 
and due to the peripheral turnover, the problem of predictability and uncertainty is not among 
the economic elite’s fears.
The different distribution of power between politics and business creates the differences in 
the role  the economic elite  has in the  country’s  foreign policy  and in  the EU integration 
process. While in Macedonia the economic elite’s influence on politics is vanishing in front of 
the  international  actors’  influence  on  Macedonian  decision  makers,  in  Serbia  the  strong 
economic interests can block (as we saw in the first half  of 2008) the process of the EU 
integration. In this sense, the recent developments in Serbia (and particularly, the initiatives of 
Serbian business people to create the links with Brussels) might prove to be a key element in 
the process of Serbia’s integration. 
We would like to finish this analysis on the economic elite’s influence with a reflection on 
the  links  and  nature  of  the  EU and economic  influence  over  the  decision  makers.  It  is 
possible, for analytical purposes, to conceive both EU and the economic elite as the resources 
the political parties are using in their competition for power. In Macedonia’s case both these 
resources  are  available  to  all  important  participants  of  the  competition  for  power.  The 
increased  demand  (numerous  actors  are  seeking  access  to  these  resources)  creates  a 
competition  for  resources between the  political  parties  and,  consequentially,  it  creates  the 
increase  of  the  parties’  compliance  with  the  requirements  deriving  from  the  actor  that 
provided support (EU or business elite), as described in Figure 3. The “servile” approach to 
the international actors of all Macedonian political parties was underlined in the interviews 
with various Macedonian experts589. The weakness of the business elite thus derives from the 
presence of the competitive, and much stronger, source of influence: the EU and USA.
588 See Pešić, 2006.
589 Interviews with Hristova, Klekovski, Taseva, Jovanovski.
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Differently, as described in Figure 4, in Serbia’s case, due to the strong presence of anti-EU 
parties, the EU does not represent a source of power available to all political options, while 
the business elite, particularly since its legitimization in 2001-2002 (see above), does not have 
any ideological  obstacle in  maintaining  the link with all  relevant  actors present.  While  the 
political  leaders  do  compete  for  financial  support,  they  do  not  compete  for  the  EU 
legitimization and protection, available only to some political actors. In such setting, the EU 
influence is weakened, not only due to the lack of its influence over the anti-EU parties, but, 
more importantly, to the lack of competition for the EU legitimization in the pro-EU block. 
In other words, as not all actors are seeking for the EU’s support, the pro-EU parties can 
maintain their status of parties legitimized by the EU even with lowed level of compliance 
with the EU requirements. The comparative advantage that the EU as a resource of power 
might have over the domestic business elite is weakened by the “low demand” for the EU 
protection.
Before concluding this chapter we’d like to make some final remarks on the capacity of the 
EU economic incentives (and mainly programs like PHARE, CARDS, IPE) to change the 
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costs and benefits balance for the domestic elite and to bring to the compliance with more 
difficult  reforms.  As we saw, the effectiveness of the funds invested in the two countries 
significantly  differed,  in  Macedonia  lower  amounts  of  assistance  produced  far  better 
compliance than in Serbia.  While  the causes of the different responses of Macedonia and 
Serbia  to the EU recommendations  will  be analyzed in  detail  in the conclusions,  here we 
would like to compare the characteristics of the EU financial support to the two countries and 
to reflect on the impact this financial support had. 
The  first  important  difference  between  the  two  countries  concerned  the  amount  of 
assistance  provided,  its  structure  (goals),  and the  conditionality  linked  with the  resources. 
Thus,  in  the  period  2000-2006  Serbia  collected  €1’208,1  million  of  EU assistance,  while 
Macedonia for the period 1997-2006 was allocated only €302,5 million590. In Macedonia’s case 
the access to funds was much more often conditioned by the rule adoption than it was in 
Serbia,  and  this  conditionality  particularly  concerned  the  implementation  of  the  OFA 
agreement. In Serbia the conditionality was used with much more determination on the micro-
financial  assistance,  where  the  main  condition  was  cooperation  with  ICTY,  while 
conditionality  in  the  CARDS  program  was  more  often  used  only  from  2005  on.  It  is 
interesting  to  notice  how the  pattern  of  the  EU Member  States  assistance  in  those  two 
countries  followed  a  similar  pattern  described  by  Fossati  (2004)  when  analyzing  the  EU 
assistance to the East-European countries: there appears to be a significant linkage between 
the levels of the FDI and the country’s financial assistance. It is no surprise then that Serbia, a 
top-user of the financial assistance from many EU member states, also counts higher levels of 
the  FDI than  Macedonia.  Similarly,  Macedonia  is  in  a  priority  list  of  assistance  only  for 
Slovenia,  a country whose structure of  the outwards FDI is  strongly concentrated on the 
Balkans and former-Yugoslav republics591. 
As far as the potential of the EU funds (PHARE, CARDS, IPE) to switch the costs and 
benefits calculations is concerned, we underlined that the very nature and the goal of these 
programs limits their capacity in producing the significant change in the cost and benefits 
calculations.  We should distinguish between two substantially  different types of  costs  that 
derive  from  the  compliance  with  a  promoted  norm.  One  kind  of  costs  concerns  the 
realization of the norm. The implementation of a particular norm produces administrative 
590 Data from the EAR annual report for 2006.
591 For the EU Member State foreign aid priorities, see Donors’ Atlas, 2006. For the data on Slovenia outward 
FDI see Svetličić, 2007. For the data on the FDI in Serbia, data are available from the National Bank of Serbia.
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costs  (like  for  example  the  costs  for  settling  a  new institution  that  would  implement  the 
norm). Another kind of cost comes from the possible re-distributive effects a promoted norm 
might contain. It refers to the cost the actors would bear due to the change of the status quo. 
The establishment of the institution of the Ombudsman, for example, would create costs for 
its realization (the resources necessary for settling a new institution),  but will  also produce 
costs for the employees in the administration that would be exposed to more severe control 
and would no longer  be able  to abuse of  their  positions.  For these actors  it  is  irrelevant 
whether the Ombudsman is financed by the state budget or by external resources: they prefer 
that the institution does not exist at all. Being put in place with a main aim to diminish the 
costs of the realization of the norms promoted, the above mentioned EU programs’ capacity 
to diminish the costs deriving from the change of the status quo is rather limited. The losers, 
thus, can be compensated only in some other dimension of the process of the integration. In 
Macedonia, the security concerns and the belief in the general economic prosperity of the EU 
membership made numerous Macedonians accept to lose their jobs due to the down-sizing 
civil  service  reform promoted by the external  actors.  In Serbia’s  case,  many of the actors 
losing from the transition accumulated losses in other dimensions as well (see next chapter), 
increasing strong anti-EU sentiment. 
APPENDIX
Figure 3: “The Average value of the EBRD transition indicators for the Balkan states” (based on EBRD transition indicators, author's elaboration)
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Table 3: “EBRD Scoring of the Reforms in Serbia 1989 – 2008”.
 
Large scale 
privatizatio
n 
Small scale 
privatization 
Enterprise 
restructuring Price liberalization 
Trade & Foreign 
system 
Competition 
Policy 
Banking reform & 
interest rate 
liberalization 
Securities markets & 
non-bank financial 
institutions 
1989 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1990 1,00 3,00 1,00 3,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1991 1,00 3,00 1,00 3,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1992 1,00 3,00 1,00 3,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1993 1,00 3,00 1,00 3,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1994 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1995 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1996 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1997 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,67 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1998 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1999 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2000 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,33 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
2001 1,00 3,00 1,00 4,00 2,67 1,00 1,00 1,00
2002 2,00 3,00 2,00 4,00 3,00 1,00 2,33 1,67
2003 2,33 3,00 2,00 4,00 3,00 1,00 2,33 2,00
2004 2,33 3,33 2,00 4,00 3,00 1,00 2,33 2,00
2005 2,67 3,33 2,33 4,00 3,33 1,00 2,67 2,00
2006 2,67 3,67 2,33 4,00 3,33 1,67 2,67 2,00
2007 2,67 3,67 2,33 4,00 3,33 2,00 2,67 2,00
2008 2,67 3,67 2,33 4,00 3,67 2,00 3,00 2,00
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Table 4: “EBRD Scoring of the Reforms in Macedonia, 1998-2008”.
 
Large scale 
privatizatio
n 
Small scale 
privatization 
Enterprise 
restructuring Price liberalization 
Trade & Foreign 
system 
Competition 
Policy 
Banking reform & 
interest rate 
liberalization 
Securities markets & 
non-bank financial 
institutions 
1989 1,00 3,00 1,00 2,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1990 1,00 3,00 1,00 3,67 2,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1991 1,00 3,00 1,00 3,67 3,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1992 1,00 3,00 1,00 4,00 3,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
1993 2,00 3,00 1,00 4,00 3,00 1,00 1,33 1,00
1994 2,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,00 1,00
1995 2,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,00
1996 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,00
1997 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,00
1998 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,67
1999 3,00 4,00 2,00 4,00 4,00 1,00 2,67 1,67
2000 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,00 2,00 2,67 1,67
2001 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,00 2,00 2,67 1,67
2002 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,00 2,00 2,67 1,67
2003 3,00 4,00 2,33 4,00 4,33 2,00 2,67 1,67
2004 3,33 4,00 2,33 4,33 4,33 2,00 2,67 2,00
2005 3,33 4,00 2,33 4,33 4,33 2,00 2,67 2,00
2006 3,33 4,00 2,67 4,33 4,33 2,00 2,67 2,33
2007 3,33 4,00 2,67 4,33 4,33 2,33 2,67 2,33
2008 3,33 4,00 2,67 4,33 4,33 2,33 3,00 2,33
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18. PROMOTION OF THE OTHER 
ANCHORING TOOLS
In this chapter we will describe the EU promotion of the anchoring process. What we refer 
to here is  a set  of  particular  norms the EU is  promoting in  each candidate and potential 
candidate state, and which main function is the promotion of the anchoring process itself. 
Here we refer to all those norms and requirements concerning the settling of particular bodies 
and administration dealing with the matters of the European integration.  Even though, as 
already stressed, such requirements in the EU documents are usually grouped among the “rule 
of law”, democratic political  requirements, actually their  content does not,  in any manner, 
concern the democratization of the country. These are not the norms of the “democratic rule 
of law”, and actually do not concern the democratization but, in fact, the integration process. 
We can conceive them as those requirements “opening” the channels to the EU action and 
thus consider it as the norms aiming to “promote the anchor”. The request to develop and 
strengthen the European integration institutions thus represents an issue that, even though it 
does not concern the promotion of the political regime, it has an important impact on the 
whole process as it actually requires the constitution of the new agents with specific agenda 
and powers,  with  a  particular  task to promote  the  process  of  integration.  As  such,  these 
institutions  are  important  agents:  continuous  contacts  with  the  EU  institutions  are  of 
particular importance for the process of socialization of the employees in these institutions, 
while, on the other hand, seen the nature of these bodies, they are supposed to have a role in 
the decision-making process, being usually given the power to promote solutions that are in 
line with the European standards. 
In this chapter we will also analyze another set of issues, again, not directly linked to the 
democratization process, but, we might say, to the process of anchoring, this time anchoring 
with international organizations  other than the EU. We here refer to all those requirements 
concerning the adherence to particular regional  and international  conventions,  treaties and 
organizations, as well as the calls for compliance with the other organizations’ requirements. In 
these cases we can conceive the action of the EU as promoting other anchors for democracy. We can 
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 608
thus observe how the EU is using its own influence to increase the country’s vulnerability to 
other international  actors promoting democracy.  This tactic actually  is  a win-win for both 
actors involved in the process. What one actor gains is compliance, while the other obtains the 
possibility  to  rely  on  the  first  actor’s  assessment,  thus  allowing  it  to  spare  the  necessary 
resources for the monitoring of compliance. In such way, the organizational capacity of the 
EU is increased as it  allows the EU to rely on the instruments of the other international 
actors. It becomes interesting to examine the links between the international actors involved 
in such action, and the conditions making such relations possible. We will,  however, tackle 
this  question only  superficially,  as  the space of  this  work does not allow a more detailed 
analysis. From the point of view of the model of the international anchoring of democracy, 
this actually means a joint action of different IAs (with all the complications such joint action 
implies)  and  the  creation  of  more  than  one  anchor.  It  is  also  theoretically  relevant  to 
understand the possible differences between the IA’s that are acting jointly, paying particular 
attention to similarities and differences in interests, capacity and approach. 
18.1. SERBIA 
18.1.1.  REQUEST FOR CONSTITUTING THE INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH THE EU 
INTEGRATION
Since the very beginning of its democracy promotion activity in Serbia, the EU required the 
establishment  of  the  European integration institutions.  At the  state level,  the  Council  for 
European Integration was formed as a high-level political institution supposed to deal with 
issues related to the integration of SCG into the EU and entitled to monitor and guide the 
integration office. It was completed by the European Integration Office, acting as a secretariat 
to the council. The council was composed of nine high-degree political figures, three for each 
republic and three representing the state union. However, due to rare sessions, the functioning 
of  the  council  was  considered  unsatisfactory,  a  fact  that  can  be  explained  by  both  the 
instability  and  disfunctionality  of  the  federation  (later  State  Union),  and  by  the  lack  of 
influence  of  the  State  Union  (federal  level)  on  the  policy-making  process  in  each  of  the 
republics. 
On the level  of the Republic  of Serbia,  the parliamentary committee for the European 
integration  was  settled  in  2003,  but,  besides  having  an  important  symbolical  role,  the 
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committee  remained  inactive.  The  practice  remained  that  only  those  issues explicitly 
concerning the EU integration are discussed in the committee and, seen the prevalence of the 
executive over the legislative in Serbia,  the  committee's role is rather limited. Recently the 
committee’s  importance  in  monitoring  the  process  increased  as,  since  the  parliamentary 
resolution  on EU integration  and adoption  of  the  2005  strategy  for  joining  the  EU,  the 
government regularly  submits reports  on the activities  in that process,  and the committee 
debates on the reports giving its recommendations for further developments. In response to 
the  EU  requirements,  Serbian  European  Integration  Office  was  also  settled  in  2004. 
According to the government’s rules of procedure, every proposed bill must be accompanied 
by  a  statement  on  compliance  with  the  EU standards,  which  actually  gave  the  office  an 
important role in the decision-making process. The office is entitled to elaborate the action 
plans  for  meeting  the  priorities  of  the  European Partnership,  and,  on the  other  hand,  to 
provide all the necessary documents for the SAA reports. The strengthening of the office is 
also evident from the increase of its  budget,  that  from 0.0037% grew to 0.0098% of the 
budget share, particularly in 2005 and 2006. However, compared to Macedonian Secretariat 
for the European Affairs, the financial resources managed by Serbian SEIO are very small 
(0,207% was Macedonia’s Secretariat budget share in 2007, compared to the 0,0098% of the 
budget resources of the similar body in Serbia). 
Generally,  the  compliance  with  the  requirements  concerning  the  functioning  of  these 
structures was praised by the EU. The problem remains still in their rather limited potentials 
in a setting where the executive, often preferring the non-compliance, is exercising control 
over the other institutions and branches of power. 
18.1.2. OPENING UP OF OTHER ANCHORS
In order to understand  the relationship between the EU and other international  actors 
active in the country, we will examine the composition and formulation of the priorities (both 
considered “issues needing attention in the following 12 months” of the first SAA reports, 
and the priorities of the European partnership with Serbia), trying to understand if, in what 
terms,  how  and  when  the  EU  was  calling  for  compliance  with  the  IA  policy 
recommendations. 
In table 4 (see the appendix) we bring all priorities that required compliance with other IA’s 
recommendations (in bold we find the actors to which the recommendation refers). We can 
notice that the most often “called” for institution is the Council of Europe that, as we see in 
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the table, sets the standards, particularly in the dimension of protection of human rights, civil, 
minority and political rights. In its first reports, the EU was also calling for a more general 
ratification of the CoE conventions and compliance with CoE accession and post-accession 
criteria.  OSCE was mainly  called whenever  discussing  the reform of the  electoral  system, 
while  the proposal  of  the Center for the Control  of Armed Forces based in Geneva was 
adopted by the EU as the framework around which the army reform shall be undertaken. 
We can observe that  in these cases, the support  for the parallel  democracy promotion 
process undertaken through other actors represents the use of these other actor’s capacities 
and infrastructures in pursuing the same goals. Thus, for example, in the field of the electoral 
or army reform, the EU is not putting forward its own priorities other than those made by the 
other IA. This becomes even more obvious in the SAA reports, written in reference, among 
other,  also  to  the  reports  issued  by  CoE,  OSCE and  other  IA,  and  where  the  data  on 
compliance provided by these actors are used as a reference and their recommendations are 
underlined. 
We  can  also  observe  how  the  EU is  usually  supporting  the  actions  of  other regional  
supranational  organizations,  and  does  not  refer  to  the  possible  democracy  promotion 
strategies of other, globally active international actors. Thus USAID or NATO for example, 
both very active actors in promoting, among other, the democratization in the region, are not 
relied  upon  by  the  EU neither  are  presented  as  “joint  partners”  in  the  EU  democracy 
promotion  efforts.  This  prevalence  of  cooperation  between  regional  supranational 
organizations  might  be  a  product  of  the  particular  linkage  between  these  organizations 
through a joint membership and the similarities of their agendas. Thus, we can often read of 
the “EU and CoE standards”, the two institutions being used together more as a “fix phrase”, 
and the term “European standards” leaves it unclear weather it refers to the CoE or to the 
EU. However,  it  is  interesting to underline  that,  while  in the EU documents we find the 
imagine  of  the  “European  template”,  where  all  regional  supranational  organizations  are 
conceived as a system or a net, in the reports of the Council of Europe no such discourse is 
present, even though the opinion on the CoE as an antechamber of the EU membership was 
reported592.  This  clear  distinction  between  CoE  and  EU in  the  CoE  official  documents 
becomes evident in the analysis of the CoE country reports. Not only are the calls for the 
compliance with the EU priorities absent from these documents, but moreover, the European 
592 Thus Jovanovski, director of the CoE office in Skopje, in the interview made by the author in August 
2008, underlined how the main role of the CoE was to prepare the country for the EU integrations.
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Union is only sporadically mentioned, there is no evaluation of country's compliance with EU 
priorities,  neither are there requirements for further integration. There appears to be a clear 
accent on the “separation” of the two institutions, the Council of Europe being a unit that, 
beside some joint projects with the EU, namely through the European Reconstruction Funds, 
does not have much in common with the EU integration process. In this light it  appears 
interesting to underline that while in Serbia there is a strong anti-EU integration campaign, the 
membership in CoE is asserted as positive even by the most radical ultra-nationalists.  The 
levels of legitimacy between the two appear to differ, EU being more controversial, mainly 
due to the “requirements, conditioning,  bargaining” the process of integration brings.  The 
difference in the levels of legitimacy also derives from the basis of their legitimacy: being a 
much more “inclusive” institution, and thus having in its lines also members that are not part 
of the EU, the CoE is perceived as a less “western” and thus less antagonistic actor than the 
EU.  Due  to  this,  the  tendency  to  keep  separated  the  own identity,  requirements  and 
obligations from those of the EU we registered above is a part of the CoE’s need to underline 
its independency from the “European powers” and its unique, separated identity. 
As far as the regional  cooperation is concerned,  the EU promoted the creation of the 
CEFTA  (Central  Europe  Free  Trade  Agreement),  good  bilateral  relationship  between 
neighbouring  states  and  the  participation  to  the  regional  organizations.  These  issues, 
particularly  the  creation  of  the  free  trade  agreements  of  the  Balkans  and  the  regional 
integration, were perceived as a mean for faster economic development and the settling of the 
consequences of the Balkan wars. 
The explicit call for the respect of such particular requirements where, rather than relying 
on the other IA’s norm promotion instruments, the EU used its legitimacy to ensure Serbia’s 
compliance concerning the cooperation with the ICTY, as well as the respect for the UNSC 
Resolution 1244. These issues’ particularity is that, unlike the CoE requirements on protection 
of the human rights or OSCE recommendations concerning the elections, in these cases we 
have the security and stability of the region at stake. As such, and seen the resistance they 
caused in the country, we will dedicate separate paragraphs to these problems. 
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18.2. MACEDONIA
18.2.1.  REQUEST FOR CONSTITUTING THE INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH THE EU 
INTEGRATION
Due  to  the  rather  early  developments  of  the  country’s  relations  with  the  EU,  the 
establishment of the institutions dealing with the process of the EU integrations in Macedonia 
began already in the Nineties. In 1997, the adoption of “The Strategic Basis of the Republic of 
Macedonia on Achieving the Membership of the European Union” opened the process of 
building the institutional network of units empowered to deal with the Macedonian process of 
the EU integrations. The deputy Prime Minister for the European Integrations was appointed 
and  a  series  of  bodies  were  formed:  the  Committee  for  the  Euro-Atlantic  integrations 
(composed  by  the  Prime  Minister,  Deputy  Prime  Ministers,  a  number  of  ministers,  the 
Governor of the Central Bank and the president of the Macedonian Academy of Arts and 
Science), the Working committee for the European Integrations within the Government of 
the RM (Deputy Prime Minister charged for the EU integrations, minister of economy, and all 
vice-ministers as members) and the Sector for the EU integrations within the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, as a body coordinating the activity of all other bodies and entitled for the 
political  part  of  the  communication  and coordination  of  the  process593.  By  1999,  in  each 
ministry a Unit for the European Integrations was formed.
The process of building up and strengthening the administration entitled to prepare the 
Macedonian EU integration continued, with the Sector of the EU Integrations as the main 
domestic  promoter  of  the  process,  and  EU  as  its  external  partner.  After  a  series  of 
recommendations made in the 2002 and 2003 EU Commission reports, mainly requiring the 
strengthening and better  coordination  of  the  different  units  dealing  with the  process,  the 
government adopted an Action Plan in June which translated SAP recommendations into 216 
activities  and  also  defined  the  bodies  responsible  for  their  implementation,  adopted  the 
National Program for the Approximation of Legislation, established the Working Groups for 
the Harmonization of the Legislation with the “community acquis” and strengthened the role of 
593Vlada Republike Makedonije,  1998,  “Informacija  za Sistemot na upravuvanje i  koordinacija  na procesot  na 
evropska  integracija  vo  Republika  Makedonija,  i  Sistemot  na  upravuvanje  so  nacionalnata  koordinacija  na 
stranskata  pomoš, kako komplementaren so procesot za evropska integracija, so  Predlog za vospostavuvanje na 
institucionalna infrastruktura za upravuvanje i koordinacija na procesot na evropska integracija”, Skopje. 
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the  Legislative  Secretariat.  A  Statement  on  Compliance  with  the  EU  Legislation  was 
prescribed as the obligatory attachment of each draft legal text submitted to the Government.
A  further  step  in  strengthening  the  administrative  capacity  in  the  field  of  the  EU 
integrations took place in 2005, when the Sector for the European Integrations was turned to 
the Secretariat for the European Affairs, which had a central role in coordinating the progress 
in the EU integration objectives.  The Secretariat  was allowed its own budget,  marking an 
increase of 300% of the funds for its functioning and doubling its participation to the overall 
state budget share (see the table in the appendix). Following the EU criticisms expressed in 
the 2007 report, where the lack of human and financial resources to implement the SAA and 
the National Program for the Adoption of the acquis, the government proceeded in 2007 with 
re-structuring  the  Secretariat  for  the  European  Affairs  and  its  strengthening  through  an 
increase almost by double of the number of its employees. 
18.2.2. PROMOTION OF OTHER ANCHORS
In Table 3 we bring a list of EU’s calls for compliance with the recommendations of the 
other international institutions active in Macedonia. Similarly to what happened in Serbia, here 
again we can notice the prevalence of the European regional organizations, Council of Europe 
and OSCE being the most important EU partners in the democracy promotion in Macedonia. 
While present in the field of the protection of Human and Minority rights, the Council of 
Europe and the “European standards” are less called upon in the EU recommendations in 
Macedonia than in Serbia. Such finding is partially a result of the Macedonian early integration 
in the CoE, as the country became a member already in 1995,  seven years before Serbia. 
Moreover, the widespread support for the Macedonian membership in the EU, the high EU 
leverage in Macedonia and the importance of the EU in the process of peace building  in 
Macedonia also contributed to decrease the EU’s need to rely on other actors. It is however 
interesting  to  underline  the  different  levels  of  engagement  of  the  Council  of  Europe  in 
Macedonia  during  the  Nineties  and  after  the  2001  violence.  In  the  analyzed  chapters  we 
underlined the importance of this actor during the '90s, when, especially in the field of the 
human,  political  and  civil  rights,  this  organization  played  an  important  role  in  the  rule 
promotion. Since 2001, however, the importance of this organization in Macedonia appears to 
diminish,  mainly  due to the negative  approach of  the domestic  decision-makers and their 
concentration on the EU requirements.  In the interview with the responsible  of the CoE 
office  in  Macedonia,  Jovanovski  reported  the  rather  difficult  compliance  of  Macedonian 
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authorities and the lack of cooperation with the Council of Europe, explaining such situation 
with the lack of democratic potentiality of the Macedonian political elite. As the CoE is mainly 
interested  in  the  democracy  promotion,  and  as  it  acts  through  the  social  influence  and 
socialization  channels  rather  than  conditionality,  the  Macedonian  authorities  showed  a 
negligence towards the recommendations coming from the CoE, particularly those that are 
directly tackling the government’s interests. This is also evident in the Macedonian approach 
to the CoE monitoring process. Only a few reports of Macedonian compliance with the CoE 
standards  are  available,  mainly  due  to  the  Macedonian  authorities  refusing  to  accept  and 
publish  these  reports  (according  to the  regulations  of  the  CoE,  the  country’s  approval  is 
necessary in order for the report to be adopted). The monitoring was finished in 2004, as the 
opinion prevailed that Macedonia mainly fulfilled its obligations deriving from the CoE, a 
decision  that,  according  to Jovanovski,  neglected the  low respect  for  the  rule  of  law and 
inadequate implementation of the rules adopted in Macedonia. 
APPENDIX
Table 1: “Budget share of Serbian European Integration Office”.   (in millions of dinars)
Budget share Budget Budget share %
2004 13555 362045252 0. 0037
2005 36245 429764926 0. 0084
2006 53480 548405821 0. 0098 
2007 63668 646466666 0. 0098
Source: Budget of Republic of Serbia, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007.
Table 2: “Budget share of the Macedonia Secretariat for European Affairs” (in millions of denars)
Budget share Budget Budget share %
2004 51461 66666000 0,077
2005(evropska 
integracija
59119 66538469
0,089
2006 150172 81749000 0,183
2007 164694 79522497 0,207
2008 168000 89397520 0,188
Source: Budget of Republic of Macedonia, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007.
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Table 3: “EU promotion of other anchors in Macedonia”.
2002 Adapt electoral legislation in line with OSCE/ODHIR recommendations before the next Parliamentary elections in 2002, and enforce implementation.
Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees on freedom of expression in line with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Downsizing of the Public Administration as agreed with the IMF.
2003 Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees on freedom of expression in line with the European Convention on Human Rights.
The authorities should maintain a consistent macroeconomic and fiscal
framework in agreement with the IMF and fully implement the programme
agreed with the Fund.
2004 Ensure full compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment and other relevant international conventions.
Review the legislation on defamation to reflect European standards and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
Adopt an appropriate legal framework on cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
2006 Implement the recommendations regarding the electoral process made by the OSCE-Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in time for the 
next elections.
Adopt the constitutional amendments needed to implement the reform of the judicial system, in line with the recommendations of the Venice Commission.
Fully implement the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
Fully comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and other relevant international conventions.
Promote respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights and the principles laid out in the Council of 
Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, in line with best practice in EU Member States.
2007 Implement fully the recommendations made by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
Fully comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the recommendations made by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture as well as the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
Continue to cooperate fully with the ICTY and, in view of the possible return of files from the ICTY, meet all the necessary preconditions that would ensure due 
process.
Continue to promote the transition from the Stability Pact to a more regionally owned cooperation framework and effective implementation of the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
2008 Implement fully the recommendations made by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO).
Fully comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the recommendations made by the Committee for the Prevention of Torture as well as the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.
Continue to cooperate fully with the ICTY and, in view of the possible return of files from the ICTY, meet all the necessary preconditions that would ensure due 
process.
Continue to promote the transition from the Stability Pact to a more regionally owned cooperation framework and effective implementation of the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
Source: EU SAA reports on Macedonia, EU partnership with Macedonia, Accession partnership with  Macedonia, author's elaboration.
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Table 4: “EU promotion of other anchors in Serbia”.
2002
Reform of electoral laws and provisions, a priority recommendation of the Council of Europe, should be brought into line with Council of Europe and OSCE 
standards by autumn 2002.
Army reform - including security policy, the role of the army and secret services, civilian control, general modernisation/ restructuring, and budgetary issues, in line 
with the proposals by the Geneva Centre for Control of Armed Forces - should be under way by the end of 2002. Reform of the security and police services 
should continue, transforming them into a service, adopting the Council of Europe's Police Code of Ethics, bringing them under clear internal and external 
control and improving coordination between the various services and with other state services. State security and law enforcement agencies must be separated. 
Prisons must be urgently brought in line with Council of Europe standards.
Legislation on minority rights, including relevant changes to Criminal and other Codes in line with the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (in force September 2001), should be urgently adopted and implemented.
Cooperation with ICTY should improve. Indictees should be surrendered to the Hague - including and particularly those currently holding elected office or military 
positions.
On the federal level, an agreement with London Club debtors is required, and an intra-FRY agreement on the internal split of the debts (both regarding the 
London Club and the Paris Club, as well as World Bank must also be reached, as well as an agreement on the management of these debts.
2003 Urgent implementation of army reform in line with the proposals by the Geneva-based Centre for the Control of Armed Forces.
Continued legislative reform and implementation regarding the police
services, reducing their size and transforming them into a public service under clear internal and external control and accountability, with improved co-ordination 
between these and other state services, adopting the Council of Europe Police Code of Ethics.
Police to be urgently brought into line with Council of Europe standards.
Real progress in alignment with European (EU and Council of Europe) standards, even before Council of Europe accession. Ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Implementation of the new constitutional arrangements in such a way as to provide for the full 
respect and protection of minority rights throughout the country, in line with the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the protection of national 
minorities.
Improved co-operation with ICTY in all regards.
2004 Complete the ongoing electoral law reform (including electorate register) to bring the electoral system up to international standards notably by revising electoral 
laws, in line with the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights recommendations and fully implementing legislation on financing of political 
parties. 
Fulfill all short term obligations arising out of membership of the Council of Europe including uniform effective implementation, throughout the State Union, of 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and European Convention for the Prevention of Torture. 
Adopt law on free access to information, in line with Council of Europe standards. 
Ensure full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
Continue efforts with a view to come to an agreement with commercial creditors (London Club) on debt restructuring. 
2006 Ensure full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Complete the reform of the electoral law reform (including electoral register), in line with the recommendations of the Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights; fully implement legislation on financing of political parties. 
Fulfill all remaining obligations arising out of membership of the Council of Europe. Ensure uniform effective implementation of these obligations, throughout 
the State Union, notably with regard to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture.
Continue to make the necessary adjustments to Serbian trade regime, to render it compatible with the autonomous trade measures, the WTO rules and the future 
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SAA.
2007 Ensure full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Create an IT network for prosecutors at all levels, ensure enforcement of court decisions and further strengthen the capacity to try war crimes domestically in full 
compliance with international obligations to the ICTY.
Fulfill all obligations arising out of membership of the Council of Europe.
Contribute to strengthening regional cooperation, reconciliation and good neighborly relations, including by promoting the transition from the Stability Pact to a 
more regionally owned cooperation framework and effective implementation of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
Adjust the trade regime and relevant legislation to comply with obligations stemming from the WTO, SAA and CEFTA.
Ratify the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.
Continue preparations for accession to the WTO.
2008 Ensure full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Create an IT network for prosecutors at all levels, ensure enforcement of court decisions and further strengthen the capacity to try war crimes domestically in full 
compliance with international obligations to the ICTY.
Fulfill all obligations arising out of membership of the Council of Europe.
Contribute to strengthening regional cooperation, reconciliation and good neighborly relations, including by promoting the transition from the Stability Pact to a 
more regionally owned cooperation framework and effective implementation of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
Adjust the trade regime and relevant legislation to comply with obligations stemming from the WTO, SAA and CEFTA.
Continue preparations for accession to the WTO.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
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19. UNSOLVED ISSUES AND RELATED 
REQUIREMENTS  
What we will consider as “other” political requirements refers to those issues that are not 
part of the democracy promotion, but that still represent an important (in some cases even 
crucial) requirement in the process of integration. These can refer to any area of policy that 
does not concern the political regime directly (but such requirements most commonly concern 
the state’s foreign policy). Here we refer to all those interventions where the EU is seeking to 
use its influence to help countries solve possible disputes with other states, or to push them to 
fulfill their international obligation. These issues usually differ from one country to another, in 
light  of  the  national  particularities.  In  Serbia’s  case,  the  cooperation  with  ICTY and  the 
Kosovo  status  are  of  particular  importance.  In  Macedonia’s  case,  the  name  dispute  with 
Greece is of the highest importance.
There  are  two  theoretical  reasons  for  considering  these  issues  separated  from  the 
democratization  process.  First  of  all,  these  “other  political  issues”  are  not  directly  and 
explicitly linked to the dimensions we identified as those important for assessing the level of 
democracy, so they will not be part of our dependent variable. But this does not mean that 
they are irrelevant for understanding the process of the democratization and EU integrations 
of the country. Rather contrary, with the costs and benefits for the state and single actors 
deriving from the compliance with these requirements, they represent an important dimension 
in the process of international anchoring and might significantly influence both the country’s 
democratization process and its relationship with the EU. In such light, the Serbian example is 
highly important.
Another particularity of these issues is the lower level of the EU’s potential to use the 
socialization as a strategy for promoting these issues. While the EU and its Member States are 
widely accepted as an inspiration for democracy and represent one of the most credible actors 
capable to promote democratic values, the legitimacy of the EU when, for example, dealing 
with the Kosovo issue or the name dispute in Macedonia is far lower. This lack of legitimacy 
to influence what is often perceived as the country’s internal matters significantly diminishes 
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the  EU’s  action  capacity,  as  the  strong  pressure  on  these  issues  can  harm the  relations 
between the EU and the country in question. As a consequence, the use of the conditionality 
in these dimensions is also hampered. This is rather evident in the case of the Kosovo status 
problem and Macedonia’s name dispute, as in no official stances the EU formulated a clear, 
unambiguous recommendation that would express its preference. We can thus read how the 
EU requires Serbia and Macedonia to be “cooperative” on these dimensions, leaving aside 
what the “cooperative” behavior  in a situation of  threatened territorial  integrity  or denied 
national identity actually mean.  In this section we will therefore examine the development of 
these particular issues, reflecting on the impact of the EU engagement in these areas on the 
overall process of anchoring.
19.1. WAR CRIMES AND TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY IN SERBIA
19.1.1. COOPERATION WITH ICTY
The full cooperation with ICTY is one of the most difficult issues in the process of the 
integration of Serbia and, as we will later argue, it is the issue that brought significant costs to 
the process of democratization of Serbia as well. 
Serbia’s obligation on cooperation with ICTY derived both from the FR Yugoslavia (now 
Serbia)’s membership in the UN, as well as from the Dayton peace agreement. No need to 
mention  that  such  cooperation  never  took  place  during  Milošević’s  period.  Even though 
Milošević himself accepted Serbia’s recognition of the tribunal, the regime adopted a negative 
approach towards the ICTY claiming its politicization. It could be heard that the tribunal was 
put in place especially in order to prosecute Serbs and as a mean of political pressures on 
Serbia. The prevalence of Serbian indictees (more than half of the about 160 charges in front 
of ICTY are against Serbs, the other half is distributed among Bosnians, Croats, Macedonians, 
Albanians and a few Montenegrins) was used as an evidence of the tribunal’s politicization and 
anti-Serbism. 
The fall  of  Milošević  brought  the  pro-democratic,  pro-western elite  to  power,  and the 
international pressures for the cooperation with ICTY substantially gained strength as the new 
ruling elite’s foreign policy was oriented towards the full integration of Yugoslavia (and thus 
Serbia  as  well)  into  the  international  community  (membership  in  several  regional  and 
international organizations included). 
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Very soon the new elite was forced to cope with the problem of the ICTY, causing a sharp 
conflict  in  the  country  on  the  matter:  while  the  CoE,  EU,  NATO,  all  the  international 
community  was  pressing  Yugoslavia,  and  in  particular  Serbia,  to  fulfill  its  international 
obligation594, at the same time the indictees, once the key persons of Milošević’s regime, were 
still  controlling  significant  portions  of  power (through the  presence of  the ancient-regime 
supporters  in  the  lines  of  the  judiciary,  police,  administration,  military  etc),  successfully 
avoiding such cooperation and lobbying against the compliance with the IA’s requirements. 
They used their influence to delegitimize the court, mobilize the nationalist rhetorics against 
the international pressures, undermine the pro-western political elite, and mobilized the losers 
of the political and economic transition to gain electoral support and increase their political 
influence. 
The first years of transition were thus characterized mainly by postponing the cooperation, 
by  delaying  the  establishment  of  the  necessary  legislative  framework  and  obstructing  its 
implementation. Some of the indictees even maintained their office, occupying the highest 
positions in the country (the case of the Serbian president Milutinović and the Chief of Staff 
Nebojša  Pavković  are  the  important  ones).  In  2001  the  former  president  Milošević  was 
arrested and charged in front of the Serbian court of abuse of power and corruption, and in 
order to avoid the use of violence and solve a difficult situation that saw the security forces 
involved in defense of Milošević during the arrestment, the new ruling elite gave Milošević the 
guarantee that no extradition to Hague would take place595.
A few months after his arrestment, Milošević was transferred to Hague, on the secret order 
of Serbia’s  Prime Minister Đinđić,  a decision that would bring to the dissolution of DOS 
coalition.  The  Yugoslav  president  Kostunica,  known  for  his  “soft,  negotiated-transition 
legalistic approach” was not even informed of the transfer596. The transfer caused the fall of 
the federal government and the crisis of the institutions of the state union, as, on the federal 
level, the opponents of ICTY enjoyed a substantial support, both due to Koštunica’s role as 
594 On the international pressures on Serbia to cooperate with ICTY see Begović ad Đilas, 2005. 
595 The negotiations on Milošević’s arrestment were undertaken by Čedomir Jovanović, at time the vice-prime 
minister of the government of Serbia and one of the leaders of DOS. In the interview with B92, Jovanović 
revealed  the  details  about  Milošević’s  arrestment  and  the  negotiations.  See: 
http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&nav_id=166741.
596 Among the  causes  that  brought  DOS to  the  end,  Goati  mentions:  Kostunica’s  malcontent  with  the 
division of the power that saw him controlling fewer functions in the republican government even though he 
enjoyed large support from the electorate, the discrepancy of the vision of transition and in particular on the 
issues of the ICTY and decentralization. The extradition of Milošević was a direct cause that brought to this 
conflict to burst. See Goati, 2006.
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the president,  as well  as  due to the pro-socialist,  pro-regime,  pro-Yugoslavia  Montenegrin 
coalitional partner (SNP)597. 
The  international  community  continued  exercising  pressures  for  the  cooperation, 
normative as well as financial, with ICTY, which created inner conflicts as the new ruling elite 
was eager to ensure the integration into the international community, while the strength of the 
ancient regime forces and their activities  were significantly  increasing the political  costs of 
compliance.  The centrifugal dynamics of the international  and domestic pressures resulted 
first in the breaking of the DOS ruling coalition and the conflict between the two strongest 
parties and two most important leaders, Đinđić and Koštunica. Such break, combined with 
the  political  struggle  it  produced,  was  condemned  by  the  Serbian  electorate,  traditionally 
considered too much sensitive to the conflict within the “democratic block” (see Goati, 2002). 
The  result  was  the  loss  of  the  electoral  support,  the  growth  in  the  political  apathy  and 
abstinence,  and,  consequently,  the  increase  of  the  relative  strength  of  the  ancient  regime 
forces (see Mihajlović, 2002; Goati 2002; Golubović, 2003). At the same time, the difficult 
financial situation deriving from the economic transition and “shock” approach adopted by 
Đinđić (see Goati, 2002), combined with the too high, almost unrealistic expectations from 
transition (Mihajlović, 2002), brought disappointment in the democratic parties. The ancient 
regime supporters used the moment to seize support through a two-fold tactic: changing the 
demagogy from communist/socialistic to nationalistic rhetorics598, and re-opening the national 
question,  this  time  pointed  against  the  international  community,  accused  for  its  hostility 
against  Serbia.  The following  arguments  were  used to  support  the  thesis  of  the  Western 
hostility  towards  Serbia:  the  IC’s  approach to the  war  in  Croatia  and Bosnia  (support  to 
Bosnians and Croats),  the IC’s  approach to the war in Kosovo (support  to the  Albanian 
minority),  NATO intervention in Serbia 1999, the “de-nationalization” of Serbian property 
through the process of privatization where the foreign investors were accused for actually 
destroying  the  Serbian economy and are  accused to be  a  cause of  the difficult  economic 
597 On the conflict Koštunica – Đinđić during Milošević’s arrest and extradition, see the interview of B92 with 
Čedomir Jovanović, at the time the vice-prime minister of the government of Serbia and one of the leaders of 
DOS, available at: http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&nav_id=166741. 
598 Here we shall underline that while Milošević’s regime did use nationalism to strengthen the executive and 
remain in power, however, its basis of legitimization have never become clearly nationalistic. The regime, among 
other things, lost its power also because it lost the votes of the ultra-nationalists, who accused the regime of not 
protecting the Serbian national interests, for withdrawing from Croatia, for withdrawing the army from Kosovo 
and settling the peace agreement with NATO. That the ancient, “socialist” regime opted for nationalism as the 
new rhetorics is reflected in Milošević’s support to the SRS’ president Šešelj on the 2003 presidential elections, 
and it was also revealed in the analysis of the voting behavior that showed that both SRS and DSS have attracted 
SPS voters (Mihajlović, Goati,). 
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situation, and, finally, the pressures to cooperate with ICTY, a politicized tribunal settled up to 
prosecute Serbia599. The delegitimization of the international institutions and community was 
an  answer  to  the  international  community’s  (unsuccessful)  attempt  to  delegitimize  the 
“national heroes and patriots”. 
The support of the security sector given to these parties was further complicating the issue 
by opening a constant treat of escalation of violence in case of more decisive measures. When, 
after transferring Milošević, two members of the units for special tasks (JSO) were transferred 
to The Hague, the unit’s armed protest made the limits of the new democratic power clear. 
Officially,  the  unit  was  protesting  against  the  “unlawful”  transfer  of  indictees  and  was 
requesting  the  adoption  of  a  law  that  would  regulate  the  matter.  Actually,  the  unit  was 
requesting the amnesty for its members, and further obstructing the process600. 
The Law on Cooperation with ICTY was declared to be the necessary condition in order to 
transfer  the  indictees,  as  the  federal  constitution appeared not  to allow the extradition of 
Serbian citizens601.  Such legislation was to be adopted on the federal level  in the assembly 
where the distribution of forces respected both the republics’ inner conflict and the conflict 
between the constitutive nations. The particularity of the situation was represented by the fact 
that the Montenegrin pro-western parties were at the same time the independence-seeking, 
anti-Yugoslavia Đukanović’s party that, in sign of protest against the “Serbian control over 
Montenegro”, withdrew its deputies from the federal assembly. The federal government was 
thus  composed  of  the  Serbian  DOS  (DSS  included)  and  a  pro-socialist,  pro-Yugoslavia 
Bulatović’s SNP, known for its support to Milošević. The opposition to the ICTY thus almost 
enjoyed  the  veto  power  on  the  federal  level,  where  Koštunica’s insistence  on  the  solid 
constitutional basis for compliance was combined with the obstruction of the rule adoption 
and change of status quo602. 
The law was finally adopted in 2002, on the pressures of the international community, and 
in an effort of fake compliance in order to avoid serious financial consequences. Not only the 
US aid, but also 15.000.000 USD World Bank credit to Yugoslavia were said to be unblocked 
by such rule adoption. The law represented a clear case of fake compliance and was a product 
599 See “Velika Srbija”, journal of the Serbian Radical Party.
600 On the protest of the JSO and negotiations of the government with the paramilitary unit, see the interview 
of B92 with Čedomir Jovanović, at time the vice-prime minister of the government of Serbia and one of the 
leaders of DOS, available at:
        http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&nav_id=166741  .
601 For Kostunica’s argumentation on the necessity of such law, see 
        http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2002&mm=04&dd=02&nav_id=57788  . 
602 See  http://www.b92.net/info/emisije/insajder.php?yyyy=2005&mm=04&nav_id=166741. 
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of complicated three-level negotiations (in Serbia, in Montenegro, and then on federal level). 
The Montenegrin SNP even conditioned their support for the law with Đukanović’s support 
for the union with Serbia603. On the federal level, the SNP required that the provision limiting 
cooperation only to the already indicted is included, while the DSS asked for the “formation 
on the federal level of a national council controlling the ICTY access to the state archives, in 
order to defend the national sovereignty and dignity”. The law was finally adopted, with only 
limited  effects  being  produced,  while  the  international  pressures  for  compliance  were 
constantly growing. 
The  first  period  in  which  the  government  was  balancing  between  the  international 
community and domestic pressures ended with the death of the Prime Minister Đinđić, the 
ancient regime and ICTY indictees being accused for both his assassination and the political 
background of the murder604. In 2003, the state of emergency was used by DOS to change the 
legislation and transfer some of the indictees. Yet, it was again due to the strong international 
pressures and conditionality linked with the financial assistance. In the second half of 2003, 
new charges were published against some of the high-rank officials that resulted in the open 
refusal to comply from the authorities. 
The parliamentary elections in 2003 saw the change in favour of both the nationalists (SRS) 
and the “soft” nationalists (DSS). The formed government was composed of forces interested 
in avoiding the cooperation with the ICTY as much as possible, leaving the issue out from the 
list of the government’s priority. The support of the socialists to the minority government was 
a clear sign of the new approach based on the negotiation with the ancient regime and the 
compliance  that  took  place  was  a  product  of  the  strong  international  pressures,  mainly 
financial, but also normative, as, in that period, the parties that entered the coalition embraced 
the EU integrations  at  least  as  an officially  proclaimed goal605.  The approach to the  issue 
changed. Instead of the internal conflict between change agents and veto players present in 
the  government,  one  pushing  for  full  compliance,  the  other  towards  non-compliance, 
Koštunica’s government  adopted  the  approach  of  the  voluntary  transfers  based  on  the 
negotiations with the ancient regime forces. The indictees no longer were war criminals of the 
“ancient regime”, but citizens who, being accused in front of the international tribunal, were 
called to surrender as patriots and, in exchange, they would be given the state’s protection, 
603 Interview with Bulatović, Vjesti, 03/06/2002.
604 See for example Gow, 2005.
605 See Gow, 2005. See Helsinki Report for Serbia, 2005.
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guarantees  and  assistance.  The  state  was  producing  incentives  both  in  the  protection  of 
property and care for the family members, and it offered guarantees, financial and technical 
assistance for all those indictees that decided to surrender to the tribunal. The result came 
with relatively positive reports of the ICTY on cooperation as a product of the “voluntary 
surrender” approach, but, as time passed and the approach reached its limits, the international 
pressures re-emerged. 
The ICTY prosecutor continued accusing Serbia for hiding the “most wanted”, Karadžić 
and  Mladić,  while  Serbian  authorities  were  trying  everything  possible  to  avoid  the 
responsibility by underlining that the government was doing “everything possible” in order to 
ensure full cooperation with ICTY. 
The international pressure for Karadžić and Mladić’s surrender was constantly growing, 
and the EU settled the deadline in several occasions, after which the EU would suspend the 
negotiations with the State Union. Belgrade was delaying the compliance as long as possible, 
first by designing the “national strategy”, then through the rule adoption and IAC developing, 
promising and requiring further time. Finally, in May 2006, the EU fulfilled its threat and the 
SAA negotiations were suspended due to the lack of cooperation with ICTY. This brought to 
the crisis  of Koštunica’s  government,  and,  according to some authors,  it  also significantly 
influenced  the  independence  referendum in  Montenegro  and the  constitutional  reform in 
Serbia. Indeed, the referendum on the independence of Montenegro (a rather delicate issue 
seen the inner conflict between the forces requiring independence and those supportive for 
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro) was settled for May 2006, and the EU integrations 
were one of the important arguments the supporters of independence used for advocating the 
secession. 
In 2007 we register another important shift in the trend, this time due to the change of the 
international actors’ approach. Seen the political crisis in the first half of 2007, the threat of 
the  creation  of  an  anti-western  government,  the  growing  nationalism  and  the  crisis  over 
Kosovo’s final status, the EU significantly diminished the importance associated to the ICTY 
issue, and re-opened the negotiations even though the surrender of Karadžić and Mladić did 
not take place. The SAA and cooperation with ICTY were surely “goods exchanged” between 
the domestic elite and the EU during the political crisis over the government formation and 
EU’s  unofficial  pressures  for  keeping  nationalists  out  of  the  game.  The new government 
included  the  cooperation  with  ICTY  among  its  priorities,  a  few  days  after  some  of  the 
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fugitives were arrested and transferred, and the SAA negotiations were re-opened. It was clear 
that the EU decided to neglect the ICTY and “consider Serbia’s efforts as sufficient” from the 
dissatisfaciton  of  the  ICTY’s  prosecutor’  Del  Ponte  with  the  re-opening,  and  later  the 
signature, of the SAA agreement between Serbia and the EU. However, on the insistence of 
the Netherlands, full compliance continued to be the key requirement for Serbia: the SAA, 
even  though  ratified,  is  still  not  implemented,  waiting  for  Serbia  to  fulfill  its  obligations 
towards ICTY. This brought to the arrestment of Karadžić in summer 2008, but still was not 
enough to open the door for the Serbian integration,  as Mladić is still  free and the ICTY 
claims that he is hiding in Serbia.  
19.1.2. THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY  ON THE SERBIAN PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
What was then the impact of the ICTY on the Serbian democratization and its relations 
with Brussels?
The  Serbian  obligation  to  cooperate  with  the  ICTY  had  a  particular  effect  on  the 
distribution of the costs and benefits in the democratization and boundary removal process. 
Concerning the old-regime elite, the necessity to cooperate with the ICTY increased the costs 
of the regime change. In the first place, this elite’s interest in the field of the Serbian foreign 
policy  was determined  by the  Western insistence  on the  extradition  of  the  indictees.  The 
foreign policy oriented towards the west became unacceptable for the old elite exponents, 
fearing  not  only  the  loss  of  power  and  influence,  but  even  the  loss  of  freedom  and 
condemnation for the rest of their lives. Indirectly,  this also increased their costs from the 
democratization process,  as democratization meant a potential  shift  in the external  policy. 
According to some authors, the main preoccupation of Milošević in 1999 – 2000 and the 
increase  of  the  oppression  he used in  maintaining  the  regime derived  precisely  from the 
concerns related to the ICTY: for Milošević the loss of power also meant the loss of freedom, 
and this sealed his struggle to maintain the regime at any cost606
606 Goati  thus argues:  “The electoral  debacle  of  Milošević  at  the presidential  elections and the SPS-JUL 
coalition at the federal elections first of all caused a shock-wave amongst the leadership of the ruling order and 
then, quite expectedly, desperate attempts, which lasted from the 25th September to the 5th October 2000, to 
cover up Milošević’s defeat. We say “quite expectedly”, as the people at the head of Serbia’s authoritarian order 
had become so deeply steeped in violence that the loss of power inevitably meant facing criminal and civil legal 
charges. On top of all that, the International Tribunal in The Hague had brought charges against Milošević and 
his  closest  associates  in  May 1999,  and the  defeat at  the elections meant their  probable  extradition to  that 
Tribunal” (Goati, 2001, p. 55).
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The  insistence  on  the  cooperation  with  the  ICTY  made  it  impossible  for  Serbia  to 
undertake  a  path  of  negotiated  transition  to  democracy,  a  path  that  in  the  politological 
literature is  considered the safest way for the newly established democratic regimes in the 
context where the old forces maintain a certain influence607. In Serbia’s case the international 
actor, by requiring the prosecution of the ancient regime elite for the war crimes, intervened 
with  what  at  the  beginning  was  supposed  to  be  the  negotiated  process.  In  front  of  the 
international  pressure backed by strong financial  conditionality,  the domestic pro-reformist 
forces did not have any choice. 
The conflict between Đinđić and Koštunica, and, more generally, the conflict between two 
types of transition (continuity vs. discontinuity), was brought onto the agenda sooner than it 
was  recommendable.  This  is  not  to  say  that  DOS coalition  would  have  survived,  as  the 
animosities between the two leaders and the differences between their visions were already 
present608.  But  the  external  insistence  on  what  was  the  most  conflictive  issue  of  Serbian 
transition brought the problem onto the agenda in a particularly sensitive moment. In 2001, 
Serbia had a series of reforms ahead, and the pressure to deal with its past and justice brought 
to the conflict  that resulted in the stagnation of the reforms we described in the previous 
chapters (see in particular the reform of the judiciary and the security sector, two fields most 
influenced by the issue).  
The international insistence in promoting the cooperation with the ICTY not only brought 
to the conflict  in the line of the democratic  forces,  but also indirectly  brought to the re-
awaking  of the nationalistic  rhetorics609.  In their  effort to shift  Serbia’s  foreign policy and 
diminish the external pressure for the extradition, the “anti-Hague lobby”, as it was called, 
seizing the wave opened by the conflict in DOS, used the still open problem of the Kosovo 
status (see next section) for delegitimizing the international community. They succeeded in 
attracting the support of the losers of the transition, increasing the electoral strength. This 
brought to the re-emergence of the strong anti-EU block on the extreme right of the political 
spectrum,  increasing  the  level  of  polarization  of  the  party  system  and  significantly 
strengthening the central actor: Koštunica’s DSS. The strengthening of the anti-EU forces, 
607 See Linz and Stepan, 1996.
608 As Jovanović said, already in the evening of the 5th October it was clear the discrepancy of their visions 
was obvious.
609 As Begović and Đilas underline, “the continuous requirements of the ICTY, the radical rhetorics of the 
ICTY officials and its un-functionality brought to the strengthening of those Serbian political forces that were 
against the international integration of Serbia” (Begović and Đilas, p.338, translated by the author). On the ICTY 
and its inefficiency as one of the factors that brought to the rise of the nationalists, see also Gow, 2005.
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combined  with  the  EU  strategy  of  influencing  the  domestic  distribution  of  power  and 
delegitimization of the nationalists, not only sealed Koštunica’s central position towards the 
other domestic political actors, but, as we will see in the next section and as we will argue in 
the  conclusive  chapter,  it  also  strengthened  Koštunica’s  bargaining  power  towards  the 
international community. It also created the structural incentive for Koštunica to “flirt” with 
the  nationalistic  powers,  forced  to  move  always  closer  to  them  in  order  to  make  his 
nationalistic orientation more credible. The gradual increase of Koštunica’s nationalism, that 
can be followed in the analysis of his speeches, represented a logical strategy in a setting where 
the combination of domestic and external factors created a structure of opportunity that made 
nationalism the most remunerative option for his maintenance on power. 
19.1.3. THE KOSOVO ISSUE: DEVELOPMENTS
Since NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, which ended with the UNSC resolution 
1244, the south-eastern Serbian province was under KFOR’s control and the administration 
of  UNMiK.  Both  Serbian  as  well  as  Kosovo  Albanian’s  respect  for  the  resolution  and 
cooperation with UNMiK and KFOR forces was a crucial condition for the stability in the 
whole Balkan region. Among the political requirements to FR Yugoslavia, and later to the 
State Union and to Serbia, the EU included the respect of the resolution and cooperation with 
UNMiK,  requiring  the  “constructive  approach  to  settling  the  question  of  Kosovo’s  final 
status”. Being Kosovo’s status a very delicate question involving the international norms on 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, and being left open and unresolved in the resolution 1244, 
in the first years the EU opted to require the implementation of the existing instruments, 
dismantling the Serbian parallel institutions in the province and requiring the Serbian support 
for the Kosovo Serbs recognition and participation to the Kosovo institution. The Serbian 
elite opted to underline the sovereignty and territorial principle, deciding not to comply with 
those  requirements  that  were  perceived  as  “contributing  to  Kosovo’s  independence”.  In 
practice this meant that the parallel institutions in the Serbian municipalities were maintained, 
calling on the incapacity of UNMiK and Kosovo government to protect Serbian and non-
Albanian population, while, at the same time, Belgrade was also supporting the Kosovo Serbs’ 
boycott  of  Kosovo’s  political  institutions,  applying  tactics  similar  to  those  used  by  the 
Albanians towards the Serbian institutions in the period prior to the armed conflict,  1990-
1997. 
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By the end of 2003, under the mediation of the international community, Belgrade and 
Priština  started  the  negotiations  over  the  technical  issues  (judiciary,  police,  education, 
dismissed persons, political prisoners), leaving the final status to be settled only after a stable, 
multi-ethnic democratic regime was established in Kosovo. In March 2004 the escalation of 
violence made the international actors change their position: the incapacity of the KFOR and 
UNMiK to avoid the violence made it clear to all the key actors in the process and to the 
members  of  the  Contact  Group610 that  Kosovo’s  peace  and  stability  were  still  far  away, 
inducing  them  to  propose  the  acceleration  of  the  solution  of  the  problem.  The  UN 
commission report, issued in October 2005, recommended that the status negotiations shall 
begin, and in the preparation for negotiations the Contact Group issued the guiding principles 
in November 2005, underlining that the return to the situation prior to 1999, the change of 
the borders and the unification of Kosovo with third states (Albania) were not possible. The 
negotiations started in the beginning of 2006, led by the UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti 
Ahtisaari.  After  (unsuccessful)  cycles  of  negotiations,  Ahtisaari  was supposed to bring  the 
proposal for the solution of the final status in front of the UNSC. The plan was supposed to 
be exposed by the end of 2006, but was delayed for “after the end of Serbia’s parliamentary 
elections”, called for as part of the constitutional reform (undertaken in September 2006) and 
scheduled for the 21.01.2007. The plan was delivered in February 2007, and was refused by 
Belgrade  who  argued  that  the  plan  prescribed  the  de-facto  independence  of  Kosovo, 
undermined Serbian sovereignty  and territorial  integrity  and as  such was unacceptable  for 
Serbian authorities.  The Serbian government required another round of negotiations and a 
solution within the limits of the UNSCR 1244. The USA and part of the UNSC members 
prepared to vote the Ahtisaari plan and decide on the final status by giving an interpretation to 
the resolution 1244 that would allow the status solution  without  the need to adopt the new 
resolution, but the Russian veto in the UNSC blocked the process. The support provided by 
Russia in the matter was a core basis of the Serbian hard-line approach to the issue. A new 
round of negotiations were opened, with a three-month period, and were concluded without 
any significant improvements, as both parts involved in the process remained firm on their 
positions.  The  end  of  the  three-month  period,  on  10.12.2007,  saw  the  negotiation  parts 
incapable  of  finding  the  solution.  In  the  end of  2007,  statements  were  coming  from the 
610 Contact group for Balkans is composed by UK, USA, Russia, Italy, France and Germany, formed as an 
informal grouping of those countries that have a significant interest  in policy developments in Balkans in a 
response to the war and crisis in Bosnia. 
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Albanian leaders in Kosovo that if the solution was not to be found until December the 10th, 
Kosovo would declare independence, an act that, according to the media from Priština, the 
USA, EU and NATO would support by immediately recognizing the independent Kosovo. 
This threat became a reality in February 2009, “safely” postponed after Serbian presidential 
elections,  when  on  February  the  17th Kosovo  declared  the  independence,  immediately 
recognized by the USA, and followed by the recognition by many other states, included most 
of the EUMS. 
The official recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the European Union was blocked by 
the veto of some Member States (namely Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Cyprus and Greece). This 
resulted in the difficulty for the EU to adopt a single foreign policy and common position on 
the issue. However, these countries did not block the EU’s decision on the employment of a 
non-military 2,000-member Rule of Law mission, "EULEX,", whose main goal was to help 
Kosovo develop its police and justice sector.
The independence of Kosovo and the recognition that arrived from many countries caused 
the fierce reaction of Serbia. In line with the National Strategy for Kosovo, Serbia withdrew 
its ambassadors from all  countries that recognized Kosovo. The conflict  within the ruling 
coalition,  between Koštunica  (Prime Minister)  and Tadić  (president)  over  Serbia’s  foreign 
policy in this new asset, brought to the fall of the government, new parliamentary elections 
and political crisis that lasted until summer 2008 when a new government was formed. The 
EU integrations and relationships between Serbia and EU were seriously hampered by this 
issue, as in Serbia the further EU integrations were perceived by some actors (particularly 
Koštunica’s  DSS  and  SRS)  as  a  Serbian  acceptance  of  the  Kosovo’s  independence.  The 
signature and then ratification of the SAA were blocked, as Koštunica, who was then Prime 
Minister, claimed that SAA, as it refers only to Serbia without Kosovo, is directly attacking 
Serbia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The pro-European forces on their turn claimed 
that  as  SAA  mentions  the  UNSCR  1244,  its  signature  would  actually  reinforce  Serbia’s 
position on the Kosovo issue, as it re-affirms the EU’s acceptance of the UN resolution in 
which the independence of Kosovo is categorically excluded. 
Kosovo and the question of Serbian foreign relations and EU integrations with which it is 
related, brought to the further polarization of the Serbian scene. The elections that took place 
in 2008 (presidential in January/February and parliamentary in May 2008) took the shape of 
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“quasi-referendum”  for  the  “future  of  Serbia”,  marked  by  the  significantly  increased 
turnout611.  After  the  formation of  the new government  in  summer 2008,  the  government 
initiated a “softer” approach in the foreign policy, still underlining, however, that Kosovo’s 
independence is unacceptable for Serbia and trying diplomatic links in order to defend Serbia’s 
position. The SAA was ratified, both EU integrations and the Kosovo issue being among the 
government’s  primary  goals.  In  October  Serbia  required the  UN to ask the  International 
Court of Justice’s opinion on Kosovo’s independence, a decision adopted by the UN with 76 
votes for, 6 against and 74 abstained. The decision of the UN opened a new period in Serbia’s 
foreign  policy:  any  decision  is  postponed  for  “after  the  sentence”  from the  UN,  as  the 
“official plan” is to seek the re-opening of the negotiations once the ICJ sentence declares 
Kosovo’s independence unlawful. The UN decision also served as a strong argument in front 
of  the  Serbian  electorate,  which  gives  the  decision  makers  the  image  of  “those  who 
successfully play the game on the international scene to defend Serbia’s interests in Kosovo”. 
It also justified Serbia’s approach towards those countries that recognized Kosovo after this 
decision of  the UN: Serbia  banned the ambassadors of  Macedonia and Montenegro after 
these two countries, Montenegro under the USA pressures, and Macedonia due to the internal 
pressures  coming  from the  ethnic  Albanians,  recognized  Kosovo’s  independence  in  mid-
October 2008. 
19.1.4. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO ISSUE
The Kosovo issue significantly shaped Serbia’s both internal and external politics. We have 
already underlined above how the pressures to cooperate with ICTY increased the costs for 
the  ancient  regime  supporters  that,  in  order  to  avoid  the  trials,  opted  to  advocate  an 
alternative path in the foreign policy. They used the conflictive relationship between Serbia 
and  Western  democracies  in  the  '90s  and  particularly  the  Kosovo  issue  to  channel  the 
dissatisfaction  of  the  population  in  the  re-awakening  of  the  nationalist  rhetorics.  The re-
awakening of nationalism served a series of goals: it mobilized consensus behind which the 
ancient regime and the losers of the possible EU integration rejoined in order to protect their 
interests; it was used by the government to strengthen the executive, to switch the public’s 
attention from the economic issues and to mobilize consensus and fight back the opposition 
611 For the second round of the presidential elections 2008, in which two candidates representative for two 
distinct visions of Serbian future ran for the office, the turnout was 68%, the highest ever reached in Serbia. The 
competition between the same two candidates (Nikolić vs.  Tadić), for the same position of the president of 
Serbia, in the second round of the presidential elections 2004, where the political alienation was very similar, 
succeeded to attract to the pools only 48% of the Serbian electorate.
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(here we recall the adoption of the new constitution and the violence on the media, NGO and 
political opponents, particularly in the last two years, see the sections on constitutional reform, 
civil sector and media). On their side, the re-awakening of nationalism was particularly useful 
in the field of foreign relations, where the strengthening of the ultra-nationalist party was used 
to  strengthen  the  bargaining  position  of  the  so-called  “pro-European”  elite,  and,  more 
generally,  to  decrease  the  vulnerability  of  Serbia  towards  the  western  influence.  The 
nationalism and the “treat of ultra-nationalists gaining power” was used in several occasions to 
postpone the negotiations on Kosovo’s status by scheduling the elections/referendums in a 
manner  to  force  the  international  community,  fearing  the  electoral  results  and  ulterior 
strengthening  of  nationalists,  to  postpone  the  decisions  for  the  period  after  the  electoral 
competition. We can thus observe how all “important” moments in Kosovo’s status settling 
were scheduled and then postponed by the Serbian electoral competitions: the beginning of 
negotiations  on  “technical  issues”,  postponed  for  after  the  parliamentary  elections  in 
December 2003, the exposition of the Arthisaari’s plan for Kosovo, re-scheduled for after the 
2006 parliamentary elections, and finally the date for independence was postponed until the 
end of the presidential elections on February the 3rd612. Finally, nationalism was also used, in a 
strategy Putham well describes as the two-level game, to obtain a more favourable treatment: 
in the beginning of 2008 Serbia was offered the signature of the SAA and “quicker integration 
into the EU”. 
The tactics used by Serbia’s political  elite in approaching the problem of the Kosovo’s 
status  (hard-line,  use  of  internal  instability  to  increase  the  negotiation  potentials),  beside 
resulting in a defeat613,  also brought to significant internal costs. The intensification of the 
negotiation over the Kosovo’s issue and the usage of the nationalist rhetorics caused a general 
increase in the temperature and consequent re-definition  of  the priorities  of  some actors. 
Thus,  Koštunica’s  DSS  changed  the  party  line  towards  a  more  “patriotic”  one,  which 
subsequently caused Tadić’s DS to slightly moderate his “pro-European” approach changing 
the position in order to make his party acceptable to Koštunica in 2007. The polarization of 
612 http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/12/europe/EU-POL-Serbia-Elections.php.
613 Serbia’s foreign policy in defending its territorial integrity should be considered a complete defeat for 
several reasons:  1) Serbia did not succeed in making its own solutions adopted 2) Serbia did not succeed in 
getting  support  from  the  relevant  international  actors  who  decided  to  support  Kosovo  instead  3)  most 
importantly,  while  it  increased  its  bargaining  power  in  the  short  run,  Serbia  did  not  use  its  advantage  for 
obtaining other goals: like for requiring better protection for the Serbs living in Kosovo, settling the economic 
questions and property issues with Kosovo, or improving its international position. With its hard-line approach 
and  the  nationalistic  rhetorics,  Serbia  lost  the  opportunity  to  minimize  the  losses  deriving  from Kosovo’s 
independence which appeared inevitable already in the second half of 2007.
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politics became evident, as such re-structuring of the preferences saw the emergence of a new 
force on the “pro-western, pro-democratic” extreme of the party system in 2006-2007, being a 
clear  sign  of  the  polarization  of  Serbian  society  and  centrifugal  tendencies  in  force.  The 
growing violence, directed against ethnic and sexual minorities, as well as against the political 
parties, media and political leaders advocating the protection of minority rights, are one of the 
consequences. 
This high ethnic tensions in the country are particularly dangerous considering that, beside 
Kosovo, Vojvodina’s status is still not settled. Being, as Kosovo, an ethnically heterogeneous 
region,  and  claiming  the  autonomy  enjoyed  before  the  '90s  already  since  2000,  once  the 
Kosovo’s  status  is  settled,  Vojvodina  might  drive  an  even  stronger  pressure  for  greater 
autonomy and the re-examination of its political status614. Such requirements, seen the current 
intensification of the ethnic conflict, might be both intensified by, as well as become a source 
of,  the  further  radicalization  of  nationalism.  It  would  require  considerable  wisdom  and 
experience  to  solve  Vojvodina’s  status  problem,  especially  after  such period  of  top-down 
ethnic manipulation and radicalization. 
Another cost of this tactics lies in the credibility of the political actors. The stakes in the 
game have  been  set  so  high,  that  it  becomes  impossible  for  any  Serbian  party  leader  to 
recognize the independence of Kosovo without losing their credibility. Rather similar is the 
problem of Serbia’s integration into the EU: as many EU officials underlined (yet, the official 
standing  of  the  EU  on  Kosovo  is  still  pending),  while  the  recognition  of  Kosovo’s 
independence is not a condition for Serbia’s integration into the EU, the “good relations with 
the neighbouring countries” are. It was already a difficult process for Serbia to accept the EU 
mission in Kosovo, EULEX, considered illegal by the Serbian authorities, but on which the 
EU adopted the position that  it  could not  be  negotiated.  The position  of  the incumbent 
Serbian  political  elite  is  to  keep  the  question  of  the  EU integration  separated  from the 
question over the Kosovo’s issue. As far as it succeeds in doing so, Serbia’s integration into 
the  EU  has  some  chance.  But  should  Kosovo  become  a  condition  for  Serbian  EU 
membership, the costs the compliance with such requirement would produce for the Serbian 
ruling elite (indifferently from which party holds the office) would be very difficult to handle, 
risking a new blockage of the process of integration.
614 For the dynamics and chain reactions caused by the secession of one part of the country see Bunce, 1999, 
2005, 2006.
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As far as the further democratization of Serbia is concerned, here we recall the well-known 
negative  correlation  between  the  nationalization  policies  and  the  democracy  building:  the 
radicalization of the ethnic sentiments surely is not a positive atmosphere for the process of 
democratization, a rule confirmed in Serbia’s case by the data on the growing violation of the 
human rights in the last two years. The claim in front of the ICJ and the unsolved problem of 
Kosovo’s status keep the question over the polity in Serbia still open, thus representing on 
one side an obstacle to the democratization, and on the other a potential source for the future 
radicalization of nationalism.
Before  closing,  we should  ponder  on  the  impact  that  Kosovo’s  independence  had  on 
Serbia’s party system. The unilateral proclamation of Kosovo and the recognition by most of 
the EU Member States represented an external shock that brought to the further polarization 
in Serbia, the emptying of the center and the concentration on two blocks, pro-EU and hard-
line nationalists. The electoral defeat Kostunica suffered in 2008 and the increase of the vote 
share  that  went  to  those  parties  representing  the  poles  of  the  system  clearly  show  this 
tendency. The result of the 2008 parliamentary elections brought Milošević’s SPS to the center 
of attention as the only party acceptable as a partner both by nationalists and pro-Europeans. 
The  negotiations  started,  the  influence  of  the  EU  appearing  rather  important  seen  the 
frequent consultations of the SPS leadership with different international actors. After a few 
months, the party succeeded to model its own ideology in a manner to justify the coalition 
with the DS on the grounds of its socio-economic policy. As far as the question of Kosovo 
and EU integration is concerned, the ruling elite successfully argued that the two problems are 
separated, underlining that it is possible to be both patriot and pro-European, and that the EU 
integrations could be, rather than an obstacle, a mean in Serbia’s struggle for its territorial 
integrity. 
As the European future of Serbia became more certain with the ratification of the SAA, 
part of the nationalists re-defined their own positions on the EU integration. Guided by the 
leader of the SRS, Nikolić, part of the nationalists exited the party due to the inner conflict 
over the EU. It is still soon to say what influence such decision of Nikolić had. Surely, seen 
the latest shifts and the EU influence on the internal distribution of power, and, in particular, 
seen the rehabilitation and re-legitimization Milošević’s SPS gained due to its participation in 
the pro-European government,  Nikolić’s  pragmatic considerations  induced him to seek to 
move his faction from the extreme right to the far more remunerative position of the center-
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right. After several years of opposition to the EU and the “irresponsible” opposition that saw 
him losing power despite the size of electoral support he enjoyed, induced by the external 
shocks that brought to big shifts in the party system, he embraced a more pragmatic, power-
oriented strategy. Covering what previously was the position held by Koštunica (pro-EU but 
with respect for Serbia’s national pride), he gained the legitimacy of the EU (previously closed 
for the SRS, several western ambassadors made contact with the new Nikolić’s party). This 
also  limited  the  room  for  strategic  movements  of  the  DS  which,  in  the  period  March-
September 2008, was gaining a disproportional strong influence. The party system still remains 
polarized in the dimension of the foreign policy (with the remaining SRS and DSS on one 
extreme and LDP on the other), but the actors at the center changed, as well as the strength 
of one of the extremes. The pro-European option gained more support,  while the present 
situation is characterized by an extremely high level of electoral uncertainty for all political 
parties. As we identified the peripheral turnover and high electoral certainty for some actors 
(like  Koštunica)  as  a  main  obstacle  in  the  process  of  the  democratization  in  Serbia,  this 
moment might appear crucial for the further developments of Serbian democracy.
19.2. MACEDONIA: THE NAME DISPUTE
19.2.1. THE CONTESTED IDENTITY
One of the most salient issues of Macedonia’s foreign policy concerns its struggle to gain 
recognition under its constitutional name (Republic of Macedonia). The importance of settling 
the name dispute with Greece is many-fold. First of all, the lack of international recognition 
under  the  constitutional  name  is  a  source  of  stress  in  the  nation-state  building  process, 
keeping the  nation-building  policies  high on the  agenda and this  way contributing  to the 
alimentation of the nationalism in the country615.  
Secondly,  the  name  dispute  with  Greece  has  obstructed,  and  still  does,  Macedonia’s 
integration into the various international organizations. Macedonia’s membership in UN, IMF, 
WB, WTO, and more recently in NATO have all been blocked by Greece which was seeking 
to use its international influence to force the Macedonian authorities to change their position. 
The consequences are many fold.
615 On the inner tension between the nation-building process and the democratic principles, see Goio, 2007. 
On the difficulties the nation-building process creates for democratization, see Linz and Stepan 1996.
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On the level of the foreign policy, the country is much more vulnerable towards the other 
states whose recognition it  is  seeking for.  Concentrated on the name-issue, the bargaining 
power of the Macedonian diplomacy in other fields is decreased. Further on, it also makes the 
country more vulnerable  to the influence of the IO in which the country is,  or  wants  to 
become,  a  member.  The  threat  of  Greece  lobbying  or  even  veto  against  Macedonia’s 
candidacy  increases  the  country’s  incentive  to  comply  with  the  membership  norms  and 
accession criteria.  The illustrations for this point can be found in Macedonia’s compliance 
with the UN embargo to Serbia which brought enormous costs to the country’s economy 
strongly  dependent  on  trade  with  the  northern  neighbour616,  or  in  its  overly  praised 
compliance with the NATO pre-accession conditionality. And yet, even though declared to be 
the country that  among the three candidates  for the last NATO enlargement showed the 
quickest and highest level of compliance, Macedonia’s membership is still blocked by Greece’s 
veto. 
Further  on,  the  blockage  of  the  country’s  international  recognition  and  the  Greek 
obstruction to the country’s membership in the international organizations had an important 
impact on the domestic events. As we saw in the section on the economic reform, the delay of 
the membership in the international financial institutions influenced the early periods of the 
country’s economic transition, while the Greek embargo (1994-1995) brought significant costs 
to the Macedonian economy.
Last, but not least, the persisting of the name dispute with Greece that successfully blocked 
Macedonia’s much longed for membership in NATO and that raised concerns over Greece’s 
reaction to the future EU membership of Macedonia might further complicate the already 
fragile inter-ethnic relations. As our analysis of the process of democratization in Macedonia 
showed, the prospect of the NATO and EU membership appears to be the only goal keeping 
the ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians together. The events linked to the constitutional 
changes in 2005 clearly showed that a prospect of Euro-Atlantic integrations is maybe the 
only incentive capable to induce the ethnic groups to put their disputes aside. Currently, the 
ethnic Albanians are supportive for Macedonia’s foreign policy, yet should the stagnation in 
the NATO membership persist, their position might change. Particularly, seen the low level of 
legitimacy of the Macedonian state by the ethnic Albanian minority, and seen the importance 
the  EU and NATO membership  has for the  Albanian  political  parties  in  Macedonia,  the 
616 Bozzo and Simon-Belli, 2000, underline the research for the international recognition as a central factor 
inducing Macedonia’s high level of compliance with the obligations deriving from the membership in UN.
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impact of the name dispute over Macedonia’s foreign policy might have serious consequences 
for the inter-ethnic relations as well617.
The dispute with Greece started immediately after Macedonia declared the independence in 
1991 and adopted the name “Republic of Macedonia” in its constitution. The controversy was 
born due to the existence of the region of Macedonia, a geographical unit, whose territory was 
covering the territory of northern Greece  (Aegean Macedonia) and eastern Bulgaria (Pirin 
Macedonia) as well, and can be seen as a continuity of the older conflict over the region dating 
back to the First and Second Balkan Wars. After the liberation from the Ottoman occupation 
of the territory of the Macedonia (as a geographic region) the division of the territory between 
Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Albanian brought to the Second Balkan War. While Macedonia’s 
nationalists tried to promote the creation of a new state (the Great Macedonia, including parts 
of the nowadays Greece and Bulgaria as well), the peace treaty divided the territory between 
the forces that took part to the war against the Turks, and the geographic region of Macedonia 
was  divided  between the  Serbs  (a  part  to  become “Southern  Serbia”  and  since  1944  the 
Socialistic Republic of Macedonia), Greeks and Bulgarians618. The key principle of the Greece 
in  the  name  dispute,  beside  the  underlining  of  the  Hellenistic  heritage  of  the  name 
“Macedonia” and the intellectual property over the “Vergina Sun” (the symbol Macedonia 
adopted in 1992 as its flag), is also the presumed concern over the Republic of Macedonia’s 
territorial pretensions on the Greek territory.
In a response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, an Arbitration Commission of the 
Peace Conference on the former Yugoslavia (Badinter Commisison) was settled up by the 
Council of Ministers of the EEC in order to assist the Conference on Yugoslavia with legal 
advice, particularly on whether or not the republics that declared the independence should be 
recognized as  independent  states.  The opinion on Macedonia was issued in January 1992, 
underlining  that  the  state  gave  the  necessary  guarantees  to  respect  human  rights  and 
international  peace and security,  settled as  the requisites  for the recognition,  and that  the 
country  fulfills  conditions  for  being  recognized  as  independent619.  However,  the  Badinter 
commission’s  opinion  was  set  aside,  as  Greece  succeeded  in  convincing  its  partners  to 
formulate  the  position  “whereby  it  was  to  recognize  FYROM  in  accordance  with  the 
617 This point was also underlined by professor Hristova in the interview conducted by the author in August 
2008.
618 On Balkan wars, division of the region of Macedonia, and the establishment of the SR Macedonia, please 
see Demetrius, 2001.
619 See the Badinter Commission Report No. 6.
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December  1991  declaration  and  only  “under  a  name  which  does  not  include  the  term 
Macedonia”  (Lisbon European Council,  Conclusion  of  the  Presidency,  Annex II,  cited in 
Demetrius, 2001, p. 4). According to Demetrius, in exchange for the pressure on Macedonia 
to  change  the  name,  Greece  promised  its  EC  partners  to  ratify  the  Maastricht  treaty, 
participate to sanctions against Serbia and ratify the EC financial protocol with Turkey. 
However, the Greek position slowly weakened as the war in the Balkans raised concerns 
over the future of Macedonia as well. The Security Council of the UN decided to accept the 
country’s  candidacy  for  the  membership  into  the  UN according  to  the  provisional  name 
“Foreign  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia”,  which  was  a  label  often  used  by  the  IO in 
discussions over the Macedonian case. A series of IOs followed this example by accepting the 
FRYoM as a member (in particular IMF and WB). 
The conflict between Macedonia and Greece, however, did not settle with the adoption of 
this provisional solution (which in fact was opposed both in Greece and Macedonia). The rise 
of nationalistic feelings in Greece due to the “betrayal from its Western partners” over the 
name-issue (in particular NATO and EU, a betrayal that consisted in a series of recognitions 
of  Macedonia  as  an  independent  state  both  under  its  constitutional  and  FRYoM name) 
brought Papandreou to adopt a hard line against Macedonia, imposing economic sanctions to 
the country in 1994. The two countries re-established the relations in 1995, due to the strong 
pressures  on  Greece  coming  from  the  other  EU Member  States,  when  the  “provisory” 
solution was found: the Macedonia was to give up the use of Vergina Sun flag and to change 
the parts of the constitution that Greece found offensive, while Greece would not object to 
any application by the country under its provisional name FRYoM, allowing the country to 
enter  OSCE,  Council  of  Europe  and  Partnership  for  Peace.  As  far  as  the  name  was 
concerned,  no  solution  was  found  and  the  agreement  settled  that  the  countries  should 
continue negotiations under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General.
A series of lengthy and unfruitful negotiations followed. A solution which was acceptable 
for both parties, however, was not found. The negotiations were intensified in 2007 when the 
proximity of the country’s NATO membership brought the issue high on the agenda. While 
avoiding to mention the usage of veto (also due to the interim agreement), Greece however 
made it clear that it would block the country’s application in both NATO and EU and that it 
would not ratify Macedonia’s access to the EU and NATO if the name issue was not solved 
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beforehand620. By the end of 2007, Greece made it very clear that no NATO or EU access for 
Macedonia  under  its  current  name would be possible,  causing  reactions  from Skopje  and 
opening new negotiations. As in March 2008 the country was not called to join NATO as 
expected,  due  to  Greece’s  intervention,  it  became  rather  clear  that  Greece  would  use 
Macedonia’s so longed for integrations to strengthen its position in the negotiation.
However,  until  now Macedonia showed determination not to give up its  identity,  both 
sides being radical in disputing the different proposals advanced by  Matthew Nimetz, UN 
Secretary-General’s  Personal  Envoy  for  the  Greece-FYROM  negotiations.  The  set  of 
proposals advanced in October 2008 was officially refused by Skopje, as it was considered 
unacceptable due to the “uncertainty such proposal induces for the national identity” (mainly 
the usage of the label “Macedonian” for the language and nation621),  while Greece also has 
some perplexities. 
Pressed by Greece’s veto in NATO and by potential obstacles for the EU membership, 
Macedonia’s leadership decided to follow the example of Serbia’s diplomacy on the Kosovo’s 
issue and to require the arbitration of the international court of justice for what it called a 
"violation" of the 1995 Interim Accord. Yet, as there was no official Greek veto in NATO 
(formally the decision was not brought on vote), the exit of the verdict is highly uncertain. In 
August  2008  the  Macedonian  government  also  openly  supported  the  organization  of  the 
Aegean  Macedonians  in  their  property  right  claims  against  Greece  and  intensified  the 
pressures for the recognition of Macedonian ethnic minority in Greece for the first time. In a 
letter from the Macedonian Prime Minister Gruevski to Ban Ki Mun and the UN Secretary 
General  Special  Envoy,  Macedonia’s  PM required that  the recognition of  the Macedonian 
ethnic minority in Greece (according to the Greek Helsinki Committee, about 30.000 people) 
and the problem of the children of the Aegean Macedonians (who were deprived of their 
property and expelled from Greece during the Greek Civil War) should also be included in the 
negotiations on the name dispute622. In his response, Ban Ki Mun underlined his interest for 
the issue, arguing however that the name solution should come first, this way preparing the 
620 "Embassy of Greece - Washington, DC" (in English).  Answer of FM Ms. D. Bakoyannis regarding the 
FYROM name issue. Retrieved on September 11, 2006.
621 For the reactions on the proposal see: 
        http://www.dnevnik.com.mk/default.asp?itemID=1DA13135787BC8469A64922A935C5E84&arc=1  .
622 The text of the letter to Ban Ki Mun available at::
        http://www.vecer.com.mk/?ItemID=4D82805E875E6747AB9537BE288552EE  . The text of the letter 
to Karamanlis available at: http://www.vlada.mk/?q=node/704.
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basis for the recognition of the Macedonian minority in Greece623. He also immediately called 
a meeting with the Greek negotiator requiring explanations on the existence and status of 
Macedonia’s minority in Greece and underlining that the matter would be analyzed in detail624, 
a step that is believed to slightly improve Macedonia’s position. 
Beside  the  issues  concerning  the  Aegean Macedonian’s  property  and  citizens  rights  in 
Greece,  the  status of  the  Macedonian  minority,  and the  Interim Agreement with  Greece, 
another issue strengthening Macedonia’s negotiating position is the rather diffuse number of 
countries that recognized the state under its constitutional name, USA included (since 2004, as 
a  strategic  step  in  fostering  the  decentralization  of  Macedonia,  see  the  part  on 
decentralization).  The  two  countries  thus  appear  stuck  to  their  positions,  while  the  new 
NATO summit in December 2008 and the insistence of the EU in December for elections, 
political  dialogue  and  the  name  issue625 as  key  conditions  of  Macedonian  integration  are 
increasing the pressures on Macedonia. 
19.2.1. EU AND THE NAME DISPUTE IN MACEDONIA
The position of the EU and its member states towards the problem of the Macedonian 
dispute with Greece was rather ambivalent in time, reflecting the lack of consensus among 
MS. The Greek capacity to use the veto power and to bargain with its partners surely made 
Macedonia’s EU integration an important  trump to use in bargaining with Macedonia. The 
very procedure of the accession according to which all MS should ratify the document on the 
EU enlargement gives Greece the last word in the dispute. 
The name issue became a matter of the EU conditionality only recently (only since 2006 
accession  partnership  with  Macedonia),  requiring  Macedonia  to  be  “cooperative”  in  the 
problem solution.  In its  official  documents, the EU always used the name of the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, while 12 out of its 25 member states recognized the country 
under its constitutional name. Judging from the positions the countries took in the question of 
Macedonia’s membership to NATO, only few EU MS (Slovenia, Czech Republic,  Estonia, 
Lithuania, Denmark and Bulgaria) supported the USA proposal on Macedonia’s admission.
The EU’s approach to the name dispute with Greece is often underlined as unjust by the 
Macedonian public, as a certain inconsistency even with the EU norms is pointed out, but no 
623Seehttp://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2008/08/2
0/nb-04.
624 See: http://macedoniaonline.eu/content/view/3442/1/. 
625 http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=62D9252B20F303479C91D745E8B1430D. 
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such positions were advanced by the political actors or official bodies. Such situation brings to 
the resentment of the Macedonian citizens and offers the decision makers the chance to rather 
successfully play the nationalistic card. The Greek journal Kathimerini underlined in October 
2008 that the Greek diplomats were becoming pessimistic about the perspectives of a solution 
to  the  name dispute,  as,  according  to  their  findings,  “the  government  of  the  FYRoM is 
planning  a  public  campaign  to  convince  its  people  that  their  national  identity  is  more 
important than the prospect of European Union membership” (Leviev-Sawyer 2008). Such 
findings are based on the speeches of the Macedonian Prime Minister that since summer 2008 
underlined in several occasions that no trade with name should be made, that country “can 
even without NATO”, “that Macedonia can develop internally if Greece blocks the NATO 
and EU membership” of the state. Such statements are perceived by the opposition as an 
effort  to  use  the  nationalistic  rhetoric  to  seize  the  power  and  as  a  strategy  of  delaying 
Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integrations in order to allow further enrichment of those parts of 
the economic elite which support the ruling coalition626.
While it is difficult to assess the validity of such claims, we should ponder on the impact of 
Gruevski’s  strategy.  Searching  for  an  alternative  in  the  foreign  policy  and  increasing  his 
requirements  from Greece  can  be  perceived  as  a  tactic  for  increasing  its  own bargaining 
power. At the same time, should Macedonia really find a credible alternative in its foreign 
policy, the EU leverage will  significantly decrease. Further on, seen that currently the only 
common  goal  that  keeps  Macedonians  and  Albanians  together  is  the  EU  and  NATO 
integration,  the failure the enter  these organizations  might have a negative  impact for the 
inter-ethnic relations in the country.  
19.3. A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
In this section we analyzed the impact of the “other political requirements”, in particular, 
the cooperation with ICTY and Kosovo’s  status in Serbia  and the name dispute between 
Greece and Macedonia. The impact of these issues on the process of international anchoring 
626See http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=D7E032415E3BD7409A3D673BA0B11758, 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=88A0395735ABA343875B7A1680E581AC, 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=917E3E281AC4E74FB24EBC957415ADC9, 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=A15E6C6B50C34049A7DC7A0AD2A07BA0, 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=B453407E6D39884CAC43C65C30B0E2CD, 
http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=1805853338B5B846810C01EE3FC3F441 .
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 642
of the democracy in the two countries under the study significantly differed, both due to the 
position held by the EU, but also due to the substantial differences between these issues. For 
the analytical purpose we can observe that the “nature” of these three problems differ: on one 
side we have Kosovo’s status and the name dispute, the issues tackling the state’s identity and 
sovereignty, and on which on the domestic side there is a rather high consensus over the 
preference (none of Serbia’s leaders ever publicly advocated Kosovo’s independence, none of 
Macedonia’s  leaders  ever  publicly  denied  Macedonia’s  national  identity).  Further  on,  both 
these issues are directly linked to the questions of the nation-building, and represent a rather 
fertile ground for potential nationalistic mobilization. They do not directly distinguish on the 
domestic  level  between winners  and losers,  for being  questions  of  national  interest,  these 
issues usually gain the overall  consensus. Further on, being sensitive issues concerning the 
nation-building process, they might be potentially used to rise nationalism, and, as we saw in 
Serbia’s case, to result in the growing tensions between the target state and the EU. The lesson 
of  the  impact  Kosovo’s  question  had  on  Serbian  domestic  and  foreign  policy  might  be 
important for the future development of Macedonia’s foreign policy. As we underlined, the 
recent statements of  Macedonia’s  Prime Minister,  according  to whom “Macedonia has an 
alternative” and “it can seek for internal development”, represent an official consideration by 
Skopje on Macedonia’s alternatives in foreign policy for the first time. If we recall the finding 
of Macedonia’s annalists, according to which in the process of the EU integrations the best 
strategy  for  the  applicant  countries  is  the  membership  without  compliance  with  the  EU 
requirements627, further on, if we recall the increase of Koštunica’s bargaining power created 
by the existence of the anti-EU option, and finally, if we recall the Serbian ad Bosnian gains in 
bargaining  with  the  EU,  then  we  can  conclude  that  a  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  on 
Macedonia’s  name  dispute  might  have  serious  consequences  for  the  country’s  future 
relationship with the EU. Using the nationalistic rhetorics and calling for a shift in the foreign 
policy  (“Macedonia  has  an alternative”,  or  “Macedonia  should  cooperate  with  China  and 
Russia628”,  or  “Macedonia,  as  it  can  not  enter  NATO,  should  enter  the  Non-Aligned 
Movement”629), Macedonia can increase its bargaining power towards the EU, diminishing, 
through the presence of the alternative, the reward offered by the EU. Similarly, it can ease 
627 In the article on the EU conditionality, prof Karakamiseva analyses the negotiation process as the prisoner 
Dilemas’, showing how the winning option for the EU is the domestic reforms without the memebrship, while 
for the applicant countries the best result is achieved with the memebrship without reforms. Karakamiseva 2008.
628 See http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=3839035AEE408F428E182F133A9E5BB7. 
629 See http://www.utrinski.com.mk/?ItemID=3839035AEE408F428E182F133A9E5BB7. 
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the citizens’  pressures for EU membership.  The outcome, from the standing point  of the 
Macedonian incumbent elite, is win-win. Either they arrive to a more acceptable solution to 
the name dispute, or they cover the responsibility for the country’s deficiencies in democracy 
that brought to the negative EU Commission report in November 2008, keeping the country 
in the anti-chamber of the EU, drawing benefits from the further ethnicization of politics, 
corruption and un-controlled power.  
Finally, we underlined how, due to the lack of domestic consensus between the Albanian 
and the Macedonian block, the failure of the country’s integration in NATO and EU might 
cause serious problems for Macedonia’s peace and democracy.
On the other hand, the cooperation with the ICTY is a positional, rather than a value issue, 
with strong effects  on the  distribution  of  power,  and extremely  high costs  for a  specific, 
narrow group of  individuals  who are  strongly  incentivized  to  mobilize  in  order  to  avoid 
compliance.  Moreover,  as  we saw,  similarly  to  the economic issues,  the  insistence  on the 
compliance  with  the  ICTY  actually  reinforced  the  re-distributive  effects  of  both 
democratization and EU integrations. The old regime supporters were thus destined to lose in 
each single dimension of the great changes the Serbia was undertaking. Being so, the linkage 
between  the  domestic  regime  change  and  the  boundary  removal  process,  the  main 
characteristic of the anchoring model we apply in this study, rather than allowing the actors to 
compensate in one field the losses suffered in other dimensions, it went on creating absolute 
losers  and absolute  winners.  Being  so,  the  “other  political  requirements”  in  Serbia’s  case 
proved to be crucial for understanding the last eight years of Serbia’s domestic politics, and 
turned  out  to  be  the  main  cause  of  the  obstacles  in  Serbia’s  democratization  and  EU 
integration process.  
Table 1: “EU recommendations to Serbia concerning ICTY and Kosovo”.
2002 Existing good cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina, including within the competencies of the provisional institutions of self-government, should continue and 
develop. Parallel Serbian institutions and jurisdictions in Kosovo must, however, be dismantled. All parts of the FRY should be aiming for compatibility with 
European -EU and Council of Europe – standards.
Cooperation with ICTY should improve. Indictees should be surrendered to the Hague - including and particularly those currently holding elected office or military  
positions. There should also be full cooperation on investigations, access to evidence (witnesses, documents, archives - particularly military) and, if a law is still 
considered necessary, it should be adopted immediately.
UNSCR 1244, and the Common Document of November 2001, should be fully implemented. Review of the cases of all Kosovo Albanian prisoners should be 
completed, and the agreed transfers implemented by spring 2002 at the latest.
2003 Improved co-operation with ICTY in all regards. Full respect and implementation of UNSCR 1244 and further development of cooperation between Belgrade and 
Pristina (UNMiK and PISG)*. Full and immediate dismantling of parallel Serbian institutions and jurisdictions in Kosovo.
2004 Ensure full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Fully respect the UNSCR 1244 and continue dialogue with Pristina on practical issues of common interest. Ensure
recognition of UNMIK travel documents and car plates.
2006 Key short term priorities: Ensure full cooperation with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Fully respect the UNSCR 1244 and intensify dialogue with Pristina. Encourage the participation of  Kosovo Serbs in the provisional institutions of self-government. 
Show constructive approach with regard to
Kosovo.
2007 Ensure full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Engage constructively in the further negotiations to find a sustainable solution on the status of Kosovo together with the provisional institutions for self-
government in Pristina.
2008 Ensure full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
Cooperate constructively on matters relating to Kosovo.
Source: EU SAA reports on Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia and Montenegro, EU partnership with Serbia, author’s elaboration.
Table 2: “EU recommendations to Macedonia concerning name dispute with Greece”. 
2006 Short  term priorities:  Ensure  regional  cooperation and good neighbourly  relations,  in particular  through intensified efforts  to  find a  negotiated and mutually 
acceptable solution on the name issue with Greece, in the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 817/93 and 845/93.
2007 Short term priorities: Ensure good neighbourly relations, in particular by intensifying efforts to find a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the name issue 
with Greece, in the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 817/93 and 845/93.
2008 Ensure good neighbourly relations, in particular by intensifying efforts with a constructive approach to find a negotiated and mutually acceptable solution to the 
name issue with Greece, in the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 817/93 and 845/93, and avoid actions which could negatively affect them
Source: EU SAA reports on  Macedonia,  EU partnership with Macedonia, Accession partnership with Macedonia, author’s elaboration.
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20. CONCLUSIONS: HOW TO EXPLAIN 
THE OUTCOME?
20.1. THE DEMOCRATIZATION ACHIEVED: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
The  main  subject  of  this  work  was  the  development  of  democracy  in  Serbia  and 
Macedonia. We decided to follow the changes introduced in a series of dimensions directly or 
indirectly linked to democracy (the analyzed dimensions included: constitutional issues, form 
of  government  and  political  system,  decentralization,  administration/civil  service  reform, 
judiciary, fight against corruption and organized crime, constitutional issues, law enforcement 
agencies  and police  service,  civilian  control  over  the military  forces,  and a series  of  civil, 
political and minority rights). This choice is actually following Morlino and Magen’s definition 
of the “democratic rule of law”630 and it was influenced by the necessity to choose a set of 
dimensions that is as near as possible to the set of dimensions in which the EU concentrated 
its activities (see the chapter about the theoretical framework). In the introductory part of each 
section we examined how the policy area analyzed is linked to democracy and to the process 
of democratization.
In  Table  1  we  bring  the  summary  assessment  of  the  current  situation  in  each  of  the 
analyzed dimensions. Even though we assess the legislative framework by comparing it to the 
international (and EU) standards of democracy, and even though in most cases it also testifies 
the level of the country’s respect for the norms promoted by the EU, the table actually does 
not  refer  to  the  compliance  with  the  EU  requirements:  on  one  side  we  consider  the 
dimensions in which the EU was not involved in the rule promotion (for example the civilian 
control over the military forces in Macedonia), on the other, in some cases we underline the 
deficiencies  even  in  those  fields  where  the  EU  assessment  was  actually  positive  (the 
constitutional issues in Macedonia for example). Beside the rule adoption, the practice and 
rule implementation is included in the table, as well as those issues raising particular concerns 
in a given dimension.
630 Morlino and Magen, 2004; 2008.
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A mere look at the table shows the striking differences between the two countries. If we 
had limited our analysis to the rule adoption and the assessment of the legislative framework, 
Macedonia  would  have  appeared  to  be  an  established  democracy  with  the  legislative 
framework  which  in  most  cases  follows  the  best  international  practices.  However,  by 
including  the  rule  implementation  in  the  analysis,  we  discovered  a  similarity  between 
Macedonian democracy and Potemkin’s villages: quite in line with its status of the only EU 
candidate whose negotiations are postponed, the Macedonian political regime only formally 
appears to respect the Copenhagen criteria. The rules on paper are not reflecting the reality of 
the Macedonian political regime, which is still judged to be only “partially free”631. In this light 
it is important to notice how, even in those cases of relatively good legislative framework and 
appropriate  implementation,  the  final  outcome  is  still  unsatisfactory:  we  thus  recall  the 
institution of the Ombudsman which often fails to exercise its duties, or the High Judicial 
Council which was reported to actually abuse the high levels of independence it was given. 
Similarly,  the Agency for Civil  Servants and the Agency for the Fight Against Corruption, 
both institutions designed to implement the well-developed legislative frameworks, are often 
falling short of their obligations (the most clamorous example being the conflict of interest 
within the Agency for the Fight Against Corruption). Not to mention the case of the national 
assembly, designed by the constitution as a strong, independent legislator, which in reality is 
turned into a rubber stamp for the legislation already adopted by the government, a situation 
often  registered  in  other  countries  as  well.  Finally,  and  most  striking,  the  incapacity  of 
Macedonia to ensure free and fair elections, without violence, threats, riots and intimidations 
at the polling place, is one of the most serious concerns for Macedonian democracy. 
631 Freedom House's index of the freedom in the World in 2008 assigns 3 points to Macedonia for both its 
civil and political rights. 
Table 1: “Assessment of the status in the dimensions analyzed in Macedonia and Serbia”.
Dimension
(main concerns)
Macedonia Serbia
Judiciary Rules in line with EU standards adopted (2005-2006).
Rule implementation ongoing, yet slow.
(Judiciary independent, lacking accountability, corruption).
Rules adopted not in line with EU standards 
(political control over the judiciary)
Constitutional issues Constitution in line with EU standards (1991, 2001, 2005).
(The national consensus is still fragile due to the inter-ethnic conflict. Some 
constitutional provisions on the power-sharing represent a source of further 
ethnicization).
Constitution still failing to meet EU standards (2006)
(particularly concerning: imperative mandate, decentralization, 
judiciary)
Decentralization Rule in line with EU standards adopted (2002-2004).
Rule implementation ongoing.
(Difficulties in implementation. The relevant legislation introduced the 
provisions that further ethnicized the process of decentralization). 
Rules adopted overly in line with EU standards, with some 
shortcomings remaining, regionalization still pending (2007)
Difficult implementation 
(imperative mandate, centralizing effect of the decentralization)
Civil service reform Rule in line with EU standards adopted (2000-2005).
Implementation concerning the equal representation good.
Implementation concerning professionalization and depoliticization lacking
(politicization and ethnicization of the civil service, the law applied only to a 
limited number of civil servants, the problems in functioning of the Civil 
servants agency).
Rules in line with EU standards adopted (2004-2005)
Rule implementation ongoing
(politicization still persisting, failure to ensure the merit-based 
recruitment)
Fight against 
corruption
Legislative framework good.
Lack of implementation.
(Agency exists, but it is biased in its functioning, often failing to act. Series of 
charges are made, yet usually they are not prosecuted. Publicization of the cases).
Rules adopted subject to the serious shortcomings and loopholes 
annulling the effects of legislation 
Rule implementation lacking
Police reform Rule in line with EU standards adopted (2006).
Implementation concerning the decentralization of police service and equal 
representation: good. 
Implementation concerning the human rights protection and accountability of 
the police forces: obstructed.
Rules adopted but some serious shortcomings persist (2005-2006)
Slow rule implementation
(lack of clear organizational structure, lack of transparent control 
mechanisms, insufficient definition of the powers of police 
officials in performing their functions)
Civil control over 
military forces
Rules in line with EU standards adopted (1991-1992, 2001).
Rules implemented.
(persistence of the spoil system and politicization in appointment and 
recruitment).
Rules in line with EU standards adopted (2006-2007)
Implementation ongoing
Civil society Rules in line with EU standards adopted (1998, 2006-2007)
Difficult implementation 
(NGOs financially dependent on the external support, their involvement in the 
Rules in line with EU standards still not adopted
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decision-making process is minimal)
Minority rights Rules in line with EU standards adopted (1991,1995, 1997,2001-2008) 
Good implementation 
(weakness in protection of the minorities other than Albanian)
Rules in line with EU standards adopted (2002)
Slow implementation
(the overall spread of intolerance in Serbian society)
Elections and right to 
vote
Rules in line with EU standards adopted (2002; 2006)
Complete lack of implementation
(repeated acts of violence on the elections)
Rules in line with EU standards still not adopted
Good implementation (compensating for the shortcomings in the 
legislation. Problem: imperative mandate)
Ombudsman Rules in line with EU standards adopted (1997; 2003)
Rules implemented
(Yet, the institution is several stances failed to exercise the own function. 
Political appointment created politically biased institution
Rules in line with EU standards adopted (2005-2007)
Full implementation obstructed
(institution is functioning and mainly fulfilling its duties, even 
though it is faced with serious obstacles)
Media Rules in line with international standards adopted (1997-1998; 2005-2006)
Difficult implementation
(financial autonomy and sustainability of the public broadcaster hampered, 
unclear media ownership, media controlled by economic and political elite, 
political interference on media)
Legislative framework still subject to the serious shortcomings 
(2002-2006)
Slow implementation 
(political influence over the media, violence over the journalists, 
hate speech, non-transparent allocation of frequencies) 
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Unlike Macedonian democracy on the paper, in most of its dimensions Serbia did not even 
pass  the  threshold  of  the  rule  adoption.  In  some  areas  a  complete  lack  of  a  legislative 
framework  in  line  with  the  democratic  standards  was  registered,  while  in  others  the 
commitment to the best international practices is combined with the loopholes built in the 
legislation which directly hamper the effects of the rule implementation. A high administrative 
capacity (often praised by the EU as the best among the countries in the region) is combined 
with  hampered – or  missing  – democratic  norms.  In some cases,  mainly  where  goodwill 
persists, this high administrative capacity is capable to compensate for the lack of adequate 
legislative framework: thus for example, even though the legislative framework regulating the 
elections is  far from the European standards, the Serbian elections are usually  assessed as 
mainly  free  and  fair.  However,  such  situation  is  limited  only  to  those  dimensions  where 
political will allows the implementation to compensate for the lack of adequate legislation: in 
all other cases where the political will is lacking, the stakeholders are using the implementation 
phase to annul the effects of the laws. 
The lack of judiciary independence and the imperative mandate which assigns the control 
of the mandates to the political  parties are the two most serious shortcomings of Serbian 
democracy. Together, these two elements bring to the malfunctioning of all other democratic 
mechanisms and institutions. The media freedom, the fight against corruption, the minority 
rights,  none  of  these  dimensions  can  function  without  an  independent  judicial  power 
guaranteeing the political, civil and human rights of the individuals. Similarly, the assembly’s 
control over the executive, the decentralization as a mean of bringing the government closer 
to the citizens, the right to vote and to be elected are all hampered due to the introduction of 
the imperative mandate which de-facto annulled the effects of these rights and mechanisms632.
The two countries, thus, even though apparently far from each other when it comes to 
their normative framework, are rather similar in the level of (lack of) democratization. In the 
previous chapters we showed how, in many dimensions, they faced similar problems: overall 
politicization and prevalence of the spoil system, state capture, unaccountable ruling elite, and 
overspread corruption were registered in both countries. The “rule of deal” replaces the rule 
of law, and the main line of discrimination in both Serbia and Macedonia is the line dividing 
party  members  from  the  ordinary  citizens.  Following  the  developments  in  the  analyzed 
dimensions,  we noticed  how in  both countries  the  decision-making process  is  very  often 
untransparent,  characterized by the  exclusion of  the NGOs,  experts  or other  civil  society 
632 See the relevant chapters.
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actors and with the intra-party (intra-ethnic) bargaining (see for example the decentralization 
reform in  Macedonia  and Serbia,  police  reform and electoral  reform 2002  in  Macedonia, 
legislation on judiciary  and even the constitutional  reform in Serbia).  Even in  those cases 
when the law was drafted in cooperation with relevant NGOs, domestic and international 
experts, the deputies in the assembly were rather successful in amending the law draft in a 
manner to empty the legislative proposals of any substance. The main difference between the 
two countries, rather than in the outcome, is in the form of the deficiencies: in Macedonia the 
relatively good legislative framework is not implemented, while in Serbia the bad norms are 
quite respected633. 
While the outcome in the two countries is similar, the mechanisms that brought to this lack 
of accountability and strengthening of the ruling elite differ634,  quite in line with what was 
reported  in  the  interview  with  Jovanovski:  “if  you  compare  Macedonia  and  Serbia,  the 
situation on the ground is very similar, only the manner differs”.
In Macedonia the main mechanism strengthening the political  elite  vis-à-vis the society 
derives from the consociational democracy design and power-sharing mechanisms built in the 
political system. Some kind of power-sharing was sought as a solution for the inter-ethnic 
conflict  already in the first year after the independence (the inclusion of the Albanian ethnic 
parties in the government, for example), but it became a hallmark of the Macedonian political 
regime (culminated in a tendency towards non-territorial ethnic federalism635) only since the 
2001  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement636.  The  decentralization,  the  principle  of  equal 
representation in the state administration, the veto-power of the minority, the joint control of 
the major ethnic groups (ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians) over the executive, the 
proportionality of the parliamentary representation, all these mechanisms were included into 
the Macedonian political life. Even though prescribed as a mean for solving the ethnic conflict 
in Macedonia,  in  the empirical  part  of  this  thesis  we actually  identified the power-sharing 
mechanism as both a mechanism hampering the Macedonian democratization and a source of 
further ethnicization of the Macedonian politics which would increase, instead of smoothing 
out,  the inter-ethnic  divisions.  As Snyder argued,  power sharing  is  a  difficult,  if  not even 
633 Such finding is in line with the results of similar recent researches on democratization. Morlino and Magen 
thus identify the “executive control” and the mechanisms of limiting the executive’s influence as the areas in 
which the strongest opposition to the change was registered. See Morlino and Magen, 2008.
634 You can also see the conclusive chapter and the tables in the appendix for the chapter on corruption that 
analyzes the different causes for corruption in two countries.
635 See Gaber-Damjanovska and Jovevska, 2006. See the section on the form of government.
636 See the sections on constitutional  reform, form of government,  decentralization,  civil  service reform, 
police reform, minority rights.
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dangerous, solution in societies that are not fully democratic, and this seems particularly true 
for Macedonia. When we assess the situation in Macedonia in light of a comprehensive list of 
conditions  for  the  successful  establishment  of  consociational  democracy,  identified  by 
Schneckener (2002), we find that in the aftermath of the 2001 ethnic conflict the country did 
not  satisfy  the  conditions  necessary  for  the  successful  application  of  the  power-sharing 
mechanisms. In particular, it lacked the numeric balance between the two ethnic groups637; 
there  were  large  socio-demographic  differences  between  the  two  groups,  with  economic 
disparities and rather different structures of economic opportunities across the groups638 and 
the  overreaching  loyalties  that  would  reduce  the  exclusiveness  of  ethnic  attachment  were 
missing639. The analysis of the party system showed that there are no significant ideological 
differences between the political parties, particularly in the Albanian block, and the electoral 
behaviour showed the absence of relevant cleavages that would cross-cut the ethnic lines640, 
while  what happened with the Albanian  ethnic  parties'  maximization  of  requirements and 
events linked to the May agreement showed that the Macedonia is still far from having a stable 
status quo641. The tradition of compromise and mutual understanding is also lacking642, while 
the high level of political fragmentation into blocks (two big parties and several small ones for 
each  block643)  increases  the  level  of  competition  within  the  single  ethnic  group,  which 
enhances  their  blackmailing  potential  and  diminishes  their  coalitional  potential644.  The 
inclusion  of  the  power-sharing  mechanisms in  a  setting  that  evidently  did  not  satisfy  the 
conditions for its success brought to the development of a logic well described by Snyder in 
637 Macedonians  enjoy  the  majority  counting  for  64%,  while  ethnic  Albanians  count  for  25%  of  the 
population. See the section on minority rights.
638 On the socio-demographic disparities see Nikolovska and Siljanovska-Davkova, 2001. On the differences 
in the economic activities and on the different structure of opportunities for the two ethnic groups, see the 
European Stability Initiative report 2002, “Ahmeti’s village, the political economy of inter-ethnic relations”.
639 While Macedonians perceive themselves as the titular nation, the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia lack the 
identification with the Macedonian state: there is no attachment to the state symbols,  identity, past,  religion, 
institutions. See the section on the constitutional issues and the section on minority rights. 
640 See the chapter on the forms of government. The lack of cross-cutting cleavages also emerges from the 
socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the two ethnic groups. 
641 See the section on the constitutional issues. 
642 The confrontation between the government and the opposition, rather than a compromise, appeared to be 
the  main “style”  of  Macedonian politics.  See  the  section on the  forms of  government.  Also,  in  the  e-mail 
interview from 17th December 2008, professor Hristova underlined the lack of cooperation between the political 
blocks,  while  in  the  last  EU  report  the  political  dialogue  is  underlined  as  a  necessary  step  towards  the 
integrations.
643 See the section on the form of government.
644 “The main difference beside the number of parties is that political fragmentation normally increases the 
‘blackmailing potential’ and decreases the ‘coalition potential’ (see Lijphart, 1977: 61–65). In other words, the 
more parties existing on each side and the smaller they are, the more unlikely it is that a stable coalition between 
each segment’s major parties will be formed”, Schneckener, 2002, p. 214). For the list of the conditions favouring 
the power sharing, please see Schneckener 2002.
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his criticisms to power-sharing in the democratizing societies:  instead of depoliticizing  the 
ethnicity, the power-sharing created the incentives for the political elite to use the nationalistic 
rhetorics in their struggle for power: 
 “The power-sharing approach is especially problematic in the context of a democratizing 
society.  Power  sharing,  as  Lijphart  conceives  it,  depends  on  mass  groups  deferring  to  the 
judgments of moderate elites who represent their ethnic segments. However, deference can hardly 
be taken for granted in democratizing societies. Mass groups clamoring for a greater say in politics 
will use any available argument, especially the argument that traditional elites are selling out the 
nation’s interests by being too accommodating towards outsiders. In this context, elites jockeying 
for power within the ethnic group often have an incentive to be immoderate. Institutionalized 
power-sharing exacerbates this by defining all politics as ethnic politics. As mass groups enter the 
political process, any one who wants to participate must go through ethnic channels. Mobilizing 
support  by  definition means making sectarian appeals.  Cross-ethnic  politicking  is  reserved to 
elites,  who may be too pressured from below to be accommodating towards the elites of the 
opposing community” (Snyder, 2000, p. 330).
In the sections dedicated to decentralization, civil service reform and constitutional issues, 
we showed the examples of how the ethnic Albanian elite was maximizing its requirements for 
further  strengthening  the  Albanian  ethnic  minority,  while  in  the  chapter on the  forms of 
government  we  analyzed  the  competition  of  the  Albanian  party  system  underlining  the 
prevalence of the nationalistic electoral platforms and the competition centered around the 
question of the traitors and protectors of the Albanian ethnic group. 
Beside consolidating and institutionalizing the inter-ethnic conflict645, the persistence of the 
nationalistic rhetorics also hampered the full development of the democratic institutions. The 
implementation of the power-sharing solutions created mechanisms that are the basis for the 
shortcomings of Macedonian democracy we identified in the different analyzed dimensions. 
The decision-making process is  moved from the parliament and public  debate to the un-
transparent process within the executive,  where the intra-party/intra-ethnic bargaining  and 
logrolling prevail. The result is the adoption of laws that, instead of solving social problems, 
sacrifice the public good to the political elite’s narrow interests (see for example the section on 
the decentralization and in particular the Law on Municipal Borders), while the principle of 
equal representation is interpreted in a manner that directly hampered the professionalization 
of the bureaucracy. The universalistic, citizen-based principles of democracy were hampered 
as power in Macedonia, rather than from citizens as underlined in the constitution, comes 
from the ethnic communities646.
645 On the institutionalization of the ethnicity see Bieber, 2004.
646 From the e-mail interview with Hristova, 18/12/2008.
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The  prevalence  of  the  inter-ethnic  conflict  significantly  shaped  the  democratization 
process,  producing  unequal  cross-dimension  developments  as  we  pass  from  the  issues 
concerning the inter-ethnic relations to those concerning the government's accountability. The 
assessment of the rule implementation in Table 1 shows the clear distinction between the two 
patterns. We can thus notice that Macedonia achieves the best scores in the implementation of 
those laws of  particular  interests for the Albanian ethnic group (decentralization,  minority 
rights,  ombudsman,  the  provisions  of  the  civil  service  reform  that  concern  equal 
representation, the provisions of the police reform that concern the decentralization and equal 
representation of the police forces), while at the same time the fight against corruption, the 
professionalization  and  depoliticization  of  the  civil  service,  the  accountability  and  human 
rights respect of the police forces, media freedom and the participation of the civil society are 
particularly difficult to implement.
The mechanisms that hamper the democratization in post-Milošević Serbia are of different 
nature, even though the final outcome is similar. The nationalism enters this picture only as a 
cover, rather than a cause for the lack of accountability  of the ruling elite.  It  represents a 
political instrument inherited from the previous period, and as we will argue in the sections to 
come,  it  is  strongly  linked  to  the  Serbian  foreign  policy.  In  this  chapter,  nationalism  is 
important due to the existence of strong nationalistic,  “anti-system” party, whose presence 
produced the centrifugal competition in the party system647. 
Immediately after the fall of Milošević’s regime, Serbia experienced a positive period that 
appeared favourable for the democratization of the country. The laws that were adopted and 
those drafted in this first cycle of the Serbian democratization show a high level of democratic 
potential. Yet, this positive period lasted only a year and a half, after which the dissolution of 
DOS and the re-emergence of nationalism resulted in the polarization of the party scene. A 
short period of stagnation and crisis took place, culminating in the assassination of the Prime 
Minister,  the  final  dissolution  of  DOS  and  the  fall  of  the  government.  After  the  2003 
parliamentary elections, the polarized pluralism of the party system, a characteristic already 
underlined by Goati when referring to the ''90s, appeared institutionalized.648 In the period 
647 In the classical term of the “anti-system party” as the party that questions the political regime, SRS could 
not be completely seen as an anti-democratic party, as they nominally adhere to the democratic norms. However, 
the mechanisms of the  competition of  this  party,  and its  strong opposition to  the domestic  developments, 
particularly to the Serbian foreign policy, delegitimization and not-acceptance of the democratically elected elite, 
the high polarization that the existence of this party introduces, the centrifugal competition, and the extreme 
positioning justify such label. 
648 See Goati, 2000, 2001, 2002.
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2003-2008 Serbia  showed all  characteristics  identified by Sartori  (1972) as typical  for such 
asset, radicalization and breaking of the center included (beginning of 2008). Yet, the shock 
caused by Kosovo’s unilateral independence and the changes in the party system in mid-2008 
do not appear to have significantly changed the ideological distance of the political spectrum. 
The emptying of the centre brought to a short period of redefinition of party ideologies (in 
particular DSS, SPS, part of the SRS), after which the system appeared rather similar to the 
one at the beginning of 2003, with few pretenders on the central position, a new entry due to 
the secession of one part of SRS, and a weakened party of the extreme right (SRS). 
The nature of the party system significantly influenced the strategies and preferences of the 
political actors, which was further reflected on the democratization process. The centrifugal 
competition  resulted  in  the  strengthening  of  the  central  actors  (DSS)  who,  due  to  the 
extremely favourable positioning which made it be an unavoidable partner in any coalition, 
withdrew itself from the electoral accountability. This brought to the peripheral turnover and 
the  consequential  irresponsibility  of  both the opposition  and the  ruling  elite.  The lack of 
electoral accountability and the security of the ruling elite’s position are particularly harmful in 
the early phases of democratization, when the mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability 
are still  not developed.  Rather sure of his position in the government, Koštunica was not 
motivated to introduce mechanisms limiting the power of the ruling elite. The characteristics 
of that third cycle of Serbian democratization are thus strongly influenced by the nature of the 
party  system  that  shaped  the  incumbent  elite’s  structure  of  opportunities.  In  almost  all 
legislations  adopted  in  this  period  we  registered  the  failure  to  establish  mechanisms  of 
accountability  and  the  subordination  of  the  newly  formed  institutions  to  the  simple 
parliamentary majority.
Another  feature  that  seriously  hampers  Serbian  democracy  is  the  introduction  of  the 
imperative mandate and the strengthening of the party control over the deputies. Established 
already in  the  2000  electoral  law,  and finally  constitutionalized  in  2006,  the  party  control 
seriously interfered with the relations among parties, government and assembly, strengthening 
the  narrow  political  leadership.  Combined  with  the  undemocratic  nature  of  the  Serbian 
political parties and the practices of almost authoritarian leadership649, this provision actually 
concentrated all power in the hands of the few political leaders in charge. Enjoying absolute 
control over the assembly, this narrow elite circle obtained the control of all those institutions 
controlled  by  the  majority  in  the  assembly  (especially  the  judiciary).  The  lack  of  solid 
649 See Goati, 2006.
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mechanisms  of  inter-institutional  accountability  we  described,  and  the  lack  of  electoral 
accountability caused by the type of the party system are thus combined with the complete 
absence of inner-party democracy and with the incapacity  of the deputies to control  their 
leaders.  Even  in  the  clamorous  corruption  scandals  in  the  government,  the  politically 
controlled judiciary failed to initiate the process, while the deputies, responsible to their parties 
and not  to their  electorates,  had neither  instruments nor  incentives  to make their  leaders 
accountable. As Pešić argues, this resulted in the “feudalization of the government” where the 
only mechanism of accountability is the one towards the coalitional partners, which results in 
the division of the sphere of interests, no interference, the prevalence of the “rule of deal” 
over the rule of law which represents the basis for the state-capture in Serbia650.
In  this  section  we  analyzed  the  outcome  of  the  democratic  transition  in  Serbia  and 
Macedonia, underlining the main deficiencies in the two countries and offering the illustration 
of  the  domestic  mechanisms  that  supported  such  shortcomings.  However,  the  domestic 
factors we underlined as the main obstacles to full democratization in the two countries are 
not capable to offer a full insight of the process that took place in the analyzed cases. First of 
all, the inter-ethnic conflict and the perils of the power-sharing are not capable to explain the 
seven-year long peace in Macedonia. What succeeded in maintaining the fragile Macedonian 
peace, under the very unfavorable conditions we described? How come did the Macedonian 
nationalists, enjoying significant numerical advantage, accept the power-sharing mechanisms 
that strengthened the ethnic Albanian elite? What keeps the ethnic Albanians from advancing 
the secessionist requirements and strategies, similar to those that brought to the independence 
of Kosovo? How is it possible that the most successful changes were introduced in those 
dimensions that directly tackle the most salient  cleavage of Macedonian society (the inter-
ethnic  conflict)?  Finally,  where  did  the  legislative  framework  respecting  the  highest 
international standards come from?
Similarly, in Serbia's case we also have some questions that can not be explained by a study 
concentrated on purely domestic factors. First of all, what brought to such quick dissolution 
of DOS? How did nationalism and pro-nationalistic parties gain strength after the defeat they 
suffered  in  the  aftermath  of  the  regime fall?  Why  did  Kosovo's  unilateral  independence, 
condemned and contested by all  Serbian political  parties,  cause the increased polarization, 
shock and re-structuring of the party system?
650 See the section on the form of government and on the economic issues. 
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In the following sections we will examine the factors included in the revised EUCLIDA 
theoretical framework, arguing that fully understanding both the Serbian and the Macedonian 
democratization processes requires that the international dimension (both the direct influence 
of  the  international  actor,  but  also  the  process  of  international  anchoring)  are  taken  in 
consideration.
20.2. THE EU FACTOR: THE SUPPLY SIDE
In this work we tried to develop an analytical  framework for studying the international 
influence over the democratization process that would be capable to account not only for the 
democratization and consolidation, but for the crisis and possible failure as well. We identified 
in Morlino’s anchoring theory and in Morlino and Magen’s EUCLIDA analytical framework a 
potentially fruitful basis upon which we built the EUCLIDA revised model by adding three 
more  factors,  all  concerning  the  supply  side:  the  IA’s  interest,  approach  (content  of  the 
promoted norms and the channel of influence used to promote the norms) and organizational 
capacity.  The following sections will  be dedicated to these “supply-side” factors of revised 
EUCLIDA. As we will see in the next sections, each of these factors appeared particularly 
relevant for understanding the impact that the EU had on the democratization process in 
Serbia and Macedonia, justifying their inclusion in the theoretical framework. Further on, we 
will see how the factors identified on the supply side influence one another quite in line with 
our hypothesis: the international actor’s interests contributed to shape the IA’s priorities and 
the content of the promoted rules,  and at the same time had an impact on the strategies 
chosen by the international actor, being, on its turn, influenced by the domestic developments 
and the feedback of the anchoring process.
20.2.1. INTERNATIONAL ACTOR’S INTERESTS AND PRIORITIES
In  line  with  Whitehead's  observation  on  the  importance  of  the  International  actor’s 
interests in analyzing its impact on the domestic regime change, our theoretical framework 
releases  the  assumption  about  the  international  actor  genuinely  interested  in  democracy 
promotion651.  We do not  consider  the  international  actor’s  interests  as  given,  but  on  the 
651The prevalent approach in the analysis of the EU impact over democratization in the Eastern and Central 
Europe consists in assuming that the EU is promoting democracy and then to consider the EU’s interests as a 
factor hampering the EU’s credibility of action. 
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contrary,  the  interest  of  the  international  actor  in  both  promoting  the  democracy  and 
integrating the target state represents one of the most important factors on the supply side of 
the revised EUCLIDA theoretic framework. It significantly influences the entire process as it 
is the base upon which the strategy of the IA is developed. The main questions we made in 
the theoretical part were: 1) whether the IA is more interested in the democratization of the 
target state or in the creation of economic, military or other linkages with the given state; 2) 
what is the main interest guiding the EU's democracy promotion actions: is it the value-guided 
action  of  spreading  democracy  around the  world,  or  some other  goal  (strategic,  military, 
economic etc) that is supposed to be easier to achieve through the democratization of the 
target  state;  3)  Finally,  how  are  the  interests  of  the  international  actor  interpreted  and 
operationalized to influence the choice of the norms that will  be promoted in the specific 
target state. The main hypothesis is that in those cases where the process is guided by interests 
other than  the  spreading  of  democracy,  the  IA  could  even  choose  to  sacrifice  the 
democratization of the target state, should it turn out to be a threat to the main goals of the 
IA.
Since the fall of the iron curtain at the beginning of the '90s, democracy promotion became 
the hallmark of the EU’s policy towards the former communist countries. The EU became 
one of the most active and, seen the experience of Central-Eastern Europe, most successful 
democracy-promoting international actors652. While the importance of the democratic values 
for the EU are doubtless and the promotion of the democratic values and freedoms were 
included in the very first documents of the European Community, this still does not exclude 
that the EU actions in a particular case might be guided by concerns other than the value-
oriented desire to spread freedom around the world.
Of  particular  importance  in  analysing  the  EU  interests  in  the  democratization  of 
Macedonia and Serbia is the link between democracy and peace, so often underlined by the 
liberalistic theories. As Mattina argued, 
“the fall of the USSR allowed the EU to develop its particular way of acting in the foreign 
policy, i.e. linking the security issue to democracy, starting from the assumption that the latter, 
when supported by a  strong market economy, represents  a  guarantee for the stability  on the 
continent” (Mattina, 2004, p. 14, translated by IM). 
652 On the conditions the international organization shall fulfill in order to successfully promote democracy 
see Pevehouse, 2002. On the supremacy of the EU over other international actors to successfully use different 
channels of influence, see Magen, 2004.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 658
While democratization became the instrument for security and a strategy of foreign policy, 
the enlargement soon turned out to be the carrot offered to the countries in order to induce 
them to accept the democratic rules of the game. 
Many documents of the EU Commission, as well as the statements of the Commissioner 
for Enlargement, underlined this link between the EU security concerns and the enlargement 
as a particular instrument of the EU foreign and security policy. This is particularly true for 
the EU approach to the Western Balkans, where the violent inter-ethnic conflicts during the 
'90s  increased  the  EU’s  concerns  of  maintaining  peace  in  their  own  backyard.  The 
Commission report (1996) on the Common Principles for the Contractual Relations with the 
Balkan States, testifies that the security concerns shaped the EU’s approach to the Western 
Balkans: 
“The overriding objective of the European Union’s action in South-Eastern Europe is the 
successful implementation of the Dayton/Paris peace agreements and the creation of an area of 
political stability and economic prosperity, also by fostering the process of political and economic 
reforms, and the respect of human and minority rights and democratic principles. (…) Due to 
geographic proximity, the European Union has a particularly great interest in peace and stability in 
the former Yugoslavia. The area is surrounded by Member States and associated countries, and 
the spreading of political and military conflicts and the economic crisis on its own present and 
future territory must be avoided. (…) Agreement with these countries should be negotiated at a 
time and with a content so as to make a maximum contribution to the stability in the region” 
(Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, com (96) 476 final).
Even after twelve years of this commission report and seven years after the last inter-ethnic 
“war” in the Balkans (Macedonia,  2001),  in a moment when most of the Western Balkan 
States improved their relations with the EU, the security-guided conception of enlargement, as 
a tool of foreign policy and democratization, and EU integrations, as guarantees of the EU 
security, still are the prevailing item when it comes to the question of the Western Balkans. In 
the  most  recent  communication  from the Commission  to the  Council  and the  European 
Parliament  on  the  enlargement  strategy  and  main  challenges  for  the  period  2008-2009,  a 
similar argumentation for integrating the Balkans into the EU is found:
“Enlargement is  one of the EU's most powerful  policy tools.  It  serves the EU's strategic 
interests in stability, security, and conflict prevention. The present enlargement agenda covers the 
Western Balkans and Turkey, which have been given the perspective of becoming EU members 
once they fulfill the necessary conditions. The European perspective has contributed to peace and 
stability,  and enabled partners to cope with major challenges, such as Kosovo's declaration of 
independence, while maintaining regional security. It provides strong encouragement for political 
and economic reform in both the Western Balkans and Turkey. It is in the EU's strategic interest 
to keep up the momentum of this process, on the basis of agreed principles and conditions. This 
interest to project stability is all the more apparent in the light of recent challenges to the Eastern 
EU’s stability, including in southern Caucasus. The present security environment in Europe also 
calls for the consolidation of stability and enhancement of the reforms in the Western Balkans. 
The  European  Union  is  stronger  with  stable,  prosperous  and  democratic  neighbours. 
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Enlargement serves the EU's strategic interests in stability, security and conflict prevention. It has 
helped to increase prosperity and growth opportunities, to improve links with vital transport and 
energy  routes,  and  to  increase  the  EU's  weight  in  the  world”  (Communication  from  the 
Commission  to  the  Council  and  the  European  Parliament,  Enlargement  Strategy  and  Main 
Challenges 2008-2009, COM 2008, 674 final).
Yet, saying that security was the main concern in the EU approach to the Western Balkans, 
and therefore to Macedonia and Serbia, is not enough for understanding the process. It only 
mean that democratization might be sacrificed to the security concerns, but whether this was 
the  case  or  not,  it  depends  on  the  particular  interpretations  of  the  security  and 
democratization issues, as well as on the particularity of the target state. However, here we 
enter  a  rather  difficult  terrain  for  assessment,  for  the  fact  that  democracy  promotion  is 
commonly used as a legitimization even for those actions that actually do not have much to 
do with the democratization.
In Macedonia’s case, the EU security interest mainly consisted in avoiding the inter-ethnic 
conflict between the ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians. It thus concentrated to the 
implementation of the OFA agreement, which appeared to be the central priority of the EU’s 
policy in Macedonia. Since 2001, most of the EU funds were conditioned by the respect and 
implementation  of  OFA,  and  the  dimensions  of  policy  tackled  by  the  peace  agreement 
absorbed great part of the EU financial assistance. But did the Ohrid Framework Agreement, 
the key security priority, hamper or develop the democratization in Macedonia?
As we argued in the section on democratization, the power-sharing mechanisms built in the 
peace  agreement  actually  made  both  the  democratization  and the  de-ethnicization  of  the 
political  discourse  more  difficult.  But  as  the  inter-ethnic  power-sharing  is  one  of  the 
approaches considered by many eminent scholars as the best recipe for both stabilization and 
democratization  of  divided societies653,  this  means that  the  negative  effects  of  the  power-
sharing and the EU insistence on the power-sharing mechanisms, rather than showing the 
prevalence of the EU security concerns over the spread of democracy as a goal, should be 
seen as the (adequate or less adequate) choice of content of the norms to promote. In order to 
assess whether the EU security concerns might bring to neglect the need for democratization, 
we should pay  attention to the  possible  existence  of  situations  in  which  the  security  and 
democratization goals were in conflict,  deducing the prevailing EU interest from the EU’s 
choice in such circumstances.
653 See for example the various works of Lijphart.
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As we showed in the empirical part of the analysis, in several occasions the EU tolerated 
the undemocratic behavior and the abuse of power by the domestic stakeholders in exchange 
for the rule adoption. Surely the most clamorous example was the Macedonian referendum on 
the  Law  on  Municipal  Borders  in  2004,  when  the  EU  failed  to  react  to  the  serious 
intimidations and violations of the electoral law undertaken by the government in order to 
ensure  that  the  referendum  fails  and  the  Law  on  Municipal  Borders  remains  in  force. 
Moreover, the EU opposed the use of the referendum as an expression of the citizens’ protest 
against the law drafted by the narrow political leadership of two ruling parties, it supported the 
ethnically-based solutions hampering the functionality of the future municipalities and it failed 
to react to the violations of the OFA principles and European Charter on the Local Self-
Government.  Similar  tolerance  for  non-transparent  decision-making,  abuse  of  power  and 
violation of the good democratic practices also registered in the constitutional reform of 2001, 
in the electoral reform of 2002, in the appointment of the Ombudsman and in fostering the 
equal representation in the civil service (see the relevant chapters). Obviously, such decision of 
the EU was clearly guided by its preoccupations for the continuous inter-ethnic tensions to 
which Macedonian political life is exposed. The content of the Ohrid Framework agreement, 
the  decentralization  process  in  Macedonia  and the  constitutional  reform in  2001  all  were 
highly conflictive issues: the OFA was a peace agreement bringing an end to the inter-ethnic 
violence, while the constitutional reform and the decentralization, key elements of OFA, were 
further ethnicized by the political elite bringing to the increase of the security concerns. In 
such assets, the EU decided to play the role of the mediator between the two ethnic groups, 
supporting  whichever  solution the incumbent Macedonian and Albanian elite  would agree 
upon and promoting what, at the prevailing market place of ideas, appeared to be the best 
solution: inter-ethnic consociationalism. 
In Serbia’s case, the situation was far more sensitive, as, due to the Serbian involvement in 
the outbreak and war in former Yugoslavia and due to its importance for the stability and 
peace in the region, the EU action in the country was clearly security-guided, aiming, first of 
all, to ensure peaceful solutions for the Montenegrin and Kosovo independence. However, in 
the analyzed period, the interpretation of the security concerns into the concrete action and 
the  understanding  of  the  link  between  democratization  and  security  underwent  some 
important changes that reflected the domestic developments. In the first period of transition 
(2001-2002), the democratization was perceived as the best mean for stability and peace in 
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Serbia, and the two goals were mutually reinforced. The forces supporting democratization 
were at the same time pro-European, pro-integration, anti-Russian and anti-nationalistic. The 
problem  rose  when  the  dichotomy  “authoritarian  regime  +  nationalism  + foreign  policy 
oriented towards Russia and China” vs. “democracy + European integration” broke apart. 
The rise and strengthening of the nationalists who embraced the agenda of economic and 
political reforms654 but opposed the EU integrations and west-oriented foreign policy brought 
to  a  change  in  the  relations  between  EU security  goals  and  democracy  promotion.  The 
protection of the international actor’s security ad strategic interests was therefore no longer 
only the democratization of Serbia, but since 2003 it also implied a preference for the specific 
distribution  of  power  between the  domestic  actors.  We will  see  in  the  section  about  the 
channels  of  influence  how  this  preference  influenced  the  EU  strategies  towards  Serbia, 
inducing it  to take measures that  are against  the democratic  practice and that  contributed 
hampering the democratization process. 
In Table 2 we bring the assessment of the interests that guided the EU actions in the single 
areas of policy, together with the assessment of the compliance with the norms promoted by 
the EU. In Macedonia’s case it is almost striking how the level of compliance is linked with 
the interest of the EU: in all fields where good compliance was registered, the EU action was 
guided by the security concerns. This is not to say that the security concerns on the supply 
side directly increase the response on the domestic level. All issues in Macedonia where EU 
action was security-guided were, as we saw in the chapter about the democratization, those 
that tackled the inter-ethnic relations, and, as we will see in the analyses of other factors of 
EUCLIDA  framework,  these  issues  showed  particularities  on  other  dimensions  as  well. 
Moreover, as we will  see in the section dedicated to the channels of influence used, there 
appears to be a link between the prevailing EU interest in the particular dimension and the 
strength of the conditionality applied. Rather than directly influencing compliance, the interest 
of the international actor appears to be an important element influencing the choice of the 
particular promoted norms and the choice of the used strategies. If we link this result to the 
main studies on the EU democracy promotion, we can notice how the factor “IA’s interests” 
654Among the main political goals of the nationalistic SRS we find the promotion of the reforms in many of 
the dimensions included in this study: the independence of the judiciary, the depoliticization of the civil service 
and the creation of a professional, efficient bureaucracy, the fight against corruption and organized crime, the 
strengthening of the units of local self-government (but opposition to the regionalization). Further on, during the 
five-day long nationalists' presidency in the parliament, the leader of the nationalistic SRS was very careful to fully 
respect the good norms of the parliamentarianism and it was during these five days that the national minorities, 
following their request, were assigned the interpreters and allowed to speak in their mother tongue. 
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tackles two of the most salient dimensions identified in this literature: the “credibility” of the 
IA's action and, in a certain sense, the level of misfit between the promoted norm and the 
domestic  status  quo.  The IA's  interests  thus  become the  factor  that  determines  both the 
choice  of  the  action  (the  stronger  the  interest  in  reaching  the  compliance,  the  “harder” 
channels of action will be used: i.e. when the stakes are high, conditionality is preferred to the 
social influence or social learning, or the different strategies will be combined together) and 
the  strength  with  which  such  action  is  exercised  (the  size  of  reward  offered  when 
conditionality is used, the amount of the resources invested etc.655). As far as the level of misfit 
is concerned, the interests of the international actor and their practical operationalization into 
the  norms  to  be  promoted  influence  the  content  of  the  requirements,  thus  indirectly 
influencing the level of misfit between the domestic rules and the promoted rules. At the same 
time, the interests of the IA and their practical interpretations are strongly influenced by the 
domestic  situation  and  developments,  so  that  during  the  process  it  can  undergo  some 
adjustments or even significant changes, as we saw it was the case with Serbia.
655This point will be further examined and empirically documented in the section dedicated to the channels of 
influence. 
Table 2: “Interests of the EU in promoting specific norms in Macedonia and Serbia”.
Dimensions Macedonia Serbia
Constitutional issues 2001-security
2005-democratization
Good Compliance
Democratization
Partial compliance
Decentralization Security
Good Compliance
Democratization
Compliance initiated only recently (still not implemented)
Form of government - Security
- (the EU interest of keeping SRS away from power was satisfied)
Civil Service (equal 
representation)
Security
Good Compliance
-
Civil Service 
(professionalism)
Democratization
Partial Compliance
Democratization
Partial compliance
Judiciary Democratization
Partial Compliance
Democratization
Lack of Compliance
Fight against corruption Democratization
Fake Compliance
Democratization
Fake Compliance
Police reform (issues 
concerning the equal 
representation)
Security
Good Compliance
-
Police reform (issues 
concerning the 
accountability of the police 
forces)
Democratization
Partial Compliance 
Democratization/security
Partial Compliance
Civil control over military - Democratization/security
Compliance initiated only recently
Right to vote Democratization
Partial Compliance (see section on right to vote)
Democratization
Partial Compliance (see section on right to vote)
Media Democratization
Partial Compliance
Democratization
Partial Compliance
Civil society Democratization
Partial Compliance
Democratization
Lack of compliance
Minority rights (concerning 
Albanian ethnic minority)
Security 
Good Compliance 
-
Minority rights (concerning 
other ethnic minorities)
Democratization
Partial Compliance
Democratization/security
Compliance
Ombudsman (issues 
concerning minority rights 
Security
Good Compliance
-
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and equal representation)
Ombudsman (protection of 
other human rights)
Democratization
-
Democratization
Partial Compliance
Cooperation with ICTY - Security/international justice
Compliance varied in time.
Kosovo issue - Security
- (overly, the EU interest to avoid the inter-ethnic conflict was satisfied)
Name dispute Diplomacy
-
-
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20.2.2 THE SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATION’S CAPACITY
The supranational  organization’s  capacity in promoting the norms is another important 
factor of the revised EUCLIDA theoretical framework, as it directly influences the choice of 
the strategies for rule promotion and their credibility. Unfortunately, the range of this study, 
which was mainly concentrated on the EU as an external actor and only sporadically tackled 
other international organizations (like OSCE or CoE), does not allow a proper comparative 
assessment of the impact the IA’s organizational capacities on the success of the democracy 
promotion. However, in this section we will summarize the remarks that emerged during our 
study, in hope to offer potentially useful insights for further research.
In the theoretical chapter we distinguished between different resources an organization can 
control and use for promoting the rules in the target states. Here we will shortly reflect on 
each of these resources and their importance for the EU democracy promotion in Serbia and 
Macedonia.
The material resources of the IA referred to the security, richness, preferential agreements, 
cooperation in particular policy areas and financial resources the organization controls. These 
are particularly relevant when the IA is using conditionality as a strategy for rule promotion, as 
they represent the goods that might be offered as incentive/compensation for compliance 
with a particular norm. Due to its nature, the EU is particularly rich in the material resources 
on its disposal. The access to the EU common market of goods, capital and labor represents 
an enormous EU resource that makes the membership – or the preferential agreement with 
EU  –  a  particularly  attractive  incentive.  When  referring  to  Serbia  and  Macedonia,  both 
countries with credible perspectives for the EU membership, the access to the EU funds, the 
security and prestige coming from the membership in the EU (security being of particular 
importance to Macedonia),  and finally,  the possibility  to access and participate to the EU 
decision-making process are all  particularly  important.  However,  as we saw in the chapter 
dedicated to the  economic  issues,  the  capacity  of  the  EU to successfully  use  its  material 
resources strongly depends on the attractiveness of a particular incentive for the influential 
domestic  actors.  If  we  release  the  assumption  of  the  nation-state  as  a  unitary  actor  and 
perceive a state as made of different groups with different interests, we can notice how the 
interests of these groups concerning the EU incentives might differ. We thus saw in Serbia's 
case how the opening of the market and the preferential trade agreements with the EU, while 
generally  conceived  as  an important  incentive  the  EU can  use  to  influence  the  domestic 
policy, are not necessarily welcomed by all relevant domestic actors. Similarly, the integration 
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into the EU, that in many theoretical models is assumed to be the strongest incentive the EU 
can offer, is not necessarily perceived as a reward by all the relevant domestic actors. Finally, 
the financial  assistance offered by the EU is not equally distributed between the domestic 
actors and, as we saw in the chapter on the economic issues, in some cases it might have 
important effects on the domestic distribution of wealth and power. Such findings bring to 
two important conclusions: from a theoretical point of view, it draws the attention on the 
distinction between the material resources of the IA and the possibility that such resources are 
successfully used in promoting the compliance with particular norms. The availability of the 
material resources a particular IA controls represents only the potential source of influence, but 
whether  or  not  the  IA's  incentives  will  bring  to  compliance  will  strongly  depend on the 
relevant domestic actor's perception of such incentives and on the possible distributive/re-
distributive effects that the incentives can produce. This also means that, whenever analyzing 
the external impact on the domestic politics, we can not assume that the material resources 
controlled by the IA and the incentives that the IA can offer are necessarily perceived by the 
domestic  actors  as  a  reward,  and  this  is  true  even  for  those  incentives,  like  the  EU 
membership,  that  are  traditionally  assumed  to  be  attractive  for  all  domestic  actors.  The 
plurality of the groups within the target state, the distribution of power among them and, in 
particular, their interests not only towards the content of the promoted norm but also towards 
the offered reward should be included into the analysis. From the prescription point of view, 
this practically means that the “one-size fits all” template is not only inefficient when referred 
to  the  content  of  the  promoted  norms656,  but  also  the  equivalent  “one  reward  fits  all” 
conception should be abandoned. When choosing the incentives to offer, the policy makers 
should pay particular attention to the possible distributive effects the incentives can produce, 
understanding that, due to the pluralism of groups and interests within the target states, what 
might be a reward for some can be perceived as a threat for others.
The  EU material  resources,  and  thus  the  EU leverage  on  the  two  studied  countries, 
significantly increased with the two rounds of enlargement that took place in the analyzed 
period  (2004  and 2007).  As  we  saw in  the  chapter  on  the  economic  resources,  this  was 
particularly true for the last enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, both important trading 
partners  of  Serbia  and  Macedonia.  The  short  period  of  time  that  passed  from  this 
enlargement, however, does not allow us to assess the impact that this increase of the EU 
656For the “one size fits all” as the characteristic of the EU approach in the democracy promotion, see Borzel 
and Risse, 2004.
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leverage had on the rule-promotion success rate,  but the economic figures show that  the 
vulnerability of both Serbia and Macedonia to the EU trade regulations, as well as the impact 
of the EU visa-regime, have particularly tackled both analyzed countries (in the chapter on the 
economic issues we saw how, due to the last two enlargements, both the Serbian export and 
import with the EU increased from 42-40% to 59%, while for Macedonia the increase in the 
import from the EU was from 45% to 62%). Furthermore, in Macedonia’s case, the material 
incentives offered by the EU appear to have particular relevance. As reported by Jovanovksi, 
Head of the Information Office of the Council of Europe in Skopje, the drastically different 
compliance of the Macedonian authorities to the recommendations of the CoE and to those 
coming from the EU derives from the differences in what we labeled as the organizational 
capacity of these two organizations: “The CoE is a value-based institution, not interest-based 
like the EU is.  It  can not condition,  it  can not exercise strong pressure, as the country is 
already a member. It has far less material resources than the EU. It offers a partnership to the 
government, a guide for the reforms, an important hand in the process of democratization, 
but does not and can not impose them. But the Macedonian government is not interested in 
such approach. They don’t want an advice, because they don’t want to reform. The EU carrot 
is thus far more attractive for them”.657 On the contrary, in Serbia such value-based nature of 
the  CoE,  its  softer  strategies  and  the  vast  membership  that  includes  Russia  as  well, 
significantly increased the perceived legitimacy of this institution. In their presentation of the 
bill proposals in the analyzed dimensions, the Serbian government was more often referring to 
the democratic standards of the Council of Europe, or to the Venice Commission or OEBS 
recommendations than to the recommendations of the EU. When calling for the EU as a 
source for particular solutions, the language of conditionality is much more present than that 
of socialization: unlike the “democratic standards and recommendations of the CoE”, when it 
comes to the EU usually the ministers justify their proposal by underlining that a particular 
law is “important for the Serbian integration into the EU”658.
Here we arrive to another set of resources, the social resource of the IA. The social or 
symbolic  values  referred  to  the  values  the  organization  is  based  on,  the  authority  and 
prominence of its members and the symbolic weight the organization has. These resources are 
decisive for the successful usage of the strategies based on the socialization mechanisms. In 
this light,  of particular importance is the respect for the democratic norms in the member 
657 From the interview with Jovanovski, August 2008, Skopje. 
658 For the differences between the EU and CoE in the tactics used, see Checkel, 2000.
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states, as the level of respect for the democratic values within the organization significantly 
influences the legitimacy of the IA when promoting the democratic values outside. From this 
point  of  view,  the  EU is  also  particularly  rich,  as  the  old  member  states  were  all  long-
established,  well-consolidated  western  democracies.  In  all  fields  of  the  “EU  democratic 
package”, the EU Member States do have an important positive record in compliance (the 
rule of law, independence of judiciary, administration, respect of human rights). However, due 
to the diversities of the institutional designs among the member states, while the general call 
for the respect of the democratic norms can be considered legitimate, this can not be said for 
the  particular  solutions  recommended,  for  there  is  no  model  of  judiciary,  administration, 
territorial organization, institutional design common to all member states. This significantly 
influenced the capacity of the EU to promote specific solutions in the target states659. From 
this point of view, any break of the democratic norms in a EU Member State heavily resonates 
in the target states: the Greek refusal to recognize the existence of the national minorities in 
Greece,  the recent intolerance  for the immigrants  in  Italy,  the high level  of  corruption in 
Bulgaria and Romania, all these issues are frequently used by the target state’s government to 
diminish  the  EU  legitimacy  when  criticizing  the  domestic  governments  for  the  lack  of 
compliance. When compared to the CoE, it is interesting to notice how, in Serbia’s case, even 
though  the  CoE  membership  is  granted  to  the  states  that  can  hardly  be  considered 
democratic,  the  legitimacy  enjoyed  by  the  CoE  is  higher  than  that  of  the  EU.  This  is, 
obviously,  partially  a  consequence  of  the  existence  of  strong  anti-EU political  options  in 
Serbia,  but  it  might  also be  linked  to  the  strategies  used  by  the  actors.  It  is  possible  to 
hypothesize that the harder the measures applied and the stronger the influence exercised, the 
more incline the domestic actor are to diminish the vulnerability towards the IA’s leverage, 
which in some cases might bring to questioning the legitimacy of the IA’s action.
Of particular importance in Serbia is the lower level of the EU legitimacy when making 
requirements linked to  other  political issues. As the Serbian authorities are often underlining 
when it comes to the issue of Kosovo, no EU Member State has ever been required to pay its 
entry into the EU with a portion of its territory. Similarly, the EU requirement to Serbia to 
cooperate with ICTY, seen that the tribunal  is  perceived in Serbia  as politicized and anti-
Serbian, is considered illegitimate by many citizens. In a context with strong anti-European 
forces present, the engagement of the EU in promoting the rules in those areas where its 
659 For an example on how the lack of judiciary structure common to all Members States influenced the EU 
rule promotion see Piana, 2005, Piana, 2006.
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action is perceived by the domestic public opinion as illegitimate is used to undermine the 
overall  credibility  of  the EU and to diminish the country’s  vulnerability  to the EU social 
influence. 
Another  important  organizational  resource  derives  from the  institutional  design  of  the 
international  organization.  While  on  one  side  the  political  regime,  the  distribution  of 
authorities and the decision-making process are important for the legitimacy of the IA’s action 
(for an organization which is de iure or de facto ruled by undemocratic practices is unlikely to 
be perceived as legitimate when promoting democratic norms), on the other they are also 
important for the credibility of the commitments made by the organization. In this light, the 
EU decision-making process in  the field  of  enlargement and the veto powers each single 
member state has over the access of new member states is often perceived in the target states 
as the issue undermining the credibility of the promised membership. The overview of the 
press in both Macedonia and Serbia testifies the great attention of these states for the EU 
domestic  affairs.  The  failure  to  adopt  the  EU’s  constitution  and  the  crisis  of  the  EU 
institutions, the global financial crisis and its impact on the EU economy, the decision of the 
EU to diminish the funds prior to the access of the Eastern-Central European countries and 
the assessment of the costs of the enlargement are all issues to which the domestic public is 
paying a lot of attention, basing on such news their assessment of the credibility of the EU 
promises. Further on, the institutional design of the EU and the strong influence the member 
states  have  on  the  EU's  security  and  foreign  policy  can  also  significantly  influence  the 
credibility of the EU conditionality. Whenever there is a divergence between the interests of 
the single member states and the official position of the EU, the political elite of the target 
state can hope to use this discrepancy to achieve the reward without the compliance with the 
promoted norm. The weaknesses of the EU, deriving from the EU's institutional design and 
distribution of power between the EU institutions and the national governments of the single 
member states, represent an important factor influencing the credibility of the EU activity in 
the target states and, in some cases, they can prove to be the most serious obstacle to the 
decisive, credible action of democracy promotion.
Finally, the EU was also successful in using its well-developed networks with other regional 
and global organizations. In the section on the promotion of the anchors we underlined how 
the EU was using its influence to promote the compliance with the recommendations made 
by other international organizations (CoE, OSCE, ICTY, IMF to mention only some). This 
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cooperation was two-fold. By embracing the agenda of the other IA, the EU is capable to 
make use of the partner’s resources. Thus, as Jovanovski stressed, in the field of the human 
rights the EU is completely relying on the CoE and its monitoring mechanisms660. A similar 
approach was also reported by Manevski, an OSCE representative, who underlined how the 
EU relies  on their  office  assessment on the  freedom of the press661,  while  in  the section 
dedicated to the promotion of the other anchors we saw how the same approach was used in 
the  promotion  of  norms  concerning  elections  (rely  on  the  OSCE/ODIHR 
recommendations),  corruption  (GRECO  and  CoE  offering  the  monitoring)  and  civilian 
control over the military (Geneva Center for the Control of Armed Forces).
20.2.3. THE IA’S APPROACH: CONTENT OF THE NORMS PROMOTED
What we refer to when speaking about the content is the set of rules the IA is requiring the 
compliance  with.  For  analytical  purposes  we  distinguished  between  the  “democratization 
package”,  referring to the norms that concern the political  regime in a given country and 
whose goal is to bring to the establishment and consolidation of the democracy in the target 
state and the “integration package”,  which refers to all  other norms promoted by the IA 
(some of which were examined in the chapter named 17, 18 and 19). The distance between 
the content of the norms promoted and the domestic rules in the particular field is known in 
literature as the level of “misfit” (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2005) and it represents the “adaptation 
pressure” (Borzel and Risse, 2000), a factor that is considered as one of the crucial factors 
influencing the compliance. Both the costs of compliance and their distribution among the 
domestic actors are directly influenced by the content of the norm promoted, which makes 
this  factor  particularly  important  for  our  theoretical  framework  as  well  (see  Morlino  and 
Magen, 2008). Further on, the EUCLIDA model hypothesizes that the linking between the 
two separate processes of democratization and integration offers the possibility for cross-issue 
compensation (or attenuation) of the costs and benefits, where the costs one actor suffered 
from the compliance in one area might be compensated by the benefits of the compliance in 
other  areas  of  policy.  In  such case,  the  assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  content  of  the 
“anchoring  package”  implies  not  only  the  analyses  of  the  impact  of  the  single  norms 
promoted, but, more important, the analyses of the combination of the costs and benefits 
deriving from the entire process of the anchoring. This means that the inclusion or exclusion 
660 Interview with Jovanovski, August 2008. Skopje.
661 Interview with Manevski, August 2008, Skopje.
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of  the  particular  issues  in  the  democratization  or  boundary  removal  package  and  the 
developments in that particular policy can have serious consequences for the entire process of 
the international democratic anchoring.
As in the empirical parts of this work we saw the content of the norms promoted by the 
EU in different  dimensions  of  policy662 and the  impact  the  particular  content  had in  the 
analyzed dimensions, in this section we will ponder on the general impact the choice of the 
“EU package” had for the anchoring of Serbian and Macedonian democracy.
When  assessing  the  level  of  democratization  in  the  two  countries,  we  underlined  the 
importance the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the power-sharing instruments had for the 
process  of  democratization  in  Macedonia  and  for  the  establishment  of  the  mechanisms 
hampering the full democratization in this country. An overlook on the dimensions in which 
the  EU concentrated  the  largest  part  of  its  intervention  in  Macedonia  clearly  shows  the 
salience  of  the  issues  concerning  the  inter-ethnic  division  of  power,  while  the  particular 
solutions  promoted  testifies  the  strong  influence  of  consociational  theory  and  its 
recommendations for managing the divided societies. However, before claiming that it was 
the particular content chosen by the EU to influence the democratization in Macedonia, we 
should  first  wonder  whether  other,  alternative  solutions  were  available  for  managing  the 
Macedonian inter-ethnic relations. If no other solution was available, then the content of the 
EU set could not vary, and thus it would be erroneous to claim that it  was the particular 
approach of the EU to produce the registered effects.
. As different scholars argued, when managing the divided societies there is an alternative to 
Lijphart’s model of the consociational democracy and inter-ethnic power-sharing. One of the 
most  influential  criticisms  of  the  power-sharing  mechanisms  comes  from Horowitz,  who 
developed an alternative model according to which a more integrative approach, capable to 
offer the incentives for the cross-ethnic political alliances is the most suitable solution for the 
inter-ethnic  conflicts663.  The  very  Ohrid  Framework  Agreement  seems  to  follow  the 
recommendations coming from both sources: while prescribing the decentralization and equal 
representation (two remedies proposed by Lijphart), it also tried to maintain some of the civic 
features of the state by underlining democracy and rejecting the territorial solutions for the 
inter-ethnic  conflict  (Daftary  2001,  cited in  Bieber,  2004,  p.  5).  However,  as  we saw, the 
662 For a systematized overlook of the recommendations for each dimension, please see the Tables on the EU 
priorities in the appendix of each section.
663 See Lijphart, 1990; Horowitz, 1990. For a discussion of Lijphart’s and Horowitz’s approaches, see Snyder, 
2000.
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interpretations of the OFA and its implementation radically deviated from any civic feature 
the OFA prescribed. 
The analysis of the literature on the inter-ethnic conflict management shows the existence 
of the theoretical alternative to the one prescribed by the Lijphart664. The history on the other 
hand shows some practical examples of both approaches. To stay in the Balkan area, we can 
recall the peace agreement between the Serbian minority and the Croatian majority that was 
included  in  the  Dayton  package,  which  brought  the  inter-ethnic  violence  in  Bosnia  and 
Croatia to an end. The Erdut Agreement, which represented the basis for peace in Croatia, is 
strongly concentrated on the protection of  civic,  political  and human rights  and does not 
include  any  of  the  inter-ethnic  power-sharing  mechanisms.  With  the  constitutional  and 
electoral reform in 2000, under strong pressures from the international community, some of 
the weak forms of consociational mechanisms were included on the local and regional level in 
order to strengthen the protection of the minorities' rights, but without the inclusion of such 
principles on the national level. It is indicative, even though the causal relationship between 
the peace agreement and the further democratization in Croatia should be confirmed through 
a detailed comparative analyses we do not have the space for in this work, that among the 
countries  involved  in  the  inter-ethnic  violence  in  Balkans,  the  Croatian  record  in  both 
democratization  and  stability  is  far  better  than  the  one  we  register  in  the  Bosnia  and 
Macedonia,  cases where the power-sharing  approach including  the entire  spectrum of the 
inter-ethnic consocialism was adopted. Further on, in the works of Horowitz we also find 
other  examples  of  the  successful  management  of  the  inter-ethnic  conflict  through  the 
institutional design that would produce the incentives to inter-ethnic conciliation (to mention 
only  some  of  the  cases  in  which  the  author  analyzed  the  impact  of  the  power-sharing 
mechanisms  and  inter-ethnic  conciliation  mechanisms:  Nigeria  before  and  after  1978, 
Indonesia,  1952, Papua New Guinea before and after dropping the AV electoral system, a 
664For a criticism to Lijphart's consociational approach and inter-ethnic power sharing, see: Horowitz, 1991, 
who developed an alternative approach for the management of divided societies, and criticized the inter-ethnic 
power sharing  on the grounds both of the empirical  evidence and its capacity  to contribute  to the conflict 
settlement; Barry, 1975, who found tautology in Lijphart's pondering over consociationalism's capacity to bring 
to political stability, and challenged the cases Lijphart used as illustrations for the successful cases of power-
sharing;  Snyder,  2000,  who  pointed  out  the  enormous  risks  for  fueling  the  inter-ethnic  violence  that  the 
application of consociationalism and inter-ethnic power sharing in the democratizing states can provoke; Goio, 
2008, who explained how the inter-ethnic power-sharing influences the decision-maker's perspectives of power, 
creating incentives for the further ethnicization of politics; Schendelen, 1984, who criticized the selective use of 
evidence  and  who  challenged  the  English  reader's  vision  of  the  Netherlands  as  a  case  of  consociational 
democracy;  and finally  Lustick,  1995,  who criticized Lijphart's  epistemology and methodology and criticized 
Lijphart's analysis of India. 
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quantitative cross-regions analysis of the link between the electoral results and the inter-ethnic 
relationships in India. See Horowitz, 2008). Finally, as underlined by Schneckener, 2002, by 
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, or by  Snyder, 2000, there are plenty of different consociational 
arrangements and a large spectrum of different power-sharing that create different impact in 
the  different  settings,  offering  thus  plenty  of  concrete  policy  solutions,  some bringing  to 
positive, other to negative outcome when implemented in the concrete national setting.
Turning back to the case of Macedonia, our analysis showed that none of the solutions the 
international actors pushed forward in trying to manage the inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia 
included  mechanisms  encouraging  the  cross-ethnic  political  alliances,  even  though  such 
solutions existed on the market-place of ideas.  Even though the OFA underlined that no 
territorial solutions to inter-ethnic conflict should be applied in Macedonia and required that, 
when  drawing  the  borders  of  the  municipalities,  the  representatives  of  the  municipalities 
would be consulted and the European Charter on Local Self-Government would be respected, 
the borderlines  were drafted following only  the ethnic  key,  neglecting  even the minimum 
logical  requirements  for  the  municipalities’  sustainability.  Similarly,  we  saw  how  the 
implementation of the OFA in the field of the equal representation seriously hampered the 
professionalism of  Macedonian  civil  servants,  while  the  provisions  concerning  the  use  of 
language and education, rather than creating bridges between the divided communities, made 
the  inter-ethnic  division  even  deeper.  If  Macedonia  had  opted  for  a  blind  merit-based 
recruitment  in  administration,  police,  arm  forces  and  judiciary665,  including,  among  other 
criteria,  also  the  knowledge  of  the  Albanian  language666,  the  percentage  of  the  minority 
members in the administration would have increased without hampering the administration's 
professionalism.  Should  the  provisions  ensuring  the  multi-ethnic  character  of  the political 
parties be included, an important link between the divided communities would be created. 
While Horowitz successfully argued that the choice of the electoral system can significantly 
influence the strategies of the political parties, creating the incentives for the creation of the 
multi-ethnic coalitions, the EU never made the recommendations concerning the choice of 
the electoral formula.  Even though Schneckener (2002) underlined that parliamentarianism, 
limited veto rights, limited segmental autonomy (be it territorial or personal) and the flexibility 
of  the  proportional  rules  are  far  more  functional  mechanisms of  power-sharing  than  the 
665According to Snyder, 2000, such solution is explicitly considered a necessary condition for avoiding the 
further deepening of the inter-ethnic conflict and ethnically-blind rule implementation, see Snyder, 2000, p. 332.
666A similar solution based on the language knowledge and more flexible approach to the question of the 
ethnic representation in the civil service can be found in Belgium. See Schneckener, 2002.
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respective  alternative  solutions  (direct  election  of  the  president,  large  veto  rights,  large 
segmental autonomy and fix and rigid approach to the proportional ethnic representation), in 
Macedonia's case the international actors did not include those recommendations that would 
interfere  with  the  relevant  institutions  and  settings  in  a  manner  to  ensure  the  better 
functioning of Macedonian consociationalism.  While  Roeder and Rotschild (2005) develop 
the  “strategy  of  nation-state  stewardship”  as  a  solution  to  the  inter-ethnic  conflicts, 
underlining the important role of the civil society and strong civil liberties,  mechanisms of 
checks  and  balances  and  division  of  power  that  would  create  alternative,  crosscutting 
majorities, the EU promotion of the civil society is only sporadic (see chapter 11) and, as far 
as  the constitutional  design is  concerned,  its  recommendations,  when made,  were actually 
strengthening  the  inter-ethnic  segmentation  (see  chapter  5). Finally,  in  order  to  meet  the 
urgent needs of the higher education in Albanian language, the international actors active in 
the  country  dedicated  significant  help  to  the  creation  and  strengthening  of  the  South 
European  University,  which  is  mainly  addressed  to  the  Albanian  students  (non-Albanian 
students amount to only 20%). However, such approach created a situation in which the two 
ethnically based scientific communities coexist without any communication between them. It 
is  possible  to  hypothesize  that  an  approach  that,  instead  of  strengthening  the  ethnic 
segmentation and isolation,  would create incentives  for crossing the ethnic division in the 
academic community and, more generally, in the civil society, could have contributed to the 
reduction of the inter-ethnic tensions.
Obviously, it is impossible to assess the impact of these alternative solutions we proposed 
above.  The more civic-based approach would surely  be more costly  for the  EU than the 
acceptance of the (bad) solutions over which the leading elite of the two ethnic groups agreed. 
It would require a stronger pressure on the domestic actors and a more active role of the 
solution-promotion rather than the one of the “mediator” played by the EU. Obviously, seen 
the lack of EU's experience with the democracy promotion in ethnically divided societies (the 
sharp inter-ethnic conflict and inter-ethnic violence made the Balkan transition one of the 
most  difficult  transitions  of  the  former  communist  block,  and surely  completely  different 
from  the  EU's  experience  with  the  Central  Eastern  Europe),  the  important  impact  that 
Lijphart's  idea  has  on  the  policy  makers,  the  positive  experience  with  consociationalism 
among the EU member states, the urgency to bring the ongoing inter-ethnic violence to an 
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end and, most importantly,  seen the preferences and requirements of the domestic  ethnic 
elite667, such choice of the EU is fully understandable. What is regrettable is that during the 
implementation of the OFA, in front of the domestic ethnicization of the issues, the EU 
allowed the domestic elite to further institutionalize the ethnicity, instead of insisting on the 
more civic elements present in the original OFA document. Such approach would surely be 
more difficult to promote, seen the large level of misfit between the civic-based solutions and 
the domestic elite's preferences and established status quo. However, seen the very high EU 
leverage  on  Macedonia  and  its  political  elite  that  was  registered  in  this  work,  we  might 
hypothesize  that  the  international  pressures  combined  with  the  incentives  to the  political 
leadership, could have pushed for more civic-based interpretations of the OFA, not allowing 
the  developing  of  incentives  for  the  further  politicization  of  the  ethnicity,  that  were 
recognized in this work as the biggest threat to both Macedonian peace and democracy.
As far as Serbia is concerned, the impact of the “EU anchoring package” content on the 
entire process was very strong. In particular, the choice of the EU to concentrate its attention 
on promoting Yugoslavia’s  and Serbia’s  cooperation with the ICTY significantly  interfered 
with the democratization process, as it increased the costs that the elite of the ancient regime 
derived  from  both  democratization  and  Serbia’s  pro-Western  foreign  policy668.  Such 
requirement  undermined  the  possibilities  for  Serbia  to  follow  the  negotiated  path  in  its 
transition towards democracy, and induced a part of the political elite to break the basis of the 
agreement on the peaceful regime change negotiated the day before the “revolution of the 5th 
October”. The requirement to face the past prematurely brought the question of lustration 
onto  the  agenda,  bringing  to  the  division  within  the  DOS and the  strengthening  of  the 
nationalistic,  anti-EU  political  parties669,  which  in  turn  brought  to  the  developments  we 
described when assessing the democratization in the two countries670. This criticism to the EU 
approach  does  not  mean  to  argue  that  the  EU  should  have  neglected  the  war  crimes 
committed during the '90s. It means to argue that the timing was particularly inadequate. In 
line  with  Snyder’s  affirmation  that  “justice  does  not  lead,  it  follows”,  and  observing  the 
667As Roeder and Rotschild underlined, while the power-sharing settings, in the short-run, are easier to be 
agreed upon and to bring to the ceasing of violence, their implementation in the long-run and the consolidation 
of the peace and democracy build upon such mechanisms is particularly difficult,  bringing to what the two 
authors  labeled the “power-sharing dilemma” which consists  in “ending the war, but losing the peace”.  See 
Roeder and Rotchild, 2005, p. 6.
668 See the section on other political requirements. See also Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2003, Snyder, 2005. 
669 See the section on other political requirements.
670 See the comparative assessment of the mechanisms hampering the democracy in two countries at the 
beginning of the Conclusions.
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example of Croatia and its cooperation with the ICTY, we argue that the EU choice to push 
the  cooperation  with  the  ICTY  before  ensuring  the  establishment  of  the  democratic 
institutions in Serbia had a particular impact on the entire process of democratization. The 
conflict within the new ruling coalition emerged before the reforms had even started, causing 
the  democratization  process  we  previously  described  to  stagnate.  The  effects  of  the  EU 
decision  to  pursue  justice  before  democratization  in  Serbia  rather  confirms  Snyder’s 
prognosis:
“In those cases where the country’s political institutions are weak, forces of reform have not 
won a decisive victory and potential spoilers are strong, attempts to put perpetrators of atrocities 
on trial are likely to increase the risk of violent conflict and further abuses, and therefore hinder 
the  institutionalization  of  the  rule  of  law… Attempting  to  implement  universal  standards  of 
criminal justice in the absence of these political and institutional preconditions risks to weaken the 
norms of justice by revealing their ineffectiveness and hindering necessary political bargaining” 
(Snyder, 2005 p. 11).
As  we  argued  in  the  section  dedicated  to  “other  issues”,  the  content  of  the  EU’s 
“integration package” had a particular importance in Serbia’s  case. The distribution of the 
costs and benefits from the democratization process and from Serbia’s integration in the EU 
overlapped,  thus  making  the  anchoring  process  a  zero-sum  game.  Instead  of  the 
compensation of the costs that we saw in Macedonia's case, in Serbia we registered a situation 
in which,  to the costs  deriving from the regime change,  the costs deriving  from the new 
course of foreign policy were added, creating absolute losers and absolute winners. It was no 
surprise then that a strong anti-EU political force emerged. 
Here again, as it was the case in Macedonia, the main question to answer is whether there 
was any available alternative and what the exit might have been if another course of policy had 
been chosen by the EU. The problem of the Serbian cooperation with the ICTY tackled a 
series of  issues. First of all, the EU's commitment and recognition of the court established 
through the UNSC decision, the USA insistence on the Serbian cooperation with the ICTY, 
the obligation in front of the public opinion to punish those who were responsible for the war 
crimes and genocide perpetrated during the war in the Balkans671,  all these were important 
pressures that influenced the EU's choice to insist on this issue. Further on, the cooperation 
with the ICTY was also perceived as highly important for both the democratization of Serbia 
and for the stabilization and peace in the region: removing the important exponents of the 
671Here the position of the Netherlands is particularly important. As the Netherlands military forces under the 
UNPROFOR were entitled to protect the safe area of Srebrenica, the country was accused of lack of intervention 
to  prevent  the  massacre.  In  order  to  defend  its  own  credibility  and  as  a  kind  of  ransom  for  their  own 
responsibility, the Netherlands was and still is strongly supporting the ICTY.
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ancient regime would further strengthen the new democratic elite, and at the same time would 
neutralize potentially dangerous heads of the military and paramilitary units. The last piece of 
the puzzle to explain the EU's choice to insist on the  cooperation with the ICTY is to be 
found in the underestimation of the strength of the ancient regime and in the underestimation 
of the impact that such requirements would produce on the domestic actors. Yet, while these 
arguments justify the EU's choice to concentrate on the cooperation with the ICTY, this still 
does not mean that there were no available alternatives. As Snyder and Vinjamuri showed, 
there  are  several  different  manners  of  dealing  with  the  war  crimes  (trials  in  front  of 
international courts like ICTY, trials in front of domestic courts, truth commissions, amnesty), 
and the choice among them should be based upon a particular domestic environment (and 
distribution  of  power  between  the  new  and  old  elites)  and  the  impact  that  particular 
instrument produces on the democratization process (see Snyder and Vinjamuri, 2004). The 
different alternatives are based upon different logics of behaviour and the choice of one rather 
than other represents the trade off  between the logic  of  appropriateness and the logic  of 
consequences, between legalism and politics,  between justice and pragmatism. The above-
listed series of reasons brought the EU to opt for the logic of appropriateness, including an 
issue that, from the consequential,  pragmatic, more political point of view was doomed to 
deadlock the democratization process in Serbia among the norms it promoted.
As we saw, the content of the norms promoted by the EU therefore had an important 
impact not only on the developments in the single dimensions, but, more important, on the 
entire process of democratization and integration of Serbia and Macedonia. The choices of the 
EU were strongly influenced by its security concerns (see the previous section on the EU’s 
interests)  and by the  particular  domestic  settings  in  the  two countries,  which  represented 
enormous challenges to the democratization process. As we saw, the impact of the EU choice 
not  only  hampered  the  success  of  the  EU  democracy  promotion  strategies,  but  it  also 
introduced elements of internal instability  that,  on the long run, threatened the security as 
well.
Beside the costs that come from the adaptation pressure of the promoted norms, timing is 
also an important dimension of the IA’s approach that can significantly influence the exit of 
the entire process. The promotion of the particular norm represents an external influence on 
the domestic decision-making agenda. It is erroneous to see the promotion of a particular 
norm as an isolated event. A recommendation coming from an influential external actor is 
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strongly influenced not only by the existing domestic status quo, but by the particularities of 
the moment, by other issues on the agenda, by the distribution of the power and the domestic 
actors’ perspective of power. As the garbage-can model of decision-making teaches us, each 
decision is the product of the particular moment in which it was taken. The timing in which 
the IA chooses to push forward the issues on the domestic agenda is an important aspect of 
the IA’s approach that might be crucial  for understanding the exit  of the IA’s promotion 
activity.
20.2.4. THE IA’S APPROACH: CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE
Another component of the IA’s approach is the channel of influence through which the IA 
is promoting the norm. In the theoretical part of this work we identified four channels of 
influence: conditionality, influence on the domestic distribution of power, social influence and 
persuasion (social learning). The goal of this study, which included the analysis of numerous 
dimensions  in  the  two  countries,  does  not  allow  to  focus  on  the  micro-processes  of 
socialization of individuals or small groups, nor the assessment of the influence these agents 
have on the decision-making process, approach that best suits the constructivist ontology (see 
Johnston,  2001,  pp.506-507).  For  this  reason,  while  the  research  offers  the  possibility  to 
properly assess the impact of the conditionality and influence on the domestic distribution of 
power, we were not able to collect the necessary data for a proper, exhaustive analysis of the 
socialization strategies. However, a research design that concentrated on the process-tracing 
allowed us to identify those cases where the impact of the social influence strategies directly 
brought to the changes, offering us the possibility to analyze at least the most relevant cases of 
influence  through  the  socialization  strategies,  drawing  conclusions  from  them  about  the 
conditions  under  which  those  strategies  are  functioning  and considering  the  impact  they 
produce. Further on, by concentrating on the prevailing ideologies of the ruling political elite 
and  on  the  diffusion  of  the  values  in  the  society,  we  will  also  be  able  to  make  general 
reflections concerning the vulnerability of the state elite to the EU’s social influence. As far as 
the influence on the domestic distribution of power is concerned, as we underlined in the 
theoretical chapter of this work, the particularity of this strategy is that, rather than promoting 
a specific  norm, it  concentrates  on bringing  the actors  who share the IA’s  agenda to the 
power. Due to its particularities, this strategy it is rarely used (until now, it was used only in 
the cases of Maciar’s Slovakia, and, as we will see, in Serbia) and also rarely studied, so that the 
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research that included the country in which the strategy was put in place is offering a precious 
opportunity to assess the impact of this channel of influence. 
As  we  can  see  from  Tables  3  and  4,  conditionality  was  applied  extensively  in  both 
countries, with an important cross-country difference when it comes to the strength of the 
conditionality  and the rewards offered in exchange for compliance. We can notice how in 
Macedonia  not  only  were  official  requirements  on  the  level  of  the  European (Accession) 
partnership for rule adoption/implementation made, but also financial assistance was more 
often conditioned by the rule adoption, and, more importantly, in a great number of cases the 
compliance  was conditioned  by more immediate  and greater  awards (such as  the donors’ 
conference in 2002, the EU candidate status in 2005 and since then the promise to open the 
negotiations)672. In 11 out of 15 cases of rule promotion included in Tables 3 and 4 different 
means of conditionality were used, and 7 dimensions of policy linked to the democratization 
were included among the key short-term priorities. In Serbia, the conditionality applied was 
far weaker: a) the access to the CARDS funds was usually not linked to the rule compliance 
with the EU recommendations; b) only 4 dimensions concerning the democratization found 
their place among the key short-term priorities; c) only in case of requirement to cooperate 
with the ICTY a strong, decisive conditionality with important rewards (donors’ conference in 
2001, SAA negotiations in 2006-2007, signature and implementation of the SAA 2007-2008) 
was applied. 
672 On the importance of the size of the award offered, see Morlino and Magen, 2004; Morlino and Magen, 
2008, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004.
Table 3: “The use of conditionality, rule adoption and compliance in Macedonia”
  
Rule adoption explicitly made 
a necessary condition for the 
signature of an important 
international treaty, 
integration process, accession 
to the funds
The issue was 
a part of the 
EU key short 
term priorities
The issue was a part of 
the EU short term 
priorities or among the 
priorities needing 
attention in the SAA 
reports
CARDS financial 
support to the 
process 
conditioned by the 
adoption of the 
laws
Rule 
Adopti
on
Compliance 
Judiciary Judicial reform 2004 - 2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial
Constitutional 
issues
Constitutional reform (OFA 
2001) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Good
Constitutional reform (part on 
judiciary 2005) Yes Yes Yes Not directly Yes Partial
Decentralizatio
n
Decentralization: 
Amendments 2001, The Law 
on Local Self-government 
(2002)
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Good
The Law on Municipal 
Boundaries (2004) Yes No Yes Yes Yes Good
Civil Service Civil service reform Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Partial
Civil Society 2001-2008 No No Yes No Yes Difficult
Police reform
Issues concerning the equal 
representation and 
decentralization of police 
service
Yes yes yes Yes Yes Good
Issues concerning the human 
rights protection and 
accountability
Partially yes yes Yes Partially Difficult
Minority rights 2001-2008 Yes No Yes Yes Yes Good
Elections and 
right to vote
2002 No - Yes No Yes No
2006 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No
Ombudsman Strengthening of the ombudsman (2003-) No no yes No Yes Partial
Media freedom 2001-2008 No No Yes No Yes Difficult
Fight against 
corruption 2001-2008 x Yes Yes Yes Yes No
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Table 4: “The use of conditionality, rule adoption and compliance in Serbia”.
 
Rule adoption explicitly 
made a necessary condition 
for the signature of an 
important international 
treaty, integration process, 
accession to the funds
The issue was 
a part of the 
EU key short 
term priorities
The issue was a part 
of the EU short term 
priorities or among 
the priorities needing 
attention in the SAA 
reports
CARDS 
financial 
support to the 
process 
conditioned by 
the adoption of 
the laws
Rule 
Adoption
Compliance 
Judiciary Judicial reform 1 (2001) - - Yes No Yes No
Judicial reform 2 (2002-2003) No - Yes No No -
Judicial reform 3 (2006 -) No Yes Yes No No -
Constitutional 
issues
2000-2006 No X Yes No No -
Constitution 2006 No X Yes No Partial Partial
Decentralization Local Self-government, 2002 Yes (CoE) No Yes No Yes Partial
local self-government 2007 No Indirectly No No Partial Partial
Regions 2002 Yes (CoE) No Yes No Yes Partial
Regions 2006 No No - No - -
Civil Service 
Reform
Failure to reform (2001-
2003) No X Yes Yes No
-
The reform (2004 - ) X Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial
Fight against 
corruption
2001-2002 No - - No Partial Partial
2004- No Yes Yes Yes Partial Partial
Civil Society No No Yes Yes No -
Military
The lack of reform 2000-
2003 No No Yes No No
-
The reform 2006 - No Yes Yes No Yes Ongoing
Police reform 2001-2003 No No Yes No Partial Partial
2004- No No Yes Yes Partial Partial
Minority rights Yes (CoE) No Yes No Yes Difficult
Elections and 
right to vote
2002, 2004 No No Yes No Partial Partial
2007 "electoral reform" No No Yes No Partial Partial
Ombudsman 
(2005- ) No No Yes No Partial
Partial
Media Freedom Serbia 2000-2003 No No - Yes Partial -
Serbia 2004-2007 No No Yes Yes Partial Partial
Cooperation 
with ICTY  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Compliance 
with 
difficulties
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Two are the factors explaining such difference in the level of the conditionality used: first 
of all, the two countries differ in their relationship with the EU. Macedonia signed the SAA 
already in 2001 (mainly as part of the EU’s effort to bring peace to Macedonia by offering a 
strong political incentive for ceasing the hostilities), and a series of reforms were put in place 
since 2004 with the intention to apply for the candidate status. Serbia, on the other hand, still 
appears far from the application for candidate status (it only recently signed the SAA whose 
implementation is postponed by EU until  the arrest of the last two ICTY indictees).  This 
practically  confirms  the  thesis  advanced  by  the  scholars  studying  the  EU  democracy 
promotion, according to which the nearer and bigger the award, and the more advanced the 
process of integrations of the country, the more credible and successful is the conditionality673. 
However,  the  level  of  the  country’s  integration  with  EU  only  partially  explains  the 
difference in the strength of the conditionality applied to the two countries, as it concerns 
only one component of the conditionality strategy: the reward offered. It does not, however, 
explain the content of the norms that are linked to the reward offered. If we observe the 
conditionality that was linked to the donors’ conferences in Macedonia and Serbia,  we can 
notice how, while in Serbia the only requirement was Milošević’s transfer to the Hague, in 
Macedonia the donors’ conference was used to promote a series of norms: the constitutional 
reform, the Law on Local Self-Government, the Law on Amnesty and parts of the police 
reform. Similarly,  while the advancement in the relationships with EU in Serbia’s case was 
(and still  is)  conditioned by the cooperation with the ICTY (and, as we will  see, with the 
particular distribution of power between political leaders), the advancement in the integration 
process in Macedonia’s  case was conditioned with several  reform (police  reform, judiciary 
reform,  issues  concerning  the  elections).  The choice  of  the  issues  that  will  represent  the 
condition for assigning the reward reflects rather well the IA’s interests and the way the IA’s 
interest is reflected in concrete requirements. We can therefore notice that almost all issues 
(the judiciary reform in Macedonia being the only exception) in which the EU decided to use 
the strong conditionality (conditioning both the integration and the financial assistance) were 
those  issues  that  were  perceived as  keys  for the  EU’s security  concerns  in  two countries 
(ICTY and distribution  of  power  in  Serbia,  decentralization,  police  reform,  constitutional 
reform, Law on Amnesty, ceasing of the violence on the pooling day in Macedonia). This link 
between the IA’s interest, the practical interpretation of these interests in specific dimensions 
673 See  Morlino  and  Magen,  2004;  Morlino  and  Magen,  2008,  Schimmelfennig  and  Sedelmeir,  2004, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2005, Kelley 2004.
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of  policy  and  the  use  of  the  conditionality  are  of  particular  importance  for  the  revised 
EUCLIDA theoretic framework as they justify our decision to enlarge the framework on the 
supply side and include the IA's interests as an independent exogenous variable. 
If  we  turn  to  the  implementation  of  the  norms  promoted  through  the  conditionality 
channel (see Tables 3 and 4), we can see that while the strength of the conditionality generally 
appears to be positively linked with the rule adoption674, it appears to be a sufficient condition 
for the rule adoption only in those cases where an important reward (such as the signature of 
an important treaty, access to a huge amount of financial assistance or advancement in the 
integration  process)  is  at  stake.  Such finding  is  largely  in  line  with  the  findings  of  other 
researches that assessed the impact of the conditionality (see Morlino and Magen, 2008, also 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). In all such cases a positive response of the domestic 
governments followed, despite the large domestic costs the compliance caused (see the cases 
of the cooperation with ICTY in Serbia or the issues concerning the implementation of OFA 
in Macedonia). In other cases, where such important reward was not offered, the adoption of 
the rule promoted by the EU was influenced also by the factors on the domestic level (see 
below).
 Finally, as it emerges from the columns dedicated to the implementation of the rule, the 
impact  of  the  conditionality  appears  far  less  influential,  offering  further  evidence  to  the 
findings of Morlino and Magen who also register the gap between the rule adoption and the 
rule implementation (see Morlino and Magen, 2008). The important reward could ensure the 
proper implementation of the norms only in those areas concerning the implementation of 
the peace agreement in Macedonia, the same issues the EU had the most interest in, and 
where, as we will see, the domestic factors also had a positive influence. In other cases the 
partial or fake compliance were registered. This is quite in line with our hypothesis about the 
type of compliance achieved through the usage of the conditionality: the implementation of 
the adopted norm due to the change in the costs and benefits calculations will depend on the 
further structure of the costs and benefits for the stakeholders. Once the rule is adopted and 
the reward achieved, the original stakeholders’ preferences might bring to the obstruction of 
the  implementation  making  the  final  outcome  strongly  depending  on  the  structure  of 
opportunities in the phases of the rule implementation.
674 Among the 41 issues presented in Tables 3 and 4, the high level of conditionality (positive assessment in at 
least three out of four indicators included in the table) was used in 14 cases, and brought to the adoption of the 
rule as recommended by the EU in 11 cases (or 78%), most of which in Macedonia. 
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As  far  as  the  social  influence  is  concerned,  for  the  reasons  we  underlined  in  the 
introduction  to this  section,  we registered only  few cases  in  which  this  strategy appeared 
relevant. One of the most interesting is surely the corruption issue in Macedonia, where the 
report of the International Crisis Group exercised not only an extremely strong pressure on 
the Macedonian ruling elite (resulting in the immediate adoption of a series of measures for 
fighting back the corruption), but, by accusing the international organizations (EU included) 
for financing the corruption in Macedonia, it exercised social influence over the IA as well, 
resulting  in  the  immediate  inclusion  of  the  “fight  against  corruption”  among  the  norms 
promoted in Macedonia. The social influence of the ICG report on the content of the norms 
EU was promoting in Macedonia is evident if we compare the 2002 and 2003 Commission 
report on Macedonia. While corruption was recognized as a serious problem in Macedonia 
already in the 2002 report, it was not mentioned among the Commission’s recommendations 
to Macedonia until 2003. Usually, in the studies assessing the impact of the social influence, 
scholars are underlining that “when social influence is at work, (…) compliance should take 
place in the absence of material side-payments or threats of sanctions” (Johnstone, 2001, p. 
506). However, in the case of the fight against corruption in Macedonia, we can claim that the 
social  influence  was  crucial  and  more  important  than  the  conditionality,  both  for  the 
compliance  of  the Macedonian authorities,  and for inducing  the security-concerned IA to 
include the issue among its priorities. 
Other cases in which the social influence was applied in Macedonia concerned the reform 
of the judiciary, the accountability of the police forces and the electoral reform. In the case of 
the judiciary reform, strong criticisms against the Macedonian judiciary came from the World 
Bank, IMF and EU identifying in the lack of rule of law the main obstacle to the Macedonian 
economic development and thus drawing the attention of the domestic public onto the issue. 
However,  seen  that  strong  conditionality  was  exercised  in  promoting  the  reform  of  the 
judiciary in Macedonia, it is difficult to assess the impact of social influence in this case. The 
same is true for the police service reform where the CoE’s report on the violation of the 
human rights led to domestic criticisms, but as the adoption of the Law on Police was a part 
of the conditions for the candidate status, we can not consider social influence decisive for the 
reform. Finally,  in the case of the electoral reforms, the social influence was also relevant. 
Both electoral reforms (2002 and 2006) were triggered by the OSCE reports on the electoral 
irregularities that caused the delegitimization of the domestic status quo and loud criticisms 
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from the domestic civil society and experts. However, seen that in 2006 the social influence 
was  combined  with  strong  conditionality,  the  social  influence,  while  present  and  surely 
relevant in both cases, can be considered important only in the case of the 2002 electoral 
reform. 
Rather in line with the prediction concerning the type of compliance a particular strategy 
produces, here again we register fake compliance as the final outcome of the reforms. Yet, 
unlike the case with conditionality, the particularity of social influence as strategy to promote 
the reforms resides in the type of issue promoted: it usually concerns those issues in which the 
main line of the conflict divides the rulers from the ruled; the costs of the compliance with 
such norms usually tackles the political elite, while the citizens are the main beneficiaries of 
the  compliance.  For  this  reason,  it  is  obvious  that  the  government  is  usually  prone  to 
answering to the criticisms that undermine its democratic legitimacy with the adoption of a 
legislation  which is  usually  symbolic  in  its  nature.  The success of  such strategies  strongly 
depends on the strength of the domestic civil society and of the electorate to influence the 
decision makers675. Where, as we claimed it was the case in Serbia and Macedonia, the ruling 
elite succeeds in avoiding the accountability, the impact of the strategies aiming to undermine 
the ruling elite’s legitimacy is rather limited.
As  we  saw  from  this  short  description  of  those  cases  in  which  social  influence  was 
registered, in most cases it was an international actor other than the EU to issue the critical 
report that caused the delegitimization of the domestic status quo. Even though such finding 
is strongly biased by our level of analysis which is inadequate, as we argued, for revealing the 
impact  of  the  socialization  strategies,  some general  observations  can be  made.  The  most 
visible moment in which the EU exercises such influence is when the Commission issues its 
reports on the developments in the candidate and potential candidate status. As the report 
covers all dimensions included in the study, rather than an impact on specific dimensions of 
policy, the EU Commission reports represent a kind of overall evaluation of the government’s 
performance.  Concentrating  on  the  reactions  of  the  two  countries’  governments  on  the 
evaluation of the EU Commission, we can notice how the Macedonian political leadership 
appears to be much more vulnerable to the criticisms coming from Brussels. While in Serbia 
the EU commission reports are usually  commented over the media but do not rise great 
675 Thus Checkel,  2001,  examines the link between the patterns of the decision-making process  and the 
success of the social influence as strategy, underlining that the social influence can be successfully used only 
where there is a strong civil society with significant influence over the decision makers.
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discussions  among the public,  in  Macedonia  the last  negative EU report  triggered serious 
discussions  on  both  public  and  political  levels.  The  opposition  seized  the  possibility  to 
criticize the government, while the space the media dedicated to the deficiencies was rather 
consistent. This brings us to the assessment of the overall capacity of the EU to exercise social 
influence on the ruling elite in two countries. 
As we underlined in the theoretical part of this work, the level of identification of the target 
state (citizens’ and elite’s) with the international environment and the level of misfit between 
the norm promoted and the internally  diffused norms are two crucial  factors opening the 
possibility for social influence. Seen the high level of domestic support the EU and NATO 
integrations enjoy in Macedonia, the Macedonian political elite is particularly vulnerable to any 
criticism coming from the EU and NATO. The domestic experts often report the enormously 
high levels of the external accountability of the Macedonian political elite, which practically 
results  in  a  situation  where  the  IA  replaces  the  citizens  in  their  function  of  keeping  the 
government responsible. Such situation has two consequences: on the one hand, the influence 
of the external actors on the Macedonian political leadership is extremely high, on the other, 
the democratic capacity of the country appears rather low. As Hristova underlined, whenever 
some political actor fails to comply with the democratic norms, the first reaction is 
“to run to the EU representative or the USA ambassador, to lament the misbehaviour of the 
political opponent. They behave like children that do not have the capacity to solve their inner 
conflicts and have to run to the teacher seeking for protection. Instead of using the domestic 
institutions, instead of mobilizing the citizens, instead of calling for the attention of the public, 
they run to the foreign representatives. And this shows where the legitimacy to govern Macedonia 
comes from” (from the interview with Hristova, August 2008, Skopje). 
Such behavior  is  further  propelled  by  the  domestic  public  which,  in  desire  to  see  the 
country become part of the EU and NATO, is very sensitive to the assessments coming from 
the IA. The importance of the external legitimacy for the domestic political  elite  was also 
registered  when,  in  the  section  dedicated  to  the  right  to  vote,  we  underlined  the  USA 
ambassador’s  statements  according  to  which  the  government  elected  due  to  electoral 
irregularities will not be considered legitimate by the USA, a statement that brought to what 
can be considered the only round of elections positively assessed since 2001. 
As social influence can derive from  both  the desire to be part of a specific international 
organization and from the desire to show compliance with the internationally accepted norms, 
it appears relevant in Macedonia's case to underline that the main source of the elite’s leverage 
to the IA’s assessment comes from the desire to become part of the EU rather than to comply 
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with the democratic norms. This emerges as an evident conclusion from the studies by the 
domestic authors who claim that 
“in Macedonia there is an impression that our political consolidation is a process undertaken 
only due to the pressure from the international community. In practice, this means that we and 
our political elite do not need to improve the existing situation, we would be happy with lower 
standards as well,  but, as they (the international community,  author's note) insist,  we are forced 
to…” (Hristova, 2005, p. 2). 
In such asset, where the vulnerability of the domestic elite towards the influence of the 
external  actors  results  in  the substitution  of  the  accountability  from the citizens  with  the 
international  factors,  the  democratization  process  is  completely  dependent  from  the 
international anchoring. In absence of external anchors, an extremely weak domestic society, 
whose democratic potential is also questionable, would not be able to make the ruling elite 
accountable  for.  The  entire  process  of  Macedonian  democratization,  as  we  will  see,  is 
therefore a product of the external influence and the international anchor appears to be the 
only source of survival of Macedonian (to-be) democracy.
The situation  in  Serbia  is  completely  different.  The presence of  strong anti-EU forces 
diminishes the general importance this actor has for the legitimization of the domestic elite. 
Such influence should be rather assessed for the single actors, where the capacity of the EU to 
exercise social influence decreases as we pass from the pro-EU to the anti-EU actors. As we 
will see, a part of the EU strategy towards Serbia consisted in maintaining on power those 
actors whose ideological package and higher identification with the EU made them more open 
to external influence. However, while in Serbia there is no largely diffused identification with 
the EU, there is a widely accepted support for democracy as a form of government and the 
diffused belief that Serbia needs a series of reforms in order to become a well consolidated 
democracy.  The democratic  values and the conscience about the importance of change in 
many  of  the  dimensions  we  analyzed  in  this  work  are  accepted  even  by  the  right-wing 
nationalistic party, who, while strongly opposing the pro-Western course of the foreign policy, 
still  underlines its devotion to democracy, respect for the rule of law, the necessity for an 
independent judiciary, free media, professional bureaucracy, de-politicized military and police, 
the strengthening of the local units of self-government (without regionalization)676. In practice, 
this means that the external social influence can be better  exercised by relying on Serbia’s 
identification with the democratic values, rather than on its identification with the EU. The 
partial reforms that, even in the absence of strong and credible external conditionality and of a 
676 Program SRS u deset tačaka, available at http://www.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/index.php?a=44. 
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strong civil society, were introduced by the mid-nationalist government in the period 2004-
2007, testifies the importance that the label “democratic” has for the Serbian political elite. 
The  trend  to  include  the  external  experts  in  the  procedure  of  law-drafting  even  without 
complying with their recommendations, and the trend to seek for the legitimization of the 
introduced reforms by underlining the compliance with “the highest international democratic 
standards” testifies the existence and importance of the identification with the internationally 
accepted democratic norms and the importance that the social influence had for the Serbian 
decision makers. At the same time, the tendency to introduce the shortcomings in the adopted 
legislation and to obstruct the full implementation indicates that the level of the interiorization 
of these norms by the ruling elite  is  rather low,  inducing  us to assess these changes as a 
product of social influence rather than social learning677.  Such lack of implementation also 
confirms the hypothesis according to which the compliance with the norm adopted in the 
search for legitimacy can be ensured only when there are mechanisms capable to unmask the 
fake compliance and to threaten the elite’s legitimacy in case of non-implementation. Where, 
like in Serbia,  the media freedom is threatened,  the civil  society is  weak and the electoral 
accountability is hampered by the peripheral turnover, the fake-reforms are the mix produced 
by the government’s necessity to keep its “pro-democratic” label and a structure which allows 
that the full compliance with the democratic norms is avoided.
This  lack  of  influence  on  part  of  the  Serbian  political  forces  and  the  lack  of  general 
identification with the EU induced the international actor to include, among the strategy used 
in  Serbia,  the  influence on the  domestic  distribution  of  power.  Such choice  was  strongly 
influenced by the EU’s security concerns, that identified in the SRS and Serbian nationalism a 
main security  threat,  particularly  in  the  light  of  the at  time still  unsolved Kosovo's  status 
problem.  Further  on,  judging  from  the  SRS  electoral  promises,  their  victory  would  also 
strengthen the Russian influence over the Balkans, it would make it difficult for the western 
companies to enter the Serbian market, possibly also threatening the foreign investments in 
the country, as the party was promising the “revision” of the privatization arrangements and 
was opposing the right of the non-citizens to own property. This way, the possible rise to 
power of SRS would represent a potential threat not only to the EU security, but also to its 
strategic and economic goals, inducing the EU to try to keep the Radicals from being in office. 
677 According to Johnston, 2001, the main difference between social influence and social learning resides in 
the level  of interiorization of the norm: in the case of the social  learning, the norm is internalized and the 
subject’s values and preferences are changed due to successful persuasion. In the case of the social influence, 
such change does not take place. 
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Last,  but not  least,  maintaining  those known as “pro-EU and pro-democratic” parties  on 
power,  would on the one hand ensure the  prevalence of the actor whose agenda is more 
compatible with the EU’s, while on the other it would also ensure better domestic conditions 
for the successful usage of other strategies of rule promotion (as we saw, the social influence 
is functioning only on those actors who are highly identified with the actor exercising the 
influence, and only a pro-EU government would consider the EU integrations as a reward for 
compliance).
The usage of this strategy is best registered by analysing the statements that followed the 
Serbian electoral competitions: since 2002, the comments of the EU representatives on the 
forthcoming electoral competition in Serbia were filled with the “hopes” that Serbia would 
“opt for democracy and Europe”.  The results  of the election,  on their  turn,  were usually 
commented  with  expressions  of  satisfaction  for  the  victory  of  the  democratic  blocks 
combined with expressions of concern for the rise of nationalists. The strong EU message 
given to the Serbian electorate, according to which “No EU future is possible with radicals” 
found its  practical  example in May 2007.  During the 5-day-long Nikolić’s  mandate as the 
assembly’s spokesman, the Belgrade stock market fell, the international agreements signatures 
were postponed and foreign investments suspended. 
While in the period 2002-2007 the EU limited its influence on the electoral competitions in 
Serbia to stating its support to the pro-EU candidates and to schedule the Kosovo agenda in a 
manner to diminish the opportunity for nationalists to use the Kosovo issue for their electoral 
campaign,  after  May  2007  the  EU started  to  openly  support  the  pro-European  political 
parties. In order to avoid the rise to power of the nationalists in May 2007, the EU pressed on 
Tadić to accept Koštunica’s conditions for the creation of the “pro-EU government”, offering 
in  exchange  the  re-opening  of  the  SAA negotiations  with  Serbia  (see  the  section  on the 
ICTY).  As  Koštunica  moved  towards  the  nationalistic  block,  in  2008  the  EU  openly 
influenced the electoral results in Serbia in an effort to increase Tadić’s and small pro-EU 
parties’ credibility and in a hope to ensure the victory of the candidates devoted to the EU 
agenda. Thus, during the campaign for the presidential elections in the first months of 2008, 
Serbia was offered a “special agreement” with the EU on January the 29th, to be signed on 
February the 7th,  an offer coming from the EU Council  of Ministers and criticized by the 
European  Parliament  as  an  effort  to  directly  influence  the  exit  of  the  second  turn  of 
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presidential elections, scheduled for February the 3rd.678 The same criticisms were expressed on 
the decision to sign the SAA with Serbia on April the 29th, prior to the end of the campaign 
for  the  parliamentary  elections  scheduled  for  May  the  11th679.  The  formation  of  the 
government in 2008 was also under strong EU influence, when, in order to avoid the coalition 
between SPS, SRS and DSS, the EU started pressing for the formation of what was seen by 
the Serbian public  as an impossible,  unnatural coalition between DS and SPS, parties that 
since the beginning of the '90s were in a relation of strong animosity. It is difficult to assess if 
there were any financial incentives offered to the SPS to induce them to take the EU path. 
Generally, due to the lack of transparency of the parties’ financings in Serbia, it is difficult to 
bring the evidence of possible EU material supports to specific political parties, even though 
there  is  a  high  possibility  that  such  link  was  established  already  in  the  '90s,  when  the 
opposition to the regime was financed by international  donations (illegal,  according to the 
law)680. However, in exchange for the SPS support, the party was offered the integration in the 
international  flows from which  it  had been cut away,  and a new perspective  of  the  pro-
European left-wing party: while SPS required the membership in the Socialist International in 
exchange for their entrance into coalition with DS, it was also offered the status of observer in 
the Party of the European Socialists681.  All these examples testify that, since 2002, the EU 
sought to influence the distribution of power among the Serbian political  actors,  first in a 
softer  manner  by  delegitimizing  the  nationalists  and  recommending  the  composition  of 
“acceptable”  ruling  coalitions,  and  since  2007  even  more  openly,  combining  the 
delegitimization of SRS with clear,  open support to the electoral campaign of the pro-EU 
parties and strong pressures for ensuring the formation of the pro-EU ruling coalitions. But 
what was the impact of such strategy?
In terms of the EU short term preferences, the strategy can be considered successful, as 
the immediate goal, to keep the SRS away from power, was realized. A closer look, however, 
reveals the serious problems such strategy rose. By identifying in SRS an enemy to fight, the 
EU actually  froze  SRS’s  anti-EU preferences.  The  EU’s  de-legitimization  of  the  radicals 
678 See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=29&nav_id=282615  ,  
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=01&dd=29&nav_category=11&nav_id=282615. 
679 See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?
yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=29&nav_id=296320&nav_category=11. 
680 See Southeast European legal development initiative report “Anti corruption in southeast Europe: first 
steps and policies”, p. 91. 
681 See http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=05&dd=27&nav_id=300625 
http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=07&dd=01&nav_id=306393. 
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contributed  to  strengthen  the  party’s  identity  and  was  the  best  proof  of  the  radicals’ 
commitment to anti-Europeism that the party could offer to its own electorate682. 
While the effects of such EU strategy on the SRS electoral results are mixed (the discussion 
would  require  a  specific  study  on  the  subject),  it  had  a  decisive  influence  on  the  SRS’s 
(im)possibility to gain the power. It decreased the radicals’ coalition potential, and it kept their 
candidate away from the Presidential office. But at the same time, the usage of this strategy 
strengthened the effects of the polarized pluralism type of political system, contributing to 
further limitation of the political competition and electoral accountability683.  As the biggest 
political  party was cut away from the access  to power,  the pro-democratic  forces (and in 
particular  the  central  actor  of  the  party  system)  were  withdrawn  from  the  electoral 
accountability, which influenced their devotion to the democratization reforms684. Further on, 
as the EU support was offered only to part  of the political spectrum, unlike in Macedonia 
where the parties are competing for the EU’s support and recognition which then make them 
accountable for by the external actor, in Serbia the EU is a resource of power available only to 
some actors. This diminished the EU’s influence on the pro-EU parties by undermining the 
possibility for the EU to make these parties accountable for by threatening to withdraw its 
support685. The tolerance for Koštunica’s nationalism and fake compliance or the acceptance 
of the SPS as the pro-EU party are the illustrations of such weakness.
682 The effect of the EU delegitimization of the SRS on the party’s electoral results represents a potentially 
fertile ground for testing Rabinowitz’s model of the spatial competition. The hypothesis could be made that, far 
from discouraging its voters, the EU approach to the SRS increased the credibility of the party’s anti-western 
rhetorics.
683 As Vachudova stresses, “the EU and other Western policymakers need to understand that all previous 
cases of successful transition in post communist Europe are associated with the regular alternation of political 
parties in power, as well as the eventual transformation of most illiberal parties into parties that govern their 
countries on the road to EU accession. This has several implications for the Western Balkan states. First, the 
alternation  of  parties  in  power  should  be  welcomed  –  most  crucially,  after  the  2006  elections  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Second, parties that are considered extremist, such as the Radical party in Serbia, are unlikely to 
disappear. The best hope is to open more channels of communication and create incentives for them to embark 
on the process of “adapting” to an EU-compatible agenda.” (Vachudova, 2006, p. 14).
684This is particularly true for the Koštunica and his DSS. A comparison of the laws drafted by the DSS (both 
those that were adopted and those that were only proposed) in the period prior to the consolidation of the 
polarized pluralism type of political system and those drafted and adopted after the DSS became a central party 
of the polarized party system with centrifugal competition and peripheral turnover shows a clear change of the 
preferences concerning the mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability. See the relevant empirical chapters, 
and, in particular, the chapter on the judiciary that brings some concrete examples.
685 The importance of this finding is best seen if we compare the impact of the EU with the impact of the  
actors that, by offering their support to all political parties, create a situation where the parties are forced to 
compete for their support. In this work such comparison was made in the chapter dedicated to the economic 
issues, where the EU and the domestic business elite's impact on the political stakeholders were compared, and a 
comparative analysis of the situation in Macedonia and Serbia was undertaken. For a more detailed explanation 
and argumentation of this point, please see the paragraph “comparative assessment” in the chapter 17.
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It is interesting to notice how the factors on the IA and domestic level have influenced 
each other: the IA’s interests (security) resulted in the definition of the content of the norms 
to be promoted (concentrating  on the ICTY, Kosovo,  relations  with Montenegro),  which 
brought to the internal conflict within the domestic ruling elite that saw a re-emergence of the 
pro-nationalistic parties. The re-emergence of nationalism brought to further EU’s security 
concerns  which  now  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  new strategy  to  apply  towards  the 
country. Finally, the choice of the strategy sealed the SRS on its position of the “anti-system” 
party, and contributed to the further radicalization of their political agenda, turning them into 
the  irresponsible  opposition,  further  nourishing  the  polarized  pluralism  type  of  political 
system whose dynamics we identified as the main obstacle in the Serbian democratization 
process.
20.3. DOMESTIC LEVEL
20.3.1. CHANGE AGENTS AND VETO PLAYERS
One of the most important factors on the domestic level is the distribution of preferences 
among the relevant domestic actors. In Macedonia and Serbia's cases, due to the relatively 
weak civil societies and their low impact on the decision-making process (see the section on 
the civil society), the political elite represents the core actor in both deciding the course of 
democratization process and the course of the foreign policy and EU integrations.
As we have already underlined in  the previous  sections  of  this  conclusive  chapter,  the 
political  elite’s  preference in  the  field  of  the  foreign policy  in  the  two analyzed  countries 
substantially differed. While in Macedonia all relevant actors (on both elite and citizens level) 
are supporting the EU integrations, in Serbia there is a strong presence of the anti-EU forces 
and the course of the foreign policy represents the most salient and most polarized dimension 
of the intra-party conflict. This practically means that, beside the change agents pushing for 
the Serbian integration with EU, there are also relatively strong actors trying to obstruct the 
process  of  the  boundary  removal.  As  we  saw  in  the  section  on  the  international  actor’s 
strategies, this difference significantly shaped the capacity of the EU to influence the domestic 
politics  by  using  the  incentive  of  further  integrations  in  order  to influence  the  costs  and 
benefits calculations of the domestic actors.
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As  far  as  the  democratization  process  is  concerned,  the  assessment  of  the  actor’s 
preferences is more complicated, as there are both cross-country and cross-issue differences 
with, in Serbia’s case, differences between periods of time as well.  While in Serbia the ten 
years of Milošević’s semi-authoritarian regime resulted in the strong delegitimization of the 
status quo and the rise to power of the new elite with a reformist agenda, which brought to 
the positive cycle of reforms in 2001-2002 period, in Macedonia we generally do not register 
an overall delegitimization of the domestic status quo, neither the general division between the 
pro-reformist elite and the ancient-regime forces we found in Serbia. Further on, the turbulent 
domestic changes in Serbia saw the sequence of what we identified as three distinct cycles of 
the  process,  with  the  different  distribution  of  power  between the  political  actors  and the 
different structure of their preferences.
In the first period immediately after the regime change (2001-2002), the positive domestic 
developments are associated with the delegitimized status quo and the presence of the reform-
oriented political elite.  All cases of positive compliance with the EU recommendations are 
registered in this first period, with the cross-issue differences coming from the level of the 
conflict over the issue and the presence or absence of the veto players: we can thus observe a 
partial compliance in those cases where the government had a strong interest in maintaining 
the  status  quo  (like  in  the  case  of  the  decentralization)  or  even  the  lack  of  the  rule 
implementation in the case of extremely conflictive issues like the law-package on the judiciary 
adopted in 2001 and never implemented. The legislation adopted in this period, the proposed 
law-drafts that did not make it in time to reach the decisional agenda, as well as the process of 
law drafting (generally inclusive, with the public discussion involving civil actors, domestic and 
foreign experts) all indicates the ruling elite’s devotion to the democratization agenda.
The  second  period  (2002-2003)  was  a  period  of  political  instability  caused  by  the 
dissolution of DOS and reached its peak with the assassination of the Prime Minister Đinđić. 
It was the period in which the sharp political conflict within the new elite caused the blockage 
of the institutions, when in the name of democracy the democratic values were put aside and 
when the  ruling  elite  was using  the  authoritarian  mechanisms inherited  from the ancient-
regime in order to defeat the opponents.
From the analytical point of view, the most interesting is the period is 2004-2008, in which 
the ruling elite represented at the same time the most important change agent and the biggest 
obstacle to the reform. In line with Vachudova’s label of “fake compliance”, we can label such 
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actors “fake change agents”. In substance, a fake change agent is an actor who apparently 
proposes the reformist agenda pushing for the adoption of laws that are usually perceived as 
part of the democratization process, but that in substance obstructs the full democratization 
either through the shortcomings and loopholes built in the legislation, or by obstructing the 
rule implementation. What are the factors that induce an agent to promote the reforms he 
does not have any intention to comply with?
Aside from the intervention of the international actors which, as we saw, can produce the 
incentive for the actors to accept changes they do not actually support, there is a series of 
factors  on  the  domestic  level  that  brought  to  such  outcome.  First  of  all,  Koštunica’s 
government was elected due to the reformist agenda proposed for the elections. Koštunica 
himself was perceived as the actor who does prefer the reforms, not so drastic and quick as 
those promoted by Đinđić, but who still shared his pro-democratic and pro-EU orientations. 
Elected upon the reformist agenda, in an asset where, generally, the delegitimization of the 
status quo still  persisted in many dimensions (judiciary reform, reform of the civil  society, 
fight  against  corruption  and  organized  crime,  military  reform  were  all  perceived  by  the 
domestic electorate as the areas most needing the reforms), Koštunica’s government could not 
avoid the introduction of the promised reforms. We should not forget that during the whole 
'90s  and  in  the  first  period  after  the  change  of  Milošević’s  regime  this  actor  was  truly 
advocating for the democratization of the Serbian state, and his conflict with Đinđić was more 
a conflict on the  manner in which the democratization process should be undertaken rather 
than a conflict over the need for changes. Yet, the political  setting significantly influenced 
Koštunica’s perspective of power, this way influencing this actor’s short term preferences. As 
his party enjoyed the benefits of the polarized pluralism type of system, in an asset where the 
positioning  on the  center  of  the  political  spectrum made him a  necessary  partner  in  any 
government  and  subtracted  him  from  the  electoral  accountability,  the  introduction  of 
mechanisms that  would limit  the ruling  elite’s  power  and introduce mechanisms of  intra-
institutional  accountability  became the issue directly tackling the power he enjoyed and he 
believed he would enjoy in the years to come. The central actor of the political system and the 
most influential actor in the decision-making process became at the same time the main loser 
of  the  reforms he was supposed to undertake,  turning  him into what we labeled a  “fake 
change agent”. Koštunica’s first government was a most active government in terms of the 
number  of  laws  proposed:  the  civil  service  reform,  judiciary  reform,  police  reform, 
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constitutional  reform, a  series  of  laws in the field of the fight against  corruption were all 
undertaken in a very short period of time. However, as the relevant sections of this work 
showed, in each of these fields the adopted rules contained a series of loopholes, all of which 
for the benefit of the same agents and ruling political parties, and all of which have the same 
deficiency, that is a failure to establish truly independent bodies necessary in order to ensure 
inter-institutional  accountability.  The distribution  of  the  portfolios  in  the first  Koštunica's 
government indicates that each of these bills was proposed by a minister controlled by DSS.
The structural characteristics of the party system also influenced DSS’s preferences in the 
field of the foreign policy. As the main dimension of the Serbian party system concerned the 
direction  of  the  foreign  policy  and EU integrations,  Koštunica’s  power  depended on the 
maintenance  of  the  high  polarization  of  the  political  system in the dimension of  the  EU 
integrations.  The  security-driven  EU approach  to  Serbia  and  the  effort  to  influence  the 
domestic distribution of power that saw Koštunica as the main beneficiary of such strategy, 
have only further strengthened this actor’s interest in maintaining a high level of conflictuality 
over the external policy. The mid-instability, the presence of the nationalistic rhetorics and the 
uncertainty on the direction of the foreign policy turned into the main factors that maintained 
DSS on power.  This actually  induced Koštunica to intensify the usage of the nationalistic 
rhetorics and to gradually shift closer and closer to the nationalists in order to increase his 
bargaining power. Finally, when the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo brought to 
a shock in the domestic party system and a further polarization of the positions, Koštunica 
had no choice rather than to switch his preference about the EU integration and join the pro-
nationalistic block. 
In Macedonia’s case, the preferences of the stakeholders appear to follow a cross-issue, 
rater than cross-time pattern. By  analyzing the domestic factors, distribution of preferences, 
lines and levels of conflict, we can observe two prevalent patterns: the first can be identified in 
the issues concerning the Ohrid Framework Agreement and inter-ethnic distribution of power 
(decentralization, constitutional reform in 2001, minority rights and the equal representations). 
In all this fields we registered the presence of a strong domestic change agent pushing for the 
introduction  of  the  changes  (Albanian  ethnic  minority)  and  an  extremely  high  level  of 
conflictuality over the issues (inter-ethnic conflict), which resulted in negotiations between the 
narrow political leadership behind closed doors with the international actor’s mediation. The 
outcome in these dimensions, as we saw, was the rule adoption and the relatively good and 
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efficient  implementation  of  the  laws  adopted.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how,  in  those 
dimensions concerning the inter-ethnic distribution of power in Macedonia, the role of the 
veto players opposing the change is linked to the position rather than to the identity of the actor. 
We saw how, in the field of the decentralization and police reform, the political parties acting 
as  change agents  during  their  stay in  office,  once in  opposition,  turned into  veto players 
obstructing the same changes they used to advocate. Especially  in the fields salient to the 
international actors, the obstruction of the change, rather than a  goal,  as it was the case in 
Serbia, appears to be a strategy in the political struggle. Which ever the content of the externally 
promoted issue, the government always tends to play the role of the change agents, while the 
opposition by default assumes the role of the veto players, and the passage of the actors from 
the opposition to the government implies the change of their preferences. The preferences are 
thus fixed to the roles exercised by the actors, in case the government is determined by the 
international pressure and necessity to maintain peace and stability, while the preferences of 
the  opposition  is  determined  by  the  convenience  in  using  nationalistic  rhetorics  for  the 
mobilization  of  the  electoral  support.  Such  fusion  between  roles  and  preferences  is  a 
consequence of the switch in the lines of the accountability: the parties at the power, strongly 
dependent  from the  external  actors,  are  subject  to  the  external  accountability,  while  the 
opposition’s  strategy  consists  in  mobilizing  the  citizens’  support  and  in  obstructing  the 
governments to score points for the further development of the EU integrations.
The  other  pattern  identified  in  Macedonia  concerns  those  issues  that  tackle  the 
depoliticization  of  the  state  institutions,  the  introduction  of  the  intra-institutional 
accountability,  the strengthening of the democratic norms and values and the fight against 
corruption. In these fields Macedonia follows similar dynamics to those registered in Serbia’s 
third  cycle  of  democratization:  an  absence  of  strong  change  agents,  which  results  in  the 
adoption of laws that remain not implemented. In this group, the main difference with Serbia 
lies in the origin of the input for the rule adoption and in the modality of avoiding the change: 
while  in  Serbia  the  main  input  for  introducing  the  reforms  comes  from the  key actor’s 
ideological  baggage,  electoral  promises  and  the  need  to  maintain  an  image  of  “reformist 
forces”, in Macedonia such input principally comes from the international actor’s democracy 
promotion requirements. Such difference is reflected on the modus in which the political elite is 
avoiding the introduction of the democratic reforms: in Macedonia the high level of external 
accountability combined with low administrative capacity results in the rather good normative 
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compliance  with  the  externally  promoted  norms  and  the  lack  of  implementation  of  the 
legislative  framework that usually  reflects the international  standards.  In Serbia,  where the 
entire  process  is  more  domestically  guided,  where  the  EU leverage  is  weaker  due  to the 
presence of the anti-EU forces and the administrative capacity is rather high, the prevalent 
pattern consists in the introduction of loopholes in the legislation to make the obstruction of 
the implementation easier. 
20.3.2. PRESENCE OF ALTERNATIVES
The presence of the alternative norms to the ones promoted by the external actor  was 
identified in literature on norm promotion as one of the important factors influencing the exit 
of the international actor’s norm-promoting efforts (Morlino and Magen 2004, Morlino and 
Magen  2008,  Schimmelfennig  and  Sedelmeier,  2004).  We  should  distinguish  between  the 
general  alternative  in  the  country’s  course  of  foreign  policy  and  the  alternatives  to  the 
democratic norms (to be identified as the alternative to the specific norms promoted by the 
EU).
The alternative to the foreign policy, in our case, actually means the alternative to the EU 
integrations. When, as in Serbia, the ruling elite, or part of it, think it has an alternative to the 
EU integrations, the EU’s capacity to influence the government by offering EU integrations in 
exchange for the compliance with the norms promoted is diminished, due to the lower value 
the elite associates to the reward in question. The presence of the alternative in the country’s 
foreign policy thus hampers the EU’s possibility to influence the domestic process through 
the usage of the conditionality channel. The two countries included in this study significantly 
differ  in  this  dimension:  while  in  Macedonia  the  Euro-Atlantic  integrations  are  overly 
accepted, in Serbia the conflict over the foreign policy sees the political elite and electorate 
divided  into  filo-europeists  and  filo-russians.  While  the  important  role  of  the  USA  in 
Macedonia usually  strengthens,  rather than weakening,  the EU’s efforts,  as the two actors 
have a rather similar agenda686, in Serbia’s case, the strong history of partnership with Russia, 
and in particular the Russian support to the Serbian cause in questions linked to the Kosovo 
status, represented a serious threat for the EU influence on Serbia. The EU security concerns 
over the Serbia-Russia relations particularly grew in the last period of stronger confrontation 
686 As Butini’s,  Police Advisor at European Commission Delegation of Skopje and former Deputy Chief of 
EUPOL-Proxima, mission in Skopje underlined, there usually is an atmosphere of cooperation with the other 
international actors present on the field, where an effort is made to achieve a common approach to the issues. 
From the interview with Butini, August 2008, Skopje. 
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on the line EU-Russia about Kosovo and Caucasus and the growth of the Russian economic 
relevance, due to the economic strengthening of Russia687 and Russian control over important 
energetic resources. The EU perceives Russia as a “country of great power ambitions688”, ruled 
by Putin’s “authoritarian capitalism689”, with a hard-line approach in the foreign policy. This 
situation  makes  the  pro-Russian  orientation  of  part  of  the  Serbian  political  elite  an  issue 
directly  tackling  the EU’s strategic interests  in its  foreign policy,  raising the EU’s security 
concerns and strengthening its preferences for the particular distribution of power between 
the Serbian elite.
As far as the alternative to democratization is concerned, the spread of liberalism after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall resulted in posing serious difficulties for any legitimization of the power 
that  does  not  recall  the  “will  of  the  people”,  bringing  to the  disappearance of  any other 
paradigm  that  could  propose  and  legitimize  a  political  system  different  than  democracy. 
However, this still  does not mean that the worldwide political elites decided to accept the 
democratization agenda, for while there is almost no political regime that the citizens of the 
single states would prefer to democracy, there are plenty of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian 
alternatives the ruling elite might find useful to replicate at home. The Russian authoritarian 
capitalism, or, as it prefers to be labeled, the “sovereign democracy”, represents a model for 
the power-seeking political leadership who can easily justify the democracy limitations in the 
name of “greater national interests”, as we saw in Serbia and, recently, Macedonia (see the 
section on the name issue in Macedonia). 
Finally, in the single dimensions of policy, the presence of alternatives might not only refer 
to the existence  of  the external  alternative  resources of  rewards or of  external  alternative 
resources of norm, but it can also come from the different preferences of the domestic actors. 
In Serbia’s case many reforms were blocked exactly due to the incapacity of the ruling elite to 
agree which of several alternative solutions to adopt. Not necessarily the choice is between the 
democratic norm and the authoritarian practice, all the available alternatives often are equally 
democratic and equally efficient but with different distributive effects. The most illustrative 
case of such situation is the conflict over the nature of Serbian transition, where part of the 
actors supported the continuity-approach while other political leaders were advocating for the 
687 See Maynes, 2006.
688 Olli Rehn, 2008, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/08/236&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
689 Olli Rehn, 2008, see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=SPEECH/08/222&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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discontinuity-based transition.  The judiciary  system reform, the reform of the civil  service 
reform, the police and military reform, the constitutional reform, in all these fields the changes 
were blocked in the first period of Serbian transitions even though all relevant actors were 
hoping for the introduction of democratic changes, mainly due to the lack of consensus over 
the manner in which the specific reforms should be undertaken.
20.3.3. FLUIDITY-STABILITY OF THE DOMESTIC SETTING
The political environment in a particular period of time is another factor of the EUCLIDA 
theoretical frameworks. As Morlino and Magen underlined, it is possible to hypothesize that 
in the “uncertain, (fluid) political environment the state actors will be more open to seek for 
new solutions”,  which opens the possibility  for substantial  domestic  change (Morlino and 
Magen, 2008, p. 23). The uncertainty of the political environment can be caused by different 
factors: the collapse of the previous ideological regime or the deep internal crisis or conflict 
are the most evident examples of shocks that might create the need for the reformist turns 
due to the elite or popular pressures. In both analyzed countries we register the events that 
brought  to  the  uncertainty  of  the  political  environment,  further  resulting  in  a  series  of 
changes. In Serbia, such situation is linked to the end of Milošević’s regime, that saw the rise 
of the new political elite and the overall delegitimization of the existing status quo, while in 
Macedonia  the  2001  inter-ethnic  violence  was  ceased  by  the  signature  of  the  Ohrid 
Framework Agreement that brought to the series of changes we described in the empirical 
part of this work.
Beside the impact of these important events, we should also take into account the electoral  
uncertainty that, in the works on the institutional choice, have been identified as an important 
factor  influencing  the  features  of  the  newly  established  institutions.  In  the  periods  of 
transition  to  democracy,  the  distribution  of  power  and  the  degree  of  uncertainty  of  the 
stakeholders  influence  the  decision  maker’s  preferences  over  the  institutional  design.  The 
higher  levels  of  uncertainty  over  the  future  distribution  of  power  and  increased  political 
competition would thus favour the introduction of mechanisms limiting the power of the 
winners,  while  the decision makers that  expect  to maintain their  office after the elections 
would be less willing to accept any mechanism limiting their freedom of action690. 
690 On the levels of electoral uncertainty and its impact on the choice of the form of government, see Frye, 
1997, also Kasapović, 1997. For the impact of the electoral uncertainty on the judicial system, see Smithey and 
Ishiyama,  2000,  Bumin,  2007,  Moraski,  2007.  On  the  link  between  the  electoral  uncertainty,  electoral 
accountability and their impact on cooruption, see Ferraz and Finan, 2007. On the importance of the  robust, 
programmatic  political  competition  for  the  democratization  of  the  Balkans,  and,  in  particular,  Serbia,  see 
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The level of electoral uncertainty appeared to be one of the important factors influencing 
the process of democratization in Serbia. A comparative analysis of the different periods of 
time clearly shows how the decreased electoral uncertainty caused by the emergence of the 
polarized and consequential peripheral turnover significantly influenced the preferences of the 
central actor. We can thus distinguish between a period of high level of electoral uncertainty 
immediately after the fall of Milošević’s regime, that corresponds to the most positive period 
of  the  Serbian  transition  where  the  relevant  actors  showed  true  commitment  to  the 
democratization process, and a period of extreme certainty for part of those political actors 
who emerged in the period 2003-2008. During this second period, the actors who enjoyed the 
benefits of the peripheral turnover and who were subtracted from the electoral accountability, 
clearly changed their preferences. We thus saw how, through fake compliance, these actors 
obstructed the introduction of mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability and opposed 
the establishment of rules that would limit the ruling elite's power. As we already underlined, 
the developments in Serbia confirm the hypothesis according to which the low level of the 
electoral uncertainty obstructs the introduction of mechanisms ensuring the intra-institutional 
accountability.  However,  while  the  cross-time  comparison  confirms  the  hypotheses 
concerning the relevance the system's competitiveness has for the democratization process (a 
hypotheses that was tested in different fields of reform, see the note 691), the cross-country 
comparison clearly shows that such factor can be seen only as a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition  for the change.  The higher  level  of  electoral  uncertainty in  Macedonia  was not 
capable  to increase  the  government's  accountability.  Even though Macedonia  tracks  a  far 
better record in the adoption of the rules that are limiting the power of the government and 
establishing the mechanisms of inter-institutional accountability (thus apparently confirming 
the hypothesis concerning the impact of the electoral uncertainty), the external pressure that 
brought to the rule adoption and the difficulties in the rule implementation are disqualifying 
the  competitiveness  and  electoral  uncertainty  as  a  potentially  sufficient  condition  for  a 
responsible government. As our analysis showed, the limited system's competitiveness is only 
one of the many causes that can hamper the ruling elite's responsibility. The nationalism, the 
inter-ethnic  tensions,  as  well  as  the  weak  state  institutions  and  poverty  we  identified  in 
Macedonia are also rather fertile grounds for corruption and deficiencies in the procedural 
dimensions of democracy and the rule of law691.
Vachudova, 2006. 
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 20.4. ANCHORING AND DE-ANCHORING OF MACEDONIAN AND SERBIAN 
DEMOCRACIES
At this point, both the dependent variable and the settling of the EUCLIDA factors being 
described, we can concentrate on the overall process of anchoring Serbian and Macedonian 
democracy.  In  this  section  we  will  thus  describe  the  development  of  the  process  of 
international  anchoring in the two countries,  paying attention to the manner in which the 
democratization  and  EU  integrations  processes  were  linked,  influencing  each  other  and 
bringing to the establishment of specific domestic regimes. There are few questions we will try 
to answer in this conclusive chapter of the work: did the EU influence the democratization 
processes in Serbia and Macedonia? How? Did the linking of the regime change process to the 
EU integration contribute to the outcome of the EU’s democracy promotion activities in the 
two countries? Do our two studied cases offer evidence for the thesis according to which the 
consolidated regime bears the impact of the anchors and mechanisms that characterized the 
phases of the consolidation?
In both countries the presence and the activities of the EU appear to have a great impact 
on the domestic developments, but this impact,  as we will  see, differed in the outcome it 
produced. 
In Macedonia’s case, the entire process of democratization appears to be externally guided. 
The EU and, more generally, the western democracies, exercised an extremely high impact on 
the  developments  in  Macedonia,  resulting  in  the change in  the  lines  of  accountability  we 
described above.  The high EU influence on the domestic  decision makers resulted in the 
establishment of the external accountability as the most important accountability mechanism 
in  Macedonia.  As  the  EU  in  Macedonia  became  a  resource  for  power,  available  to  all 
participants  to  the  political  game,  and  the  EU  recognition  became  necessary  for  the 
legitimization of any power-seeking actor, the political process in the country underwent an 
important  change.  Unlike  the  other  democratic  political  regimes,  in  which  a  key  political 
process sees the social groups offer their support to the leadership in exchange for decisions 
(or promise of decision) this elite will enforce, in Macedonia’s case the IA turned out to be 
691For nationalism as the obstacle  to democratization and in particular as a mechanism hampering elite's 
accountability, see Snyder, 2000, Snyder and Mansfield, 2002, Charron 2007, La Porta et al 1999, Alesina et al 
2003.
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one of the participants to the political game, with its own resources to offer to the political 
elite seeking the power, and its own requirements linked to this support. This brought to the 
situation we described in the sections dedicated to the domestic actor’s preferences, where the 
preferences are no longer linked to the actors, but to the position (function) a specific actor 
holds.  The decisions  (or  at  least  some of  the  decisions)  are  no  longer  influenced  by the 
electoral process: when voting, the citizens actually do not decide the course of their country’s 
policy, but only appoint the individuals that, in exchange for the benefits deriving from the 
office, will put a rubber stamp on the externally required policies. The only link that allows us 
to consider democratic an asset characterized by such substitution of the responsibility from 
the citizens to the external actor is the existence of strong citizen’s support for the country’s 
EU and NATO membership. It is thus due to the promise of integration and to the citizens’ 
will to fulfill the EU requirements in order to become a member state that the external impact 
on the domestic decision makers was legitimized in all fields of policy. 
If  we  observe  the  factors  that  have  most  significantly  influenced  the  outcome of  the 
anchoring process in Macedonia, a key dimension is surely to be found in the IA’s security 
concerns and the content of the norms promoted. The 2001 inter-ethnic violence induced EU 
to use the integration carrot for promoting peace and democracy in Macedonia. The strong 
accent posed on the inter-ethnic power-sharing mechanisms and consociational  democracy 
the EU was promoting in Macedonia fitted rather well into the preexisting domestic pattern of 
the  inter-ethnic  division  of  the  spheres  of  influence.  It  thus  produced  a  further 
institutionalization of  ethnicity  and further  strengthened the political  leaders  of  the  ethnic 
communities. At the same time, it also produced incentives for further use of the nationalistic 
rhetorics and the maximization of the Albanian ethnic group’s interests, which increased the 
Macedonian elite’s dependence on the IA as the only guarantee of peace and stability in the 
country. The will  to become part of the EU, and in particular the economic and security 
benefits expected from the Macedonian Euro-Atlantic integrations, were extremely important 
incentives for the Macedonian ethnic community, who was the main loser of the compliance 
with the norms the EU was most seriously promoting. The anchoring process thus produced 
a positive feedback in which the external anchor actually strengthened the domestic anchors 
of the electoral democracy, resulting in the consolidation of the regime which fully reflects the 
particularities of the process that brought to its development: the Macedonian political system, 
with  its  characteristics  and  malfunctioning,  bears  the  visible  fingerprint  of  the  interaction 
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between the EU’s security  interests  and approach to crisis  management and the domestic 
inter-ethnic relations. 
The empirical  analysis of this  work showed that the reforms aiming to consolidate  the 
Macedonian democracy were all externally guided. The strong external influence brought to 
fair compliance even in those issues of high-level policy with strong internal conflict, while the 
lack of full implementation of the democratic norms is to be blamed on the lack of domestic 
change agents combined with the lack of constant, credible IA’s pressure for reforms. The 
EU’s  capacity  of  fostering  the  compliance  with  the  democratic  norms  and  the  need  for 
constant external pressures for ensuring proper implementation was most obvious in the case 
of  the  implementation  of  the  electoral  code:  the  strong  external  pressure  was  capable  to 
ensure the  fairness  of  the 2006  parliamentary  elections,  but as  soon as  the  attention was 
lowered, the violence on the election day was registered again.
The importance that the external incentives and continuous external pressures have for 
ensuring the democratization of Macedonia induces us to question what impact will the future 
developments in the process of Macedonian integration produce on the domestic regime. As 
we  saw in  the  section  dedicated  to  other  political  issues,  the  name  dispute  with  Greece 
blocked the Macedonian membership in NATO and, due to the EU Member state’s veto 
power in the field of EU enlargement, also threatens the Macedonian EU integration. Such 
situation brings to question the EU’s credibility  when using the integration as a carrot for 
fostering  Skopje  towards  further  democratization.  Further  on,  seen  the  lack  of  domestic 
consensus over the polity, where the only goal in common between the two divided ethnic 
groups is the country’s foreign policy,  the possible  failure to proceed with the integration 
might undermine the only tie that keeps a divided society from disintegrating.
But on the other hand, seen the importance of the external anchor for the survival of the 
Macedonian democracy and the need for the continuous external incentives for ensuring the 
minimum level of compliance with the democratic rules, we can wonder on the impact that 
the EU integration will produce on Macedonia. As the Bulgarian example shows692, once the 
country  enters  the  EU,  the  EU’s  influence  on  the  domestic  political  regime significantly 
decreases, and recent researches registered even a drop and reversal of the reformist course in 
those cases of reforms promoted through the external conditionality. In a certain sense, we 
can perceive the moment when the country finally acquires its membership into the EU as the 
moment  in  which  the  external  anchor  of  the  political  regime  is  weakened,  and  the 
692 See Dallara 2008b.
Università di Bologna 
Dottorato di ricerca in Scienza politica 704
maintenance  of  the  established  political  regime  turns  into  a  mainly  domestically  driven 
process. In the absence of domestic mechanisms capable to ensure the minimum level  of 
national unity and to support the democratic regime, the weakening of what appears to be the 
strongest anchor of the Macedonian political regime could, in line with Morlino’s anchoring 
theory (1998,  2005),  result  in a serious crisis  of the regime.  From this  point  of  view, the 
Macedonian citizens currently appear to draw greater benefits from their desire to join the EU 
than they would from the actual membership. Such situation actually dooms Macedonia to a 
long permanence on the EU’s doorstep: in order to prepare Macedonia to bear the joy of the 
realization  of  its  dream,  the  current  setting  should  change,  bringing  both  to  the 
depoliticization of the ethnicity, the surpassing of the ethnic divisions and the building of a 
strong domestic support  for democracy. Seen the EU’s capacity to influence the domestic 
actors, a more democracy-concerned EU approach could be a first step in helping Macedonia 
to become a sustainable democratic state.
The anchoring process of Serbia  followed a different path,  as the content of the EU’s 
boundary  removal  package undermined  the  relationships  between  the  domestic  actors, 
hampering  the  agreement  between  the  new and the  old  elite  upon which  the  negotiated 
transition  in  Serbia  was  based,  while  the  economic  dimension  of  the  EU  integrations 
threatened the interests of the business elite with monopolistic position and strong interests in 
protectionists policies693. The insistence on the cooperation with the ICTY not only exercised 
a catalyst effect pushing the differences within the new ruling elite  to surface, but it  also 
extremely increased the old elite’s  costs  deriving  from the switch in  the country’s  foreign 
policy. The ancient regime forces found their shield in the nationalists, who used the citizens’ 
disappointment  to  gain  support  for  their  political  platform that  was  mainly  concentrated 
against the selling of domestic property to foreign investors and against the EU and Western 
influence. The dissolution of DOS and the re-emergence of the nationalists brought to the 
polarized pluralism-type of party system organized around the foreign police and nationalism 
vs. civic values as the most salient, overlapping dimensions of domestic conflict.
The  presence  and  strengthening  of  the  anti-EU  parties  increased  the  EU’s  security 
concerns, which were then reflected over the EU’s strategies, inducing the external actor to try 
to influence the domestic distribution of power by delegitimizing the nationalists and investing 
resources to ensure that the country maintains its pro-European course. The strategy appeared 
693For the preferences of the economic elite and their position towards the EU integrations, see the chapter 
17.
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successful for keeping the nationalists away from power but, at the same time, exercised a 
strong influence  on the  domestic  actors’  preferences,  and,  in  particular,  it  contributed  to 
change  the  central  actor’s  short-term  strategies  and  perspective  for  power.  In  the  field 
dedicated  to  the  domestic  actors  we  argued  how  Koštunica’s  preference  in  both 
democratization and boundary-removal process was molded by his position at the centre of 
the political  system and the choice of the EU’s strategies:  a former pro-Europeanist,  pro-
democrat turned into a fake change agent and current loudest opponent of Serbian integration 
into the EU. A similar pattern was also registered when we turned to analyse the business 
elite,  whose  substantial  interests  were  threatened  by  the  EU  boundary  removal  package 
(opening of the market being the most opposed issue), while the democratic norms promoted 
by the EU threatened their corruptive links with the Serbian political elite. Both economic and 
political  implications  of  the  boundary  removal  process  actually  threatened  the  domestic 
pattern of relationship between the key actors, resulting in a situation where the creation of 
the  external  anchor was actually dismantling the existing  domestic  anchors of democracy. The 
crisis of 2002-2003, which resulted in the complete stagnation of the democratization, even 
the  reversal  of  some  positive  changes,  and  culminated  in  the  assassination  of  the  Prime 
Minister, was a consequence of such negative impact the external intervention produced on 
the  basis  upon  which  the  fragile  domestic  regime  resided.  What  followed  was  the 
establishment of a system which nourished itself from Serbia's biased relation with the EU, 
creating  strong  short-term  interests  for  the  stakeholders  to  maintain  the  EU’s  security 
concerns vivid, keep Serbia’s uncertainty over the course of foreign policy high and undertake 
partial  reforms in the field of  democratization.  Parallel  with the process of  anchoring the 
Serbian political regime and foreign policy into the “EU hub”, the very choices in the content 
and strategies used by the EU were thus bearing the seeds of de-anchoring and of the crisis 
Serbian relationship with the EU experienced in the first half of 2008. 
The product  of  such asset  in  terms of  democratization  is  a  democracy  in  which both 
components of the procedural dimension identified  by Morlino (2004a, 2004b)  (namely  rule 
of  law  and  accountability) are  damaged.  We  already  underlined  how  the  lack  of  inter-
institutional accountability is combined with seriously hampered electoral accountability. The 
consequential deficiency in the rule of law is therefore obvious, the lack of an independent 
judiciary,  the  politicized  administration  and  corruption  being  the  main  shortcomings 
identified. 
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To what extent can Serbian democracy be considered anchored to the EU? The answer is 
difficult to give, seen the ambivalent role the EU had in the process of democratization. The 
EU was, at least until now, successful in keeping the ultra-nationalist parties away from power, 
and in the measure in which SRS is a threat to Serbian democracy, the role of the EU was 
decisive. It also supported the reforms with technical and financial assistance and it had an 
important advisory role in the drafting of many legislations. It exercised a significant social 
influence and,  last  but not  least,  with its  insistence  on the  creation of  a  “pro-democratic 
government”, it created a situation where a certain degree of compliance to the democratic 
rules and of reformist attitude were necessary in order to maintain several benefits that the EU 
was offering to the democratic regime in Serbia. But, at the same time, it also undermined the 
domestic  anchors  of  democracy,  contributing  to  the  emergence  and  maintenance  of  the 
polarized pluralism type of party system and, by the choice of its strategies, contributed to the 
mechanisms that hampered the electoral accountability and turned the central political actor 
into what we labelled a “fake change agent”. It tolerated the Serbian fake compliance, showing 
inconsistency  in  its  approach  to  Serbia,  and  it  concentrated  far  more  on  the  Serbian 
cooperation with the ICTY, rather than on pushing the democratization reforms ahead. 
The sequence of events that we described in this work and the development of the logical 
links between the different phases induce us to believe that the current features of Serbian 
political regime are strongly influenced by the dynamic of Serbia-EU interactions, where the 
factors on the supply side and those on the domestic level strongly influenced each other, 
producing the registered outcome. The Macedonian example also offered a confirmation of 
the thesis according to which the particularities of the anchoring process strongly influence 
the type of regime consolidated and based on such anchors. 
20.5. FINAL REFLECTIONS
Before concluding, we’d like to ponder on the most important lessons that can be drawn 
from this study and underline possible future fields of research.
The first set of lessons to draw from this analysis concerns the importance of the content 
of  the  norms the  IA is  promoting  as  part  of  the  democratization  and boundary  removal 
process. Aside from the particularities already underlined in literature (the level of misfit with 
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the domestic  norms694,  or the importance of concrete,  clear  recommendations in order to 
facilitate the monitoring and increase the credibility of the conditionality695), which are crucial 
for understanding the response of the state in  a particular  field  of  influence,  we’d like to 
underline the strong impact that the content of the promoted norms (both those concerning 
democratization and those concerning other dimensions) produces on the overall process of 
anchoring. As we saw in the cases of Serbia and Macedonia, the particular norms can interlock 
with the existing domestic patterns upon which the system is based, both by strengthening it 
(as it was the case in Macedonia and the IA-promoted consociationalism and inter-ethnic power-
sharing mechanisms) or by undermining it (in Serbia’s case we refer to the requirement to 
cooperate  with  the  ICTY,  which  made  the  “reforma  pactada”  and  negotiated  transition, 
praised by Linz and Stepan (1996) as the safest course to democracy, an impossible path to 
follow). As such, the content of the promoted package, due to the redistributive effects of the 
promoted norms, can significantly influence the functioning of the domestic anchors of the 
political regime, fostering, or obstructing both the domestic and international anchoring of the 
democracy. Further on, it also has important implications on the type of the political regime 
established,  as,  in line  with Morlino’s  anchoring theory,  the consolidated regime bears the 
evident  characteristics  of  the mechanisms that  brought to its  consolidation.  In promoting 
democracy, the international actors should therefore pay particular attention to the impact the 
particular requirements have on the domestic asset: a more case-sensitive approach, which 
would base any particular requirements upon an accurate knowledge of the domestic situation, 
is  needed in order to both avoid that a promoted rule brings to the strengthening of the 
domestic  un-democratic  practices,  and  to  prevent  that  the  existing  domestic  anchors  of 
democracy are destroyed.
Another important lesson drawn from this study considers the channels of influence the 
IA uses. The effects produced by the influence on the domestic distribution of power in the 
case of Serbia (change of the DSS’s preferences on both democratization and EU integration 
processes) are actually what is known in the literature on international relations as the systemic 
influence. As underlined by Waltz (1979) in his discussion on the concept of “system”, the 
distribution  of  power  represents  a  structural characteristic,  and  the  influence  over  the 
distribution of power produces a  systemic change that influences all actors of the system696, 
694 See for example Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir 2004, Borzel and Risse, 2000, Morlino and Magen, 2008.
695 See Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeir, 2004, Morlino and Magen, 2008.
696 For the definition of the system and structure see Waltz, 1979.
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causing the adaptation of their strategies and preferences to the new setting. Even though it is 
most visible in the case of the strategy which aims to the re-distribution of power among the 
domestic political actors, such systemic influence can be produced by other strategies as well: 
in the case of social learning, the change of the values and preferences of the actor subject to 
external persuasion brings all other actors into the new asset they have to adapt to. Finally, in 
the case of the conditionality  and social influence,  the presence of the external actor who 
offers incentives, in exchange for particular policies, influences not only the actors that are the 
target of such strategies, but also those who oppose the adoption of the policy and all other 
relevant  actors  in  the  system  whose  perspectives  of  power,  short-term  preferences  and 
strategies  should  adapt  to  the  presence  and  intervention  of  the  IA.  The  story  of  the 
Macedonian police reform thus offers an interesting example of how the opposition can seize 
the  opportunity  opened  by  the  government’s  necessity  to  respond  to  the  external 
conditionality in order to push its own issues on the agenda. Finally, in line with Bozzo and 
Simon-Belli (2000), we can observe how the IA becomes an unavoidable part of the domestic 
actor’s strategies and preferences. Hadn’t there been EU or USA to guarantee the peace in 
Macedonia, to mediate between the ethnic groups and to serve as an excuse in front of the 
electorate for striking the deal with the Macedonians, could the political leaders of the ethnic 
Albanians in Macedonia continue to maximize their requirements, risking to get to the point at 
which  conflict  is  unavoidable?  And,  if  there  was  no IA whose  pressure  could  justify  the 
adoption of particular  norms,  could the right-wing VMRO maintain its  credibility  and the 
image  of  “protector  of  the  Macedonian  nation”,  satisfying,  at  the  same time,  a  series  of 
Albanian requirements? 
When  initiating  the  rule-promotion  in  a  particular  target  state,  the  international  actors 
should pay particular attention not only to the impact the promoted norms will produce, but 
also  to  the  impact  their  mere  involvement  in  the  domestic  politics  will  produce  on  the 
domestic policy makers. If properly accounted for, the systemic influence can even turn out to 
be  the  most  efficient  manner  of  promoting  democratization:  creating  the  environment  in 
which  the  domestic  actors  are  embracing  the  democratic  institutions  as  the  best  way for 
pursuing their own interests would thus ensure not only the rule adoption, but full compliance 
as well. Our research showed that, in absence of the change agents, the rule adoption achieved 
without  changing  the  actor’s  preferences  and  strategies  is  not  capable  to  ensure  the  rule 
implementation unless further incentives are offered. Democracy is far from the adoption of 
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the democratic rules and the promotion of the norms; if not backed by creating a domestic 
environment that makes the democratic procedures the only way for the peaceful settling of 
the political conflict, such efforts are doomed to create, at best, façade democracies which, as 
underlined by Morlino and Magen (2008), suffer from lack of domestic legitimacy. In these 
terms, the systemic impact that the involvement of a strong IA can produce, if combined with 
the properly chosen content, can be one of the successful ways for the democracy promotion. 
But if such systemic influence is not properly accounted for, the impact it produces on the 
domestic elite’s  strategies and preferences can become particularly negative, bringing to an 
outcome which might even threaten the very interests that induced the IA to invest his time 
and resources to influence the domestic policy. As we saw, in both Serbia and Macedonia the 
issues that rose the EU’s security concerns (presence of the anti-EU nationalists in Serbia and 
inter-ethnic conflict in Macedonia) persisted as the main characteristics of the two countries, 
and were even nourished by the EU activities. 
This brings us to the lesson concerning the IA’s interests. The EU’s activity in Serbia and 
Macedonia was mainly security-guided,  and the rather low score in democratizing  the two 
countries was a consequence of the EU’s system of preferences that, in the name of security, 
decided to tolerate lower democratic standards.  As an international actor, the EU is by no 
means obliged to intervene only on fully altruistic basis and, we might argue, its primary goal 
actually should be of protecting the vital interests of the EU citizens in all spheres of policy, 
foreign policy and approach to the third-states included. The problem, yet, rises from finding 
that the EU’s primary interest – security – was not better pursued either. While the short-term 
EU goals (implementing the OFA and maintaining the Serbian nationalists away from power) 
were achieved, our analyses revealed that in both countries the mechanisms nourishing the 
EU’s  security  concerns  were  created  (the  anti-EU forces  are  strengthening  in  Serbia,  the 
politicization  of  ethnicity  is  persisting  in  Macedonia),  making  further  EU  intervention 
necessary.  Which  brings  us  to  the  old  question:  is  the  spreading  of  democracy  the  best 
guarantee of security and peace? Both Serbia in the '90s and the short inter-ethnic conflict that 
rose in Macedonia in 2001 confirmed Snyder’s thesis according to which while democracies 
are less prone to war, the states in the process of democratization are particularly prone to 
conflicts fuelled by nationalism697. The mechanisms that, according to Snyder, turn the states 
in  transition  towards  nationalism  are  to  be  found  in  the  deficient  and  weak  democratic 
institution and in the partial democratic reforms, and we showed how, in both Serbia and 
697 See Snyder, 2000, pp. 15-42.
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Macedonia, the main mechanisms that further nourish the EU’s security threats are the same 
that continue hampering the domestic democratization.  Snyder's  prescription is thus rather 
clear: where the transition still has to begin, particular attention should be concentrated on 
creating  the  pre-conditions  for  the  democratization  process,  even  when  this  implies  the 
maintaining, for a limited period of time, of the authoritarian regime. But where the transition 
has already started and partial reforms and inadequate sequence of these reforms brought to 
the rise of the nationalism, the only remedy is to push forward the full democratization and to 
strengthen  the  democratic  institutions698.  Both  our  cases  offered  a  support  to  Snyder's 
argument.  Sacrificing  democracy  too  hastily  for  the  sake  of  overestimated  (and  even 
unrealistic, due to the inequalities in the relations between EU and these countries) security 
threat practically means consolidating and institutionalizing those mechanisms and practices 
that brought to the security concerns in the first place. 
As  Morlino  and  Magen  (2008)  underlined,  developing  democracy  is  a  long  process  and 
ambitious  goal,  requiring  time  and  a  large  amount  of  external  stimuli.  Turning  Snyder’s 
“ethnic democracies” into democracies is an even more ambitious project that, first of all, 
requires that the international actor is fully conscious about the direct and indirect impacts of 
its action, with a well-defined and adequately developed agenda and with full understanding of 
the fact that the only way to promote democracy is not to fight its opponents, but to create 
the  environment  in  which  the  veto  players  will  turn  into  change  agents  and  democracy 
promoters. Hasty solutions cause more problems than they solve. 
To conclude this work by reviewing the statement with which we started our analysis: as Kant 
stressed, some causes of democratization, and – we shall add – some causes of peace as well, 
lie beyond the country’s borders. But some mechanisms hampering both should be searched 
at the same place as well.
698See Snyder, 2000.
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